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Abstract
The rise in unemployment suffered by many advanced economies since 2007,particularly in Europe, has revived long standing debates about what policiesare better equipped to fight unemployment. In one side of the debate, we findthose who believe that structural reforms, particularly in the labour market, arethe only way to achieve long lasting reductions of unemployment. In the otherside of the controversy, we find those who argue that macroeconomic stimuliought to be used to tackle unemployment. European policy makers havepredominantly favoured the first view and accordingly they have agreed uponthe “Europe 2020 agenda” (European Commission, 2010a) and most recentlythe “Fiscal Compact” (European Commission, 2012).The theoretical underpinning of these policies is the NAIRU model proposed byLayard and Nickell (1986). According to this approach the NAIRU is exclusivelydetermined by structural features of the labour and goods market, whichcannot be modified by demand policies. Further, the NAIRU is also thought toacts as an anchor for economic activity. Consequently, the only policy that canachieve long lasting reductions of unemployment is one that tackles thefeatures of the labour and goods market that determine the NAIRU.This characterization of the NAIRU is far from uncontroversial, and manyeconomists argue that there are long run links between aggregate demand andunemployment, which can channel the effects of demand policies onto theNAIRU. A well-known example is the hysteresis hypothesis proposed byBlanchard and Summers (1986), although Sawyer (1982), Rowthorn (1995,1999) and Hein (2006) also propose other channels. Furthermore, some ofthese authors also question the anchor properties of the NAIRU.Thus far, empirical research has not been able to settle this controversy. Theaim of this thesis is to provide a new empirical assessment of the determinantsof the NAIRU and its anchor properties. For that purpose, we analyse data fromeight EU economies, namely the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Germany,France, Italy, Spain, Denmark and Finland. The data cover the period from 1980to 2007. We employ time series techniques, more specifically the CointegratedVector Autoregressive (CVAR) approach. This is applied to a theoretical modelthat encompasses the conflicting views of the NAIRU that we aim to assess.The key novelty of our research is the use of this encompassing model. This isthe first time that such an approach has been employed in the literature. Thesecond novelty of our work is that our sample extends the analysis to the2000s, a period which has rarely been studied before.
vi
The findings presented in this thesis are in contrast to the dominant NAIRUview proposed by Layard and Nickell. First, we find that in all the countries inour sample, the NAIRU is determined by at least one of the following variables:Productivity, long term unemployment, capital stock or long term real interestrates. Second, we find that in all the countries in our sample, the NAIRU iseither a weak anchor for economic activity or has no anchor properties at all.
Keywords: NAIRU, European unemployment, labour market institutions,structural reforms, hysteresis, capital stock, productivity, real interest rates,CVAR.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1 PurposeThe current economic crisis and the rise in unemployment that it has causedhave reignited long standing debates about what policies are better equippedto fight unemployment. The debate is particularly acute in Europe where oncemore unemployment has surged. The approach favoured by European policymakers claims that only reforms of the labour market, which makes it moreflexible, can achieve long lasting reductions of unemployment. This claim ischallenged by those who argue that lower unemployment can be achieved bymeans of expansive macroeconomic policies.The crux of the matter is the capacity of demand policies to affect the long rununemployment equilibrium of the economy, commonly referred to as theNAIRU or Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment. According to thedominant view among policy makers, the NAIRU is neutral to demand factorsand consequently macroeconomic stimulus are not effective in fightingunemployment. By contrast, advocates of demand policies, argue that theNAIRU is determined by variables that are sensitive to economic activity, whichcan filter the impact of macroeconomic policies to the NAIRU.This controversy has lingered in political and academic circles for the last 30years, and thus far, empirical research has been unable to settle the debate. Onthe one hand, advocates of reforms claim that their approach is vindicated byempirical evidence. On the other hand, those who favour demand policieschallenge the validity of these results. The persistence of these controversiessignals the need for further research, the aim of this thesis is to present a newempirical assessment of existing NAIRU theories to contribute to these debates.
1.2 BackgroundDuring the last three decades, economic policy in advanced economies has beendominated by the version of the NAIRU proposed by Layard and Nickell (1986),later reprinted in Layard et al. (1991, Chapter 8). As it is customary in theliterature, hereafter we refer to this approach with the acronym LNJ.According to LNJ the NAIRU has two key characteristics. First, it is exclusivelydetermined by the structural features of the labour and goods market, whichcannot be modified by demand policies. In practice, the labour market hasreceived greater attention than the product market. Second, the NAIRU acts asan anchor for economic activity because the Central Bank sets interest ratesfollowing a Taylor Rule. It follows from these propositions that demand policiescan only reduce unemployment temporally, and that the only way to achievelong lasting reductions of unemployment is to reform the structures of thelabour and goods market that determine the NAIRU.
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The design of the European Monetary Union (EMU) and OECD’s “Jobs Strategy”(OECD, 1994, 1996,p.6) are examples of the influence of LNJ’s approach. In thesingle currency area, policy makers have renounced to use fiscal and monetarypolicies to stimulate the economy, with the argument that these policies canonly deliver temporary gains (Duisenberg, 1999, Issing, 2000, ECB, 2004,p.41).Furthermore, the European Union has devised an agenda of reforms in thelabour and goods market to foster employment growth and “reduce structuralunemployment”, the so called “The Lisbon Strategy”, see European Commission(2000, 2005, 2007). This agenda, has recently been re-launched as the “Europe2020 agenda” (European Commission, 2010a).Another example of the influence of LNJ’s approach in the Euro Area, is the so-called the “Fiscal Compact” (European Commission, 2012), which attempts tocoordinate macroeconomic and structural policies. This is in fact the mainbattle horse of European authorities to tackle the current crisis. OECD’s “JobsStrategy” (OECD, 1994, 1996,p.6), and their current “Going for growth” strategy(OECD, 2006a,p.20, 2010b, p.21, 2012, Chapter 1) also recommend to make thelabour and goods market more flexible, along the lines of LNJ’s model.LNJ’s characterisation of the NAIRU, has taken such a centre stage among policymakers that it is sometimes forgotten that this is just one particular view of thisconcept, i.e. the Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment concept, andthat there are other NAIRU models that challenge LNJ’s propositions and policyrecommendations.In the survey that we present in Chapter 2, we find that LNJ’s model ischallenged in two fronts. First, it is questioned that the NAIRU is exclusivelydetermined by variables that are exogenous to aggregate demand. Blanchardand Summers (1986) claims that the NAIRU can be affected by unemploymenthistory, which in turn is determined by past demand levels, hence, creating alink between the NAIRU and demand. Similarly, Sawyer (1982) and Rowthorn(1995) argue that productivity and capital stock determine the NAIRU, sincethese variables are sensitive to the evolution of economic activity, productivityand capital stock provide another two links between aggregate demand and theNAIRU.Further, Rowthorn (1999, p.422) and Hein (2006) claim that the NAIRU mightalso be affected by real long term interest rates, which these authors argue, canbe affected by the Central Bank’s policy, hence delivering a fourth link betweenthe NAIRU and demand factors. Sometimes these alternative NAIRU models aresummarized under the label of hysteresis theories (Blanchard and Summers,1986, p.27, Bean, 1994,p.603). However, we believe this can be misleading, andhere we use the term hysteresis only and exclusively to refer to the hypothesisproposed by Blanchard and Summer. The second line of attack against LNJ’smodel is based on the claim that there are mechanisms that prevent the NAIRU
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from acting as an anchor, namely hysteresis, “frictional growth” (Henry et al.,2000) and income distribution (Hein and Stockhammer, 2008).The policy implications that follow from these models are in stark contrast tothose from LNJ’s model. First, reforming the labour and goods market mightbear no fruits because the NAIRU is unlikely to act as an anchor. Second,insofar, past unemployment, productivity and capital stock are sensitive to thelevel of economic activity they provide three channels for demand policies toaffect the NAIRU. Furthermore, in the case of real long term interest rates,insofar Central Banks can change their reference rate to modify the cost ofborrowing, monetary authorities can also affect the NAIRU.These critiques have led to vivid controversies during the last three decades,and the surge in unemployment experienced by advanced economies since2007, has done nothing but to intensify these debates. Two illustrativeexamples of current debates can be found in Schäuble (2011) and Arestis andSawyer (2012).Thus far, the empirical literature has not been able to settle thesecontroversies, particularly, with regard to the determinants of the NAIRU. Onthe one hand, advocates of the NAIRU a la LNJ argue that empirics vindicatetheir claims based on the following pieces of evidence. First, panel data studiesthat find cross-country differences in unemployment associated withdifferences in labour market institutions. Second, results from dynamic paneldata studies that find the evolution of unemployment associated withexogenous wage-push factors. See OECD (2006c, Chapter 3) for a survey of thispanel data literature. Third, time series studies that find long run links betweenunemployment and structural features of the labour market, in some cases alsoof the goods market. Further, these time series studies find no evidence of theinfluence of demand factors, such as productivity and capital stock, on theNAIRU. Layard and Nickell (1986) and Nickell (1998) are some well-knownexamples.On the other hand, critics of LNJ’s approach find this evidence unconvincing forseveral reasons. Some question the reliability of panel data studies used tovindicate LNJ’s claims due to data quality and methodology issues (Blanchardand Wolfers, 2000, Baker et al., 2007). But the most damaging critique is thatthese panel data and time series studies might suffer of omitted variable biases.These misspecification claims are based on the evidence provided by panel datastudies, which find that interactions of aggregate demand variables with labourmarket institutions, and indeed demand variables such as capital stock,productivity, and real interest rates have a significant influence on the NAIRU,see for instance Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) or Storm and Naastepad (2009).Misspecification claims are further reinforced by a new wave of time seriesstudies, which also find significant links between the NAIRU and variables such
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as productivity, capital stock, real interest rates and different measures ofhysteresis (Arestis et al., 2007, Schreiber, 2012).The persistence of these theoretical and empirical controversies, signals thatour understanding of the NAIRU characteristics, in particular what variablesdetermine it, is still unsatisfactory. This situation calls for further research. Theaim of this thesis is to make a contribution that helps clarifying these debates.For that purpose we propose a new empirical assessment of the existing NAIRUtheories, that is, LNJ’s model and the models proposed by its critics.The two specific research questions we aim to answer are the following. First, isthe NAIRU exclusively determined by factors exogenous to aggregate demand,as suggested by LNJ? Second, is the NAIRU an anchor for economic activity, asalso pointed out by LNJ? To answer these questions we propose to use datafrom eight EU economies, namely the United Kingdom, the Netherlands,Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Denmark and Finland. The data cover the periodbetween 1980 and 2007. Further, we propose to analyse these data using timeseries techniques and a theoretical model that encompasses the competingNAIRU theories.
1.3 OriginalityThe main novelty of our work resides in the use of the encompassing NAIRUmodel that we present in Chapter 4. As we show in that chapter, existingliterature rarely tests LNJ’s model against competing theories, and in the rarecases in which this is done, only one or two of the alternative theories areconsidered.Secondly, the existing literature rarely considers data for the 2000s. Byincorporating data from 1980 to 2007 in our sample, our research makes anoriginal contribution to extending the current literature. This is illustrated inChapter 4. The study also considers a wide range of European countriesenabling comparisons between them to be made.Thus, the empirical evidence presented in this thesis, in Chapter 7 to Chapter10, extends the existing literature in two ways. First and most importantly, itconsiders a wider theoretical model than those used in previous studies.Secondly, it covers a period that has rarely been considered in the extantliterature.
1.4 StructureThis thesis has eleven chapters and two appendixes. Chapter 2 and Chapter 3provide a comprehensive review of the relevant literature. More specifically,Chapter 2 presents a survey of different NAIRU theories, which includes LNJ’sapproach to the NAIRU along with the models proposed by its critics. Chapter 3reviews the extant empirical literature, this chapter is divided in two sections
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depending on the methodology used in the articles reported, namely panel dataand time series.Chapter 4 plays a pivotal role in this thesis, for it uses the reviews presented inchapters 2 and 3 to formulate the research programme that occupies the rest ofthe thesis. Section 4.3 deserves special mention because it presents thetheoretical model that underlies our empirical work. As shown in Table 4.1, thismodel encompasses the different NAIRU models presented in Chapter 2, andhence constitutes an excellent framework to test their competing claims aboutthe NAIRU.Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 set the ground for our empirical work by providing thenecessary information regarding methods and data. Chapter 5 presents theCointegrated Vector Autoregressive (CVAR) approach used in oureconometrical work. This approach can be divided into five stages which arediscussed in turn. Table 5.1 and equation 5.10 are key elements to understandthe relationship between our theoretical model and our empirical work,because they are the empirical counterparts of Table 4.1.Chapter 6 presents the key features of the data used in this thesis, namely itstime and geographical scope, sources and definitions. Figure 6.1 to Figure 6.16present a first look at the data. These figures are also used to discuss some ofour econometric results in subsequent chapters. Table 6.2 provides a summaryof definitions and sources of the variables employed in the analysis.Chapter 7 to Chapter 10 present the findings of our empirical work andconstitute the core of this thesis. Results are presented by pairs, the groupingresponds to geo-economic considerations. Chapter 7 presents our results forthe UK and the Netherlands, which are generally seen as the European successstories in fighting unemployment. Chapter 8 presents our results for the twomain economies of the Euro Area, Germany and France. Chapter 9 presents ourresults for the two largest Euro Area economies of Southern Europe, Italy andSpain. Finally, Chapter 10 presents our results for two Scandinavian economies,Denmark and Finland.Chapter 7 to Chapter 10 follow the same structure since we apply the fivestages of the CVAR approach to each country’s data set. Each chapter closeswith a summary of the key findings, and with a discussion of the contribution ofour results to each country’s time series literature.Chapter 11 closes this thesis with a summary of our findings, a discussion oftheir contribution to the existing empirical literature and their implications foreconomic theory and policy.Two appendices accompany this thesis. Appendix I presents summary tables ofthe time series literature for each pair of countries. These are constructed by
6
extracting the relevant literature from the survey presented in Chapter 3. Weused these tables to inform our discussion of findings in Chapters 7 to Chapter10. Appendix II is a statistical annex and presents the results from the ADF-GLSand KPSS tests for each country’s data set.
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Chapter 2 The NAIRU, a review of different theories
2.1 IntroductionThe aim of this chapter is to present a review of different NAIRU models. Westart by presenting LNJ’s approach to the NAIRU. This seems a natural startingpoint given its dominance in the policy sphere. Following, we survey modelsthat challenge this characterization of the NAIRU grouped in two blocks. First,we review models that contradict LNJ’s propositions about the NAIRU’sdeterminants. Second, we survey models that call into question LNJ’s claim thatthe NAIRU acts as an anchor for economic activity.The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.2 reviews the versionof the NAIRU proposed by LNJ. Section 2.3 surveys the models that challengeLNJ’s characterization of the NAIRU determinants. Section 2.4 collects thecaveats about the NAIRU acting as an anchor. Section 2.5 closes the chaptersummarising the key points of the theoretical controversies presented in thischapter and their policy implications.
2.2 Layard, Nickell and Jackman’s approach to the NAIRUWe start by presenting LNJ’s approach to the NAIRU. Our exposition is based onthe widely referenced version of this model presented in Layard, et al. (1991,Chapter 8), although an earlier version can also be found in Layard and Nickell(1986). The following set of equations illustrates the main points of this model:2.1 ݌− ݓ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵ(ݕௗ௘− ݕത) − ߚଶ(݌− ݌௘) − ߚଷ(݇− )݈2.2 ݓ − ݌= ߛ଴− ߛଵݑ− ߛଶ(ݓ − ݓ௘) + ߛଷ(݇− )݈ + ݖ௪ where ߛଷ = ߚଷ2.3 ∆݌= ∆݌௧ି ଵ + ݒ2.4 ݌− ݓ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵ(ݕௗ௘− ݕത) − ߚଶ∆ଶ݌− ߚଷ(݇− )݈2.5 ݓ − ݌= ߛ଴− ߛଵݑ− ߛଶ∆ଶ݌+ ݖ௪ + ߛଷ(݇− )݈2.6 ݕௗ − ݕത= −ߙݑ+ ߝ2.7 ݕௗ = ߪଵݔ+ ߪଶ(݉ − ݌)2.8 ݑ∗ = (ఉబାఊబ)ା௭ೢ
ఉభାఊభ2.9 (ݓ − ݌)∗ = [ఉభఈఊబି௕బఊభ]
ఊభାఉభఈ
+ ఉభఈ௭ೢ
ఊభାఉభఈ
+ ߚଷ(݇− )݈
2.10 ∆ଶ݌= − ఉభାఊభ
ఉమାఊమ
(ݑ− ݑ∗)Where ݌− ݓ represents prices mark up over labour costs, (ݕௗ௘− ݕത) stands forthe level of expected demand, (ݓ − ݓ ௘) is the unexpected wage, (݌− ݌௘)stands for price surprises, (݇− )݈ is productivity proxied here by the capital-labour ratio, ݓ − ݌ stands for the real wage, ݖ௪ denotes the effect of wage-pushfactors “such as union and benefit effects” (Layard et al., 1991, p. 368). ݑ standsfor actual unemployment, ݔcaptures exogenous demand factors, such as fiscal
8
policy shocks, (݉ − ݌) stands for real quantity of money or real moneybalances, ∆݌ is the inflation rate, ∆ଶ݌ stands for the change in inflation and ݒ isa white noise process. ߚ଴ and ߛ଴ denote workers are firms’ exogenous mark-upand capture their bargaining power in the goods and labour marketrespectively. All the variables are expressed in logarithms.In this model, both firms and workers are assumed to operate in a context ofimperfect competition, meaning that they have certain bargaining power to setthe price of output, in the case of firms, and the price of labour they supply, inthe case of workers: Firms’ price behaviour is denoted by equation 2.1, whereby firms set prices as a mark-up over labour cost (݌− ݓ), depending on thelevel of expected demand (ݕௗ௘− ݕത), price surprises (݌− ݌௘), and productivity(݇− )݈. This equation is sometimes referred to as the “Feasible” real wage.Workers behaviour is denoted by equation 2.2, where by wages are set as amark-up over prices (ݓ − ݌) , depending on unemployment ݑ, on wagesurprises (ݓ − ݓ ௘), productivity (݇− )݈ and wage-push factors ݖ௪ . This issometimes referred to as “Target” real wage. Layard et al. (1991,p.364) notethat this wage setting equation is consistent with different approaches to wagesetting such as wage bargaining or efficiency wage models.A key feature of this model is that it assumes that the coefficient of productivity,in the price mark-up and in the real wage equation, are identical i.e. ߚଷ = ߛଷ.This implies that workers are able to fully absorb productivity gains and thatcapital and labour are perfect substitutes, with capital-to-labour elasticity ofsubstitution been equal to unity1. This is embedded in the Cobb-Douglasproduction function used (Layard et al., 1991, pp.101-107).As per equation 2.3, inflation (∆݌) is assumed to follow a unit root process,which means that expectations are formed in some adaptive fashion.
∆݌= ∆݌௧ି ଵ + ݒ can be rewritten as ݌− ݌௧ି ଵ = ∆݌௧ି ଵ + ݒ , then takingexpectations we obtain ݌௘ = ݌௧ି ଵ+ ∆݌௧ି ଵ. Multiplying this expression byminus one and adding the price level (݌) in both sides of the equality to obtainan expression in terms of price surprise (݌− ݌௘), it is found that changes ininflation (∆ଶ݌) can be used to proxy unexpected inflation or price surprises, i.e.
݌− ݌௘ = ∆݌− ∆݌௧ି ଵ = ∆
ଶ݌.Once, the process of expectation formation is incorporated into price and wagesbehaviour denoted by equations 2.1 and 2.2, these equations can be rewrittenas equations 2.4 and 2.5.
1 The authors acknowledged, that less than unity elasticity of substitution, i.e. non-perfectsubstitution, or different production function will allow for capital stock effects on the NAIRU,however, it is discarded because they argue that productivity being trended would giveunemployment a trend which is not observed in the data, and that other production function,such as fixed-coefficients, would only serve to account for extreme, and unlikely, scenarios(Layard et al., 1991, p.369).
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The model is completed with equations 2.6 and 2.7 that model the aggregateside of the economy: The first one is a specification of Okun’s Law and providesa relationship between output (ݕௗ − ݕത) and unemployment (ݑ). The latter is anaggregate demand (ݕௗ) expression determined by exogenous nominal factorsdenoted by ݔ, such as proxy fiscal policy, and real factors, captured here by realmoney balances (݉ − ݌).The model contemplates two horizons: In the long run expectations are fulfilledand there are no surprises, i.e. ݌− ݌௘ = ∆ଶ݌= 0 and ݕௗ = ݕௗ௘ . Then,substituting 2.6 into 2.4, and equating the resulting 2.4 with 2.5 to solve forunemployment and real wages, we obtain the model’s long run unemploymentand real wages equilibriums, denoted by equations 2.8 and 2.9.According to equation 2.8 unemployment’s equilibrium is determined by wage-push factors ݖ௪ , and the exogenous mark-up over labour costs and prices, i.e. ߚ଴and ߛ଴. All of which are independent or exogenous to aggregate demand. Whileproductivity can only affect real wages’ equilibrium, this follows from theequality of coefficients for (݇− )݈ in equations 2.4 and 2.5. And fiscal andmonetary policies have no influence on the long run unemploymentequilibrium. Thus, the long run unemployment equilibrium described byequation 2.8 is exclusively determined by factors that are exogenous to demandpolicies.In the short-run, expectations might not be fulfilled, i.e. ݌− ݌௘ = ∆ଶ݌≠ 0, andin this case actual unemployment can deviate from its long run equilibrium, i.e.
ݑ≠ ݑ∗ , generating the negative relationship between inflation andunemployment, denoted by 2.10 and sometimes referred to as inflationaugmented Phillips curve. As per equation 2.10, when unemployment fallsbelow the ݑ∗, i.e. ݑ∗ > ݑ௧, inflation raises, and vice versa. Thus, ݑ∗ in equation2.8 can be regarded as a “Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment” orNAIRU. Figure 2.1 represents equations 2.4 and 2.5 graphically, and illustratesthe relationship between inflation and unemployment embedded in this model.
ݓ − ݌
∆ଶ݌< 0 ∆ଶ݌> 0
.
Figure 2.1 The NAIRU in Layard Nickell and Jackman’s model
Wage-setting
Price-setting
1 − ݑ∗ 1 − ݑ
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This diagram is based on “Figure 1” in Layard, et al. (1991,p.380). The Price-
setting curve is the graphical counterpart of equation 2.4, and the Wage-settingcurve represents equation 2.5. In the long run, when there are no surprisesbecause firms’ and workers’ income claims are consistent the economyoperates at ݑ∗. Graphically, that is when the price and the wage setting curvesintersect. To the right of ݑ∗ inflation rises and to its left it falls, as noted byequation 2.10.The inflation dynamics depicted by equation 2.10 together with equations 2.6and 2.7 justify LNJ’s claims that the NAIRU acts an anchor: If unemploymentfalls below the NAIRU, as per Figure 2.1 is ݑ∗ > ݑ, the economy will sufferunexpected or raising inflation ∆ଶ݌> 0. This reduces real money balances anddemand in equation 2.7, which in turn feeds into higher unemployment via 2.6.This process will continue as long as unexpected inflation persists, i.e. as longas ݑ∗ > ݑ, and consequently ensures that unemployment deviations from theNAIRU are automatically corrected and makes the NAIRU an anchor foreconomic activity. This mechanism is usually referred to as “Real BalanceEffect” (RBE) (Layard et al., 1991,p.384).The RBE mechanism is no longer invoked, and nowadays, advocates of LNJ’sapproach argue that the NAIRU acts as an anchor, because Central Banks setsinterest rates according to a Taylor Rule (Nickell et al., 2005). As per such arule, when unemployment falls below the NAIRU and the economy suffersraising inflation, the Central Bank will increase interest rates in order to reduceaggregate spending and inflation. Mathematically, this implies substituting 2.7by a formulation of the Taylor rule of the kind presented in Carlin and Soskice(2006, p.152).Policy implications from LNJ’s approach to the NAIRU are straight forward:First, because the productivity and demand policies do not affect the NAIRU,and because the NAIRU acts as an anchor, trying to stimulate productivity oreconomic activity using demand policies can only render short-livedunemployment reductions. Second, given that the NAIRU, is determined bystructural features of the labour and goods market, in order to reduce theNAIRU these structures need to be reformed. The upshot of these reforms isthat because the NAIRU serves as an anchor, reforms will have a knock-oneffect over unemployment that will follow the NAIRU down.
2.3 Four nexus between aggregate demand and the NAIRULNJ’s characterization of the NAIRU is challenged by some economists, whoclaim that there are long run links between aggregate demand andunemployment which would channel the effects of demand policies onto theNAIRU. The three models presented in this section provide theoreticaljustification for four of these channels.
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2.3.1 The labour market hysteresis hypothesis:We start with the hysteresis hypothesis proposed by Blanchard and Summers(1986), see also Ball (1999, 2009). These authors argue that after a negativedemand shock, some of the workers who become unemployed can becomeirrelevant for the wage bargaining processes, precluding them from exertingany downward pressure over wages and inflation. Consequently, they claim,higher levels of unemployment will then be possible without exertingdownward pressure on inflation. In other words, demand shocks modify theNAIRU as long as they make some workers irrelevant for the wage bargainingprocess.Layard et al. (1991, p.368,p.382) present2 a version of their NAIRU model thatincorporates the hysteresis hypothesis. In the interest of comparabilitybetween the two models we will rely on their exposition, here summarised bythe following equations:2.11 ݓ − ݌= ߛ଴− ߛଵݑ− ߛଵଵ∆ݑ− ߛଶ∆ଶ݌+ ݖ௪ + ߛଷ(݇− )݈2.12 ݑ∗ = (ఉబାఊబ)ା௭ೢ
ఉభାఊభାఊభభ
+ ఊభభ
ఉభାఊభାఊభభ
ݑ௧ି ଵWhere ∆ݑ stands for the change in unemployment or workers fired in the lastperiod, ݑ௧ି ଵ is the past unemployment rate, the coefficient ߛଵଵ reflects theinfluence on wages of recently fired workers, and ߛଵ reflects the influence onwages exerted by the whole pool of unemployed workers. The rest of variablesand coefficients have the same meaning as above.Equation 2.11 is a new “Target” real wages equation, and its main differencewith that proposed by LNJ, is that the former extends equation 2.5 to considerthe possibility that the whole pool of unemployed workers might have adifferent influence on real wages claims than recently fired workers. Under thehysteresis hypothesis we would expect that ߛଵଵ > ߛଵ, reflecting that those whohave lost their jobs recently can exert greater downward pressure over wagesthan the overall pool of unemployed workers3.Equating the new “Target” real wage denoted by 2.11 and LNJ’s “Feasible” realwage denoted by equation 2.4, we can obtain the NAIRU expression of aneconomy subject to hysteresis effects, here denoted by 2.12. According to 2.12,the NAIRU is now determined by the same exogenous factors as in LNJ’s model,namely wage-push factors ݖ௪ and the exogenous mark-up over labour costsand prices ଴ܾ and ߛ଴ . However, after considering hysteresis it is alsodetermined by the degree of hysteresis denoted by ߛଵଵ, and crucially by past
2 See also Nickell (1998)3 The reverse argument is generally used in empirical work: It is usually argued that the greaterthe share of long term unemployed workers over total unemployment, i.e. the lower the shareof new unemployed, the lower the pressure over real wages exerted by the overallunemployment rate.
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unemployment levels or unemployment history. Because past unemployment isdetermined by past demand levels, in the presence of hysteresis effects, theNAIRU becomes endogenous to aggregate demand4.Before turning to the policy implications that follow from hysteresis, it isnecessary to make mention to the mechanisms that can facilitate it. This is awide an open area of research, but there is some consensus around thefollowing factors: Blanchard and Summers (1986) note that scenarios of strongunionisation might create and insider-outsiders divide that can propitiatehysteresis. It has also been suggested that long lasting and generousunemployment benefits, can reduce workers search intensity and preventunemployed workers from exerting downward pressure on wages. Similarly, ithas been argued that minimum wage legislation and collective bargaingenerally reflects prime age workers preferences, and can prevent youngerworkers and other groups from making their wage preferences –supposedlymore moderated- from influence wage setting. On the other hand, it has alsobeen argued that long term unemployment can generate hysteresis, becauseworkers who suffer long unemployment spells might loss valuable skills learntin the work place, or become disaffected and stop searching for jobs. Further, ithas been suggested that long-term unemployment records might raisequestions about the skills of workers, who might become stigmatized. For asurvey on different hysteresis mechanisms see Bean (1994, p.603-609).Thus, under the hysteresis hypothesis policy makers have a policy choice toreduce the NAIRU (Blanchard and Summers, 1986, Ball, 1999): On the onehand, given that some of the mechanisms that generate hysteresis areassociated with the structure of the labour market such as unions, wagebargaining legislation or unemployment benefits, policy makers can introducereforms a la LNJ. Or alternatively, they can use hysteresis in the reverse byengineering a number of positive shocks that “...’enfranchise’ as many workersas possible” (Blanchard and Summers, 1986,p.72).Advocates of LNJ’s view, acknowledge the importance of un-enfranchisedworkers for wage bargaining and the challenge it poses for their claims.However, they argue that hysteresis only invalidates LNJ’s, in the unlikely andextreme case of full hysteresis, i.e. only if recently fired workers exert pressureover wages ߛଵ = 0. In that scenario, Nickell (1998, P.805/6) notes; “...we cansay that high unemployment today is the result of a set of bad shocks in the1970s...” and in a rather sarcastic note adds “or indeed the 1870s”.
4 Another interesting implication of 2.10 is that any proportion of past unemployment canbecome the new level of unemployment where inflation remains stable, and therefore theNAIRU can take any value. It follows from this that the Phillips curve can be seen as a horizontalrather than a vertical as in LNJ’s model.
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2.3.2 The role of productivity and capital stockSawyer (1982) and Rowthorn (1995) argue that productivity and capital stockaffect the NAIRU. In the first case, they argue, it is because productivity gainsare not fully reflected into workers’ wages5. In the second case, because capitalstock limits firm’s ability to set their price mark-up. Hence, they argue anincrease in productivity and/or capital stock would permit lowerunemployment without inflation tensions, i.e. reduce the NAIRU. Furthermore,they argue, insofar productivity and capital stock are sensitive to the level ofeconomic activity, they provide two channels for demand policies to affect theNAIRU.In our exposition of this approach to the NAIRU we draw from Sawyer (1982)and Rowthorn (1995) but also from more recent formulations such as Sawyer(2002) and Arestis and Sawyer (2005). The following set of equationsillustrates the main points of this approach:2.13 ݓ = ߛ଴ + ݌௘− ߛଵݑ+ ߛସܤ + ߛଷ(ݕ− )݈2.14 ݌− ݓ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵߔ − ߚଷ(ݕ− )݈2.15 ݌− ݓ = ߚ଴− ߚସݑ− ߚହ݇− ߚଷ(ݕ− )݈2.16 ∆݇= ଴ܽ + ଵܽߎ + ଶܽߔ2.17 ∆(ݕ− )݈ = ଴ܾ + ଵܾ∆ߔ2.18 ݑ∗ = ߚ0+ߛ0+ఊర஻
ߚ4+ߛ1 + (ߛయିߚయ)ߚ4+ߛ1 (ݕ− )݈ − ఉఱߚ4+ߛ1 ݇Where ݓ is the nominal wage, ܤ stands for unemployment benefits, (ݕ− )݈ isthe labour productivity, ߔ stands for capacity utilization, ݇ is the capital stock,
∆݇ investment, and ߎ stands for firms’ profitability. The rest of variables andcoefficients have the same meaning as above.Equation 2.13 denotes workers’ wages claims or the “Target” real wage.Workers are assumed to bargain nominal wages (ݓ), depending on priceexpectations (݌௘), which are assumed to follow a unit root as LNJ, the level ofunemployment (ݑ), alternative sources of income such as unemploymentbenefits (ܤ), and labour productivity (ݕ− )݈. This is consistent with differentapproaches to wage setting such as wage bargaining or efficiency wagesmodels.Firms are assumed to operate under imperfect competition allowing them toset prices as a mark-up over labour cost (݌− ݓ), denoted here by equation
5 It has also been suggested that productivity can affect the NAIRU if wages are sluggish toadjust to changes in productivity growth. The argument is the following: If productivitysuddenly slows down, wage claims might take some time to acknowledge it and moderateaccordingly, hence this situation is likely to rise the NAIRU. On the contrary, if productivitysuddenly accelerates, it might take a while before workers fully acknowledge it and include thenew productivity into their claims, hence allowing for a fall in the NAIRU. See Stiglitz (1997) orBall and Mankiw (2002)
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2.14. This mark-up depends on the level of capacity utilization6 (ߔ) andproductivity (ݕ− )݈.Two assumptions made in these equations are crucial to understand thedifferences between this model and LNJ’s approach. First, the coefficients forproductivity in equations 2.13 and 2.15, i.e. ߛଷ and ߚଷ, are not assumed to beequal, in contrast to what is assumed in equations 2.5 and 2.4. This means thatworkers are not necessarily able to fully absorb productivity gains, andamounts to drop the assumption that the economy operates under a Cobb-Douglas production function is dropped. The rationale to drop this assumptionis that it seems “empirically doubtful” (Rowthorn, 1999, p.413, Sawyer,2002,p.87).Second, capacity utilization is assumed to fall not only when unemploymentgrows, but also when new capital stock is installed7. Hence, substitutingcapacity utilization ߔ in equation 2.14 by unemployment and capital stock wecan rewrite firms’ price mark-up as a negative function of unemployment,capital stock and productivity as denoted by 2.15. The negative relationshipbetween firms’ mark-up and capital stock, captures the fact that more capitalstock means more excess or idle capacity, which limits firms’ ability to set theirprice mark-up, the same way unemployment limits workers ability to claimhigher wages8 (Rowthorn, 1995, p.29).The model is completed with equations 2.16 and 2.17, which modelsinvestment and productivity. The former, describes investment (∆ )݇ as apositive function of profitability (ߎ) and capacity utilization (ߔ) (Rowthorn,1999, p.422, Sawyer, 2002, p.89, Arestis and Sawyer, 2005, p. 965). The latter,models productivity growth ∆(ݕ− )݈ as a positive function of output growth,here proxied by changes in capacity utilization (∆ߔ), reflecting the so called“Kaldor-Verdoon effects” (Storm and Naastepad, 2007, p.536, 2009, p. 314).In this framework, inflation is treated as the result of conflict over incomebetween workers and firms, hence at the level of unemployment where theirclaims are consistent, inflation remains constant, and therefore a Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment can be found. Graphically, as inLNJ, that is when workers wage claims curve and firms’ mark-up scheduleintersects. Mathematically, the NAIRU can be found by assuming that priceexpectations in 2.13 are fulfilled, i.e. ݌= ݌௘, and then equating 2.13 with 2.15 tosolve for unemployment which yields equation 2.18.
6 ߔ can be seen as an equivalent of (ݕௗ − ݕത) in LNJ’s model, see equation 2.1.7 This might be clearer if we write ߔ = (ݕௗ − ݕത), unemployment lowers ݕௗ , whereas newcapital stock increases ݕതin both cases increasing the gap.8 In the context of an open economy, it also noted that more capital stock would lead to bettertrade performance, which in turn would lead to higher real exchange rate reducing cost ofimports.
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According to 2.18, the NAIRU is determined by a number of factors, which areexogenous to aggregate demand as in LNJ’s model; such as unemploymentbenefits ܤ, and the exogenous mark-up over labour costs and prices, i.e.ߚ଴ and
ߛ଴. However, it is also determined by the gap between workers and firms claimsover productivity gains, which reduces the NAIRU as long as workers are notable to fully reflect productivity gains in their wage claims, i.e. as long as
ߛଷ < ߚଷ. Furthermore, the NAIRU is also determined by the size of capital stock,which also reduces it, reflecting the impact of new productive capacity to limitfirms’ ability to mark-up labour costs.The influence of productivity and capital stock over the NAIRU are crucialbecause as per equations 2.16 and 2.17 capital stock and productivity arefunctions of the level of capacity utilization, that is, they are sensitive to theevolution of economic activity, and in turn make the NAIRU endogenous to it. Itmust be emphasized that these results follow from dropping LNJ’s assumptionsregarding workers ability to absorb productivity gains, and from rewritingcapacity utilization as a function of unemployment and capital stock.In this model, structural reforms of the type proposed by LNJ that tackle theexogenous factors that determine the NAIRU (ܤ, ߚ଴, ߛ଴) can reduce the NAIRU(Arestis and Sawyer, 2005, p.967). However, Sawyer (2002, p.79) points thismight be unnecessary because for any level of those exogenous factors, theNAIRU can be “lifted” to full employment as long as sufficient capital stock isprovided. In Figure 2.1, this means that for a given set of exogenous factors, theprice-setting curve can always be shifted to the right, to intersect the wage-setting curve at the level of full employment. To build such stock, Sawyer (2002,p.88) and Arestis and Sawyer (2005, p.967) recommend the use of expansivepolicies, which ensure high levels of aggregate demand, and consequently highcapacity utilization and profitability to encourage investment. Bean (1989)disagrees with this policy recommendation, and instead advocates for labourmarket reforms –in line with LNJ’s suggestions- to increase firms profitability.We discuss this issue further on Chapter 11.These possibilities are acknowledges in Layard et al. (1991, p.369) but it is thetrended nature of productivity and capital stock that make these authorsdiscard them. They argue that the lack of a similar trend in unemploymentseries makes impossible a relationship with trended variables such asproductivity and capital stock. The same argument can also be found inBlanchard and Summers (1986, p.21 and 26), Krugman (1994, p.32) orBlanchard and Katz (1997, p.56). Rowthorn (1999, p.414) respond thatunemployment is the difference between the labour force and employment,which are trended. Hence, Rowthorn argues, whenever the trend of capitalstock differs from that of the labour force, there will be changes inunemployment, regardless of the latter not being trended. A similar argument
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is proposed by the Chain Reaction Theory, see for instance Karanassou et al.(2008a, p.983), who argues that all growth determinants, trended or not, spillover into the labour market and consequently have an influence onunemployment.Further, Blanchard and Summers (1986, p.27) critiques the capital-NAIRUrelationship based on the pre-WWII US experience. They argue that “Theargument that reduced capital accumulation has an important effect on thelevel of unemployment is difficult to support with historical examples”.Somehow paradoxically, Blanchard (2002, p.4) admits that rising cost of capitalcan deter investment, reducing future capital stock and potential output, whichwould translate into lower labour demand and a higher NAIRU. Bean (1989,p.34/35) re-examines the US WWII experience and argues that conclusions aresubject to the measure of capital stock used. Further, Bean notes in the samearticle, that even if there was not a link between capital stock andunemployment in the US prior to WWII, it does not preclude such as link fromexisting in a different historical moment or in a different economy.
2.3.3 Cost of borrowing and firm’s price mark-upFinally, Rowthorn (1999, p.422) and Hein (2006) argue that cost of long termborrowing, in particular its real value, increases firms mark-up rising thethreshold of unemployment at which firm’s and workers’ income claims arecompatible, i.e. the NAIRU. Furthermore, they argue, insofar the central bankcan modify their reference rate to affect the real long term rates monetaryauthorities can modify the NAIRU.Our exposition of this version of the NAIRU is based on Hein’s (2006) model,the rationale for this choice is that it makes comparison with LNJ’s modeleasier. The following set of equations summarized this model:2.19 ݓ௕௥ = ߠ+ ߝݖ2.20 ݁= ݖ= 1 − ݑ2.21 ݌= (1 + ݉ ) ௪
௬2.22 ݓ௣௥ = ௪௣ = ௬ଵା௠2.23 ݅= (1 + ݉ ௜) ஼݅஻2.24 ߎ = ߎ௡ + ܴ = ߎ௡ + ݅ܤ2.25 ݉ = ݉ ( )݅ where డ௠
డ௜
≥ 02.26 ∆ݓ௧= ∆݌௧ି ଵ+ ∆ݕ௧+ ߝ(ݖ௧− ݖ∗)2.27 ∆݌௧= ∆(1 + ݉ )௧+ ∆ݓ௧− ∆ݕ௧2.28 ݖ∗ = ∗݁ = ೤భశ೘ ିఏ
ఌ
where డ௭∗
డ௠
< 0
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Where ݓ௕௥ represents workers’ real wage target, ߠ is the exogenous componentof wage demands, ݖstands for the level of capacity utilization, ݁stands foremployment, ݑ for unemployment, ݌ represents prices set by firms, ݉ is themark-up of firms prices over unit labour costs, ݓ is the nominal wages, ݕ standsfor labour productivity, s݅tands for the real long term interest rates, ݉ ௜standsfor creditors mark-up over the reference interest rate set by the central bank, inturn denoted by ஼݅஻ , ߎ stands for the level of profits, ߎ௡ is the level of retainedearnings, ܴ profits payable to creditors, ܤ is the stock of long term creditsgranted to firms.Equation 2.19 describes workers’ wage claims. They bargain over nominalwages considering a real wage target denoted by ݓ௕௥, and their claims increasewith the level of capacity utilization ݖ. For convenience employment andcapacity utilization are considered to be equivalents, i.e. ݖ= ,݁ whereasemployment is considered to change in one-to-one basis with unemployment(ݑ), hence ݁= 1 − ݑ and ݖ= 1 − ݑ (Hein, 2006, p.312). Equation 2.21describes how firms’ set prices as a mark-up over unit labour costsݓ/ݕ,rearranging in terms of real wages, we obtain the real wage consistent withfirms’ mark-up, denoted by 2.22.Firms fund their investment with profits and long term credits from householdsand/or financial institutions. As per equation 2.23 creditors set the long terminterest rates at which they lend to firms ( )݅ as a mark-up (݉ ௜) over theCentral’s Bank reference rate ( ஼݅஻) (Hein, 2006, p.309). This equation plays akey role in this model, because it introduces monetary policy.Equation 2.24 shows the use of profits (ߎ), a part remains within the firm andconstitute retained earnings (ߎ௡), whereas another part goes to pay creditors(ܴ), depending on interest rates ( )݅ and stock of long term credit granted tofirms (ܤ). It can readily be seen from this equation that a rise in the cost ofborrowing reduces available funds to invest, hence if firms wish to ensure theiraccumulation pace need to increase their mark-ups. This is denoted byequation 2.25 that describes firms’ mark-up as positive function of real longterm interest rates .݅Equations 2.26 and 2.27 describe wages (∆ݓ௧) and prices inflation (∆ݓ௧). Theformer, is determined by past inflation, reflecting that nominal wages areagreed before prices are set, productivity growth, and a parameter measuringhow wages react when capacity increases or fall beyond ݖ∗. Price inflation isdetermined by the change in the mark-up, wages inflation, and productivitygrowth.Firms are assumed to set up prices after bargaining wages with workers, hence,the economy’s real wage will be the level of real wages targeted by workersthat is consistent with firms mark-up. Hence, equating 2.22 and 2.19 we can
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find the level of capacity utilization and employment, at which workers andfirms’ claims are compatible, denoted here by equation 2.28. ݁∗ is theemployment counter-part of the NAIRU, because as per equation 2.26 and 2.27when employment grows beyond ݖ∗ or ݁∗, wage and price inflation accelerates,and vice versa. Only when the economy is operating at the ݖ∗ inflation does notaccelerate, i.e. ∆݌௧− ∆݌௧ି ଵ = 0 , indicating that productivity changes areproperly anticipated by workers and firms, and the latter do not change theirmark-up, i.e. ∆(1 − ݉ )௧ = 0.According to 2.28, the NAIRU is determined by a number of factors, which areexogenous to aggregate demand as in LNJ’s model; such as is the wage-pushfactorsߠ. However, it is also determined by long term costs of borrowingembedded in firms’ mark-up ݉ , which as denoted by 2.23 are determined asmark-up over central banks interest rate. The fact that long term costs ofborrowing are determined as mark-up over central banks interest rate iscrucial, because it means that the central bank can then use their reference rateto reduce the NAIRU.In this model, structural reforms a la LNJ, tackling the exogenous factors thatdetermine the NAIRU, can reduce the NAIRU. However, in the light of theseresults, Hein (2006, p. 323) concludes that central banks should aim atdelivering low interest rates to reduce the NAIRU. Fitoussi and Phelps (1988, p.27,57), Hian Teck and Phelps (1992), and Gianella et al. (2008) acknowledgethat long term real interest rates can affect the NAIRU via firm’s mark-up, butthey do not see the link between these rates and monetary policy, in otherwords, they argue that equation 2.23 does not hold. Instead they argue, longterm real interest rates are the result of commodity and stock marketsevolution, along with governments fiscal position (Hian Teck and Phelps, 1992,p. 896, Gianella et al., 2008, p. 21). Although this position is controversial by itsown merits, Blanchard (2002,p.2) argues: ”There may be other interpretations,arguing that the evolution of real interest rates was the result of shifts ininvestment or saving, and had nothing to do with monetary policy. I have notseen a plausible account along those lines”.
2.4 Caveats about the NAIRU’s anchor propertiesLNJ’s characterization of the NAIRU is challenged on a second front. Someeconomists argue that there are reasons to doubt the anchor properties of theNAIRU and the mechanisms that are supposed to ensure such properties. Inthis section we review three mechanisms that can preclude the NAIRU fromacting as an anchor, and other critiques to the mechanisms, which according toLNJ, ensure that the NAIRU act as an anchor.
2.4.1 Labour market hysteresisThe first mechanism that can preclude the NAIRU from acting as an anchor ishysteresis. As noted by 2.12, in the presence of hysteresis effects, past
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unemployment determines current values of the NAIRU. That means that whena shock occurs, unemployment does not necessarily return to the ex-anteNAIRU because the new level of unemployment might turn into the new NAIRU.Of course this depends on the degree of hysteresis, or differences in thepressure over wages that different groups of workers can exert, formally
ߛଵଵ− ߛଵ. In the presence of full hysteresis, i.e. only workers fired recently exertpressure over wages ߛଵ = 0. In this case, the NAIRU does not serve as an anchorfor economic activity anymore, instead it changes every period depending onthe level of past unemployment ݑ௧ି ଵ. The smaller the difference between ߛଵଵand ߛଵ, the less the influence of past unemployment over the NAIRU, and thestronger the attraction power of the NAIRU.Advocates of LNJ’s view, acknowledge the importance of dis-enfranchisedworkers for wage bargaining and the challenge it poses for their approach tothe NAIRU (Nickell, 1998, p.806). However, they argue that only in the case offull hysteresis the NAIRU would cease to be an anchor for the economy, and thisscenario, they claim, seems a highly unlikely case (Nickell, 1997). Instead,Layard et al. (1991, p.382) argue that hysteresis might delay the inflation ordeflation tensions caused by deviations from the NAIRU to appear, giving thefalse impression after a shock that actual unemployment is closer to the NAIRUthan it is in fact. Although eventually, they claim, tensions will appear pushingthe economy towards the NAIRU. In other words, they suggest that due tohysteresis there might be some sort of short-run NAIRU, where inflation will beconstant for some time after the shock, although eventually, the differencebetween the level of unemployment and the NAIRU will erupt triggering theinflation dynamics which will push the short-run NAIRU towards its long runcounterpart.
2.4.2 The Chain Reaction Theory and “frictional growth”Henry et al. (2000) and Karanassou et al. (2008b) argue that the NAIRU doesnot serve as an anchor for unemployment due to “frictional growth”. This is aphenomenon that arises from the chain reaction, or interaction between laggedadjustment processes generated by shocks in the labour market system andgrowth factors. Thus, this approach is generally referred to as the ChainReaction Theory (CRT).These lagged adjustments are related to the interplay between labour costs andemployment, wages and prices gradual adjustments, long-term unemploymentand the labour force (Karanassou et al., 2008b, p. 376). The following equationsare generally used to formalize this approach:
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2.29 ௧݈ = ߙଶ ௧݈ି ଵ + ߚଶݖ௧2.30 ௧݊ = ߙଵ ௧݊ି ଵ + ߚଵ ௧݇− γݓ௧2.31 ݓ௧ = ߚଷݔ୲− ߜݑ୲2.32 ݑ୲= ௧݈− ௧݊2.33 ݑ௅ோ = ߞቂቀ ఉమ
ଵିఈమ
ݖ௅ோ −
ఉభ
ଵିఈభ
௅݇ோ + ఉయ
ଵିఈభ
ݔ௅ோቁ+ (ఈభିఈమ)ఒ(ଵିఈభ)(ଵିఈమ)ቃWhere ௧݈ stands for the labour force in period ݐ, ݖ௧ is the working agepopulation, ௧݊ represents the demand for labour, ௧݇ is the capital stock, ݓ௧ isthe real wage, ݔ୲ stands for exogenous wage-push factors, and ݑ୲ is theunemployment rate. The super-index ௅ோ denotes the long run level of allvariables. All variables are in logs, except ݑ.Equation 2.29 stands for the labour supply ( ௧݈) of the economy which dependson the size of working age population (ݖ௧). Equation 2.30 denotes the labourdemand ( ௧݊) of the economy that depends on capital stock ( ௧݇), and real wages(ݓ௧). Equation 2.31 denotes real wages as a function of wage-push factors (ݔ୲)and unemployment performance (ݑ୲) of the economy. Equation 2.32 computesthe unemployment rate (ݑ୲) as the difference between the labour force ( ௧݈) anddemand for labour ( ௧݊).This system of equations depicts a labour market in which shocks to any of theexogenous variables ݖ௧, ௧݇and ݔ୲spills-over to the whole system. For instance,an increase in the working age will affect the labour force, but through 2.32 italso affects unemployment, and in turn as long as ߜ≠ 0 also the real wage in2.31. Similarly and increase in the capital stock increases labour demand, andthanks to 2.32 it reduces unemployment, which in turn affects real wages.Further, an increase in wage-push factors affects real wages, and in turns aslong ߛ≠ 0 the labour demand in 2.30, which in turn affects unemployment.These equations are then used to compute the NAIRU, denoted by theexpression in the round bracket in equation 2.33. Finally, assuming that in thelong run the growth rate of the labour force is equal to that of the labourdemand, i.e. ∆ ௧݈= ∆ ௧݊ = ߣ, the unemployment rate that the economy willexperience in the long run is denoted by 2.33. It follows from this equation, thatin the long run, unemployment is equal to the NAIRU plus a componentdetermined by the lagged coefficients of the system (ߙଵ, ߙଶ) and the growthrate of the labour force and demand ߣor “frictional growth” (Karanassou et al.,2008b, p. 380). Hence, in the long run unemployment differs from the NAIRUsystematically due to the interplay of lagged effects and growth variables, i.e.frictional growth.This mechanism differs from that of the hysteresis in that the NAIRU does notchange as a result of shocks, it is instead the dynamic nature of the labourmarket what pushes unemployment away from the NAIRU. Henry et al. (2000,
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p. 181) argue that in LNJ’s approach the persistence of shocks is under-estimated, whereas the impact on exogenous components is over-rated in thehysteresis view. To this respect, they argue, the frictional growth approachpresents a middle ground between LNJ’s and the hysteresis approach.
2.4.3 Aggregate demand and income distributionThe third mechanism that can preclude the NAIRU from acting as an anchor isincome distribution and its effect on the level of aggregate demand.Stockhammer (2004b) argues that changes in unemployment, such asdeviations from the NAIRU, have knock on effects over distribution of income.Whether unemployment gravitates towards the NAIRU or not, Stockhammerargues, depends on how changes in distribution affect the overall level ofaggregate demand. The following equations summarize these claims:2.34 ∆(1 − ߎ௧) = ߜଵ(ݑ௧− ݑ∗) ߜଵ < 02.35 ݑ௧ = ߜଶ(1 − ߎ௧ି ଵ)Where (1 − ߎ௧) stands for the wage share over GDP in period ݐ, ݑ௧ is theunemployment rate, and ݑ∗ represents the NAIRU. Equation 2.34 denotes anegative relationship between the changes in the wage share ∆(1 − ߎ௧) anddeviations from the NAIRU (ݑ௧− ݑ∗), i.e. when unemployment fall below theNAIRU the wage share rises. Equation 2.35 captures the impact of distributionover economic activity, here measured by unemployment (ݑ௧) for convenience.The sign of ߜଶ is undetermined, and it illustrates the “profit” versus “wage-led”dichotomy proposed by Bhaduri and Marglin (1990). When ߜଶ > 0, a rise in thewage share leads to a rise in unemployment, or a contraction of aggregatedemand, which is said to operate under a “profit-led regime”. When ߜଶ < 0, arise in the wage share reduces unemployment, or has an expansive effect overaggregate demand, which is said to operate under a “wage-led regime”.Stockhammer (2004b) show that when the economy operates under a “profit-led regime”, the NAIRU act as an anchor, whereas it repels unemploymentunder a “wage-led regime”: When unemployment falls below the NAIRU(ݑ௧− ݑ∗) < 0, as per equation 2.34 the wage share grows, if ߜଶ > 0, i.e. if theeconomy operates under a “profit-led regime”, the rise in the wage shareincreases unemployment pushing it back towards the NAIRU, which arises asan anchor. Similar findings are also found in Rowthorn (1999, p.423). On theother hand, if ߜଶ < 0, i.e. if the economy operates under a “wage-led regime”,the rise in the wage share reduces unemployment further below the NAIRU,which is now a repellent.
2.4.4 The “Real Balance Effect”, interest rates and monetary policy rulesFinally, it has been argued that the mechanisms, which according to LNJ ensurethat the NAIRU act as an anchor, do not operate. In the original formulation ofLNJ’s model, the anchor properties of the NAIRU depend on the “Real Balance
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Effects”, see equation 2.7. As per this mechanism, when the economy deviatesfrom the NAIRU, inflation (de-)accelerates altering the real value of moneybalances in the economy in a way that pushes the economy back towards theNAIRU. This mechanism relies in modelling aggregate demand as a function ofthe quantity of the money, denoted by ݉ in equation 2.7, which is exogenouslydetermined by the central bank, in the fashion of the IS-LM model. However,this mechanism is at odds with the behaviour of modern Central Banks, at leastin advanced economies, where monetary authorities set interest rates ratherthe quantity of money in the economy (Romer, 2000, Fontana, 2005). In fact,nowadays, advocates of LNJ’s approach argue that anchor properties aredelivered by the Central Bank in setting interest rates according to a TaylorRule.However, this claim has been subjected to a number of criticisms: Hein (2006),see also Hein and Stockhammer (2008), argues that the Central Bank can onlyensure the NAIRU acts as an anchor under certain distributional conditions.Extending Stockhammer’s (2004b) framework to introduce interest rates, theyfind that the NAIRU can only act as an anchor under a very specific set ofconditions, however, these conditions constitute such a “special constellation”that it they are judged to be very unlikely9 (Hein and Stockhammer, 2008,p.17).Furthermore, Sawyer (2002, p.77) and Arestis and Sawyer (2005, p.965) arguethat when Central Banks stabilize unemployment over the NAIRU –following aTaylor Rule- what corrects deviations from the NAIRU is a policy mechanismrather than an automatic market adjustment. This leads them to conclude thatwithout such policy intervention the NAIRU is a “weak or (zero)” anchor forunemployment (Sawyer, 2002, p.77).
2.5 Summary of the theoretical reviewThis chapter has reviewed different views of the NAIRU. The model proposedby Layard, et al. (1991, Chapter 8) plays a central role in this literature, and itcan be summarized with the following two propositions: The NAIRU isexclusively determined by structural features of the labour and goods market,which cannot be altered by demand policies. Further, the NAIRU serves as ananchor because the Central Bank sets interest rates following a Taylor Rule.The policy implications that follow from this approach are straight forward.First, demand policies can only render short-lived or temporary unemploymentreductions and consequently ought to be avoided. Second, the only way toachieve long lasting reductions of unemployment is to reform the structures ofthe labour and goods market that determine the NAIRU.
9 The derivation of these conditions requires an extension of the model presented in section2.3.3 that would take us far afield, hence, on the interest of brevity we avoid it here, but referthe interested reader to the original paper.
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However, our survey shows that this model is subject to a range of critiquesthat call into question its policy recommendations. We find that LNJ’s model ischallenged in two fronts:First, it is questioned that the NAIRU is exclusively determined by exogenousfactors. Blanchard and Summers (1986) claim that the NAIRU can be affectedby unemployment history, which in turn is determined by past demand levels,hence, creating a link between the NAIRU and demand. Similarly, Sawyer(1982) and Rowthorn (1995) argue that productivity and capital stockdetermine the NAIRU, since these variables are sensitive to the evolution ofeconomic activity, productivity and capital stock provide another two linksbetween aggregate demand and the NAIRU. Further, Rowthorn (1999, p.422)and Hein (2006) claim that the NAIRU might also be affected by real long terminterest rates, which these authors argue, can be affected by the Central Bank’spolicy, hence delivering a fourth link between the NAIRU and demand factors.The second line of attack against LNJ’s model is based on the claim that thereare mechanisms that prevent the NAIRU from acting as an anchor, namelyhysteresis, “frictional growth” (Henry et al., 2000) and income distribution(Hein and Stockhammer, 2008).The policy implications that follow from these models are in striking contrast tothose from LNJ’s model. First, reforming the labour and goods market mightbear no fruits because the NAIRU is unlikely to act as an anchor. Second, insofarpast unemployment, productivity and capital stock are sensitive to the level ofeconomic activity they provide three channels for demand policies to affect theNAIRU. Furthermore, in the case of real long term interest rates, insofar CentralBanks can modify their reference rate to affect the cost of long term borrowing,monetary authorities can also modify the NAIRU.These critiques have led to vivid controversies with exchanges of counter andcounter-counter arguments, also reported in our survey, between theadvocates of LNJ’s approach and its critics, which last now three decades. Thus,it seems fair to conclude our review of theoretical NAIRU models, by statingthat despite the endorsement of policy makers LNJ’s propositions and its policyrecommendations are far from uncontroversial.
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Chapter 3 The NAIRU in the empirical literature
3.1 IntroductionEmpirical efforts to clarify what are the determinants of the NAIRU, andwhether it acts as an anchor for economic activity, have generated a largeliterature. The aim of this chapter is to review this literature, we structure oursurvey in two blocks according to the econometric techniques employed,namely panel data and time series.It might seem surprising that a thesis that only provides time series evidencealso reviews the panel data literature. However, given the importance of paneldata studies in this field, our survey would seem incomplete without a sectiondedicated to this branch of literature. Our time series review, presents theliterature’s findings grouped by theory rather than per country, the interestedreader can find these results grouped by country in the tables reported inAppendix I.The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows: In section 3.2 we report evidencefrom panel data studies. We start with those that provide support to LNJ’sclaims, and then we review the critiques that have been brandished againstthem. Section 3.3 reviews time series evidence, starting with studies thatprovide support to LNJ’s claims, and then studies that call into question thesefindings. Section 3.4 closes the chapter summarising the empiricalcontroversies reviewed here.
3.2 Panel data studies
3.2.1 The case for a NAIRU a la LNJ in the panel data literatureWe start by reviewing those panel data studies that yield support to the type ofNAIRU proposed by LNJ. The evidence provided in Layard et al. (1991, Chapter9) is one of the pioneering studies on this field. These authors employ a panel of19 OECD countries from 1956 to 1988 and find that high unemployment isassociated with unemployment benefits duration and unionized labourmarkets10.Scarpetta (1996) use a panel of seventeen OECD countries between 1983 and1993, to regress unemployment on a number of structural variables and somemacroeconomic variables, the latter are used to control for business cyclefluctuations. This author’s findings suggest that unemployment benefits, uniondensity and Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) are positively associatedwith high structural unemployment whereas coordination between workersand employers reduce it11. These results lead this author to conclude that
10 For further details see Layard et al. (1991, p.428-430).11 This discussion refers to table 1 in Scarpetta (1996, p.58).
26
differences in unemployment across countries are due to differences in labourmarket institutions.In another influential paper, Nickell (1997) employs a panel of twenty OECDcountries from 1983 to 1994 divided into two cross-sections (1983-1988 and1989-1994). The purpose of this manipulation is to remove cyclical fluctuationsfrom the dataset and use the six years average of unemployment as a proxy ofthe NAIRU. This proxy is then regressed on a number of structural variablesand the rate of change in inflation, the latter to control cyclical noise that mightpersist in the sample despite the data transformation. It is found thatreplacement rates, union density, union coverage, and total tax ratesignificantly increase the NAIRU, while Active Labour Market Policies (ALMP)and coordination reduce it12.A year later, Nickell (1998) extends his own analysis to include a variable for“owner’s occupation rate”, which measures the rate of owners living in theirown homes and that aims to capture labour mobility. This new variable is foundto be significant, and the rest of results are very similar13. In both cases, Nickellconcludes that cross country differences in unemployment can be attributed todifferences in labour market institutions.Yet, another well-known example that concludes that different institutionalsettings can lead to differences in unemployment performance is Elmeskov etal. (1998). These authors use a panel of 19 OECD countries between 1983 and1995 and use macroeconomic variables to control for business cyclefluctuations. It is found that unemployment benefits, EPL and the tax-wedge arepositively associated with high unemployment while ALMP and coordinationseem to reduce it14.In finding evidence that differences in unemployment performance areassociated with differences in institutional settings, these studies are generallythought to yield support to LNJ’s propositions. The short-coming of thisevidence is that it only explains cross country differences, but it tells us littleabout how unemployment evolves over time (Nickell, 1998,p.814). This has ledsome to argue that a different explanation might be needed for that purpose,not necessarily along the lines of LNJ’s model (Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000),we discuss this possibility in section 3.2.4.The advocates of LNJ’s approach have reacted to this critique by using dynamicpanels, which allow them to explain not only differences in structuralunemployment but also its evolution. We continue our review of panel data
12 This discussion refers to regression 1 in Nickell (1997, p. 64).13 This draws from regression 1 in Nickell (1998,p.813).14 This discussion refers to Table 2 in Elmeskov et al. (1998,p.216).
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studies, which provide supportive evidence of the NAIRU a la LNJ, reporting theevidence from dynamics panels.An early example of dynamic panel can be found in IMF (2003). This articleemploys a dynamic panel data of 20 OECD countries between 1960 and 1998,to regress unemployment against institutional variables, macroeconomicvariables that control for cyclical fluctuations and the lag of the unemploymentrate to generate a dynamic panel. It is found that EPL, union density and tax-wedge increase unemployment while bargaining coordination, and interactionsof union density with employment protection legislation and tax-wedge reduceit15. These results suggest, not only that differences in unemployment areassociated with differences in institutions, but also that the evolution ofunemployment is influenced by these exogenous factors.Similarly, Nickell et al. (2005) employ a dynamic panel data of 20 OECDcountries between 1961 and 1995, to regress unemployment againstinstitutional variables, control macroeconomic variables and the lag of theunemployment rate. Results suggest that unemployment benefits replacementrate, benefits duration, the interaction of the last two, union density and labourtaxation, increase unemployment, while coordination and its interaction withsome of the other institutions reduce it. These findings are reinforced by theresults of the Maddala and Wu Cointegration test reported in page 14 of thisarticle, which confirms that institutions can explain long run unemploymentdevelopment. Authors conclude that evidence supports claim that not only theNAIRU is determined by structural factors, but also its evolution.Gianella et al. (2008) regress the change in OECD’s NAIRU estimates, whichthey update in the same paper using a Kalman filter, on several wage and pricepush factors, finding that Product Market Regulation (PMR), tax-wedge, usercost of capital, union density and replacement rates have a significant positiveinfluence on changes in the NAIRU. A second specification is also estimated forits level, with similar results, with the exception of the PMR that becomesinsignificant16.Bassanini and Duval (2009) use a panel of 20 OECD countries between 1982and 2003 and macroeconomic variables to control for business cyclefluctuations. They find that replacement rates (gross and net), tax-wedge, andPMR are associated with high unemployment, while corporatism reduces it17.Further, they find that interactions of institutions with an overall measure ofinstitutions, is also significant in explaining unemployment differences. Thesesuggest that unemployment differences are notoriously associated to
15 This draws from “variant (3)” in IMF (2003,p.147).16 This discussion refers to column 3 (authors preferred specification) and column 4 of Gianellaet al. (2008,p.24).17 This discussion refers to Table 1 in Bassanini and Duval (2009,p.43).
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institutions heterogeneity but also that reforming institutions havecomplementary effects. Furthermore, they find a correlation of 96% betweenactual change in unemployment and that predicted by their model withinteractions, which lead them to conclude that a model with such interactionscan also explain unemployment’s evolution.The panel data studies reviewed in this section are so widely cited to vindicateLNJ’s approach to the NAIRU, and to justify its policy recommendations, see forinstance OECD (2006c, Chapter 3), that they have become the cornerstone ofthe empirical case for the NAIRU a la LNJ.
3.2.2 Data quality and panel methods caveatsThis evidence has, however, left some researchers unconvinced. In this section,we review their concerns regarding data quality and methodology. Blanchardand Wolfers (2000) and Baker et al. (2007) question the reliability of studiespublished in the 1990s due to data quality issues. They note that time series formost of the so called labour market institutions did not exist, or were poorlyrecorded until the mid-1990s, and consequently researchers had to createindicators for them. This, they claim, raises questions about the degree ofinteraction between data and the researcher who creates indicators to evaluatea phenomenon ex-facto. This is more worrying, they emphasise, when weconsider that some of these researchers, such as Layard and Nickell, were at thesame time the proponents of some of the theoretical models under test(Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000, c22, Baker et al., 2007,p.10).Following the publication of OECD’s Job Strategy (1994) substantial effortshave been devoted to improve data quality and to produce more reliablemeasures of labour market institutions. However, this has reinforced caveatsabout data quality used during the 1990s. The reason been that the strength ofevidence supporting LNJ’s approach seems to have weaken as quality of datahas improved (Baker et al., 2007,p.13).Furthermore, Baker et al. (2007) also argue that in spite of efforts to improvedata quality, there remain idiosyncratic measurement issues that raisequestions not only about the validity of results but also about the validity ofpanel data techniques. A particularly worrisome case is the unemployment rateused as dependant variable in many studies. These authors argue that despitethe adoption, in the early 1990s, of ILO definition for unemployment by mostOECD countries, comparability of unemployment rates is still “elusive”. First,because this definition is still subject to local social norms about whatconstitutes “active job search” and “being employed”, which these authorsclaim might be different across countries. Second, because OECD’s databases,the usual source of data in these studies, only provides standardisedunemployment rates since 1980, and only for nine member states. The rest ofseries are completed by linking standardised series (based on surveyed
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unemployment) with registered unemployment series. These, Baker et al. claimpose questions to whether unemployment rates from 19 or 20 OECD countriescan be pooled alongside in a panel without causing measurement problems.Another methodological critique to the use of panel data is that in some articles,the coefficients for the explanatory variables are significantly different acrosscountries country to country, i.e. the assumption of homogenous coefficientsacross the panel does not hold. Let’s cite some examples: Stockhammer(2004a) in a study for France, Germany, Italy, UK and the USA, find no evidenceof poolability of the coefficient for the replacement rate (in a regression onunemployment), neither for the coefficient of changes in union density (in aregression on employment growth).Similarly, Arestis et al. (2007) with a sample of nine EMU member states, findno evidence of parameter stability across countries using Chow F-test and VECresidual heteroscedasticity tests. Further, Gianella et al. (2008) reject the nullof equality of coefficients across countries using a Wald test for a panel of 19OECD countries. As a result, they also provide country specific estimations,which reveal that coefficients’ magnitude, significance and lag structure foreach explanatory variable are substantially different from country to country,this time series evidence is discussed in section 3.3.It must also be noted that in other panel data studies evidence suggests thatthere are no significant cross-country difference, see for instance Nickell et al.(2005,p. 14) and Bassanini and Duval (2009,p.44).
3.2.3 Robustness concernsAnother common caveat regarding the panel data studies presented in section3.2.1 is that their findings do not seem to be robust to changes in the samplesize, model specification, or across studies.Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) use a panel of twenty OECD countries from 1960to 1995, which they divide into eight cross-sections. In their initial estimations,with unobservable shocks to time invariant institutions, seven out of eightinstitutional variables have the expected sign and appear to be significant, inline with previous literature. However, once shocks are specified andalternative measures of institutions are introduced results for institutionschange drastically. Using alternative employment protection measures, onlyfive institutional variables remain significant, while using alternativeunemployment benefits measures, only the coordination index remainssignificant18.Baker et al. (2005) replicates Nickell’s (1997) study using differentspecifications. They find that considering five, rather than six, year’s average
18 This discussion refers to Table 6 in Blanchard and Wolfers (2000, p.31).
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and dropping the observations for 1983 and 1984 from the dataset, only onevariable is significant, in clear contrast to the original paper where seven out ofeight variables are found significant. Furthermore, these authors enlarge thesample size to cover the period from 1960 to 1999, and add interactionsbetween institutions, such as Replacement rate and duration of benefits, uniondensity and coordination, and tax-wedge and coordination. In this case theseven variables, which are found significant in the original paper, becomeinsignificant or change their sign. These are only their most notorious findings,for further details see Baker et al. (2005, p.53).Lack of robustness is also illustrated by differences between studies, Baker etal. (2007,p.24) compare 10 panel data studies that examine the relationshipbetween unemployment and up to eight labour market institutions. Only four ofthese variables are used in all 10 panel data studies; namely EPL,unemployment benefits, union density coordination and taxation. All of themare insignificant or wrongly signed in four or more papers. The only variablethat is found to be significant and with the expected sign in all the studies isunemployment benefits duration, but this variable is only considered in threepapers. This lack of robustness is more puzzling if we note that most of thesestudies tend to have similar geographical scope, generally a panel of 20 OECDcountries, and use very similar data sources, generally OECD databases.The advocates of LNJ’s approach acknowledge these critiques, for instanceBassanini and Duval (2009,p.40) note that “There is no or limited consensus onthe quantitative impact of institutions on unemployment, which has led someto question the case for structural reforms”. Yet, they attribute these robustnessproblems to data limitations and the difficulties in measuring key variables,rather than to weaknesses of the empirical case for LNJ’s approach (Nickell,1998,p.815, Heckman, 2007). Similarly, OECD’s (2006c, p.59-107) survey ofthe literature, acknowledges that evidence might be unclear with regard theinfluence of some labour market variables, such as union density, bargaincoverage, minimum wages or EPL. But, the OECD’s survey concludes, “overall”panel data evidence is supportive of a positive link between unemployment andthe following variables: replacement rates, labour taxation and PMR19. Thisevidence, the authors of the survey claim, vindicates LNJ’s approach.
3.2.4 Misspecification claims and the aggregate demand-NAIRU link in
the panel data literatureBall (1999,p. 213) and Blanchard and Wolfers (2000,c1/2) find a ratherdifferent culprit for robustness problems. These authors argue that robustnessproblems are not the result of data limitations, but instead of omitting relevantvariables, in particular aggregate demand or macroeconomic variables thatinteract with the design of labour market institutions.
19 And a negative link between ALMP and coordination with unemployment.
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These authors note that institutions, which explain unemployment’s cross-country differences, already existed in the 1960s when unemployment was lowand similar across countries. Furthermore, they claim that these institutionshave not changed substantially since then. This leads them to argue that theseinstitutions cannot explain the evolution of unemployment by themselves. Onthe other hand, they note that shocks occurred in the 1970s and 1980s canexplain the rise in unemployment, but not its cross-country differences becausesimilar shocks hit most advanced economies during this period. Consequently,they conclude, to explain unemployment differences across countries andovertime, some form of interaction between shocks and labour marketinstitutions is needed. We referred to this possibility in Chapter 2 as the labourmarket hysteresis hypothesis.Ball (1999) use a panel data of 20 OECD countries during the 1980s to evaluatethis hypothesis. Ball regress a ratio of changes in the NAIRU over changes inunemployment on unemployment benefits duration and a measure ofmonetary easing. This ratio is significantly increased by the duration ofunemployment benefits and reduced by monetary easing. These findings,suggest that the proportion of a shock which filters into the NAIRU, measuredhere by the ratio used as dependent variable, interacts with labour marketinstitution, benefits duration in particular, although monetary policy can beused as counter-weight.Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), as discussed in the previous section, use a panelof 20 OECD countries from 1960 to 1995 divided into eight cross-sections.Initial estimations, with unobservable shocks to time invariant institutions, arein line with panel data literature that yields support to LNJ’s claims. However,once shocks are specified20 and alternative measures of institutions areintroduced, results for institutions collapse, illustrating the robustnessproblems highlighted in the previous section21. On the other, it shows thatshocks, and particularly some of their interactions with institutions, seem toprovide a good account of cross-country differences and also of the evolution ofunemployment overtime. These findings suggest that labour marketinstitutions cannot explain changes in unemployment by themselves. Instead,these results suggest that it is the interaction between labour marketinstitutions and shocks that explains both, cross-country differences andunemployment’s evolution.As we have discussed above, this criticism has propitiated the use of dynamicpanel data, which has successfully found a link between unemploymentdynamics and labour market institutions. Comparison between these twobranches of the literature remains elusive because, these dynamic panels do
20 As productivity growth, real interest rates, and labour demand shocks.21 This discussion refers to Table 6 in Blanchard and Wolfers (2000, p.31).
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not consider interactions between shocks and institutions. An exception can befound in Nickell et al. (2005, p.21) where time dummies interacted withinstitutions are added to their model baseline, which we have already reportedabove. These authors find that none these interacted variables are significantand they conclude “make no contribution to the overall rise in unemployment”.However, it must be noted that Blanchard and Wolfers’ preferred specificationis based on interactions of institutions with productivity growth, real interestrates, and labour demand shocks, rather than unobservable shocks or timedummies interacted with institutions. Hence, Nickell’s et al. attempt is stillinsufficient to counter this critique.Storm and Naastepad (2009,p.313) go one step further, and argue thatpotential omitted variable(s) are not some form of interaction betweenmacroeconomic shocks and labour market institutions, but rather demandvariables such as capital stock, productivity, and real interest rates. Theyground their claim in the evidence provided by the following panel datastudies:Rowthorn (1995) and Alexiou and Pitelis (2003) provide evidence of a linkbetween unemployment and capital stock. The former finds that for a panel of10 OECD countries, between 1960 and 1992, one percent increase in capitalstock in manufacturing and services increases overall employment by 0.52%.The later, using a panel data for 12 European countries for the period between1961 and 1998, find that increases in the capital stock of one percent reduceunemployment by 0.5%.Rowthorn (1999) provides further evidence of the link between capital stockand the NAIRU by assessing the proposition that capital and labour are perfectsubstitutes, or that elasticity of substitution between capital and labour is equalto unity. First, the author surveys 33 empirical studies with evidence for theelasticity of substitution between capital stock and labour, or that provideinformation from which it could be computed. The median of these estimatedelasticities is 0.58, and only seven out of 33 are above 0.8.Second, using the results from the elasticity of labour demand to real wages for19 OECD countries from three well known previous papers (Newell andSimons, 1985, Bean et al., 1986, Layard et al., 1991, appendix to Chapter 9)calculates the capital to labour elasticity of substitution22. Only nine out of 52elasticities are greater than 0.5, and only five are greater than 0.8. These results
22 The following formula is used: ߪ = ఢ(௦ି భആ)(ଵିభ
ആ
) ≤ ߳ݏwhere ߪ is the capital to labour ratio, ߳is theelasticity of labour demand to real wages, ݏis the profit share over output, and ߟ is the priceelasticity of demand facing the individual firm, (Rowthorn, 1999, p.415)
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suggest that capital and labour are far from substitutes and that increases incapital stock and productivity would result in lower unemployment.Similarly, Storm and Naastepad (2007) and Storm and Naastepad (2009) assessthe impact on real wages growth of productivity gains, for a panel of twentyOECD countries, and find that labour to capital elasticity of substitution isbetween 0.56 and 0.70, and significantly different from unity.Storm and Naastepad (2007) assess the impact of productivity on the NAIRU.They use a panel data for 20 OECD countries covering the period 1984-1997,and estimate the structural equations of a NAIRU model described by aproductivity regime, an aggregate demand function, and a real wage growthequation. They find that expansive aggregate demand policies and protectiveemployment legislation (EPL) increase productivity. Further, their real wageequation suggests that this productivity gains are not fully absorbed byworkers, and consequently productivity gains reduce the NAIRU. Thesefindings lead Storm and Naastepad to argue that the NAIRU can be reducedeither enhancing productivity with more protective EPL, or alternativelystimulating demand. Solving the estimated equations for unemployment toobtain a NAIRU reduced form expression, they find that 1% increase in exports,investment growth or EPL will reduce the NAIRU by 1.21%, 2.56%, and 1.51%respectively, while 1% increase in real interest increase it by 0.13%.In a later paper Storm and Naastepad (2009), extend the sample period to2004, and consider a new variable, to measure Labour Market Regulation(LMR). This variable is created by the authors applying factor analysis to sevenindicators of the labour market. Their findings are very similar to those of theirprevious study, first, expansive aggregate demand policies and more protectiveEPL and LMR increase productivity. Second, their real wage equation suggeststhat this productivity gains are not fully absorbed by workers, and as a result,productivity gains reduce the NAIRU. Hence, these results confirm their earlierfindings that enhancing productivity with more protective EPL and LMR, oralternatively stimulating demand, can reduce the NAIRU. The specific NAIRUestimates imply that 1% increase in exports, government deficits, EPL or LMRreduces the NAIRU by 0.77%, 0.15%, 0.92% and 0.92% respectively, while 1%increase in real interest increase the NAIRU by 0.25%.Stockhammer and Klar (2008), later reprinted in Stockhammer and Klar(2011), provide further evidence of the influence of capital accumulation andreal interest rates. These authors employ two datasets, the first is the OECDdata set employed by Bassanini and Duval (2006), which contains data for 20countries over the 1970-2003 period. The second, is Baker’s et al. (2005) dataset covering the period 1960 and 1999. They take five years averages of allvariables to remove cyclical fluctuations from the dataset and to use the fiveyears average of unemployment as a proxy for the NAIRU. Their findings
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suggest that union density, collective bargaining coverage (CBC), EPL, andcrucially, also real interest rates and capital accumulation have significantimpact on unemployment23.Stockhammer and Sturn (2008), later reprinted in Stockhammer and Sturn(2012), provide further evidence of the NAIRU’s link with interest rates. Theauthors, re-assess the evidence that labour market institutions and shocksinteract by extending Ball’s (1999) empirical exercise with data up to the 2000sand considering nine labour market institutions, rather than justunemployment benefits duration. As in Ball’s study, the proportion of changesin unemployment that filters into the NAIRU is significantly reduced bymonetary easing, but interestingly, no institution seems to have a significantimpact. Hence, these results suggest that there is no interaction betweeninstitutions and monetary easing, but rather a direct impact of monetary policyon the NAIRU.Evidence from the panel data studies surveyed in this section suggests thatinteractions of aggregate demand with labour market institutions and demandfactors per se, variables such as capital stock, productivity, and real interestrates have a significant influence on the NAIRU. Thus, these findings vindicateStorm and Naastepad (2009,p.313) claim that panel data studies reported insection 3.2.1 are misspecified.
3.3 Time series studies
3.3.1 The case for a NAIRU a la LNJ, in the times series literatureWe turn now to the time series literature, and we start by reviewing those timeseries studies that yield support to LNJ’s approach to the NAIRU.Layard and Nickell (1986) pioneering paper on British unemployment,proposes an estimation strategy that has been widely employed in theliterature: They estimate the structural equations of a NAIRU model, which intheir case includes a labour demand, a real wages equation, a price mark-upand a trade balance equation24. And then solve the estimated equations forunemployment to obtain a NAIRU expression. Their results suggest that theNAIRU is exclusively determined by structural factors. First, they find that thelabour demand is neutral to capital stock and productivity in the long run, i.e.neither productivity nor capital stock affect the NAIRU. Further, solving thesystem of estimated equations for unemployment, it is found that replacements
23 It is noted that CBC and EPL have unexpected signs. This discussion refers to specificationnumber 3 and 6 in pages 14 and 16 respectively, which are the authors preferred specificationfor each dataset.24 As we will see below, sometimes the labour demand and external balance are not considered.In other occasions labour demand and price mark-up equations are considered as equivalent.For further details, see Bean (1994)
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rates, labour taxation, unions’ power, and mismatch all increase the NAIRU,while an income policy dummy for 1976 and 1977 reduces it.Dolado et al. (1986) applies the same strategy to the Spanish case. Theirestimates for the labour demand suggest that there is long run neutrality ofemployment to capital stock, but not to productivity, although this has aperverse influence on the NAIRU. Further, solving the system of estimatedequations for unemployment, they find that taxation, replacement rates, firingcosts, unions’ power and mismatch have a positive and significant effect overthe NAIRU.Layard et al. (1991, p.441) updates their 1986’s work, and again find that theNAIRU is determined by exogenous factors, such as replacements rates, labourtaxation, unions’ power, and mismatch all increase the NAIRU. In a later study,Nickell and Bell (1995) proposes a second estimation strategy that has alsoproven very popular. These authors estimate a reduced form of the NAIRUmodel for the UK, in this case described as a function of exogenous variables.Two specifications are estimated, the first is obtained using Johansen’sidentification procedure of cointegrated vectors, and it suggests that there is along run relationship between unemployment and the following variables; thetax-wedge, replacement rates, union power, skills and terms of trade.The second set of estimates is obtained by extracting the long run solution froma dynamic model containing the same variables. In this case, evidence suggeststhat unemployment has a significant and positive long run relationship withreplacement rates, skills and terms of trade but not with the tax-wedge, union’spower and industrial dispute.Nickell (1998, p.814) extends the paper co-authored with Bell by consideringreal short-term interest rates in the analysis. It is found that unemployment hasa significant long run relationship with skills, terms of trade, the tax-wedge,union’s power and interest rates, but there is no evidence of such a relationshipwith replacement rates and industrial dispute. Further, it is worth mentioningthat the influence of interest rates is downplayed because, according to thisauthor, interest rates seem to have a small contribution to the long rundevelopments.Estrada et al. (2000) estimates a price mark up and a real wage equation for theSpanish economy and find significant evidence of a positive link between theNAIRU and the following variables; direct taxation, replacement rates andunion bargaining power. The estimates of each of these variables suggest thatthe NAIRU is most sensitive to changes in taxation25.
25 This discussion refers to the authors’ preferred specification, i.e. estimates for the privatesector specification. Their results for the whole economy are very similar.
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Gianella et al. (2008,p.27-28) provide country specific estimates of their NAIRUregressions using SUR methods for nineteen OECD countries. Their findingssuggests that there is significant evidence of links between changes inunemployment and exogenous variables, such as the tax-wedge, replacementrates, and PMR, which are found to be significant in 14 out of the 19 cases, andUnion density, which is found to be significant in 11 economies. However,authors acknowledge that coefficients’ magnitude, their significance and the lagstructure for each explanatory variable are substantially different from countryto country: For instance, for Germany union density and PMR are notsignificant at all, the same happens for Denmark when it comes to the tax-wedge and benefits, or for the union density in France, the Netherlands, or theUK. For Portugal only one of the lags for union density is significant.Interestingly, real long-term interest rates is the variable that is foundsignificant in most cases, in seventeen of the nineteen regressions (all exceptPortugal and Japan), although this is interpreted as a signal of the importanceof exogenous cost of borrowing rather than the outcome of monetary policy.The importance of the findings reported in this section, resides in the fact thatstructures of the labour and goods market, proxied by labour marketinstitutions and product market regulations, can explain long rununemployment developments, or changes in the NAIRU over time.Consequently, these results vindicate LNJ’s approach to the NAIRU. Layard et al.(1991, p.443) and Nickell (1998, p.814) argue that these findings, along withpanel data studies that explain unemployment differences across countries, as aresult of differences in institutions, present a complete case in favour of LNJ’sclaims. Furthermore, they use this evidence to respond to Blanchard’s andBall’s criticism, reported above, that labour market institutions cannot explainthe rise in the NAIRU in the 1980s, because these exogenous factors alreadyexisted in the 1960s when unemployment was low and similar acrosscountries.
3.3.2 The aggregate demand-NAIRU link in the time series literatureHowever, claims that time series are supportive of a NAIRU a la LNJ, discussedin the previous section, are challenged by a growing literature that findsevidence of significant links between the NAIRU and demand factors. Thesevariables include different measures of labour market hysteresis, capital stock,productivity and real interest rates. In this section we survey this evidencegrouped in four subsections depending on the demand-NAIRU link theyexamine.
3.3.2.1 Labour market hysteresisWe start by reviewing times series papers that study the potential link betweenthe NAIRU and hysteresis. Finding a variable that measures this phenomenon istroublesome and different alternatives have been applied. A popular approach
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is to use long term unemployment as a proxy for hysteresis, these are someexamples of this strategy:Arestis and Biefang-Frisancho Mariscal (1998, 2000) find long termunemployment cointegrated with unemployment in the UK and interpret thisfinding as hysteresis affecting the NAIRU. The latter article also providesevidence for Germany, although in this case unemployment and long termunemployment do not seem to be cointegrated. Arestis et al. (2007) follow thesame strategy to proxy hysteresis in nine EMU countries. They only findunemployment and long term unemployment cointegrated in Belgium andAustria, in the rest of cases (Germany, France, Italy, Finland, Ireland, Spain andthe Netherlands) there is no supportive evidence of such long run relationship.Logeay and Tober (2006) also use long term unemployment to measurehysteresis, although in this paper a Kalman-filter is used rather thancointegration. Contrary to some of the results provided by Arestis and his co-authors, results from this article suggest that long term unemployment affectsthe NAIRU in Germany. More precisely it would explain 37% of the NAIRU’schange between 1974 and 2002.Lagged (un-)employment is another popular proxy for hysteresis. Some recentexamples of this can be found in Stockhammer (2004a), who finds persistenceof unemployment in Germany, France, Italy, the UK and USA. Karanassou et al.(2008a) who find significant persistence of employment in Sweden, Finlandand Denmark. Karanassou and Sala (2008) who find persistence ofemployment in Spain. And Logeay and Tober (2006) who find that pastunemployment explains 31% of the NAIRU’s change in the EMU during theperiod 1974-2002.Others authors have employed structural VAR (SVAR) models and impulseresponse (IR) functions to examine the hysteresis hypothesis. The usefulness ofthese techniques resides in the fact that, they allows the research to simulatedifferent shocks and examine how lasting are their effects over unemployment.If the economy suffers of hysteresis the effects of these shocks should be longlasting. Dolado and Jimeno (1997) applies these techniques to the Spanish casefinding that rises in demand reduces unemployment permanently, whereaswages, prices, productivity and labour supply shocks increase unemployment,also permanently. This evidence leads them to conclude that persistence ofunemployment in Spain is due to hysteresis effects.We are cautious of this interpretation, because no evidence is providedshowing that permanent effects are due to the interaction between shocks andlabour market institutions. In fact, somehow contradictorily, the results fromsimulating a labour supply shock shows that more labour participation leads to
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greater unemployment, the contrary that one would expect if the economy wassubject to hysteresis effects.Hansen and Warne (2001) also use IR functions to study the impact of laboursupply shocks to unemployment in Denmark. These authors find that greaterlabour participation leads to permanent lower unemployment, which suggestthat some form of hysteresis might operate in the Danish labour market.Another popular approach to test the hysteresis hypothesis is to apply unit rootand stationarity tests to unemployment series. The rationale is that underhysteresis unemployment would exhibit a unit root or behave like a randomwalk. Whereas, unemployment would be stationary or mean reverting if therewas a NAIRU a la LNJ. Romero-Avila and Usabiaga (2008) and Fosten andGhoshray (2011) present some recent reviews of this literature. The overallconclusion is that results are mixed and sensitive to the inclusion of structuralbreaks and sample period studied.However, we are wary of this approach because these tests only provideinformation about unemployment’s behaviour, but they tell us nothing aboutthe factors that propitiate such behaviour. On the one hand, this is means thatwe cannot differentiate between different demand-NAIRU nexus. On the other,as noted by Logeay and Tober (2006), these can be misleading, because if thesample under study contains changes in the exogenous factors that aresupposed to determine the NAIRU, unemployment is likely to have a unit root,which might be erroneously interpreted as a sign of hysteresis.
3.3.2.2 Capital stockThe possible link between capital stock and the NAIRU has received a great dealof attention. Two estimation strategies seem to predominate in this branch ofthe literature, the first strategy, was pioneered by Arestis and Biefang-Frisancho Mariscal (1998). These authors use cointegration analysis toestimate the reduced form equations of a NAIRU model, that is, theunemployment and real wages long run equilibria. Their findings suggest thatunemployment has a long run negative relationship with capital stock, i.e. theyappear to be cointegrated, which lead these authors to conclude that capitalstock affects the NAIRU, more precisely reduces it. Furthermore, they also findevidence of long term unemployment and capital stock been cointegrated,which reinforces the role of capital stock in determining labour marketoutcomes.Arestis and Biefang-Frisancho Mariscal (2000) update their previous study ofthe UK and extends the analysis to the German economy. The results for the UKconfirm the negative influence of capital stock over the NAIRU, a link that alsoappears to be significant in the case of Germany. Arestis et al. (2007) apply thesame methodology to nine EMU Member States (Austria, Belgium Germany,
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Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain). In all cases, evidenceis supportive of a long run negative relationship between unemployment andcapital stock, although its magnitude differs across countries. Similarconclusions arise from Palacio et al. (2006) study using data for the USA, whereit is found that capacity utilization and capital stock (to output ratio) arenegatively cointegrated with the NAIRU.The second popular approach to assess the capital stock-NAIRU link, usesautoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) techniques to model the dynamicsbetween the labour market and capital stock, from which the researcher canthen calculate the long run elasticity of employment to capital stock. Miaouli(2001) use this strategy to study the cases of France, Greece, Italy, Portugal andSpain with data for the period between 1970 and 1995. The author estimatestwo equations; a labour demand with capital stock among the independentvariables, and capital stock function. In all four countries, Miaouli finds apositive and significant long run relationship between employment and capitalstock, with elasticities ranging from 0.48 in the case of Italy to 1.70 in the caseof France.Similarly, Karanassou et al. (2008a) uses an ARDL 3SLS to study the capitalstock-employment link in Denmark, Finland and Sweden. They estimate threeequations, first, a labour demand as a function of capital stock among otherindependent variables, second, a wage equation, and third a labour supply.They find the long run elasticity of employment with respect to capital stock tobe equal to 0.6% in Denmark, 0.8% in Finland and 0.7% in Sweden.The importance of capital stock for employment in these countries is furtherhighlighted by identifying changes in the investment regime using a Kerneldensity function. The means of these regimes are then used to carrycounterfactual simulations: They find that investment slowdown explains 15-30% of Danish unemployment between 1970 and 2005, 50% of the rise inunemployment in Sweden between 1991 and 1997. And in the Finnish case,they find that had investment kept its pace in the late 1990s, unemploymentwould have been five points lower.Karanassou and Sala (2008) applies the same approach for Spain, with annualdata for the period 1972-2005. Results for the labour demand show a positiveand significant long run relationship between capital stock and employment.Further, the Kernel density function exercise finds that Spain suffered apermanent shock in investment during the mid-1970s. According to authorscalculations had this shock been reverted, unemployment would have beenabout seven points lower from 1978 onwards. The importance of capital stockis further illustrated by simulating counterfactual shocks to social securitybenefits, indirect taxation, financial wealth, foreign demand and capital
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accumulation. From this simulation, capital stock is the variable with a greaterimpact on unemployment.Other estimation strategies can be found in the following articles: Ballabriga etal. (1993) estimate the level of employment consistent with the installedproductive capacity and labour demand in Spain for the period between 1968and 1988. These estimates are then compared, against the size of the labourforce and actual employment to examine whether unemployment is the resultof demand or productive capacity constraints. They find that between 1966 and1975, and from 1985 to the end of the sample, capital stock was a constraint foremployment. Stockhammer (2004a) uses a Seemingly Unrelated Regression(SUR) approach, to estimate unemployment and employment growth as afunction of labour market institutions and accumulation in Germany, France,Italy, UK and the USA. In all cases, evidence suggests that capital accumulationreduces unemployment and accelerates employment growth, but it is in the UKcase that the impact seems to be the greatest.Finally, we acknowledge that earlier evidence for France and the Netherlandscan also be found in Malinvaud (1986) and Driehuis (1986) respectively,although these findings should be taken with caution because time seriestechniques were underdeveloped in the 1980s these results might not be asreliable as the rest of the evidence discussed in this section.
3.3.2.3 ProductivitySeveral approaches have been proposed to examine the link betweenproductivity and the NAIRU. A popular strategy is to follow the approachproposed by Layard and Nickell (1986) and estimate the structural equations ofa NAIRU model, we have discussed this strategy in section 3.3.1. Using thisapproach Layard and Nickell (1986) find no evidence of a productivity-NAIRUlink. However, the contrary is found in a number of articles that we review inthe following.Modigliani et al. (1986) and Dolado et al. (1986) find a perverse (positive) longrun effect of technical change over unemployment, in Italy and Spainrespectively. Results for Spain have raised some controversy, because in alatter study Ballabriga et al. (1993) find that the effect of productivity over realwages is smaller than that over prices mark-up suggesting that the impact ofproductivity over the NAIRU is negative.Similarly, L’Horty and Rault (2003) estimate a price mark-up and real wageequation for France, and then solve for unemployment, finding thatproductivity reduces the NAIRU significantly. Hatton (2007) estimates a wageinflation equation and a labour demand equation in terms of unemployment26for the UK, and then solves to obtain a NAIRU expression. To illustrate the
26 This is equivalent to use a price mark-up equation as showed in Bean (1994)
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importance of productivity, the NAIRU is calculated under differentproductivity growth regimes, which show that higher productivity growth,generate lower NAIRU values. For instance, it is shown that had productivitygrown at the average rate of the Golden Age during 1974-99, the NAIRU wouldhave been halved. This is in contrast to earlier findings for the UK reportedabove.Nymoen and Rødseth (2003) estimate wage equations for Denmark, Finland,Norway and Sweden under the assumption that in the long run labour demandis horizontal and then solve for unemployment. They find significant evidenceof the influence of productivity over the NAIRU in Finland, Sweden and Norway,but not in Denmark.The counterpart of this strategy, i.e. estimating a reduced form equation, is lessused to study the productivity-NAIRU link. Nevertheless, a recent example canbe found in Schreiber (2012). This author identifies an unemploymentcointegrated vector for Germany, France and Italy, and finds unemploymentand productivity are cointegrated in all the cases except for Italy.Another popular strategy is to use impulse response (IR) functions to simulateproductivity shocks and observe their impact on unemployment. Dolado andJimeno (1997) applies these techniques to the Spanish economy finding thatrises in productivity increase unemployment permanently. As discussed above,these authors take this evidence as sign of shocks and institutions interactingrather than productivity having an impact on the NAIRU itself.Also using IR functions for Germany, Carstensen and Hansen (2000) finds that atechnological shocks causes permanents increases in employment, hence,suggesting that productivity has a negative impact on the NAIRU. Using a SVARto estimate a macroeconomic model of the Danish labour market, Hansen andWarne (2001) find that productivity has no long run impact on unemployment,suggesting that Danish NAIRU is unaffected by productivity.Yet, another common strategy to examine whether productivity affects theNAIRU consists on estimating the long run elasticity of real wages toproductivity. The underlying reasoning is that if productivity gains are fullyabsorbed by real wages, then there is no room to reduce unemploymentwithout triggering inflation that is to reduce the NAIRU, which becomes neutralto productivity.Arestis and Biefang-Frisancho Mariscal (1998) uses cointegration analysis toestimate the unemployment and the real wages long term equilibriums in theUK. In the case of the real wage vector, they find evidence of real wages havinga long run one-to-one relationship with productivity. Schreiber (2012) alsofinds that real wages and productivity are cointegrated on one-to-one basis inthe Netherlands, but finds no support for such relationship in the cases of
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Germany, France, and Italy. Similarly, Hansen and Warne (2001) find the longrun elasticity of real wages with respect to productivity close to unity inDenmark.Findings from Karanassou et al. (2008a, p.990) contradicts evidence for theDanish case. These authors take an ADRL approach by which they estimate thelong-run elasticity of real wages to productivity to be equal to 0.46 in Denmark,1.10 in Finland and 0.82 in Sweden. Following with the ARDL approach,Karanassou and Sala (2008) find that the Spanish long run elasticity of realwages to productivity (proxied by capital deepening) is equal to 0.52. Raurichet al. (2009, p.12) and Sala (2009,p.787) also study the Spanish case usingARDL, and find the elasticity of real wages to productivity to be slightly higher,0.65 and 0.8, but still below unity.
3.3.2.4 Real interest ratesFinally, we report studies that examine the link between the NAIRU and realinterest rates. A very well-known example is Ball (1999), this study assessesthe impact on unemployment of central banks’ reaction to the 1980s and 1990sshocks in ten OECD countries.In a first stage, a narrative approach is taken to assess the evolution ofunemployment. Four countries UK, Ireland, Portugal and the Netherlandsachieved unemployment reductions and thereafter are regarded as the successstories. On the other hand, France, Canada, Italy, Spain, Denmark and Belgiumsuffered persistent higher unemployment levels, and thereafter are regarded asthe failure stories. In a second stage, the reaction of central banks to theinflation-unemployment evolution is analysed, evaluating their real short terminterest rates policy27. In the success cases, it is found that monetary authoritiesdid not intervene to tackle inflation, while in the failure cases interest rateswere raised or kept high to tackle inflation, despite already experiencing highlevels of unemployment.Finally, the evolution of inflation is examined. In the success stories inflationstabilised at a lower unemployment levels, suggesting that the NAIRU had beenreduced, while in the failure cases it stabilised at higher unemployment levels,suggesting that the NAIRU had increased. Ball concludes that these resultsprovide strong support for the hysteresis hypothesis, because they suggest thatmonetary policy have effects over the NAIRU. However, no evidence of howinterest rates policy affects workers engagement with the labour market ispresented, and we will rather take the evidence provided in this article asevidence of a link between interest rates and the NAIRU.The twin peaks in unemployment and real long term interest rates that Finlandexperienced during the early 1990s, has given rise to a literature that
27 The interest rate measure in this paper is a rate to 360 days.
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investigate if these two phenomena could be associated. Kiander and Pehkonen(1999) estimate the structural and the reduced form equations of NAIRUmodel, and find that rises in real long term interest rates increase the FinnishNAIRU significantly. In fact, these authors conclude that “we think that Finnishunemployment –its rapid rise and fall- cannot be understood properly ifinterest rates shocks are omitted” (p.107).Honkapohja and Koskela (1999), who also estimates the structural equations ofa NAIRU conclude similarly, rises in real long term interest rates increase theFinnish NAIRU. Although these authors introduce a novelty that is worthmentioning, in this paper the effect of interest rates is decomposed in two. Onthe one hand the impact of the real cost of borrowing over price behaviour, andthe influence of indebtedness over price mark-ups and real wages claims. Theformer takes the expected positive sign, and indeed dominates the overall effectover the NAIRU, but interestingly, indebtedness has a negative influence on theNAIRU thanks to its influence on real wages claims. These authors attribute thissign to the impact of indebtedness on the opportunity cost of beingunemployed.The findings reported in this section, i.e. that interest rates might have animpact on the NAIRU are not controversial per se, as we note in section 3.3.1some advocates of the LNJ’s approach, report similar findings, for instanceNickell (1998, p.814) and Gianella et al. (2008). The controversy is around theinterpretation of these findings and their policy implications.Nickell (1998, p.814) argues that given the coefficient estimate found and themagnitude of the change of real short-term interest rates during the sampleperiod in the UK, the impact of real interest rates over the NAIRU is negligible.This might be the case in the UK, but for instance might not apply to the Finnishcase. Gianella et al. (2008,p.21) take a different stance, they argue that finding alink between the NAIRU and long term real interest rates does not imply thatcentral banks can modify the NAIRU. Their rationale is that long term interestrates are a proxy for cost of capital, which is the result of investment-savingsbalance driven by price of commodities such as oil, the evolution of stockmarkets, Governments fiscal position, external balance and country riskpremium. Hence, they conclude it is not a monetary policy variable but anexogenous price-push factor. As discussed in section 2.3.3 this statement iscontroversial by its own merits.
3.3.3 Misspecification claims in the time seriesThe findings reported in the previous section, suggests that there are nexusbetween aggregate demand and the NAIRU of the kind described by the modelspresented in section 2.3. This evidence challenges the case for a NAIRU a la LNJin the time series literature for two reasons: First, because it cast doubts on therobustness of early findings about neutrality of productivity and capital stock,
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for instance in Layard and Nickell (1986) and Dolado et al. (1986). Second,because this evidence suggests that some of the time series most commonlycited to vindicate LNJ’s claims, for instance Layard et al. (1991,p.441) or Nickelland Bell (1995) or Estrada et al. (2000), are misspecified, because they omitthese links.In the light of evidence reviewed in the previous section, ignoring these nexuscould lead to misspecification biases as already pointed out by Stockhammer(2004a,p.20) and Arestis et al. (2007, p.144). It should be noted that this claimis reinforced by the fact that most of the studies surveyed in the previoussection not only consider the role of demand factors in their econometricalmodels, but also control for the impact of institutions on the NAIRU.It is worth noting, that the importance of these findings goes beyond the timeseries literature. In challenging the view that time series are supportive of LNJ’sapproach, the evidence reviewed in the previous section, also question claimsthat panel data and time series provide a complete case for a NAIRU a la LNJ, asfor instance argued by Layard et al. (1991, p.443) and Nickell (1998, p.814).Furthermore, given that evidence reviewed in our last section finds a significantlink between the NAIRU and demand factors, it reinforces misspecificationclaims already made in the panel data literature, see section 3.2.4.The advocates of the LNJ view have responded to these critiques with thefollowing counter-arguments:Nickell and Bell (1995, p.58) remark that demand variables can explainunemployment developments in the long run because the economy’sproduction function links demand and unemployment and warns about“mistakenly” interpreting this long run relationship as evidence against theLNJ’s approach. Similarly, Nickell (1998, p.805) argues that unemployment isalways determined by aggregate demand, and consequently finding a long-runrelationship between unemployment and aggregate demand factors “tells us
nothing about which model of unemployment is the most relevant” (emphasisin the original).Further, Nickell et al. (2005, p.22) argues that inferring, from findings of arelationship between demand factors and unemployment, that empiricalevidence contradicts the view that unemployment is determined by “labourmarket institutions…is wholly incorrect”. We respond to these counter-arguments in Chapter 4.
3.3.4 Anchor properties of the NAIRU in the times series literatureEmpirical evidence with regard to the NAIRU’s anchor properties is lesscontentious than that studying its determinants, and even advocates of theLNJ’s approach, such as central bankers, accept that deviations from the NAIRU
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are long lasting or slow to correct. Several approaches have been proposed toexamine the behaviour of unemployment around the NAIRU:A popular strategy among policy makers consists of estimating the output gap(GDP’s counterpart of the gap between unemployment and the NAIRU) andexamining its persistence. OECD (2006c, p.54/55) use OECD’s Interlink modelto simulate a 1% reduction of the potential output and assess its impact on theoutput gap of the Euro Area. Three scenarios are considered, first nominalinterest rates are held constant, finding that the output gap needs seven yearsclose. In the second scenario, real interest rates are kept constant, and althoughthe adjustment happens in a faster fashion, it still requires five years for outputto align with its potential level. In the third scenario, real interest rates arereduced by 1%, the adjustment speeds up but the output gap still requiresmore than two years to be closed. Similar results are obtained for the US inBasistha and Nelson (2007), where a Kalman filter is used to estimate theoutput gap. In this article the output gap is found to be large and persistentwith an autoregressive component close to unity.Duval and Vogel (2008) estimate the output gap for a panel of twenty OECDcountries as a function of a synthetic labour market indicator, householdmortgage debt and lagged changes of the output gap. Actual national values arethen introduced in the equation and using impulse response functions, theshock of a 1% fall in GDP is simulated. The fastest economies to close theoutput gap are Switzerland and the UK, although they still require slightly morethan two years and a half. They are followed by New Zealand, Canada, Australia,Denmark, Japan and Germany, all requiring between three and four years toclose the output gap. Between four and five years are required in Norway,Sweden, Ireland, Spain, Portugal, Finland, Belgium and Austria. The economieswith a slowest adjustment seem to be France and Italy, who need more thanfive years to absorb the shock. These results are also reported in OECD (2010b,p.33/34).Another popular approach to test the anchor properties of the NAIRU is theError Correction Model (ECM). This usually complements cointegrationanalysis aiming at identifying the NAIRU determinants, and its usefulnessresides in that having identified an unemployment cointegrated vector, theerror term from this relationship can be used as proxy for deviations from theNAIRU or an unemployment error correction mechanism. Then, regressingchanges of unemployment on this error term the researcher can evaluate theinfluence of the deviations from NAIRU over unemployment dynamics.Arestis and Biefang-Frisancho Mariscal (1998) find that in the UK, thecoefficient of the ECM from their unemployment cointegrated vector is notgreater than -0.024, meaning that only a very modest 2.4% of the deviation is
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corrected in each period28. These authors conclude that the UK’s NAIRU is avery weak anchor for unemployment. In a later study, Arestis and Biefang-Frisancho Mariscal (2000) confirm the results for the UK, and find analogousevidence for Germany. The ECM coefficient for Germany is significant andnegative, but they also imply that a modest less than 1.5% of the deviation iscorrected in each period.Similar results are obtained for nine EMU countries (Germany, France, Italy,Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium Finland, Austria and Ireland) in Arestis et al.(2007). Spain is the country with a larger significant coefficient for the ECMterm, and yet the estimate for the ECM in this country implies that only 11.9%of the gap between the NAIRU and unemployment is closed each period.Schreiber (2012) does not provide estimates of the ECM, instead it provides thecorrelation coefficient of two versions of the unemployment gap 29 onunemployment dynamics for Germany, France, Italy and the Netherlands. Thehighest of the correlation coefficient for each country are -0.434, -0.599, -0.463and -0.216 respectively. This implies that there is a negative relationshipbetween changes in unemployment and the unemployment gap, as suggestedby anchor claims. However, the coefficients of determination implied by thesecorrelation coefficients suggest that the unemployment gap can only explain36% of the change in unemployment, in the best of the cases, which is alsoindicative of a rather weak influence on unemployment dynamics.Autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) estimations also allow us to assess theinfluence of the long run parameters over the short run dynamics of the modelusing an ECM term. Miaouli (2001) employ this methodology to study thedynamics of manufacturing employment in France, Italy, Spain Portugal andGreece. In all cases except France, it is found that there is some degree ofattraction towards the long run employment equilibrium, in the cases of Italyand Spain it seems particularly intense, with coefficients of -1.445 and -1.112respectively, and more moderate in the cases of Portugal and Greece, withcoefficients of -0.294 and -0.366 respectively.Layard and Nickell (1986) employ a regression with differences and levels,which can be regarded as an equivalent to a modern ARDL model, and find thata shock to UK’s labour demand would have a half-life of five years.Another valuable piece of evidence to examine the anchor properties of theNAIRU can be obtained from simulating (un-)employment shocks using IRfunctions, and then observing whether unemployment returns to its baseline or
28 They differentiate between positive and negative shocks: For one lag negative shock it wasequal to -0.02, meaning 2% of the deviation is corrected in the following period. For one lagpositive shock it was equal to -0.01. For three lags without differentiating negative frompositive shocks it was equal to -0.024.29 This is the difference between actual unemployment and authors’ estimates of the NAIRU.
47
drifts away from it. Henry et al. (2000) present the response of UK’sunemployment to a labour demand shock. These authors find that the joblessrate returns to its baseline but it requires between 14 to 20 years to do so,which suggests that the NAIRU has very modest anchor power in the UK.Similar results are obtained for Germany in Carstensen and Hansen (2000),these authors report the IR of employment after a labour demand shock, andthey find that employment requires more than 13 years to return to its pre-shock level, suggesting that the NAIRU has very modest anchor power inGermany.Yet another strategy to evaluating the NAIRU’s anchor properties is to estimatethe NAIRU and then compare its evolution against that of actualunemployment. This approach is followed in Henry et al. (2000) andKaranassou et al. (2008b), where the Chain Reaction Theory (CRT) model isused to separate the structural part of unemployment and its cyclicalcomponent for the UK and Denmark respectively. In both cases, their estimatesof the NAIRU seem to be compressed within a small range of values, whereasunemployment varies widely and shows no sign of reverting to the NAIRUvalues. They interpret these findings as a sign of the NAIRU’s lack of attractionpower.Logeay and Tober (2006) use the Kalman filter to estimate the gap betweenunemployment and the NAIRU. According to their estimates, this gap has acycle length of over eight years in the German case, and ten years in the case ofthe Euro Area, in both cases, portraying a very slow adjustment.
3.4 Summary of empirical controversiesThis chapter has reviewed the empirical literature devoted to the study of thedeterminants of the NAIRU and its anchor properties. The case for a NAIRU a laLNJ seems supported by the following pieces of evidence. First, panel datastudies that find cross-country differences in unemployment associated withdifferences in labour market institutions. Second, results from dynamic paneldata studies that find the evolution of unemployment associated withexogenous wage-push factors. See OECD (2006c, Chapter 3). Third, time seriesstudies that find long run links between unemployment and structural featuresof the labour market, in some cases also of the goods market. Further, thesetime series studies find no evidence of the influence of demand factors, such asproductivity and capital stock, on the NAIRU (Layard and Nickell, 1986, Nickell,1998).However, some researchers find this evidence unconvincing for the followingreasons. First, some question the reliability of these panel data studies due todata quality issues, particularly those published in the 1990s because of theinteraction between the researcher and data (Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000).Second, some question the suitability of panel data techniques to examine these
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issues, because they claim that comparability of some key variables remain“elusive” (Baker et al., 2007). Further, some note that the constancy ofcoefficients across countries, implied by panel data methods, does not hold(Arestis et al., 2007).Third, it is also pointed out that results from panel data studies that vindicateLNJ’s claims are not robust to changes in the sample and the specification(Baker et al., 2007). Fourth, some attribute these robustness problems to theomission of relevant variables. This claim is based on the evidence provided bypanel data studies, which find that interactions of aggregate demand factorswith labour market institutions, and indeed demand factors such as capitalstock, productivity, and real interest rates, have a significant influence on theNAIRU (Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000, Storm and Naastepad, 2009). This is infact, the most damaging critique to panel data studies used to vindicate LNJ’sapproach.Fifth, there is a new wave of time series studies that find significant linksbetween the NAIRU and variables such as productivity, capital stock, realinterest rates and different measures of hysteresis. These findings havemultiple repercussions for the empirical case for the NAIRU a la LNJ. On the onehand, these findings question the robustness of time series studies that find theNAIRU neutral to productivity and capital stock and that are used to vindicateLNJ’s claims, such as Layard and Nickell (1986) and Nickell (1998). On theother hand, this evidence suggests that time series studies cited to vindicateLNJ’s claims are misspecified, because they omit the possible link between theNAIRU and demand factors in their analysis. Hence, in the time series literaturewe also find claims that empirical studies used to vindicate LNJ’s approach aremisspecified.Our survey has also reported the counterarguments to these critiques.Advocates of LNJ’s view, claim that robustness problems in panel data studieshighlight nothing else but data limitations and the difficulties to measure someof the exogenous factors that determine the NAIRU (Heckman, 2007). Further,they also argue that despite “no or limited consensus” on the quantitativeimpact of labour market institutions on the NAIRU, “overall” evidence issupportive of such links (OECD, 2006c, Chapter 3). Counterarguments to timeseries critiques are generally based on the interpretation of empirical findings.Advocates of LNJ’s approach argue that unemployment is always determinedby aggregate demand, and that therefore finding a long run relationshipbetween demand factors and unemployment tells us “nothing” about thedeterminants of the NAIRU (Nickell, 1998, p.805).Empirical evidence with regard to the anchor properties of the NAIRU seems tobe less contentious, because all evidence suggests that the NAIRU is at best aweak anchor.
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Thus, it seems apparent that despite considerable empirical efforts, economistsstill remain divided over the characteristics of the NAIRU, particularly withregard to what variables determine it.
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Chapter 4 Research programme
4.1 IntroductionThis chapter draws from the theoretical and empirical controversies reviewedin Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, to design the research programme that isimplemented in the rest of this thesis. The chapter is organized as follows:Section 4.2 formulates the research questions we aim to answer and explainsour motivations. Section 4.3 presents the theoretical model used to answerthese research questions. Section 4.4 illustrates the novelty of our researchprogramme. Section 4.5 closes the chapter with a summary.
4.2 Motivations and objectivesOur review of the theoretical literature in Chapter 2 concludes that despite theendorsement of policy makers, LNJ’s propositions are far from uncontroversial.Furthermore, in the light of our empirical survey in Chapter 3, it seemsapparent that despite considerable efforts, there is still no consensus over thecharacteristics of the NAIRU, particularly with regard to what variablesdetermine it.These debates have lingered in the literature for the last three decades, but thecurrent surge in unemployment has revived them, particularly in Europe wherethe rise in unemployment has been more pronounced than in other advancedeconomies. In one side of the debate we have European policy makers, whobelieve that more “flexible labour markets” is the only way to achieve longlasting reductions of unemployment (Schäuble, 2011). Accordingly, they havedecided to deepen the process of labour market de-regulation that started inthe 1980s in line with LNJ’s recommendations, by renewing the “Lisbon’sStrategy” of structural reforms, now called “Europe 2020 agenda” (EuropeanCommission, 2010a). Most recently, European authorities have agreed on the“Fiscal Compact” (European Commission, 2012), which coordinatesmacroeconomic and structural policies, also in line with LNJ’s propositions.This position is also endorsed by the ECB (2008b, a, p.66, 2010, p.64) and theOECD (2010b, 2012).In the other side of the debate we find economists who claim that stimulimacroeconomic policies have long term effects on unemployment, see forinstance Skidelsky (2010), Munchau (2011) or Arestis and Sawyer (2012).They question that the combination of structural reforms and fiscalconsolidation policies, agreed upon in the “Fiscal Compact”, can deliver lowerunemployment. In fact, they argue, these policies will have perverse long termeffects on employment and growth.The persistence of these controversies, signals that our understanding of theNAIRU’s characteristics, in particular what variables determine it, is still
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unsatisfactory. This situation calls for further research. The aim of this thesis isto make a contribution that helps clarify these debates. For that purpose wepropose a new empirical assessment of the NAIRU theories reviewed in Chapter2. The two specific research questions we aim to answer are the following:i. Is the NAIRU exclusively determined by exogenous factors, as suggestedby LNJ? Or on the contrary, is the NAIRU determined by variables suchas productivity, capital stock, real long term interest rates or hysteresis,as suggested by critics of LNJ’s approach?ii. Does the NAIRU serve as an anchor or gravitation centre for economicactivity, as suggested by LNJ?To answer these questions we propose the following: First, to use data fromeight EU economies, namely the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Germany,France, Italy, Spain, Denmark and Finland. Data cover the period between 1980and 2007, this sample period is given by data availability, see Chapter 6 forfurther details about the data. Second, we propose to analyse this data usingtime series techniques in order to formulate country specific recommendations.We discuss the rationale and the details of this methodological choice inChapter 5. Third, we propose to employ a theoretical model that encompassesthe NAIRU theories reviewed in Chapter 2. The particulars of this model arediscussed below.The novelty of this research programme resides in the use of this encompassingmodel and the use of a sample period with data including the period from 2000to 2007. We illustrate the originality of our work in Section 4.4 but before wedo it, it is necessary to present our model.
4.3 An encompassing NAIRU modelThe theoretical model we propose to use draws from our review in Chapter 2and from Stockhammer (2008), who presents a similar survey. The followingequations summarize the model:
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4.1 ݌− ݓ = ߮଴− ߮ଵݑ− ߮ଶ݇− ߮ଷ(ݕ− )݈ + ߮ସ(ݓ − ݓ௘) + ߮ହ(݅− ∆݌)4.2 ݓ − ݌= ߱଴− ߱ଵݑ+ ߱ଵଵ ݈ݑ+ ߱ଶ(ݕ− )݈ + ߱ଷ(݌− ݌௘) + ݖ௪4.3 ݖ௪ = ߱ସ݃ݎݎ+ ߱ହݐ௪ + ߱଺݉ ݈݅4.4 ݑ∗ = ߚଵ଴ + ߚଵଶ(ݕ− )݈ + ߚଵସ ݈ݑ+ ߚଵହ݃ݎݎ+ ߚଵ଺ݐ௪ + ߚଵ଻݉ ݈݅ + ߚଵ଼݇+ ߚଵଽ(݅− ∆݌)
ߚଵ଴ = ߱బାఝబ߱భାఝభ , ߚଵଶ = ߱మିఝయ߱భାఝభ, ߚଵସ = ߱భభ߱భାఝభ, ߚଵହ = ߱ర߱భାఝభ
ߚଵ଺ = ߱ఱ߱భାఝభ, ߚଵ଻ = ߱ల߱భାఝభ, ߚଵ଼ = − ఝమ߱భାఝభ, ߚଵଽ = ఝఱ߱భାఝభ4.5 (ݓ − ݌)∗ = ߚଶ଴ + ߚଶଶ(ݕ− )݈ + ߚଶସ ݈ݑ+ ߚଶହ݃ݎݎ+ ߚଶ଺ݐ௪ + ߚଶ଻݉ ݈݅ + ߚଶ଼݇+ ߚଶଽ(݅− ∆݌)
ߚଶ଴ = ቀ߮ ଵ߱బାఝబ߱భାఝభ− ߮଴ቁ, ߚଶଶ = ቀ߮ ଵ߱మିఝయ߱భାఝభ + ߮ଷቁ, ߚଶସ = ቀ߮ ଵ ߱భభ߱భାఝభቁ,
ߚଶହ = ߮ଵ ߱ర߱భାఝభ,ߚଶ଺ = ߮ଵ ߱ఱ߱భାఝభ , ߚଶ଻ = ߮ଵ ߱ల߱భାఝభ
ߚଶ଼ = ቀ߮ ଶ− ߮ଵ ఝమ߱భାఝభቁ, ߚଶଽ = ቀ߮ ଵ ఝఱ߱భାఝభ− ߮ହቁ4.6 ∆ݑ= ߛ(ݑ− ݑ∗)Where ݌− ݓ stands for firms’ price mark-up over labour costs, ݑ is theunemployment rate, ݇ is the capital stock, (ݕ− )݈ stands for productivity,(ݓ − ݓ ௘) denotes wage surprises, (݅− ∆݌) is the long term real interest rate,
ݓ − ݌ stands for real wages, ݈ݑ is the long term unemployment rate, (݌− ݌௘)represents price surprises, ݖݓ encapsulates wage-push factors, ݃ݎݎis a measureof unemployment benefits, ݐ௪ is the tax wedge and ݉ ݈݅ captures unions’ power.The asterisk in ݑ∗ and (ݓ − ݌)∗ denote the long run unemployment equilibriumor NAIRU and the real wages equilibrium respectively. ∆ݑ is the change inactual unemployment, and (ݑ− ݑ∗) stands for deviations of unemploymentfrom the NAIRU. All the variables are expressed in logarithms, the coefficients
߮୧and ߱୧are all positive, and the sign of ߛ is unknown.Equation 4.1 formulates the price setting behaviour of firms as a mark-up overlabour cost ݌− ݓ . This is consistent with the models reviewed in Chapter 2,where it was assumed that firms operate in a context of imperfect competition,which allows them to behave as price setters. In our model, firms’ mark-up is afunction of unemployment ݑ, capital stock ݇, productivity (ݕ− )݈ , wagesurprises or unexpected rises in labour costs (ݓ − ݓ ௘) and real long terminterest rates (݅− ∆݌).Further, also following the models reviewed in Chapter 2, imperfectcompetition is not limited to the goods market, and workers are also assumedto have some bargaining power that allows them to influence real wages. In ourmodel, workers’ wage setting behaviour is denoted by equation 4.2, where realwages claims ݓ − ݌ , are a function of unemployment ݑ , long termunemployment ݈ݑ, productivity (ݕ− )݈, price surprises (݌− ݌௘) and a vector ofwage-push factors ݖݓ .
54
Equations 4.1 and 4.2 include the determinants of firms’ mark-up and real wageclaims considered in all the models reviewed in Chapter 2, i.e. unemployment ݑ,capital stock ,݇ productivity (ݕ− )݈, wage surprises (ݓ − ݓ ௘), real long terminterest rates (݅− ∆݌), long term unemployment ݈ݑ, productivity (ݕ− )݈, pricesurprises (݌− ݌௘) and a vector of wage-push factors ݖݓ . These variablescapture the same phenomenon over price mark-up and real wages as inChapter 2. The only difference is that in our model we use long termunemployment ݈ݑ, rather than change in unemployment ∆ݑ to account forhysteresis, see equation 2.11.The rationale is of statistical nature, ∆ݑ is a stationary variable, which meansthat it cannot be used in cointegration analysis, because cointegration can onlyidentify long run relationships between variables that are integrated of orderone ܫ(1). This problem does not arise with ݈ݑwhich is ܫ(1), for all the countriessin the sample, the results for the stationary and unit root test are provided inAppendix II, and hence we proceed with ݈ݑ as our proxy for hysteresis. Itshould be noted that this can be done without loss of meaning, as long as
߱ଵଵ ≠ ߱ଵ, that is, as long as long term unemployed workers exert a differentinfluence on real wage claims than the rest of unemployed workers. Further, asnoted in Chapter 3, using ݈ݑ is a popular strategy to model hysteresis inempirical work, particularly when using cointegration analysis.As per equation 4.3, the vector of wage-push factors contains threecomponents. A measure of unemployment benefits ݃ݎݎ, the difference betweenthe take home and actual pay, the so called tax-wedge ݐ௪ , and a measure ofunion’s power ݉ ݈݅. The rationale for considering these wage-push factors isthree fold. First, the theoretical link between these variables and the NAIRU, iswell documented, Nickell et al. (2005, p.3) and Sala (2009,p.780) refer to thesevariables as the “usual suspects”.The second reason is that these three variables summarize some of the keyfeatures of the labour market that “Europe2020 agenda” and OECD’s “Going forgrowth” strategy recommend to reform: European Commission (2010b)recommend to ensure the efficiency of benefits and labour taxation to “makework pay”, seeking the right balance between rights and responsibilities ofunemployed workers and favour less constraining labour contracts. Similarly,OECD (2010b, p.21, 2012, Chapter 1) recommend to adopt measures that makewage and labour costs more flexible. Hence, we can evaluate the adequacy ofthese reforms with the estimates for ݃ݎݎ, ݐ௪ and ݉ ݈݅.Third, another reason to consider unemployment benefits and labour taxation,is that previous empirical evidence seems to be supportive of the link betweenthese variables and the NAIRU, see for instance the survey in OECD (2006c,p.59-107). Hence, they seem to be good representatives of LNJ’s empirical case.
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Equation 4.4 and 4.5, denote the NAIRU and the long run real wagesequilibriums of our model. To derive them, we follow the same procedure as inthe models surveyed in Chapter 2. First, we assume that in the long runexpectations are fulfilled, i.e. ݌= ݌௘ andݓ = ݓ ௘, then equating 4.1 and 4.2 tosolve for unemployment, and substituting ݖݓ by equation 4.3 to specify thecomposition of the wage-push term, we obtain the NAIRU ݑ∗, denoted byequation 4.4. Finally, substituting the unemployment term of equation 4.2 bythe expression from equation 4.4, and solving for real wages we obtain the longrun real wages equilibrium (ݓ − ݌)∗ denoted by equation 4.5. It should benoted that according to equations 4.4 and 4.5, both the NAIRU and the long runreal wages equilibrium, are a functions of productivity, long termunemployment, the wage-push factors, capital stock and real long term interestrates. We discuss the implications of this in Table 4.1.Equation 4.6 closes the model describing changes in the rate of unemployment
∆ݑ, as a function of deviations from the NAIRU (ݑ− ݑ∗). This equationcaptures the influence of the NAIRU over demand fluctuations, here proxied bychanges in unemployment, and we use it to evaluate the anchor properties ofthe NAIRU. For instance, if ߛ≈ −1, deviations from the NAIRU (ݑ≠ ݑ∗) cause achange in unemployment that corrects such deviations, and the NAIRU can thenbe considered as an anchor for economic activity. Stockhammer (2008) refersto this equation as “demand closure”.The model described by equations 4.1 to 4.6 encompasses the NAIRU modelreviewed in Chapter 2, because each of them can be obtained from theseequations under a different set of restrictions. In other words, the competingNAIRU theories surveyed in Chapter 2 are nested or special cases of our model.Table 4.1 summarizes the restrictions that each nested model needs, but beforewe discuss the content of this table it seems adequate to explain its structure.The first two columns show the restrictions that are required for our model toreduce to Layard et al. (1991, Chapter 8) model, here denoted by LNJ. The nexttwo columns show the restrictions that are needed to extract a NAIRU model ofthe characteristics proposed by Blanchard and Summers (1986), here denotedby BS. The following two columns detail the restrictions that are necessary toobtain Rowthorn (1995) and Arestis and Sawyer (2005) model, here denotedby ASR. The last two columns show the restrictions required for our model toreduce to a NAIRU model of the characteristics proposed by Rowthorn (1999,p.422) and Hein (2006), here denoted by RH. Further, it should also be notedthat rows i) to iii) show the restrictions that refer to the structural equations ofthe model i.e. equations 4.1 and 4.2. Rows iv)-vii) show the counterpart of theserestrictions for the reduced form equations, i.e. equations 4.4 and 4.5. And row
viii) shows the restriction that refers to the equation that links the NAIRU withunemployment fluctuations, i.e. equation 4.6.
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LNJ restrictions over BS restrictions over ASR restrictions over RH restrictions over
Equation 4.1 Equation 4.2 Equation 4.1 Equation 4.2 Equation 4.1 Equation 4.2 Equation 4.1 Equation 4.2
i) ߮ଷ = ߱ଶ ߱ଵଵ = 0 ߮ଷ = ߱ଶ ߱ଵଵ ≠ 0 ߮ଷ ≠ ߱ଶ ߱ଵଵ = 0 ߮ଷ = ߱ଶ ߱ଵଵ = 0
ii) ߮ଶ = 0 ߮ଶ = 0 ߮ଶ > 0 ߮ଶ = 0
iii) ߮ହ = 0 ߮ହ = 0 ߮ହ = 0 ߮ହ > 0
Equation 4.4 Equation 4.5 Equation 4.4 Equation 4.5 Equation 4.4 Equation 4.5 Equation 4.4 Equation 4.5
iv) ߚଵଶ = ߱ଶ− ߮ଷ߱ଵ + ߮ଵ = 0 ߚଶଶ = ൬߮ ଵ߱ଶ− ߮ଷ߱ଵ + ߮ଵ + ߮ଷ൰≈ 1 ߚଵଶ = 0 ߚଶଶ ≈ 1 ߚଵଶ ≠ 0 ߚଶଶ ≈ 1 ߚଵଶ = 0 ߚଶଶ ≈ 1
v) ߚଵସ = ߱ଵଵ߱ଵ + ߮ଵ = 0 ߚଶସ = ൬߮ ଵ ߱ଵଵ߱ଵ + ߮ଵ൰= 0 ߚଵସ ≠ 0 ߚଶସ ≠ 0 ߚଵସ = 0 ߚଶସ = 0 ߚଵସ = 0 ߚଶସ = 0
vi) ߚଵ଼ = − ߮ଶ߱ଵ + ߮ଵ = 0 ߚଶ଼ = ൬߮ ଶ− ߮ଵ ߮ଶ߱ଵ + ߮ଵ൰= 0 ߚଵ଼ = 0 ߚଶ଼ = 0 ߚଵ଼ < 0 ߚଶ଼ ≠ 0 ߚଵ଼ = 0 ߚଶ଼ = 0
vii) ߚଵଽ = ߮ହ߱ଵ + ߮ଵ = 0 ߚଶଽ = ൬߮ ଵ ߮ହ߱ଵ + ߮ଵ− ߮ହ൰= 0 ߚଵଽ = 0 ߚଶଽ = 0 ߚଵଽ = 0 ߚଶଽ = 0 ߚଵଽ > 0 ߚଶଽ ≠ 0
Equation 4.6 Equation 4.6 Equation 4.6 Equation 4.6
viii) ߛ≈ −1 ߛ> −1 ߛ> −1 ߛ> −1
Table 4.1 Nested models, theoretical restrictionsNote: LNJ= Layard et al. (1991, Chapter 8), BS= Blanchard and Summers (1986), ASR= Rowthorn (1995) and Arestis and Sawyer (2005), RH=Rowthorn (1999, p.422) and Hein (2006)
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Let’s now discuss each set of restrictions. Our model reduces to LNJ’s model ifthe following restrictions are imposed. In equations 4.1 and 4.2, ߮ଷ = ߱ଶ toensure that productivity has identical impact on firms price mark-up than overreal wages claims. Further, ߮ଶ = ߮ହ = 0 to make firm’s mark-up independentfrom capital stock and real long term interest rates. And ߱ଵଵ = 0 to ensure thatall unemployed workers exert the same pressure over real wages claims.The counterparts of these restrictions in the reduced form equation of themodel are as follows. In equation 4.5, ߚଵଶ = 0, ߚଵସ = 0, ߚଵ଼ = 0, ߚଵଽ = 0, whichrespectively imply that neither productivity, nor long term unemployment, norcapital stock, nor long term real interest rates have an impact on the NAIRU. Inequation 4.6, ߚଶଶ ≈ 1, ߚଶସ = 0, ߚଶ଼ = 0, ߚଶଽ = 0, which respectively imply thatproductivity has a one-to-one long run relationship with real wages30, thatneither long term unemployment, nor capital stock, nor long term real interestrates have an effect over long run real wages equilibrium. The restriction thatcloses LNJ’s set is ߛ≈ −1, see row viii). This implies that deviation from theNAIRU cause a corrective movement on actual unemployment, and as a resultthe NAIRU can be considered as an anchor for economic activity.To extract BS’s model from equations 4.1 to 4.6, it is necessary to relax some ofLNJ’s restrictions. In equations 4.2 the restriction ߱ଵଵ = 0 must be dropped toconsider that long term unemployed workers might exert different pressureover real wages claims than that exerted by the rest of workers, see rows i).This is equivalent to drop the restrictions ߚଵସ = 0 and ߚଶସ = 0 in equations 4.5and 4.6, which reflects that long term unemployment has an impact on theNAIRU and the real wage equilibrium, see rows iv)-vii). Finally, ߛ≈ −1 alsoneeds to be dropped to reflect that the NAIRU has limited or no anchor power,see row viii).
ASR’s model can be obtained by relaxing some of the restrictions adopted inLNJ’s case: In equations 4.1 and 4.2, the restrictions ߮ଷ = ߱ଶ and ߮ଶ = 0 needto be dropped. This implies, respectively, that the impact of productivity overfirms price mark-up is different to that over real wage claims and that the pricemark-up is a function of capital stock. This is equivalent to drop the restrictions
ߚଵଶ = 0, ߚଵ଼ = 0, and ߚଶସ = 0, ߚଶ଼ = 0 over equations 4.5 and 4.6, which allowsproductivity and capital stock to have an impact on the NAIRU and the realwage equilibrium. Finally, ߛ≈ −1 is also dropped reflecting that the NAIRU issupposed to have limited or no anchor power in ASR’s model.Finally, to extract RH’s model, it is necessary to impose the same restrictions asin LNJ’s case with the following exceptions: In equations 4.1, the restriction
30 Productivity affects long run real wages equilibrium, even when it does not affect the NAIRU,i.e. even when ߮ଷ = ߱ଶ, as long as ߮ଷ ≠ 0 as can be observed from ߚଶଶ = ቀ߮ ଵ ఠమିఝయఠభାఝభ + ߮ଷቁ. Weadopt the standard assumption for ߮ଷ that productivity would allow firms to reduce prices onone-to-one basis, i.e. ߮ଷ ≈ −1, and hence ߚଶଶ = 1.
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߮ହ = 0 must be dropped to consider that the price mark-up is a function of longterm real interest rates. This is equivalent to drop the restrictions ߚଵଽ = 0 and
ߚଶଽ = 0 in equations 4.5 and 4.6, which allow long term real interest rates tohave an impact on the NAIRU and the real wage equilibrium. According toRowthorn (1999, p.422) and Hein (2006) the NAIRU might have anchorproperties under certain condition, we denote this with ߛ> −1.After showing how our model encompasses the NAIRU models reviewed inchapter 2, it is time to show how it can help to answer our research questions.Having a model that encompasses several competing NAIRU theories, which wecan treat as nested or special cases of our model, allows us to test the validity ofthese theories by testing the set of restrictions that they require. In otherwords, testing the restrictions that each nested model needs, we can test thevalidity of such model. This possibility is already suggested in Stockhammer(2008,p.507).Two strategies are possible to test these sets of restrictions. One possibilityinvolves estimating equations 4.1 and 4.2, the structural equations of themodel, test the restrictions that each model requires over ߱௜and ߮௜, and thenequate our estimated equations to work-out the ߚଵ௜and ߚଶ௜. The secondpossibility consists of estimating equations 4.4 and 4.5, the reduced formequations of the model, and then test the restrictions over ߚଵ௜and ߚଶ௜that eachmodel requires.As reported in Chapter 3, there are numerous examples of both strategies in theliterature. Here we favour the second approach, because having the data toestimate the reduced form equations, it seems unnecessary to estimate themindirectly via the structural equations. Further, estimating the reduced formequations we avoid the identification problem that arises when dealing withtwo equations with the same dependent variable such as equations 4.1 and 4.2(Manning, 1993, p.99,105, Bean, 1994, p.583).
4.4 OriginalityAfter presenting our theoretical model it is time to illustrate the originality ofour work. We claim in section 4.2 that the novelty of this thesis resides in theuse of our encompassing theoretical model and in the use of a sample periodthat includes data for the period from 2000 to 2007.To illustrate this claim we present Table 4.2 to Table 4.5. These tables drawfrom our survey in Chapter 3 and summarize existing time series evidence forthe eight countries in our sample. Table 4.2 for the UK and the Netherlands,Table 4.3 for Germany and France, Table 4.4 for Italy and Spain, and Table 4.5for Finland and Denmark. Columns i) to iii) of these tables, show if these studiesinclude the three wage-push factors that we consider in our theoretical model,i.e. ݃ݎݎunemployment benefits, ݐ௪ labour taxation and ݉ ݈݅ union’s power. A
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black dot denotes that the variable in question is considered. Column iv)reports any ܱݐℎ ݁ݎexogenous factor that might be considered in the paper inquestion.Further, columns v) to viii) of these tables show if these studies include any ofthe four endogenous variables to aggregate demand that we consider in ourmodel, i.e. ݕ− p݈roductivity, ݈ݑ long term unemployment, ݇ capital stock and
݅− ∆݌ real long term interest rates. A black dot denotes that the variable inquestion is considered. Column ix) denotes whether the paper in questionprovides evidence regarding the anchor properties of the NAIRU. Finally,column x) shows the sample period covered by each article.
i) ii) iii) iv) v) vi) vii) viii) ix) x)
UK Exogenous factors Endogenous factors Anchor Sample
ࢍ࢘࢘ ࢚࢝ ࢓ ࢏࢒ Other ࢟− ࢒ ࢒࢛ ࢑ ࢏− ∆࢖Layard and Nickell (1986) • • • mm+ipd • • • 1954-1983Layard et al. (1991,p.441) • • • mm 1954-1985Nickell and Bell (1995) • • • mm 1963q1-1992q4Nickell (1998) • • • mm • 1964q4-1992q4Arestis and Biefang-Frisancho Mariscal (1998) • • • • • • 1966q1-1994q4Ball (1999) • 1985-1997Arestis and Biefang-Frisancho Mariscal (2000) • • • • 1966q1-1995q4Henry et al. (2000) • 1964-1997Stockhammer (2004a) • • • • • 1962-1993Hatton (2007) • 1871-1999Gianella et al. (2008) • • • PMR • 1976-2003Duval and Vogel (2008) • 1982-2003
Netherlands Exogenous factors Endogenous factors Anchor Sample
ࢍ࢘࢘ ࢚࢝ ࢓ ࢏࢒ Other ࢟− ࢒ ࢒࢛ ࢑ ࢏− ∆࢖Driehuis (1986) • 1960-1983Ball (1999) • 1985-1997Arestis et al. (2007) • • • • • • 1983q4-2002q4Duval and Vogel (2008) • 1982-2003Gianella et al. (2008) • • • PMR • 1976-2003Schreiber (2012) • 1977q1-2008q2
Table 4.2 Variables and periods used to study the NAIRU, the UK and the NetherlandsNote: mm denotes a variable capturing skills miss-match, ipd denotes an income policy dummy for 1976and 1977, PMR stands for OECD’s measure of Product Market Regulation. Sample periods are annualunless they include a q and the corresponding quarters they cover.Let’s start with Table 4.2. We observe that most of the articles that study thecases of the UK and the Netherlands, such as Layard et al. (1991,p.441) orNickell and Bell (1995), only consider “exogenous factors” in their analysis, i.e.we only find black dots under the heading of ݃ݎݎ, ݐ௪ and ݉ ݈݅. Other articles testthe hypothesis that one “endogenous factor”, sometimes two, affects the NAIRU,for instance in the UK’s case Layard and Nickell (1986) test the hypothesis thatproductivity and capital stock can affect the NAIRU. Similarly, Schreiber (2012)in the Netherlands’ case, test the impact of productivity over the NAIRU.
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However, none of the studies reported in Table 4.2 consider the four variablesthat we account for in our model, none of them has a row of black dots under
ݕ− ,݈ ݈ݑ, ݇and ݅− ∆݌. In other words, these studies do not control for thetheories that link these variables with the NAIRU. Hence, using ourencompassing model to study the cases of the UK and the Netherlandsconstitutes a contribution to the existing literature of these countries.It is worth noting that the rationale for using an encompassing model goesbeyond the pure gap in the literature. As Blanchard (2002, p.3-5) points out, itis reasonable to believe that some of the variables that can make the NAIRUendogenous to aggregate demand might interact among themselves, forexample real interest rates might affect capital stock or long termunemployment. Consequently, to separate the individual effect that each ofthese factors has on the NAIRU we need to consider a model that accounts forthem. Otherwise, results could overrate or underestimate the actual effect of aparticular variable. Further, Bean (1994,p.616) point out that it also importantto use “models ... (that) encompass the findings from other researchers” inorder to ensure comparability across studies.Furthermore, as shown in column x) of Table 4.2, extant literature consideringthe 2000s is very limited, only Schreiber (2012) used a sample period thatincludes data up to 2008, and only for the Netherlands. Hence, using a sampleperiod with data for the 2000s constitutes another contribution to the existingliterature of these countries, particularly the UK.Examining Table 4.3 to Table 4.5 we find similar patterns in the articles thatstudy the cases of Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Denmark and Finland. On theone hand, articles consider “exogenous factors” along with one or two“endogenous factor” in their analysis, see for instance Arestis and Biefang-Frisancho Mariscal (2000) in Table 4.3, or Stockhammer (2004a) in Table 4.4or Nymoen and Rødseth (2003) in Table 4.5. On the other, data for the 2000s israrely used, only Schreiber (2012) uses data that includes this period, but onlyfor Germany, France and Italy. Thus, using our encompassing model and oursample constitutes a contribution to the existing literature of these countries,namely Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Denmark and Finland.
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i) ii) iii) iv) v) vi) vii) viii) ix) x)
Germany Exogenous factors Endogenous factors Anchor Sample
ࢍ࢘࢘ ࢚࢝ ࢓ ࢏࢒ Other ࢟− ࢒ ࢒࢛ ࢑ ࢏− ∆࢖Ball (1999) • 1985-1997Arestis and Biefang-Frisancho Mariscal (2000) • • • • 1966q1-1990q4Carstensen and Hansen (2000) wIR • • 1964q1-1994q4Stockhammer (2004a) • • • • • 1962-1993Logeay and Tober (2006) • • 1973q1-2002q4Arestis et al. (2007) • • • • • • 1991q4-2002q4Duval and Vogel (2008) • 1982-2003Gianella et al. (2008) • • • PMR • 1976-2003Schreiber (2012) • • • 1977q1-2008q2
France Exogenous factors Endogenous factors Anchor Sample
ࢍ࢘࢘ ࢚࢝ ࢓ ࢏࢒ Other ࢟− ࢒ ࢒࢛ ࢑ ࢏− ∆࢖Malinvaud (1986) • 1963-1984Ball (1999) • 1985-1997Miaouli (2001) • • 1970-1996L’Horty and Rault (2003) • mm+ qr • 1970q1-1996q4Stockhammer (2004a) • • • • • 1962-1993Arestis et al. (2007) • • • • • • 1979q4-2002q4Duval and Vogel (2008) • 1982-2003Gianella et al. (2008) • • • PMR • 1976-2003Schreiber (2012) • • • 1977q1-2008q2
Table 4.3 Variables and periods used to study the NAIRU, Germany and FranceNote: mm denotes a variable capturing skills' miss-match, PMR stands for OECD’s measure of ProductMarket Regulation. Qr stands for the quit ratio, wIR denotes simulations of wage shocks using impulseresponse functions. Sample periods are annual unless they include a q and the corresponding quartersthey cover.There are other reasons that justify the geographical scope of our research.First, the evolution of unemployment in these countries since the 1980s hasgiven rise to what is generally referred to as the “European Unemployment”problem (Bean, 1994), which seems to have erupted once more since 2008.Second, the evolution of unemployment in these countries is despair and henceprovides an interesting sample of “winners” and “losers”, to paraphraseElmeskov et al. (1998) and Ball (1999), which should help us understand whatmakes an economy successful in fighting unemployment. Third, it has aninteresting mix of Euro Area and non-Euro Area member states, which can yieldinteresting policy implications for the single currency area.
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i) ii) iii) iv) v) vi) vii) viii) ix) x)
Italy Exogenous factors Endogenous factors Anchor Sample
ࢍ࢘࢘ ࢚࢝ ࢓ ࢏࢒ Other ࢟− ࢒ ࢒࢛ ࢑ ࢏− ∆࢖Modigliani et al. (1986) • 1961-1983Ball (1999) • 1985-1997Miaouli (2001) • • 1975-1995Stockhammer (2004a) • • • • • 1962-1993Arestis et al. (2007) • • • • • • 1983q4-2002q4Duval and Vogel (2008) • 1982-2003Gianella et al. (2008) • • • PMR • 1976-2003Schreiber (2012) • • • 1977q1-2008q2
Spain Exogenous factors Endogenous factors Anchor Sample
ࢍ࢘࢘ ࢚࢝ ࢓ ࢏࢒ Other ࢟− ࢒ ࢒࢛ ࢑ ࢏− ∆࢖Dolado et al. (1986) • • • mm+ fc • • 1964-1983Ballabriga et al. (1993) • • 1964-1988Dolado and Jimeno (1997) w&pIR • • 1971q1-1994q1Ball (1999) • 1985-1997Estrada et al. (2000) • • • 1980q1-1999q3Miaouli (2001) • • 1973-1995Arestis et al. (2007) • • • • • • 1979q4-2002q4Duval and Vogel (2008) • 1982-2003Karanassou and Sala (2008) • • • 1972-2005Gianella et al. (2008) • • • PMR • 1976-2003
Table 4.4 Variables and periods used to study the NAIRU, Italy and SpainNote: mm denotes a variable capturing skills' miss-match, PMR stands for OECD’s measure of ProductMarket Regulation. Fc stands for firing costs, w&pIR denotes simulations of wage and prices shock usingimpulse response functions. Sample periods are annual unless they include a q and the correspondingquarters they cover.
i) ii) iii) iv) v) vi) vii) viii) ix) x)
Denmark Exogenous factors Endogenous factors Anchor Sample
ࢍ࢘࢘ ࢚࢝ ࢓ ࢏࢒ Other ࢟− ࢒ ࢒࢛ ࢑ ࢏− ∆࢖Ball (1999) • 1985-1997Hansen and Warne (2001) • • 1901-1992Nymoen and Rødseth (2003) • • 1968-1994Duval and Vogel (2008) • 1982-2003Gianella et al. (2008) • • • PMR • 1976-2003Karanassou et al. (2008a) • 1973-2005Karanassou et al. (2008b) • 1973-2005
Finland Exogenous factors Endogenous factors Anchor Sample
ࢍ࢘࢘ ࢚࢝ ࢓ ࢏࢒ Other ࢟− ࢒ ࢒࢛ ࢑ ࢏− ∆࢖Kiander and Pehkonen (1999) • • • • 1961q1-1994q4Honkapohja and Koskela(1999) • • • • • 1970-1994Nymoen and Rødseth (2003) • • 1963-1994Arestis et al. (2007) • • • • • • 1980q4-2002q4Duval and Vogel (2008) • 1982-2003Gianella et al. (2008) • • • PMR • 1976-2003Karanassou et al. (2008a) • 1976-2005
Table 4.5 Variables and periods used to study the NAIRU, Denmark and FinlandNote: PMR stands for OECD’s measure of Product Market Regulation. Sample periods are annual unlessthey include a q and the corresponding quarters they cover.
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Using a theoretical model, in which demand factors can potentially affect theNAIRU, as our encompassing model, opens us to Nickell’s critique thatunemployment is always determined by aggregate demand, and consequentlyfinding a long-run relationship between unemployment and aggregate demandfactors “tells us nothing about which model of unemployment is the mostrelevant” (Nickell, 1998, p.805), see section 3.3.3 for further details.We find this argument unconvincing for the several reasons. First, if theresearcher aims to test the validity of a range of models empirically, it does notseem appropriate to interpret the results of these tests on the basis of one ofthe very same models that are being tested. In other words, if we want to testthe validity of LNJ’s model against that of its critics, it does not seem adequateto interpret the results of our empirical tests based on LNJ’s theoreticalassumptions. It would be equivalent to assume that LNJ’s propositions holdbefore testing them.Further, from an econometric perspective Nickell’s claim is also hard to justify.This is because in practical terms, it amounts to argue that cointegrationbetween unemployment and unions’ power proves that unions affect theNAIRU, but cointegration between productivity and unemployment, “tells usnothing” about the NAIRU. Finally, Nickell’s critique seems to be at odds withthe accepted methodologies to test embedded or nested models, such as the“general to specific” approach.
4.5 SummaryIn this chapter we have formulated the research programme that we develop inthe rest of this thesis. We propose a new empirical assessment of the NAIRUtheories reviewed in Chapter 2. More precisely, we aim to answer the followingtwo questions: First, is the NAIRU exclusively determined by factors exogenousto aggregate demand, as suggested by LNJ? Second, is the NAIRU an anchor foreconomic activity, as also pointed out by LNJ?To answer these questions we propose the use of data from eight EUeconomies, namely the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Germany, France,Italy, Spain, Denmark and Finland. The data cover the period between 1980 and2007. Further, we propose to analyse these data using time series techniquesand a theoretical model that encompasses the NAIRU theories reviewed inChapter 2.The novelty of this programme rests on two pillars. Its most importantcontribution is the use of the encompassing model denoted by Equations 4.1-4.6. Table 4.1 presents the set of restrictions that each nested model requires toarise from our encompassing model, and constitutes the list of hypothesis totest in coming chapters. The second contribution is the use of data including theperiod from 2000 to 2007.
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Chapter 5 Methodology
5.1 IntroductionIn our empirical work, we adopt a time series approach, in particular the“Structural long run modeling” or Cointegrated Vector Autoregressive (CVAR)approach, advanced by Pesaran and Shin (2002). The aim of this chapter is toexplain the rational for this choice and to present a technical description of thistime series methodology.The chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.2 explains why we favour timeseries techniques. Section 5.3 presents a brief overview of specific time seriestechniques we use, the CVAR model. Section 5.4 discusses how data propertiesaffect our choice of model specification. Section 5.5 presents the cointegrationtests used. Section 5.6 discusses the estimation and identification methods usedto identify long run relationships. Section 5.7 presents the methods employedto analysis the short-run modeling of our variables. Section 5.8 discusses theuse of impulse response functions to complement our analysis. Section 5.9summarizes the chapter.
5.2 Methodology choicesBefore we discuss the particulars of technique employed in our empirical work,it is necessary to explain why we have favoured time series techniques. Thefirst reasons follows from Tables 4.2 to Table 4.5, as discussed above, there is agap in the time series literature summarized in these tables that is worthbridging.Second, results from time series studies can be sued to make country specificpolicy recommendations. The need for individual remedies, is highlighted in theliterature for instance in the case of the “Spanish disease” (Dolado and Jimeno,1997, p.1304). This is not always possible in a panel data, e.g. in the widelycited Bassanini and Duval (2009), conclusions refer to the “average OECDcountry”, p.53.Third, panel data techniques imposes homogeneity of coefficients across thecountries, and as reported in section 3.2.2, this is controversial, and has alreadyled some authors to dismiss panel data studies in favour of time series, forinstance Arestis et al. (2007) or Gianella et al. (2008).Fourth, panel data are subject to the potential error measurement associatedwith definitions of unemployment. As reported in section 3.2.2, despite OECD’sand ILO’s efforts to produce standardized unemployment measures, there arereasons to believe they are still subject to local social norms about whatconstitutes “active job search” and “being employed” (Baker et al., 2007). Thisproblem might also exist in time series studies for large economies, but it iscertainly less likely to appear than in a panel of countries.
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Finally, time series techniques, in particular cointegration analysis togetherwith Error Correction Mechanisms (ECM), can replicate the division of“temporal horizons” considered in economic theory. By “temporal horizons” wemean that this methodology allows to study what variables determine the longrun unemployment equilibrium or NAIRU, but also the influence of thisequilibrium on the short run dynamics of unemployment, i.e. it also allows us tostudy the anchor properties of the NAIRU. The CVAR approach that we proposeto use has further virtues that we detail below.
5.3 Long run structural modeling, the CVAR approachIn the analysis of time series it is necessary to start by establishing theproperties of the series under consideration, in particular, whether they arestationary, also referred to as integrated of order zero ܫ(0), or whether theyhave a unit root or integrated of order one ܫ(1). This is far from trivial, becauseregressing a variable with a unit root on another ܫ(1) variable, can yieldspurious results unless these variables are cointegrated. To test the stationaryproperties of our data we use the ADF-GLS (Elliott et al., 1996) and KPSS tests(Kwiatkowski et al., 1992). In our case, evidence from these tests suggests thatall variables are ܫ(1) , tests results are reported in Appendix II, andconsequently it is necessary to proceed with cointegration analysis.Here, we follow the Cointegrated Vector Autoregressive (CVAR) approachproposed by Pesaran and Shin (2002). This approach consists of five steps,namely modeling, testing for cointegration, identifying long run relationships,estimating the VECM and Impulse Response functions, simulation of shocksusing IR functions.The main characteristic of this approach is that it imposes theoreticallymotivated restrictions on the long run relationships existing among a vector ofvariables, while it leaves their short-run dynamics depicted by an unrestrictedVAR system. This makes it very attractive for us because as noted in Table 4.1,the bulk of the hypotheses we aim to test refer to the long run unemploymentand real wages equilibria. In fact, the approach presented in Pesaran and Shin(2002), or some earlier versions of this paper, is already used in several studiesthat examine the determinants of the NAIRU and its anchor properties, such asArestis and Biefang-Frisancho Mariscal (1998), Arestis and Biefang-FrisanchoMariscal (2000), Palacio et al. (2006) or Arestis et al. (2007).In the following, our exposition of this methodology draws from Pesaran andShin (2002) and from its textbook presentation in Pesaran and Pesaran (2003,pp132-139,429-447) and Garrat et al. (2006, Chapter 6).
5.4 Model specificationThe starting point of the CVAR approach is the VAR representation of a vector
ݖ௧containing k variables that are ܫ(1), described by the following equation:
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5.1 ∆ݖ௧ = ܥ+ ߔଵ∆ݖ௧ି ଵ+⋯+ ߔ௣ିଵ∆ݖ௧ି ௣ାଵ + ߎݖ௧ି ଵ + ߣݔ௧+ ε௧Where ∆ݖ௧ is a vector containing the first difference of the k variables containedin ݖ௧. ܥ is a matrix of deterministic components, its composition is not trivialand appropriate discussion of this term is provided below. The matrix ߎdenotes the influence on ∆ݖ௧of the level or long run relationships existingamong variables contained in ݖ௧. These long run relationships, are also referredto as cointegrated vectors, we use these two terms indistinctively in the rest ofthis thesis. X௧ is a vector containing h exogenous I(0) variables. ߝ௧ is a vector oferror terms, Normally and Independently Distributed (NID) satisfying theclassical conditions, i.e. ߝ௧~ܰܫܦ(0, Σ). The subindex ݌denotes the lag order ofthe VAR system, chosen using the standard selection criteria, i.e. AIC and SBC.Matrix ߎ is the key element of our analysis, three scenarios are possibledepending on its rank denoted by ݎ, but only one is of relevance for us. In thefirst scenario, the rank of matrix ߎ is zero ݎ= 0. Recall that the rank of ߎ tellsus the number of linear combinations among the variables included in ݖ௧, thatare stationary, i.e. the number of cointegrated vectors that exist among thesevariables. Hence, finding ݎ= 0 means that there are no cointegrated vectorsamong the k variables contained in ݖ௧. In this case 5.1 reduces to a VAR(p-1)model for ∆ݖ௧.In the second scenario, the rank of matrix ߎ is ݎ= ,݇ in this case ߎ is said to befull rank. This means that there are ݇ linear combinations among the kvariables contained in ݖ௧ that are stationary, which suggest that each variable isstationary rather than ܫ(1). In this case, 5.1 can be re-written as a VAR(p)model for ݖ௧. In the third case, and this is the relevant case for us, the rank ofmatrix ߎ , is ݎ< ݇ , in this case ߎ is said to be rank deficient. This means thatthere are ݎlinear combinations that are stationary among the k variablescontained in ݖ௧, or ݎcointegrated vectors. This is the interesting case for usbecause then ߎ can be decomposed as follows: ߎ = ߛߚᇱwhere ߛ is a (ܭݔݎ)matrix and ߚᇱis a (ݎ݇ݔ ) matrix. Hence, ߎݖ௧ି ଵ can be rewritten as follows
ߎݖ௧ି ଵ = ߛߚᇱݖ௧ି ଵ, where ߚᇱݖ௧ି ଵ denote the long run relations or cointegratedvectors that exist among ݖ௧variables and ߛdenote the impact on each of theselong run relations over short-run dynamics of ݖ௧, i.e. ∆ݖ௧.Finding the rank of ߎ is key for our analysis, but before presenting the teststhat can help us to find out about the rank of ߎ , we need to discuss thecomposition of ܥ and customize this general notation for the purpose of ourresearch. Depending on what combination of intercepts and time trends ܥcontains, and whether these intercepts and time trends belong to the short-rundynamics of ݖ௧or to its long run relationships we can differentiate five cases,summarized by the following equations:
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5.2 ∆ݖ௧ = ߔଵ∆ݖ௧ି ଵ+⋯+ ߔ௣ିଵ∆ݖ௧ି ௣ାଵ + ߎݖ௧ି ଵ + ߣݔ௧+ ε௧5.3 ∆ݖ௧ = ߔଵ∆ݖ௧ି ଵ+⋯+ ߔ௣ିଵ∆ݖ௧ି ௣ାଵ + ߎ∗ݖ௧ି ଵ∗ + ߣݔ௧+ ε௧Where Π∗ = [Π, ଴ܿ] = Π[I୩, −μ]z୲ି ଵ∗ = ቂz௧ି ଵ1 ቃ5.4 ∆ݖ௧ = ଴ܿ + ߔଵ∆ݖ௧ି ଵ+⋯+ ߔ௣ିଵ∆ݖ௧ି ௣ାଵ + ߎݖ௧ି ଵ + ߣݔ௧+ ε௧5.5 ∆ݖ௧ = ଴ܿ + ߔଵ∆ݖ௧ି ଵ+⋯+ ߔ௣ିଵ∆ݖ௧ି ௣ାଵ + ߎ∗ݖ௧ି ଵ∗ + ߣݔ௧+ ε௧Where Π∗ = [Π, ଵܿ] = Π[I୩, −δ]
ݖ௧ି ଵ
∗ = ቂݖ௧ି ଵ
ܶ
ቃ5.6 ∆ݖ௧ = ଴ܿ + ଵܿݐ+ ߔଵ∆ݖ௧ି ଵ+⋯+ ߔ௣ିଵ∆ݖ௧ି ௣ାଵ + ߎݖ௧ି ଵ + ߣݔ௧+ ε௧In Case I, denoted by 5.2, ܥ = 0 , ܥ does neither contain intercepts nordeterministic trends. Case II, denoted by 5.3, ܥ = ଴ܿ and ଴ܿ = −ߎߤwhere ߤ is a( ݇ݔ1) vector of unknown coefficients. In this case ܥ only contains interceptasthat belongs (or are restricted) to the long run relationships rather than theshort-run dynamics. Case III, denoted by 5.4, ܥ = ଴ܿ and ଴ܿ ≠ −Πμ. In this case,
ܥ only contains an intercept that belongs to the short-run dynamics. Case IV,denoted by 5.5, ܥ = ଴ܿ + ଵܿ ,ܶ ଴ܿ ≠ −Πμ and ଵܿ = −Πδ where δ is a ( ݇ݔ1) vectorof unknown coefficients. In this case, ܥ contains both intercepts and timetrends, the time trends belongs (or are restricted) to the long run relationships,while the intercepts remain unrestricted and belongs to the short-rundynamics. Case V, denoted by 5.6, ܥ = ଴ܿ + ଵܿ ,ܶ ଴ܿ ≠ −Πμ and ଵܿ ≠ −Πδ. In thiscase, ܥ contains intercepts and time trends both belonging to the short-rundynamics.The appropriate choice among these specifications depends upon thecharacteristics of variables contained in ݖ௧. Pesaran et al. (2000)31 show thatwhen matrix ߎ is rank deficient, using unrestricted versions such as case III andV, i.e. 5.4 and 5.6, generate quadratic trends in ݖ௧, in a number that dependsupon how many cointegrated vectors exist among these variables. Hence, toavoid this problem they recommend to adopt Case II, i.e. equation 5.3, whenvariables in ݖ௧do not contain deterministic trend, and to adopt Case IV, i.e.equation 5.5, when variables in ݖ௧have a deterministic trend.In order to better illustrate the usefulness of this techniques for our researchpurpose, let’s customize the above notation according to variables of relevance
31 See also Pesaran and Pesaran (2003, p.135,p.432)
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for our theoretical model. In our case, ݖ௧contains nine variables which form a(9ݔ1) vector as follows32:
ݖ௧ =
⎝
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎛
ݓ௧− ݌௧
ݕ௧− ௧݈
ݑ௧
݈ݑ௧
݃ݎݎ௧
ݐ௧
௪
݉ ݈݅௧
௧݇
௧݅− ∆݌௧⎠
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎞
Some of these variables seem to have a time trend, see Appendix II, hence, inorder to avoid the problem of quadratic trends highlighted above, in ourempirical work we adopt Case’s IV specification, i.e. equation 5.5, where ݖ௧ି ଵ∗contains all the variables from ݖ௧plus a time trend ܶ:
ݖ௧ି ଵ
∗ = ቂݖ௧ି ଵ
ܶ
ቃ, ݖ௧∗ =
⎝
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎛
ݓ௧− ݌௧
ݕ௧− ௧݈
ݑ௧
݈ݑ௧
݃ݎݎ௧
ݐ௧
௪
݉ ݈݅௧
௧݇
௧݅− ∆݌௧
ܶ ⎠
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎞
Further, considering the composition of ݖ௧and ݖ௧∗, and assuming that ߎ∗is rankdeficient33, i.e. ߎ∗ = [ߎ , ଵܿ] = [ߛߚᇱ, ଵܿ], we can now rewrite equation 5.5 usingthe notation from our theoretical model as follows:
5.7
⎝
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎛
∆(ݓ௧− ݌௧)
∆(ݕ௧− ௧݈)
∆ݑ௧
∆ ݈ݑ௧
∆݃ݎݎ௧
∆ݐ௧
௪
∆݉ ݈݅௧
∆ ௧݇
∆( ௧݅− ∆݌௧)⎠⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎞
= ଴ܿ + ߔଵ∆ݖ௧ି ଵ+⋯+ ߔ௣ିଵ∆ݖ௧ି ௣ାଵ + ߛߚᇱ
⎝
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎛
ݓ௧ି ଵ− ݌௧ି ଵ
ݕ௧ି ଵ− ௧݈ି ଵ
ݑ௧ି ଵ
݈ݑ௧ି ଵ
݃ݎݎ௧ି ଵ
ݐ௧ି ଵ
௪
݉ ݈݅௧ି ଵ
௧݇ି ଵ
௧݅ି ଵ− ∆݌௧ି ଵ
ܶ ⎠
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎞
+ ߣݔ௧+ ε௧
Where ଴ܿ is (9ݔ1) vector of intercepts, according to our encompassing modelthere are two long run relationships among the variables contained in ݖ௧,denoted by equation 4.4 and 4.5, hence a priori we expect ߚᇱto be a (2ݔ10)matrix of coefficients, where each row denotes the coefficients that eachvariable takes in each of these two long run relations. Further, accordingly weexpect ߛ to be a (9ݔ2) matrix, of coefficients capturing the impact of each ofthese two long run relations over the short-run dynamics of each variable in
∆ݖ௧, hence ߛߚᇱݖ௧ି ଵ∗ can also be written as follows:
32 Due to data limitation discussed in Chapter 6, In the case of Germany ݖ௧ is a (8ݔ1) vectordescribed as follows ݖ௧ = ൫ݓݐ− ݌ݐ,ݕݐ− ݈ݐ,ݑݐ, ݈ݑݐ,݃ݎݎݐ,ݐݐݓ , ݇ݐ, ݅ݐ− ∆݌ݐ൯ᇱ. Consequently, for thiscountry, we expect ߚᇱto be a (2ݔ8) matrix and ߛa (8ݔ2) matrix.33 Recall that otherwise, there are no long run relationships among our variables.
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ߛߚᇱݖ௧ି ଵ
∗ =
⎝
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎛
ߛଵଵ ߛଵଶ
ߛଶଵ ߛଶଶ
ߛଷଵ ߛଷଶ
ߛସଵ ߛସଶ
ߛହଵ ߛହଶ
ߛ଺ଵ ߛ଺ଶ
ߛ଻ଵ ߛ଻ଶ
଼ߛ ଵ ଼ߛ ଶ
ߛଽଵ ߛଽଶ⎠
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎞
൬
ߚଵଵ ߚଵଶ ߚଵଷ ߚଵସ ߚଵହ ߚଵ଺ ߚଵ଻ ߚଵ଼ ߚଵଽ ߚଵଵ଴
ߚଶଵ ߚଶଶ ߚଶଷ ߚଶସ ߚଶହ ߚଶ଺ ߚଶ଻ ߚଶ଼ ߚଶଽ ߚଶଵ଴
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⎟
⎟
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⎟
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Finally, x௧ is a column vector with ݍ+ ݆rows composed of exogenousstationary variables, such as those capturing the effect of external shocks ∆݌௧ି ௤௩௠ ,and stationary dummy variables ܦ௝, which accommodate serial correlationand/or outliners problems. We decompose x௧as follows:
x௧ =
⎝
⎜
⎜
⎛
∆݌௧ି ଵ
௩௠
⋮
∆݌௧ି ௤
௩௠
ܦଵ
⋮
ܦ௝ ⎠
⎟
⎟
⎞
Where ∆݌௧ି ௤௩௠ denotes the last lag of a variable that captures the evolution ofreal imported raw materials inflation, and ܦ௝ is the ݆௧௛ dummy variableconsidered. The specific lag structure of ∆݌௧ି ௤௩௠ and the necessary number ofdummies is an empirical issue and is left undefined at this stage. Accordingly, λis a matrix of (9ݔ[ݍ+ ]݆) capturing the effect of each of the variables in ݔ௧over
∆ݖ௧. Finally ε௧ is a (9ݔ1) matrix of error terms.
5.5 Cointegration testWe turn now to the discussion of statistical tests that can help us determine therank of matrix ߎ , that is, to find how many cointegrated vectors exist amongour variables. For this purpose, we use the well-known Johansen’s approachand employ the Maximum eigenvalue test ߣ௠ ௔௫ and the Trace test ߣ௧௥௔௖௘. Bothtest are sequential, they start with the null hypothesis of ݎ= 0, if rejected thena new null hypothesis of ݎ≤ 1 is tested, and again if rejected a new nullhypothesis of ݎ≤ 2 is tested. This process continues until we fail to reject thecorresponding null hypothesis. Formally, under the null that rank of matrix ߎ isequal to ݎ଴, ܪ଴: ݎ≤ ݎ଴:
ߣ௠ ௔௫(ݎ଴) = −݊ ݋݈݃ ൫1 − ߣመ௥బାଵ൯
ߣ௧௥௔௖௘(ݎ଴) = −݊∑ ݋݈݃ ൫1 − ߣመ௜൯௞௜ୀ௥బାଵWhere ݊ is the number of observation, ߣመ௥బାଵ and ߣመ௜are the eigenvalues ofhigher order for which ൫1 − ߣመ௥బାଵ൯and ൫1 − ߣመ௜൯are zero. For a further technicaldetails see Pesaran and Pesaran (2003, p329) and Garrat et al. (2006,p.122).Critical values for these tests depend upon the specification chosen for ܥ, hencein our case we consider the critical values corresponding to Case IV.
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Finally, two caveats need to be taken into consideration when interpreting theresults from the Maximum Eigenvalue and Trace tests: First, the results fromthese tests tend to be contradictory (Pesaran and Pesaran, 2003,p.293). Second,inference needs to be carried with care, because their critical values arecomputed using asymptotic theory, and they might lead to erroneousconclusions in finite samples (Garrat et al., 2006,p. 140). On this regard, Cheungand Lai (1993) find that in finite samples, the size of the test, i.e. the probabilityof rejecting the null hypothesis when it is correct, increases with the number ofvariables considered and the lag order of the system. Further, in the samepaper it is also shown that size of the tests increase when some of the originalassumptions are breached. In particular, when the residuals from equationsused to compute the test, in our case equation 5.7, are not normally distributedand when the data generating process is a moving average rather than anautoregressive process. This size biases, could lead to the conclusion that thereare more cointegrated vectors than actually exist.In our analysis, we encounter these problems when using the MaximumEigenvalue and Trace tests in Chapter 7 to Chapter 10. To overcome theseshort-comings, we follow the advice of Pesaran and Pesaran (2003,p.293) andGarrat et al. (2006, p.198) who suggest that when using finite samples, theresearcher needs to interpret the results from the tests together with economictheory, that is, make an overall judgment weighting the tests’ results againsttheir biases in finites samples and the predictions from economic theory.
5.6 Identifying the long run relationshipsThe Maximum eigenvalue and the Trace tests provide information regardingthe number of cointegrated vectors among the variables contained in ݖ௧. Butthey do not provide any information with regard to the composition of thosecointegrated vectors, i.e. what variables are contained in each of them.Formally, this can be shown by noting that different ߛand ߚ, can generate thesame matrix ߎ , in other words, the eigenvalue and trace test tell us the space inwhich matrix ߚ and ߛspan, its dimensions, but not their composition. In orderto obtain unique values for matrix ߚ and ߛwe need to impose some form ofnormalization over ߚ.Following Pesaran and Shin (2002), we draw the identifying restrictions fromour theoretical model and use the Likelihood Ratio (LR) test they provide toassess the validity of these restrictions. This type of identification process is incontrast to those proposed by Johansen (1988), Phillips (1991), Johansen(1991 ), in which identifying schedules are based on their statistical properties.Our approach has the advantage that it delivers estimates of the long runrelationships that are economically meaningful. Furthermore, Pesaran and Shin(2002) theoretically driven approach provides an excellent framework to testthe restrictions over the NAIRU and the long run real wages equilibrium that
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the models embedded in our encompassing model require. Hence, we can treateach set of restrictions as a separate identifying schedule and then test theirsignificance using the Likelihood Ratio (LR) test.Let’s now explain how we device these identifying schedules. We need ݎଶrestrictions to just identify ݎ long run relationships. According to ourencompassing model there are two cointegrated vectors among the variablescontained in ݖ௧, the first denote by equation 4.4 illustrates a long runrelationships between unemployment and a set of variables, which we caninterpret as the NAIRU given the long run nature of the relationship they sharewith. The second denotes by equation 4.5 illustrates a long run relationshipsbetween real wages and a set of variables, which we can interpret as the realwages long run equilibrium.Hence, given our a priori of ݎ= 2 we need four just-identifying restrictions: Weidentify equation 4.4 in the first cointegrated vector and equation 4.5 in thesecond cointegrated vector by impose two normalization restrictions ߚଵଷ = 1and ߚଶଵ = 1 , and two exclusion restrictions ߚଶଷ = 0 and ߚଵଵ = 0 . Theserestrictions ensure that in the first vector we identify the variables that arecointegrated with unemployment, and in the second, the variables which arecointegrated with real wages. This just-identified ߚmatrix is denoted by ߚ௃ூ inthe second column of Table 5.1. The matrix ߚ௃ூcan be thought as the version ofthe matrix ߚ that describes our encompassing model.Then we introduce in turn, the sets of restrictions that each of the theoreticalmodel embedded in our encompassing model require. For that purpose wedraw from the restrictions from rows iv) to vii) of Table 4.1: First, therestrictions suggested by LNJ, denoted by ߚ௅ே௃ in Table 5.1, on the one hand,
ߚଵଶ = ߚଵସ = ߚଵ଼ = ߚଵଽ = 0 implying that productivity, long termunemployment, capital stock and real long term interest rates have no impacton unemployment’s cointegrated vector.On the other hand, ߚଶସ = ߚଶ଼ = ߚଶଽ = 0 imply that neither long termunemployment, nor capital stock nor real interest rates have an effect over thereal wage equilibrium. Further, indicating long run unit-proportionalitybetween real wages and productivity, we impose ߚଶଶ = −1. Finally, in thismodel there is no suggestion that neither the NAIRU nor the real wagesequilibrium have a time trend, therefore we add restrictions ߚଵଵ଴ = 0 and
ߚଶଵ଴ = 0. This is generally referred to the cotrending hypothesis, because in theevent it held, it means that variables in the cointegrated vector share a non-deterministic trend or co-trend together as in opposite to trending along a timetrend. Recall that these trends are included because some variables seem tohave a time trend and it followed from modeling rather than from theoreticalconsiderations.
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ݖ௧
∗ ߚ௃ூ ߚ௅ே௃ ߚ஻ௌ ߚ୅ୗୖ ୖߚ ୌ
ݓ௧− ݌௧ 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
ݕ௧− ௧݈ ߚଵଶ ߚଶଶ 0 -1 0 -1 ߚଵଶ -1 0 -1
ݑ௧ 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
݈ݑ௧ ߚଵସ ߚଶସ 0 0 ߚଵସ ߚଶସ 0 0 0 0
݃ݎݎ௧ ߚଵହ ߚଶହ ߚଵହ ߚଶହ ߚଵହ ߚଶହ ߚଵହ ߚଶହ ߚଵହ ߚଶହ
ݐ௧
௪ ߚଵ଺ ߚଶ଺ ߚଵ଺ ߚଶ଺ ߚଵ଺ ߚଶ଺ ߚଵ଺ ߚଶ଺ ߚଵ଺ ߚଶ଺
݉ ݈݅௧ ߚଵ଻ ߚଶ଻ ߚଵ଻ ߚଶ଻ ߚଵ଻ ߚଶ଻ ߚଵ଻ ߚଶ଻ ߚଵ଻ ߚଶ଻
௧݇ ߚଵ଼ ߚଶ଼ 0 0 0 0 ߚଵ଼ ߚଶ଼ 0 0
௧݅− ∆݌௧ ߚଵଽ ߚଶଽ 0 0 0 0 0 0 ߚଵଽ ߚଶଽ
ܶ ߚଵଵ଴ ߚଶଵ଴ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 5.1. Theoretically motivated identifying restrictions for the matrix ࢼSecond, the restrictions inspired by the labour market hysteresis approach(Blanchard and Summers, 1986), which corresponds to ߚ஻ௌ in Table 5.1. Themeaning of the restrictions would be as above. Third, we introduce therestrictions required by the claims about productivity and capital stock madeby Rowthorn (1995) and Arestis and Sawyer (2005), which corresponds to ߚ
୅ୗୖin Table 5.1. The meaning of the restrictions would be as above. Finally, weintroduce the restrictions inspired by the claims about real long term interestrates (Rowthorn, 1999, p.422, Hein, 2006), which corresponds ߚோு in Table 5.1.The meaning of the restrictions would be as above. Further, ߚ஻ௌ, ߚ୅ୗୖ and ߚோுalso include the cotrending hypothesis, as none of these model suggests thatneither the NAIRU nor the real wages equilibrium have a time trend. Finally, itshould be noted that the coefficients for ݃ݎݎ௧, ݐ௧௪ and ݉ ݈݅௧are left unrestricted in
ߚ஻ௌ, ߚ୅ୗୖ and ߚோு because these models do not deny that exogenous factors canaffect the NAIRU.The validity of each set of restrictions can then be tested using the followingLikelihood Ratio (LR) test:
ܴܮ (ߚᇱ= ߚ௤ᇱ) = 2൫݈ ௥݈మ − ݈݈௤൯~ܺ௅ோଶ (ݍ− ݎଶ)Where ߚᇱ= ߚ௤ᇱ denotes the null hypothesis that matrix ߚᇱ is equal to arestricted version of it with ݍover-identifying restrictions. ݈݈௥మ is the maximumvalue of the log-likelihood function obtained under ݎଶ just identifiedrestrictions. ݈݈௤ is the maximum value of the log-likelihood function obtainedunder ݍ over-identifying restrictions (Pesaran and Shin, 2002). See alsoPesaran and Pesaran (2003, p.443) or Garrat et al. (2006, p.128).This approach has a number of practical difficulties that need to be addressed.First, estimated coefficients are obtained using a Maximum Likelihood (ML)function. It is well documented that this methodology is extremely sensitive,and it is not always possible to obtain converging results (Pesaran and Pesaran,2003). Garrat, et al. (2006, p. 199) advices to introduce over identifiedrestrictions with a meaningful sequence, to make the most of the informationcontained in the data. In our analysis, we encounter this problem in several
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occasions, and following their advice we experiment introducing the same setof restrictions following different sequences.
5.7 The Short run dynamics: VECMHaving identified the matrix ߚᇱof long run coefficients from ߎ∗ = [ߛߚᇱ, ଵܿ], weturn now to the estimation of ߛ. Let’s start by denoting ߦ௧ି ଵ as the lagged errorterm from our cointegrated vectors or long run errors, hence:
5.8 ߦ௧ି ଵ = ൬ߦଵ,௧ି ଵߦଶ,௧ି ଵ൰= ൬ߚଵଵ ߚଵଶ ߚଵଷ ߚଵସ ߚଵହ ߚଵ଺ ߚଵ଻ ߚଵ଼ ߚଵଽ ߚଵଵ଴ߚଶଵ ߚଶଶ ߚଶଷ ߚଶସ ߚଶହ ߚଶ଺ ߚଶ଻ ߚଶ଼ ߚଶଽ ߚଶଵ଴൰
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In the first row, ߦଵ,௧ି ଵ accounts for errors from the first cointegrated vector,whereas, in the second row ߦଶ,௧ି ଵ, denotes the errors from the second long runrelationship. By plugging equation 5.8 into 5.7, and expanding the matrix ߛweobtain what is generally referred to as the Vector Error Correction Model(VECM) formulation of our empirical specification, here denoted by thefollowing equation:
5.9
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= ଴ܿ + ߔଵ∆ݖ௧ି ଵ+⋯+ ߔ௣ିଵ∆ݖ௧ି ௣ାଵ +
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൬
ߦଵ,௧ି ଵ
ߦଶ,௧ି ଵ൰+ ߣݔ௧+ ε௧
The Interest in this formulation resides in the fact that equation 5.9 describesthe vector ∆ݖ௧as a function of a vector of long run errors ߦ௧ି ଵ sometimesreferred to as Error Correction Mechanism (ECM) terms, hence the name VECMfor this formulation. The rest of terms have the same meaning as in 5.7. In ourcase, considering that ߦଵ,௧ି ଵ accounts for the error term from the firstcointegrated vector, in which we aim to identify the variables that share a longrun relationship with unemployment, i.e. the NAIRU. We can interpret theseerrors as deviations from the NAIRU. Hence, the first column of coefficients in γtells us about the impact of these deviations over the variables in ∆ݖ௧. Similarly,
ߦଶ,௧ି ଵ can be interpreted as deviations of real wages from their long runequilibrium. Therefore, the second column of coefficients of γ, tells us about theimpact of these deviations over the variables in ∆ݖ௧.The matrix of coefficients γ can easily be estimated by estimating equation 5.9using the standard Ordinary Least Square (OLS) procedure, because all thesecomponents in this equation are stationary: Since z௧ is a vector of ܫ(1)
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variables, the vector of its first difference ∆ݖ௧can only contain ܫ(0) variables,similarly with lags of ∆ݖ௧. The components of ߦ௧ି ଵ are also ܫ(0) because theydescribe the errors of two cointegrated vectors, which by definition arestationary. Finally, x௧ is a vector of ܫ(0) variables by construction. Thus,equation 5.9 can be estimated by OLS without risk of estimating a spuriousregression.The matrix formulation from equation 5.9 summarizes nine equations, one foreach of the nine variables included in ∆ݖ௧, we are particularly interested in ∆ݑ௧,here reproduced for the sake of clarity:5.10 ∆u୲= ଷܿ଴ + ߔଵ∆ݖ௧ି ଵ+⋯+ ߔ௣ିଵ∆ݖ௧ି ௣ାଵ + ߛଷଵߦଵ,௧ି ଵ + ߛଷଶߦଶ,௧ି ଵ + ߣݔ௧+ ε௧Equation 5.10 describes unemployment dynamics as a function of an intercept
ଷܿ଴, lagged values of the first differences of variables contained in ∆z௧, thevector x௧of lagged imported raw materials inflation and dummy variables. Andcrucially the long run errors from the unemployment cointegrated vector ߦଵ,௧ି ଵand the real wages cointegrated vector ߦଶ,௧ି ଵ, which can be interpreted asdeviations from the NAIRU and the real wages long run equilibrium. Hence,equation 5.10 can be used to assess the impact of deviations from the NAIRUover unemployment dynamics ∆ݑ௧, in particular to assess if these deviationsgenerate corrective movements over ∆ݑ௧, meaning that the NAIRU serve as ananchor for actual unemployment.It can readily be argued that 5.10 is the empirical counterpart of equation 4.6.Where ߛଷଵ tell us the effect of deviations from the NAIRU over ∆ݑ௧: If ߛଷଵ < 0deviations from the NAIRU in ݐ− 1 provoke changes of actual unemployment in
ݐin the opposite direction. For instance, when unemployment grows above thelong run in ݐ− 1 it provokes a reduction of actual unemployment in ݐwhichcorrects the deviation, and vice versa. Hence, the sign of ߛଷଵ tells us whetherunemployment gravitates around the NAIRU or not. The intensity of the anchorcan be evaluated by the size of the coefficient, for instance, if ߛଷଵ = −1, it meansthat 100% of the unemployment deviation from the NAIRU occurred in ݐ− 1, iscorrected for in the following period. In this case, the NAIRU is a very stronganchor. Hence, testing ߛଷଵ = −1 in equation 5.10 is the empirical counterpart ofthe restrictions in row viii) of Table 4.1.
5.8 Impulse response analysisWe complete our analysis estimating and plotting the Generalized ImpulseResponse (GIR) functions of the variables contained in the vector ݖ௧. GIRfunctions allow us simulating the response of ݖ௧ to a shock equivalent to onestandard deviation of the error term in one of the equations in 5.9, this issometimes referred to as unit shock. Hence, plots of the GIR function presentthe researcher with a diagrammatical illustration of the effects of a shock. For
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technical details of GIR in a CVAR systems like the one considered here seePesaran and Pesaran (2003, p.427) or Garrat et al. (2006, p.142).In our case, we simulate an unemployment shock equivalent to one standarddeviation of the error term in equation 5.10, denoted by ߪகොయ. The purpose is togather further evidence of the anchor properties of the NAIRU to complementthe VECM results. If we observe that unemployment returns quickly to its pre-shock level, we can infer that the NAIRU acts as a strong anchor forunemployment. On the contrary, if unemployment drifts away from its baseline,we can infer that the NAIRU has no anchor power at all, or that this is verylimited.
5.9 SummaryThis chapter provides a technical description of the CVAR approach employedin this thesis and illustrates its usefulness to answer our research questions.The main characteristic of this approach is that it imposes theoreticallymotivated restrictions, on the long run relationships existing among a vector ofvariables, while it leaves their short-run dynamics unrestricted. This makes itvery attractive for us, because the bulk of the hypotheses we aim to test refer tothe NAIRU and the long run real wages equilibria, which are long runrelationships by definition.Table 5.1 summarizes the restrictions that we aim to impose on the long runrelationships, this draws from the restrictions to the reduced form equations ofTable 4.1, which summarize the restrictions that each model embedded intoour encompassing model requires. Hence, by testing the restrictions in Table5.1 we can assess the validity of the claims made by each of these nestedmodels with regard to the NAIRU determinants.Further, the VECM formulation of the CVAR, in particular its equation for ∆ݑ௧denoted by equation 5.10, allows us to test the impact of deviations from theNAIRU on unemployment dynamics to assess the anchor properties of theNAIRU. This can be regarded as the empirical counterpart of equation 4.6, andhence can be used to test the hypothesis over the anchor properties of theNAIRU from Table 4.1.
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Chapter 6 Data
6.1 IntroductionThe purpose of this chapter is to present the key features of the data used inthis thesis. We start with a general overview of the data that discusses itsgeographic and time scope. Then we turn to the specifics of the variablesemployed in our analysis and provide details of their sources and definitions.This includes a discussion of interpolation methods used. Finally, we inspectvisually the relevant variables and discuss the key features of their evolution inour sample period.The chapter is structured as follows: Section 6.2 gives a birds-eye view of ourdata. Section 6.3 provides details of the variables’ definitions and sources.Section 6.4 discusses issues regarding the interpolation methods employed.Section 6.5 presents figures for all the variables. Section 6.6 closes the chapterwith a summary of its content.
6.2 Data overviewOur data comprises eight country data sets, one for each of the eight EUmember states studied here: The UK, the Netherlands, Germany, France, Italy,Spain, Denmark and Finland. Data are quarterly and cover the period from1980 to 2007 with some country variations that we discuss below. Table 6.1provides a snap shoot of each of these eight country data sets:
UK Netherlands Germany France Italy Spain Denmark FinlandVariables w-p w-p w-p w-p w-p w-p w-p w-p
y-l y-l y-l y-l y-l y-l y-l y-l
u u u u u u u u
lu lu lu lu lu lu lu lu
grr grr grr grr grr grr grr grr
ݐ௪ ݐ௪ ݐ௪ ݐ௪ ݐ௪ ݐ௪ ݐ௪ ݐ௪
mil mil mil mil mil mil mil
k k k k k k k k
݅− ∆݌ ݅− ∆݌ ݅− ∆݌ ݅− ∆݌ ݅− ∆݌ ݅− ∆݌ ݅− ∆݌ ݅− ∆݌
݌௩௠ ݌௩௠ ݌௩௠ ݌௩௠ ݌௩௠ ݌௩௠ ݌௩௠ ݌௩௠Dummy ܦ05ݍ4 ܦ87ݍ4 ܦ97ݍ123Sample’sStart point: 1984q1 1987q1 1992q4 1980q1 1983q4 1980q1 1990q1 1988q1End point: 2007q4 2007q4 2007q4 2004q4 2007q4 2007q4 2007q4 2007q4Number ofobservations: 96 84 61 100 97 112 72 80
Table 6.1. Time and geographical span of each country’s data setEach country data set contains the following variables (in logs): real wages
ݓ − ݌, labour productivity ݕ− ,݈ unemployment ݑ, long term unemployment
݈ݑ, a measure of unemployment benefits ݃ݎݎ, the tax wedge ݐ௪ , a measure ofunions’ power ݉ ݈݅, capital stock ,݇ long term real interest rates ݅− ∆݌and ameasure of real cost of imported raw materials ݌௩௠ . The datasets of the UK,Spain and Finland also include a dummy variable denoted by ܦ05ݍ4,ܦ87ݍ4
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and ܦ97ݍ123 respectively, which control for one-off exceptional events. Adetail description of all variables is provided in the next section.The span of the data set varies from country to country: Spain, France, Italy andthe UK have the longest data spans with above or around a hundredobservations. The Netherlands and Finland also have reasonably large datasetswith eighty or above observations. Denmark and Germany have the smallestdata sets, with only seventy-two and sixty-one observations respectively.The start point is determined in all cases by data availability. It is worthmentioning that in the case of Germany this is strictly determined by theavailability of consistent data for reunified Germany34. The last observationcorresponds to the fourth quarter of 2007 for the countries except for France,whose data set ends in 2004. This is due to a break in the tax-wedge series forthe French economy, which we cannot correct for, further details on this issueare provided in section 6.3.6. The end point of our data sets coincides with thebeginning of the ongoing economic crisis in the turn from 2007 to 2008.Most of the data come from OECD’s sources and Eurostat’s statistical office,although we also use data from the IMF statistical offices.
6.3 Variable definitions and sources
6.3.1 Real wagesReal wages ݓ − ݌: Difference between logarithm of nominal average wage ݓand the logarithm of Consumer Price Index (CPI) denoted by ݌. Logarithm ofnominal average wage (ݓ) is computed by taking the logarithm of the ratiobetween the “compensation of employees” (CE) component of GDP over totalemployment (TE).
CE is a nominal, seasonally adjusted variable measured in millions of Nationalcurrency units, which is defined as: “Total remuneration, in cash or in kind,payable by an employer to an employee in return for work done by the latterduring the accounting period. Compensation of employees is broken down into:a) wages and salaries: wages and salaries in cash; wages and salaries in kind; b)employers’ social contributions: employers’ actual social contributions;employers’ imputed social contributions” (Eurostat, 2010). CE is downloadedfrom Eurostat statistical postal (Eurostat, 2010), [d1] in the publishers codesystem.
TE is a labour force survey measure of employment which includes armedforces (conscripts as well as professional military), with some exception:Figures for Germany and Denmark are based on the National Accounts. In the
34 We contemplated the possibility of linking this data set with pre-reunification data. However,the time cost of data search was greater than the gains, which seemed marginal in a studywhich already considered another seven countries.
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French case, INSEE provides quarterly series on civilian employment, which areadded to armed forces figures by OECD (2009). TE data are downloaded fromOECD’s Economic Outlook no.86 (OECD, 2009).
݌ is the log of the Consumer Price Index (base=2005), for all items and thewhole economy, published by OECD in their statistical portal (OECD, 2010d). Itis worth noting that CPI index is based on the national definition as oppose tothe Harmonized Consumer Price Index (HCPI) produced by Eurostat, which isonly available for a shorter sample period.Further, it should be noted that this measure of real wages is created followingthe definition of “real compensation” published in OECD’s Economic Outlook,which is calculated by taking the “ratio of all wages and salaries paid to wageearners plus all non-wage labour costs paid by employers (e.g. tounemployment insurance, social security, pensions) to the number ofemployees” OECD (2009, table 11). The rationale to follow this definition is thatit is used in similar studies, for instance Arestis et al. (2007) and Karanassou etal. (2008a).
6.3.2 ProductivityProductivity (ݕ− )݈: (logarithm) of the ratio of real GDP over total employment
݋݈݃ ቂቀ
ீ஽௉
஼௉ூ
ቁ ܶܧ⁄ ቃ. Where GDP is the nominal, seasonally adjusted Gross DomesticProduct measure in millions of National currency units published by Eurostat(2010), [b1gm] in the publishers code system. Real GDP is calculated bydeflating this nominal measure of GDP using the CPI measure described above.Finally, TE is the total employment measure also described above.
6.3.3 UnemploymentUnemployment rate ݑ: (logarithm) of unemployment rates based on LabourForce Surveys according to Eurostat’s procedures to derive the HarmonizedUnemployment Rates (HURs). Data downloaded from OECD’s (2009) EconomicOutlook no.86. [UNR] as per OECD’s code system. This measure ofunemployment is widely used in the literature, see for instance Nickell et al.(2005), Arestis et al. (2007) or Bassanini and Duval (2009).The rationale to use the logarithm of the unemployment rate, rather than therate itself, follows from the fact that using rates –in preliminary estimations-we encountered multiple non-converging problems when estimating the longrun coefficients. This is typical of Maximum Likelihood estimations, see section5.5. In our case, using logs of all variables, including logarithm of theunemployment rate alleviated this problem considerably and we adopt thismanipulation. This has the upshot that estimates can be interpreted aselasticities.
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A measure of the NAIRU, or a proxy for structural unemployment such as six orfive years average, is sometimes employed in panel data studies that addressthe same questions as this thesis, see for instance Nickell (1998), Blanchard andWolfers (2000) or Stockhammer and Klar (2008). Using cointegration analysisthis is unnecessary, because cointegration allows us to identify long runrelationships, and a variable that has a long run relationship withunemployment must influence the NAIRU, see for instance Arestis et al. (2007)or Schreiber (2012).
6.3.4 Long-term unemploymentLong-term unemployment ݈ݑ: (logarithm) of ratio of long term unemployedworkers (ܷܶܮ ) over total number of unemployed workers (ܷܶ) multiplied byone hundred. TLU is the number of unemployed workers that have been out ofwork for 52 weeks (one year) or more. Data are downloaded from the LabourForce Surveys reported in OECD statistical portal (OECD, 2010d). ܷܶ is theheadcount measure of OECD’s [UNR] described above, i.e. it measures thenumber of unemployed workers in thousands. A similar procedure is followedin the literature to generate a long-term unemployment variable, see Layard etal. (1991, p.422).Data for long-term unemployment is only available with annual frequency andlinear interpolation is used to obtain quarterly observations. Further details onthe interpolation method are provided in the section 6.3.11.
6.3.5 Unemployment benefitsUnemployment benefits ݃ݎݎ: (logarithm) of OECD’s “Gross Replacement Rates”calculated as the ratio between out-of-work benefits and in-work earningstimes hundred.Benefits are computed considering a worker of 40 years old, who hascontinuously worked since s/he was 20 years old, and therefore s/he is fullyentitled to maximum benefits, and considering her/his family situations (single,with dependent spouse, and with spouse in work) and three durationcategories (first year, second and third year, fourth and fifth year), which givesplace to nine levels of unemployment benefits.The in-work earnings measure is the Average Production Worker (APW) wagesdefined by OECD as workers in ISIC industry sector D, i.e. manufacturing. Twolevels of earnings are considered 100% and 67% of APW. Each of the ninebenefit levels are divided by the two earnings measures delivering eighteenreplacement rates which are then averaged into the single measure used here.Data are downloaded from OECD (2010a). For further details in thecomputation procedure of these variables see Martin (1996) and OECD (1994,Chapter 8).
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Data for Gross Replacement rates are only available with biannual frequencyand linear interpolation is necessary to obtain quarterly data, see section6.3.11.
6.3.6 Tax-wedgeTax-wedge ݐ௪ : (logarithm) of OECD’s “Tax-wedge (old definition)” linked withOECD’s Tax-wedge (new definition). In both cases, old and new definition, thetax-wedge is calculated as the ratio of taxation paid by workers over averagelabour costs.Taxation includes the income tax, employees and employer’s social security35minus cash transfers corresponding to a worker earning 100% of averagewages, under two different family situations (single no children and marriedcouple with one earner and two children). Labour cost includes gross earningsand employers social contribution corresponding to a worker earning 100% ofaverage wages. The following formula summarizes these calculations:
ݐ௪ = ݋݈݃ ቆ݅݊ ݋ܿ݉ ݁ܽݐ ݔ+ ݁݉ ݌ ݋݈ݕ݁݁ ′ݏݏ݋ܿ ݅ܽ ݈݁ݏ ܿݑ݅ݎݐݕ+ ݁݉ ݌ ݋݈ݕ ݁ݎᇱݏ݋ܿ ݅ܽ ݈݁ݏ ܿݑ݅ݎݐݕ− ܿܽ ݏℎݐܽݎ ݂݊ݏ ݁ݎݏ
݃ݎ݋ݏݏ݁ܽ݊ݎ ݅݊ ݃ݏ+ ݁݉ ݌ ݋݈ݕ ݁ݎݏ݋ܿ ݅ܽ ݈݁ݏ ܿݑ݅ݎݐݕ ቇFollowing the procedure employed by OECD in computing the ݃ݎݎ, we averagethe two tax-wedges depending on family situation to obtain a summaryindicator. Annual series for the Tax-wedge (old definition), with annualfrequency, were kindly provided by Bert (2009) from the Tax Policy andStatistics Division (Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, OECD), while theTax-wedge (new definition), also with annual frequency, are downloaded fromOECD statistical portal (OECD, 2010d). Data for tax-wedge are only availablewith annual frequency and linear interpolation is employed to obtain quarterlydata, see section 6.3.11.There are only two differences between the Tax-wedge (old definition) and theTax-wedge (new definition) (OECD, 2005c): First, the time span they cover, theold definition covers the period 1980 to 2004 whereas the new definition onlycovers the period between 2000 and 2007. Second, the earnings measureconsidered, old definition considers is the Average Production Wages (APW),which only includes manufacturing (sector D in ISIC Rev.3). Whereas, the new
definition considers the Average Wages (AW), which includes not onlymanufacturing but also Mining and quarrying, Electricity, gas and water supply,Construction, Wholesale and retail trade, Hotels and restaurants, Transport,Financial intermediation and real estates, renting and business activities (i.e.sectors C to K in ISIC Rev. 3).
35 OECD did not collect data for employer’s social contributions for France until 1994. Hence, inthe interest of a greater sample size we consider the tax-wedge measure without thiscomponent for France: ݐ௪ = ݋݈݃ ቀ௜௡௖௢௠ ௘௧௔௫ା௘௠ ௣௟௢௬௘௘ᇱ௦௦௢௖௜௔௟௦௘௖௨௥௜௧௬ି௖௔௦௛௧௥௔௡௦௙௘௥௦
௚௥௢௦௦௘௔௥௡௜௡௚௦
ቁ. This is also donein Arestis et al. (2007).
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These two tax-wedge series are linked as follows: Data are available for bothvariables for the period 2000-2004, hence, we take the difference between eachobservation for this period, average it, and subtract this “average difference”from the Tax-wedge (new definition). The series are then connected at the endpoint of the Tax-wedge (old definition) series (2004) to introduce as little noiseas possible to the series. The linkage is then further smoothed by taking logsafter interpolation.
6.3.7 Union’s powerUnions’ power ݉ ݈݅: (logarithm) of strike activity, measured in number of dayslost in labour dispute in the case of the UK and Spain, number of hours lost inlabour dispute in the case of Italy, and number of workers involved in labourdispute for the rest of countries. This variable is not available in any form forGermany and the analysis for this country is performed without this variable asin Arestis et al. (2007). This measure is widely used in the literature, see forinstance Layard et al. (1991, p.419), Arestis and Biefang-Frisancho Mariscal(1998) or Arestis et al. (2007). Data for the number of employees involved inlabour dispute are only available with annual frequency and linearinterpolation is used to obtain quarterly data. Further details on theinterpolation method are provided in the section 6.3.11.In the literature, there are other popular proxies for unions’ power, and it isnecessary explain our choice of variable. Another popular measure of union’spower is Union Density (share of unionized workers), see for instance Layard etal. (1991, p.419), Nickell et al. (2005) and Bassanini and Duval (2009).However, as pointed out by Siebert (1997,p.47) or Nickell et al. (2005,p.6) inmany countries wage bargaining covers non-unionized workers as well asmembers of trade unions. For example, French workers covered by collectiveagreements are close to 90%, despite Union Density been around 10%.Similarly in Spain and the Netherlands, less than 40% of workers are unionizedbut more than 80% are covered by collective wage agreements.Thus, it is likely that Union Density will fail to capture workers’ influence onwages, in the sense that low (high) union density does not necessarily implylow (high) workers or unions influence on wages, see also Baker et al. (2007,p.13). The share of workers covered by collective agreements might be a goodalternative, but to the best of our knowledge, time series available are not longenough to conduct a study of the type we aim to perform here.
6.3.8 Capital stockCapital stock :݇ (logarithm) of capital stock of the total economy, less housingservices, it is measured in real terms expressed in millions of local currency.Downloaded from OECD’s Economic Outlook no.86 (OECD, 2009). [KTV] as perpublisher’s code system.
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This measure is also used in Karanassou et al. (2008a), but differs from theseries employed in Arestis and Biefang-Frisancho Mariscal (1998), Arestis andBiefang-Frisancho Mariscal (2000) and Arestis et al. (2007). These threestudies use a measure of “Business sector capital stock” produced by OECD,which is no longer published (Schreyer and Webb, 2006, Schreyer et al., 2011).
6.3.9 Real long term interest ratesReal long term interest rates (݅− ∆݌): (logarithm) of central government bondyields on the secondary market, gross of tax, with a residual maturity of around10 years minus the inflation rate, calculated using the Consumer Price Index(CPI) discussed above. Data are downloaded from Eurostat (2010). Centralgovernment bond yields correspond to [Maastricht’s Treaty long-term interestrate convergence criterion] as per publisher’s code system.
6.3.10 Real imported raw materials priceReal cost of imported inputs݌௩௠ : (logarithm) of the ratio of Commodityimports price index (in terms of local currency) to CPI, weighted by the share ofimports to GDP: ݌௩௠ = ݒ∗ ݋݈݃ (ܲ௠ /ܥܲܫ).The Commodity imports price index in terms of local currency ܲ௠ , is calculatedby multiplying the Commodity imports price index in USD dollars (CMPI) byone over the exchange rate (GBP, Euro and Danish Crown to the dollar). Wherethe Commodity Imported Price Index (CMPI) is the average of the Index of Non-Fuel Primary Commodities index (NFPC) (base 2005=100 in USD) and AveragePetroleum Spot index of UK Brent, Dubai, and West Texas index (Oilp) (base2005=100 in USD). CPI is as per description above. Finally, the share of importsto GDP ݒ, is calculated by multiplying the ratio of imports to GDP by a hundred.Imports to GDP and the exchange rates weights respond are used to control forthe reliance of the economy on imported raw materials and exchange ratesfluctuations. Data for NFPC and Oilp are downloaded from the IMF statisticalportal IMF (2010). Data for imports are downloaded from Eurostat statisticalportal Eurostat (2010), and data for exchange rates are downloaded from OECDstatistical portal (OECD, 2010d).Similar measures of imported raw materials price indexes are constructed inthe literature see for instance Layard and Nickell (1986, p. s157) and Nickelland Bell (1995,p. 58). Data for NFPC and Oilp indexes are only available inmonthly basis. To create quarterly series we considered the last month of thequarter as our quarterly observation. This procedure is followed in the interestof consistency with linear interpolation methods used here.
6.3.11 Dummy variablesWe employ three dummies in our analysis. In the UK’s data set, the variable
ܦ05ݍ4 is a dummy for the last quarter of 2005, which takes the value one inthis quarter and zero elsewhere. In the Spanish data set, ܦ87ݍ4 is a dummy for
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the last quarter of 1987, which takes the value one in this quarter and zeroelsewhere. In the Finnish data set, the variable ܦ97ݍ123 is a dummy for thefirst three quarters of 1997 that takes the value one in these quarters and zeroelsewhere.All three dummies control for the outliers that appear in the quarters in whichthey take the value one. These outliers seem to be the source of serialcorrelation that we find in preliminary estimations. We considered severalstrategies to account for serial correlation, but in all cases the dummy is thebest way to correct this problem without over-parameterizing our empiricalspecification36. Karanassou and Sala (2008) and Schreiber (2012, p.1322) alsofollow this approach.We cannot be certain of what makes our estimations less precise in thesequarters, but we speculate that these outliers might be caused by the followingfactors. We start with the UK. In the last quarter of 2005 the UK economysuffered the largest rise in quarterly unemployment in our sample, see the 1stdifference of ݑ in Figure II.1. According to the Bank of England (2005, p.p.9-11)the slowdown in GDP during 2005 is the result of a contraction of households’consumption, which they attribute to the growing cost of energy, higherinterest rates, and the slowdown in house prices. Since our estimates do notcontrol for the latter, we suspect that the outlier we find in the last quarter of2005 is the result of the evolution of the housing market. Hence, ܦ05ݍ4 mightbe seen as a control variable for the 2005 slowdown in house prices.Turning now to the Spanish dummy, Spain suffers substantial unemploymentrises and falls in the period studied here, see Figure II.6. Our estimations seemto account for these swings reasonably well, except for the reduction ofunemployment that takes place in the last quarter of 1987. We suspect that thisfall might be associated with some of the changes in legislation that followedthe entrance of Spain to the European Union in 1986. Karanassou and Sala(2008) also report outliers in this period and also resort to the use of dummiesto control for them. Therefore, ܦ87ݍ4 might capture these changes in theSpanish legal system.In the Finnish case, the first and third quarter of 1997 saw the two largestreductions in unemployment recorded in our sample, see Figure II.8. Accordingto the Bank of Finland (1997, p.p.13-16) the fall of unemployment during 1997is due to an acceleration of economic growth. More precisely, to a recovery ofemployment in sectors such as construction and manufacturing that hadremained stagnant since the early 1990s. The Bank of Finland attributes thisacceleration to “record high” consumer confidence. Since we do not include
36 For a detailed discussion on preliminary estimations see section 7.2.1 for the UK’s case,section 9.3.1 for Spain, and section 10.3.1 for Finland.
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confidence indicators among our explanatory variables, we suspect that theoutliers in 1997 are the result of this wave of optimism. Hence, our dummymight be seen as proxy of this rush of optimism.
6.4 Comments on interpolation methodsAs we point out above, our measures of tax-wedge ݐ௪ , long-termunemployment ݈ݑ and the number of employees involved in labour dispute ݉ ݈݅(for the Netherlands, France, Denmark and Finland), are only available inannual frequency and interpolation is used to transform these series intoquarterly time series. We follow a standard linear interpolation procedure:First, we treat each annual observation as the observation of the fourth quarterof the reference year. For example, the tax-wedge observation for 1980 ݐଵଽ଼ ଴௪ , istreated as the observation of the last quarter of that year ݐଵଽ଼ ଴௪ = ݐଵଽ଼ ଴௤ସ௪ , thenoperating similarly with each annual value we reconstruct our series in termsof the last quarter of the year. Second, we assume year-on-year or annualchanges denoted by our original data are evenly distributed in each quarter, i.e.that changes from quarter-to-quarter are identical. Hence, we divide thedifference between two data points by four, following with our example
௧భవఴభ೜ర
ೢ ି௧భవఴబ೜ర
ೢ
ସ
, to calculate the portion of the annual change that corresponds toeach quarter.Then, progressively adding the change of the year-on-year difference dividedby four to our last observation point, in our example ݐଵଽ଼ ଴௤ସ௪ , we can constructour quarterly data as follows:
ݐଵଽ଼ ଵ௤ଵ
௪ = ݐଵଽ଼ ଴௤ସ௪ + ݐଵଽ଼ ଵ௤ସ௪ − ݐଵଽ଼ ଴௤ସ௪4
ݐଵଽ଼ ଵ௤ଶ
௪ = ݐଵଽ଼ ଵ௤ଵ௪ + ݐଵଽ଼ ଵ௤ସ௪ − ݐଵଽ଼ ଴௤ସ௪4
ݐଵଽ଼ ଵ௤ଷ
௪ = ݐଵଽ଼ ଵ௤ଶ௪ + ݐଵଽ଼ ଵ௤ସ௪ − ݐଵଽ଼ ଴௤ସ௪4The series for Gross Replacement Rates ݃ݎݎare only available in biannualfrequency and the same linear interpolation procedure is used to transformthese series into quarterly time series. In this case the formulation is as follows,first:
݃ݎݎଵଽ଼ ଴=݃ݎݎଵଽ଼ ଴௤ସ
݃ݎݎଵଽ଼ ଶ=݃ݎݎଵଽ଼ ଶ௤ସ
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Second,
݃ݎݎଵଽ଼ ଵ௤ଵ = ݃ݎݎଵଽ଼ ଴௤ସ + ݃ݎݎଵଽ଼ ଶ௤ସ− ݃ݎݎଵଽ଼ ଴௤ସ8
݃ݎݎଵଽ଼ ଵ௤ଶ = ݃ݎݎଵଽ଼ ଵ௤ଵ + ݃ݎݎଵଽ଼ ଶ௤ସ− ݃ݎݎଵଽ଼ ଴௤ସ8
⋮
݃ݎݎଵଽ଼ ଶ௤ଷ = ݃ݎݎଵଽ଼ ଶ௤ଶ + ݃ݎݎଵଽ଼ ଶ௤ସ− ݃ݎݎଵଽ଼ ଴௤ସ8The lack of higher frequency series for these variables has made their linearinterpolation common practice in the literature. In the time series field, see forinstance Stockhammer (2004a) and Arestis et al. (2007), and in the panel dataliterature, see for example Nickell et al. (2005) and Stockhammer and Sturn(2008).The advantages of interpolation are clear, it allows the researcher to expandthe sample size, but there are also downsides that need to be acknowledged.The main problem associated with the use of interpolation, is that theresearcher introduces an element of artificiality into the series insofar s/heattributes the same share of the year-on-year change to each quarter, whichmight not necessarily be the case. In other words, the researcher is introducingsome degree of error measurement. While this might still be true, it is generallyargued that variables such as replacement rates are fairly constant throughouttime and that changes in these series happen slowly. Consequently, it is claimedthat linear interpolation ought to introduce little noise into the data(Stockhammer, 2004a, p.23).In any case, a researcher trying to compare the effect of demand factors, usuallyavailable in quarterly frequency, against that of wage-push factors, usually inannual frequency, faces a trade-off: Either not making use of the informationthat quarterly data provides or introducing some noise into wage-push factorsseries by using interpolation to increase their frequency. Considering that noisefrom interpolation is likely to be small for the reasons pointed out above, webelieve that favoring the quarterly data side of the trade-off is a reasonablecompromise. Facing this dilemma Arestis et al. (2007) and Stockhammer andSturn (2008) also favour quarterly frequency.In the context of the time series techniques that we employ in this thesis, thereare two caveats that we must also be bear in mind. First of all, in attributing thesame change into each quarter of the year, we are imposing a constant trendwithin each year, which might artificially increase probability of finding thesevariables to be ܫ(1) or even ܫ(2). In the case of the ADF-GLS test, interpolationmight increase probability of not-rejecting the null hypothesis of unit root, i.e.
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reduce power of this test. In the case of the KPSS test, interpolation mightincrease the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis of stationarity, i.e.increase size of the test.Second, as noted by the interpolation equations above, ݐଵଽ଼ ଵ௤ଷ௪ is byconstruction highly correlated with ݐଵଽ଼ ଵ௤ଶ௪ , ݐଵଽ଼ ଵ௤ଵ௪ and ݐଵଽ଼ ଴௤ସ௪ , and similarly thefour observations corresponding to each year in our sample. This means thatwhen estimating the VECM, the unexplained component at point 1981ݍ3 islikely to be correlated with the residuals at points 1981ݍ2, 1981ݍ1 and 1980ݍ4.In other words, that interpolation increases chances of having serial correlationin our ECM equations, although we account for this problem with a sufficientlyrich lag structure in the model.
6.5 A first look at the dataWe turn now to the data itself, in this section, we present figures for all thevariables in each of the eight country’s data sets. All variables are plotted intheir logarithm form except unemployment, long term unemployment, grossreplacement rates, tax-wedge, real long term interest rates and the wage share.The reason to plot the rates and not the logarithm version of these variables isthat the researched might be familiar with the values of these variables andhence, seems more informative to use rates.
6.5.1 Evolution of unemploymentWe start by examining the evolution of unemployment in Figure 6.1, whichshows the evolution of unemployment in the eight countries in our sample.There seem to be three different patterns:In the UK, the Netherlands and Denmark unemployment seems to trenddownwards overall. In the UK and the Netherlands unemployment peaks in themid-1980s and although there is a new rise in the early 1990s, this is lesssevere than the previous hike. In Denmark unemployment peaks in the early1990s and after that unemployment also seems to trend downwards.Furthermore, after the second half of the 1990s these three economies enjoylevels of unemployment in the range between 4% and 6% unemploymentconsistently.This is in contrast to the evolution of unemployment in Germany, France andItaly where the jobless rate seems to trend upwards for most of the sampleperiod. In France and Italy the hikes of the 1980s are followed by even higherrates in the 1990s, and in both economies unemployment is well above 8% bythe end of the 1990s. It is only in the very late 1990s and early 2000s thatunemployment starts to fall, in France to levels around 8%, and in Italy to levelsaround 6%. Similarly, Germany’s unemployment peaks in the 1990s, only to befollowed by yet a new maximum in the mid-2000s. Also as in France, and Italy,
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Germany’s unemployment falls in the second half of the 2000s, but only tolevels around 8%.
Figure 6.1. Evolution of unemploymentSpain and Finland suffer the highest levels of unemployment out of the eightcountries. Spanish unemployment is never below 8%, and it hits levels close to20% in the mid-1980s and in the mid-1990s. After this point it shows animpressive reduction although it never trespasses the 8% barrier. Finland,starts at a lower level, but it also suffers unemployment levels close to 20% inthe early 1990s, which is followed by a remarkable fall, although it does not
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reach the 6% to 8% range until the second half of the 2000s, well above the1980s levels. In the plots presented in the rest of this section, the evolution ofunemployment is presented in the background (with a dashed line), this isconvenient to complement our discussion of findings in subsequent Chapters.
6.5.2 Evolution of wage-push factorsWe turn no to the evolution of wage-push factors, we present the data in pairsof countries following the country grouping that we use in Chapter 7 to Chapter10. We start with the UK and the Netherlands in Figure 6.2:
(a) UK (b) Netherlands
Figure 6.2. Wage-push factors UK and NetherlandsIn the UK’s case all three wage-push variables show a clear downward trendthroughout the sample period, reflecting cuts in unemployment benefits, labourtaxation and a slowdown in union activity. A similar picture arises from theplots for unemployment benefits and labour taxation for the Netherlands, butnot from the diagram for workers’ militancy, which suggests that strike action
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increases moderately but steadily throughout the sample period in theNetherlands.
(y) Germany
(b) France
Figure 6.3. Wage-push factors Germany and FranceFigure 6.3 shows the evolution of the wage-push factors for Germany andFrance. In the German case, although unemployment benefits and labourtaxation seem to follow opposite trends, while benefits seem to trenddownwards while the tax-wedge seems to trend upwards overall, bothmeasures fall during the late 1990s and early 2000s. In France, unemploymentbenefits and labour taxation show clear upward trend since 1980, althoughthere also seems to be some attempt to curb this trend towards the end of thesample period. Workers’ militancy in France seems to remain relativelyconstant throughout the period, although it becomes more volatile since themid-1990s.
0.002.00
4.006.00
8.0010.00
12.0014.00
20.0022.00
24.0026.00
28.0030.00
32.0034.00
1992Q
4
1994Q
4
1996Q
4
1998Q
4
2000Q
4
2002Q
4
2004Q
4
2006Q
4
Gross Replacement Rate (left hand axis)
Unemployment rate (right hand axis)
0.002.00
4.006.00
8.0010.00
12.0014.00
15.0020.00
25.0030.00
35.0040.00
45.0050.00
55.00
1980Q
1
1982Q
1
1984Q
1
1986Q
1
1988Q
1
1990Q
1
1992Q
1
1994Q
1
1996Q
1
1998Q
1
2000Q
1
2002Q
1
2004Q
1
Gross Replacement Rate (left hand axis)
Unemployment rate (right hand axis)
0.002.00
4.006.00
8.0010.00
12.0014.00
38.0039.00
40.0041.00
42.0043.00
44.0045.00
46.00
1992Q
4
1994Q
4
1996Q
4
1998Q
4
2000Q
4
2002Q
4
2004Q
4
2006Q
4
Tax-wedge (left hand side axis)
Unemployment rate (right hand axis)
0.002.00
4.006.00
8.0010.00
12.0014.00
12.0014.00
16.0018.00
20.0022.00
24.0026.00
1980Q
1
1982Q
1
1984Q
1
1986Q
1
1988Q
1
1990Q
1
1992Q
1
1994Q
1
1996Q
1
1998Q
1
2000Q
1
2002Q
1
2004Q
1
Tax-wedge (left hand side axis)
Unemployment rate (right hand axis)
0.002.00
4.006.00
8.0010.00
12.0014.00
12.00
12.50
13.00
13.50
14.00
14.50
1980Q
1
1982Q
1
1984Q
1
1986Q
1
1988Q
1
1990Q
1
1992Q
1
1994Q
1
1996Q
1
1998Q
1
2000Q
1
2002Q
1
2004Q
1
mil (left hand axis)
Unemployment rate (right hand axis)
91
Figure 6.4 shows the evolution of the wage-push factors in Italy and Spain. Inboth countries, unemployment benefits exhibit a clear upward trend, whereasworkers’ militancy shows a steady decline. Interestingly, in both countries, weobserve a reduction of benefits in the second half of the 1990s. The evolution oflabour taxation is despair, while it shows a clear downward trend in Italy,exacerbated in the late 1990s, Spanish labour taxation shows a clear upwardtendency, which seems to moderate beyond 1998.
(a) Italy (b) Spain
Figure 6.4. Wage-push factors Italy and SpainFigure 6.5 shows the evolution of the wage-push factors for Denmark andFinland. In Denmark unemployment benefits and labour taxation show adownward trend, in the case of benefits, despite a substantial rise in 1996 thatis reverted subsequently. On the other hand, the diagram for workers’ militancysuggests that strike action increases steadily throughout the period. In theFinnish case, initial and end values for unemployment benefits and labourtaxation are very similar, but they are far from constant throughout the sample
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period. In both cases, there is a substantial rise in the early 1990s, althoughmost marked in the case of labour taxation. Rises in benefits generosity aresoon reverted, and as from 1992 onwards there is a clear downward trend.Increases in labour taxation, are also reversed, and from 1996 onwards itshows a clear downward trend. Workers’ militancy seems to remain constantthroughout the period, although it is more volatile beyond 2000s.
(a) Denmark (b) Finland
Figure 6.5. Wage-push factors Denmark and Finland
6.5.3 Evolution of long term unemploymentNext, in Figure 6.6 we show the evolution of the long term unemployment ratesfor the eight countries in our sample. We observe two differentiated patterns:In the UK, Germany, France, Denmark and Finland, long term unemploymentrates mirrors the evolution of unemployment. On the other hand, in theNetherlands, Italy and Spain long term unemployment peaks in the late 1980sor early 1990s and then falls markedly.
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(a) UK (b) Netherlands
(a) Germany (b) France
(a) Italy (b) Spain
(a) Denmark (b) Finland
Figure 6.6. Evolution of long term unemployment rate
6.5.4 Evolution of productivityFollowing, in Figure 6.7 we present the evolution of productivity for the eightcountries in our sample. In all of them there is a clear upward trend, althoughthere are some events that are worth noting.
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Figure 6.7. Evolution of productivityIn the UK, productivity grows steadily throughout the period, although between1988 and 1992 it slows down considerably and nearly flattens. Dutchproductivity also exhibits an upward trend overall, although between 1989 and1993, and between 1999 and 2003 it has two plateaus where productivity
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barely increases. In Germany, despite an initial fall in productivity, the sampleperiod is dominated by growth, which is particularly intense between 1993 and1996 and after 2004. In the French case, productivity remains stagnant up to1982, then it grows very rapidly up to 1990, where it shows some steady butvery modest growth until 1996, and thereafter it resumes strong growth again.In Italy and Spain, the evolution of productivity is very similar, after a period ofstagnant productivity in the early 1980s, it grows rapidly until the second halfof the 1990s (after 1997 in Italy and after 1995 in Spain), and beyond this pointit flattens dramatically. In the Italian case it should be noted that there is asecond plateau between 1991 and 1993. In the Danish case productivity growsoverall, but there are two periods, in which productivity flattens, namelybetween 2000 and 2004 and from 2005 to the end of the sample. In Finland,productivity stagnates in the late 1980s, it even falls in the early 1990s, andafter 1992 it grows very vigorously until 1998 when growth moderates.
6.5.5 Evolution of capital stock and investmentIn this section we return to our presentation in pairs of countries to show theevolution of capital stock. To better illustrate our discussion we complementthe capital stock diagram with another plot for investment, calculated as thefirst difference of .݇ We start with the UK and the Netherlands in Figure 6.8:
(y) United Kingdom
(b) Netherlands
Figure 6.8. Capital stock and investment in the UK and Netherlands
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In both countries capital stock has a clear upward trend, although some eventsdeserve our attention. In the UK, capital stock grows rapidly until 1989 andthen slows down until 1994. This is followed by a prolonged period of veryrapid capital stock growth during the second half of the 1990s. Beyond 1999capital stock grows at a diminishing rate until 2004 when growth intensivesagain. In the Dutch case, capital stock grows moderately until 1991, beyond thisyear growth continues but at a diminishing rates until 1996. This is followed bya notorious surge that peaks after 1999. Although this period of fast growingcapital stock is followed by an evenly impressive slowdown from 1999 to 2003.Between 2003 and 2006 capital stock grows at modest but fairly constant rates,after 2006 it seems to revitalize albeit modestly.
(y) Germany
(b) France
Figure 6.9. Capital stock and investment in Germany and FranceFigure 6.9 shows the evolution of capital stock and investment for Germany andFrance. In both economies, capital stock has a clear upward trend, althoughthere are some events that are worth mentioning: In Germany, capital stockgrows at a relatively stable rate during the early 1990s, and acceleratesbetween 1998 and 2000. After 2000 there is a notorious slowdown in capitalstock growth, although beyond 2003 it recovers. In the French case, capitalstock growth diminishes during the early 1980s, reaching a low in 1986,although soon revitalizes and after 1986 capital stock grows rapidly until theearly 1990s. In the mid-1990s, capital stock suffers a prolonged slow down, andit is not until 1998 that we observe another surge in capital stock growthfollowed yet again, by another slow down beyond 2000.
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Figure 6.10 shows the evolution of capital stock and investment for Italy andSpain. In both countries capital stock has a clear upward trend, although someevents deserve our attention: In Italy panel I, capital stock grows moderately inthe late 1980s, followed by a notorious slowdown that reaches its lowest pointin 1993. Beyond 1993, capital stock grows slowly but steadily during the 1990sand early 2000s peaking after 2001, thereafter capital stock grows at a slowerpace again. In the Spanish case panel (d), capital stock growth diminishesduring the early 1980s, reaching its minimum before 1986. In the 1980s, thisphenomenon was referred to as “investment strike” (Muñoz de BustilloLlorente, 2005,p.221). It soon regains momentum, and after 1986 capital stockgrows impressively, peaking in the late 1980s, and maintaining vigorousgrowth during the early 1990s. Between 1992 and 1994 capital stock slowsdown again, but beyond 1994 growth intensifies reaching a maximum after1998. And although capital stock growth slows down moderately after 2000, itremains strong until the end of the sample period.
(a) Italy
(b) Spain
Figure 6.10. Capital stock and investment in Italy and SpainFigure 6.11 shows the evolution of capital stock and investment for Denmarkand Finland. In both countries capital stock has a clear upward trend, althoughthere are some events that are worth mentioning: In Denmark there seem to betwo differentiated periods, from 1990 to 1995 capital stock growth is veryvolatile and more moderate than in the second period, between 1995 and 2008,which is also characterized by volatility but also strong growth, particularlybetween 1998 and 2000 and in 2006. The Finland’s case, capital stock grows at
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its fastest rates before 1990. From 1990 to 1994 it grows at diminishing ratesreaching zero growth around 1994, where capital stock flattens. Beyond 1994 itresumes growth at a modest but fairly stable pace, except for the periodbetween 2002 and 2005 when it seems to slow down again.
(y) Denmark
(b) Finland
Figure 6.11. Capital stock and investment in Denmark and Finland
6.5.6 Evolution of real long term interest ratesNext, in Figure 6.12 we show the evolution of the long term real interest ratesfor the eight countries in our sample. Although in all cases this variable clearlytrends downward, there are two differentiated patterns. First, in the UK, Italyand Denmark, there is an initial period of relatively high but stable real longterm interest rates, which is followed by a period of falling rates that starts inthe early 1990s. Second, in the Netherlands, Germany, France, Spain andFinland there is a short-lived rise in real long term interest rates in the firstyears of the sample period, which is followed by a marked downward trend.
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(a) UK (b) Netherlands
(a) Germany (b) France
(a) Italy (b) Spain
(a) Denmark (b) Finland
Figure 6.12 Evolution of long term real interest rates
0.002.00
4.006.00
8.0010.00
12.0014.00
0.002.00
4.006.00
8.0010.00
12.0014.00
1984Q
1
1986Q
1
1988Q
1
1990Q
1
1992Q
1
1994Q
1
1996Q
1
1998Q
1
2000Q
1
2002Q
1
2004Q
1
2006Q
1
Real long term interest rate (left hand axis)
Unemployment rate (right hand axis)
0.001.00
2.003.00
4.005.00
6.007.00
8.009.00
0.00
2.00
4.00
6.00
8.00
10.00
1987Q
1
1989Q
1
1991Q
1
1993Q
1
1995Q
1
1997Q
1
1999Q
1
2001Q
1
2003Q
1
2005Q
1
2007Q
1
Real long term interest rate (left hand axis)
Unemployment rate (right hand axis)
0.002.00
4.006.00
8.0010.00
12.0014.00
0.001.00
2.003.00
4.005.00
6.007.00
8.009.00
1992Q
4
1994Q
4
1996Q
4
1998Q
4
2000Q
4
2002Q
4
2004Q
4
2006Q
4
Real long term interest rate (left hand axis)
Unemployment rate (right hand axis)
0.002.00
4.006.00
8.0010.00
12.0014.00
0.002.00
4.006.00
8.0010.00
12.0014.00
16.00
1980Q
1
1982Q
1
1984Q
1
1986Q
1
1988Q
1
1990Q
1
1992Q
1
1994Q
1
1996Q
1
1998Q
1
2000Q
1
2002Q
1
2004Q
1
Real long term interest rate (left hand axis)
Unemployment rate (right hand axis)
0.002.00
4.006.00
8.0010.00
12.0014.00
0.002.00
4.006.00
8.0010.00
12.0014.00
16.00
1983Q
4
1985Q
4
1987Q
4
1989Q
4
1991Q
4
1993Q
4
1995Q
4
1997Q
4
1999Q
4
2001Q
4
2003Q
4
2005Q
4
2007Q
4
Real long term interest rate (left hand axis)
Unemployment rate (right hand axis)
0.002.00
4.006.00
8.0010.00
12.0014.00
16.0018.00
20.0022.00
0.002.00
4.006.00
8.0010.00
12.0014.00
16.0018.00
1980Q
1
1982Q
1
1984Q
1
1986Q
1
1988Q
1
1990Q
1
1992Q
1
1994Q
1
1996Q
1
1998Q
1
2000Q
1
2002Q
1
2004Q
1
2006Q
1
Real long term interest rate (left hand axis)
Unemployment rate (right hand axis)
0.00
2.00
4.00
6.00
8.00
10.00
12.00
0.00
2.00
4.00
6.00
8.00
10.00
12.00
1990Q
1
1992Q
1
1994Q
1
1996Q
1
1998Q
1
2000Q
1
2002Q
1
2004Q
1
2006Q
1
Real long term interest rate (left hand axis)
Unemployment rate (right hand axis)
0.002.00
4.006.00
8.0010.00
12.0014.00
16.0018.00
20.0022.00
0.002.00
4.006.00
8.0010.00
12.0014.00
1988Q
1
1990Q
1
1992Q
1
1994Q
1
1996Q
1
1998Q
1
2000Q
1
2002Q
1
2004Q
1
2006Q
1
Real long term interest rate (left hand axis)
Unemployment rate (right hand axis)
100
6.5.7 Evolution of real wages, productivity and the wage shareIn this section we present the evolution of real wages against that ofproductivity, this comparison allows us to examine the evolution of the wageshare (over GDP). We start with the cases of the UK and the Netherlands inFigure 6.13: In the UK’s case, real wages and productivity seem to trendupwards together, which translates in a fairly stable wage share. In theNetherlands, we can differentiate four stages: Up to 1993 real wages andproductivity seem to move together and the wage share remains stable.Between 1993 and 1998 real wages fall whereas productivity continues its rise,and as a result the wage share falls during this period. After 1998 real wagesand productivity regain momentum and move in parallel, leaving the wageshare stable until 2004. Thereafter, real wages slow down again despite raisingproductivity, which reduces the wage share once more.
(y) United Kingdom
(b) Netherlands
Figure 6.13. Real wages, productivity and distribution in the UK and NetherlandsFigure 6.14 presents the cases of Germany and France, Italy and Spain. InGermany, up to 2003 real wages remain fairly constant despite considerablerises in productivity, which translates into a falling wage share. This processintensives in the latter part of the sample after 2003, as real wages fall despiteproductivity sustained growth. In France, we can differentiate three moments:Before 1982 real wages and productivity seem to move together and the wageshare remains stable. Between 1982 and 1987 productivity grows in a contextof stagnant real wages, which translates in a falling wage share. After 1987, realwages and productivity seem to trend upwards in parallel, leaving the wage
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share relatively stable but at a lower level than at the beginning of the sampleperiod.
(a) Germany
(b) France
(c) Italy
(d) Spain
Figure 6.14. Real wages, productivity and distribution in Germany, France, Italy and Spain
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In the Italian case, we can differentiate three moments: Up to 1993 real wagesand productivity trend upwards in a close move, although productivity growsfaster, giving place to a slight reduction in the wage share. Between 1993 and1997 real wages stagnate whereas productivity continues rising, intensifyingthe fall in the wage share during this period. After 1997 productivity and realwages both stagnate, leaving the wage share unchanged, although towards theend of the period real wages grow slightly. In Spain, we can differentiate twophases: Before 1993 real wages and productivity trend upwards, their trendsare not well synchronized and that causes substantial swings in the wage sharethat seems to fluctuate around the same level. After 1992, real wages stagnateeven falling in some quarters, productivity also slows downs notoriously but ithardly falls, creating a widening gap between productivity and wages, whichreduces the wage share particularly after 2000.
(y) Denmark
(b) Finland
Figure 6.15. Real wages, productivity and distribution in Denmark and FinlandFigure 6.15 shows the evolution of real wages against that of productivity, andthe wage share for Denmark and Finland. In the Danish case, as in the UK, realwages and productivity seem to trend in a synchronized fashion while the wageshare remains stable. In Finland, we can differentiate three periods: Before1992 real wages grow despite productivity remaining constant, even falling insome quarters, this translates in a rising wage share. Between 1992 and 1997the opposite happens, and the wage share falls well beyond its initial level.After 1997 real wages and productivity seem to trend upwards together andthe wage share remains stable.
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6.5.8 Evolution of imported raw materials pricesFinally, Figure 6.16 present the evolution of our measure of real cost ofimported inputs݌௩௠ for all the economies in our sample.
(a) UK (b) Netherlands
I Germany (d) France
I Italy (f) Spain
(g) Denmark (h) Finland
Figure 6.16. External shocks
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Observing Figure 6.16 there seems to be a common pattern to all of themexcept for Denmark, this pattern can be characterized as follows. ݌௩௠ ispositive until the mid 1980s reflecting that imported raw materials are growingfaster than domestic prices, see UK in panel (a), France in panel (d), Italy inpanel I and Spain in panel (f). Recall that for the rest of countries we do nothave data for the 1980s. In the second half of the 1980s, ݌௩௠ turns negative andeven shows a more or less marked downward trend until 1998, reflecting thatexternal price conditions become more and more favourable for importers ofraw materials. After 1998, ݌௩௠ surges and in some cases such as theNetherlands, Germany, Italy, Spain and Finland, it approximates zerosuggesting that prices of imported raw materials are growing nearly as fast asdomestic prices, while in the UK and France, ݌௩௠ remains well into thenegatives despite the rise.In Denmark, the overall movement of ݌௩௠ is similar, relatively stable for mostof the 1990s, and rapidly rising after 1998. The peculiarity of the Danish case isthat ݌௩௠ is positive for all the sample period, suggesting that Denmark is undera negative external price shock throughout our sample. This seems to be due tothe weakness of the Danish Crown in front of the US Dollar used to measure thecommodity indexes (NFPC and Oilp) included in ݌௩௠ .
6.6 SummaryIn this chapter we have discussed the particulars of the data employed in ourempirical analysis. The key features of our data can be summarized as follows.Data comprises eight data sets one for each of the eight economies studiedhere, namely the UK, the Netherlands, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Denmarkand Finland. Data are quarterly and cover the period from 1980q1 to 2007q4,with some country variations depending on data availability.Each country’s data set contains nine core variables denoted by the followingvector ݖ௧ = (ݓ௧− ݌௧,ݕ௧− ௧݈, ݑ௧, ݈ݑ௧,݃ݎݎ௧,ݐ௧௪ ,݉ ݈݅௧, ௧݇, ௧݅− ∆݌௧)ᇱ. Germany is theonly exception because its data set does not contain a measure of workers’militancy ݉ ݈݅௧. Each country’s data set also includes a vector ݔ௧of several lagsof ∆݌௧ି ௤௩௠ , which accounts for external shocks, the exact number of lags varies ineach case depending on the most suitable econometric specification. This issueis explained in the following chapters. In the cases of the UK, Spain and Finland,the vector ݔ௧also contains a dummy, denoted by ܦ05ݍ4, ܦ87ݍ4 and ܦ97ݍ123respectively. These dummies are used to control for outliners.OECD’s statistical office is the main source of data, although we also employdata from Eurostat’s statistical office, and to a lesser extend from the IMFstatistical offices. Finally, in order to provide a quick reference point todefinitions and sources of the variables we provide the following summarytable:
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Variables Description Source
w-p (log) real wages computed as ݓ − ݌ [OC]
w (log) average nominal wages calculated: ݋݈݃ (ܥܧ/ܶܧ) [OC]
CE Employees Compensation component of GDP, accounts for total remuneration paid toemployees (wages and salaries in cash and in kind plus employers’ social contributions). Innominal terms, seasonally adjusted and measured in millions of National currency units. [5]
TE Total employment as per labour force survey, and includes armed forces (conscripts as wellas professional military), except for Germany and Denmark where figures are based on theNational Accounts. [2]
p (log) of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) (Base=2005) for all items and the whole economy. [1]
y-l (log) real labour productivity calculated: ݋݈݃ ቂቀீ஽௉
஼௉ூ
ቁ ܶܧ⁄ ቃ [OC]
GDP Gross Domestic Product in nominal terms, seasonally adjusted, measured in millions ofNational currency units. [5]
u (log) unemployment rate, based on Labour Force Surveys [2]
lu † (log) long-term unemployment rate: log[(TLU/TU)*100] [OC]
TLU Number of long-term unemployed workers, i.e. workers that have been out of work for 52weeks (one year) or more, as per Labour Force Surveys. [1]
TU Number (in thousands) of unemployed workers, as per u description [2]
grr † (log) Gross Replacement Rates calculated as the ratio between out-of-work benefits (underthree family situations and three durations of unemployment) and in-work earnings (100%and 67% of manufacturing wages) times hundred. [3]
ݐ௪ † (log) linked Tax-wedge calculated as the ratio of taxation paid by workers over averagelabour costs, for a worker earning 100% of average wages under two family situations(single no children and married couple with one earner and two children):
݋݈݃ ቀ
௜௡௖௢௠ ௘௧௔௫ା௘௠ ௣௟௢௬௘௘ᇱ௦௦௢௖௜௔௟௦௘௖௨௥௜௧௬ା௘௠ ௣௟௢௬௘௥ᇲ௦௢௖௜௔௟௦௘௖௨௥௜௧௬ି௖௔௦௛௧௥௔௡௦௙௘௥௦
௚௥௢௦௦௘௔௥௡௜௡௚௦ା௘௠ ௣௟௢௬௘௥௦௢௖௜௔௟௦௘௖௨௥௜௧௬
ቁFrance’s measure does not include employer SCC.
[4],[1]
mil * (log) of strike activity, measured in number of days lost in labour dispute (UK and Spain) [1](log) of strike activity, measured in number of hours lost in labour dispute (Italy) [1](log) of strike activity, measured in number of workers involved in labour dispute (TheNetherlands, France, Denmark and Finland). Not available for Germany [5]
k (log) real capital stock for the total economy (excluding housing services) expressed inmillions of local currency. [2]
݅− ∆݌ (log) of central government bond yields on the secondary market, gross of tax, with aresidual maturity of around 10 years minus the inflation rate. Log[ 1݅0ݕ− (∆݌∗ 100)] [OC]
i10y Central government bond yields on the secondary market, gross of tax, with a residualmaturity of around 10 years. [5]
݌௩௠ (log) of the ratio of commodity imports price index (in terms of local currency) to CPI,weighted by the share of imports to GDP: ݌௩௠ = ݒ ∗ ݋݈݃ (ܲ௠ /ܥܲܫ) [OC]
ݒ Share of imports to GDP (in percentage): (ܯ /ܩܦܲ) ∗ 100 [OC]
M Imported goods and services in nominal terms, seasonally adjusted, measured in millions ofNational currency units. [5]
ܲ௠ Commodity imports price index in terms of local currency: ܥܯܲܫ∗ (1/݃ ݌ܾݑ݀ݏ ) for the UK,
ܥܯܲܫ∗ (1/ ݁ݑݎݑ݀ݏ ) for Euro Area Member States and ܥܯܲܫ∗ (1/݀ ܿݑ݀ݏ ) for Denmark. [OC]
CMPI‡ Commodity Imports Price Index in terms of USD: (ܰܨܲܥ+ ܱ݈݅݌)/2 [OC]
NFPC Index Non-fuel Primary Commodities index (Base 2005=100 in USD) [6]
Oilp Average Petroleum Spot index of UK, Brent, Dubai & West Texas (Base 2005=100 in USD) [6]
gbpusd The US dollar/Great Britain Pound exchange rates [1]
eurusd The US dollar/Euro exchange rates [1]
dcusd The US dollar/Danish crown exchange rates [1]
ܦ05ݍ4 UK’s dummy, value=1 in the last quarter of 2005 and zero otherwise. [OC]
ܦ87ݍ4 Spain’s dummy, value=1 in the last quarter of 1987, and zero otherwise. [OC]
ܦ97ݍ123 Finland’s dummy, value=1 in the first three quarters of 1997, and zero otherwise. [OC]
ܹ ܵ Wage share of GDP: ݁ݔ݌(௪ି௣)ି(௬ି௟) ∗ 100 [OC]
T Time trend [OC]
Table 6.2. Data description and sourcesSource legend: [OC] Own Calculation, [1] OECD.stat, [2] OECD Economic Outlook no. 86, [3] Benefits and Wages: OECDIndicators, [4] Correspondence with Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, OECD, [5] Eurostat, [6] IMF.Note: † indicates that original annual data are transformed into quarterly data using linear interpolation. * indicatesthat original annual data for the Netherlands, France, Denmark and Finland is transformed into quarterly data usinglinear interpolation. ‡ Indicates that original monthly data are made quarterly by considering the last month of thequarter observation as the quarterly value.
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Chapter 7 Determinants of the NAIRU and its anchor
properties, evidence from the UK and the Netherlands
7.1 IntroductionThis chapter presents the results of applying the CVAR approach presented inChapter 5, to data for the UK and the Netherlands. To contextualize ourfindings, we open the chapter with a summary of the time series literaturereviewed in Chapter 3 that refers to these economies. A summary table of thisliterature can also be found in Table I.1, in Appendix I.UK’s literature is generally thought to provide support to LNJ’s claims, this isbased on the early work of Layard and Nickell (1986), where it is found thatthe NAIRU is neither determined by capital stock nor productivity, but byexogenous wage-push factors. This evidence is yet reinforced by later studiessuch as Layard et al. (1991, p.144), Nickell and Bell (1995) and Nickell (1998),who also find evidence of links between unemployment and exogenousfeatures of the labour market.However, these findings are challenged by a growing literature that findsevidence of links between the NAIRU and demand via different channels.Hatton (2007) find a significant negative long run link between unemploymentand productivity. Arestis and Biefang-Frisancho Mariscal (1998, 2000) andStockhammer (2004a) find evidence of labour market hysteresis and of anegative link between capital stock and the NAIRU. Further, there is evidence ofa link between the NAIRU and real interest rates (Nickell, 1998, Ball, 1999,Gianella et al., 2008).When it comes to the anchor properties of the NAIRU in the UK, evidence is lesscontentious because all seems to suggest that the NAIRU is at best a weakanchor. Layard and Nickell (1986) and Arestis and Biefang-Frisancho Mariscal(1998, 2000) find that deviations from the NAIRU have little influence onunemployment dynamics. In the same vein, all estimates suggest that theadjustment after a shock is very protracted (Henry et al., 2000, Duval andVogel, 2008).The Dutch experience has received less attention but the overall picture is verysimilar to that from the UK. It is usually argued that the evolution ofunemployment in the Netherlands provides support to LNJ’s approach (Siebert,1997, OECD, 2000b,p.223, Nickell and Van Ours, 2000), however, there is abody of empirical literature that challenges these claims. Arestis et al. (2007)find a significant negative long run link between capital stock andunemployment, which reinforces early evidence of a negative influence ofaccumulation over unemployment (Driehuis, 1986). Furthermore, there isevidence of a link between the NAIRU and real interest rates (Ball, 1999,Gianella et al., 2008).
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Further, as in the UK’s case, deviations from the NAIRU seem to have littleinfluence on unemployment dynamics (Arestis et al., 2007, Schreiber, 2012),and the adjustment to shocks appear to be very sluggish (Duval and Vogel,2008), all of which suggests that the NAIRU is at best a weak anchor.The rest of the chapter presents our own findings, and it is structured asfollows: Section 7.2 presents results for the UK, section 7.3 the results for theNetherlands. Each of them contains five subsections devoted to the five CVARstages: Data properties and model specification, Cointegration tests,Identification process, VECM estimations, and GIR simulations. Finally, section7.4 closes the chapter with a summary of key findings.
7.2 UK
7.2.1 Data properties and model specificationIn order to confirm that the CVAR approach can be applied to the UK’s data set,we examine the stationary properties of the data. According to the unit root andstationarity tests results, reported in Appendix II, all the variables in UK’s
ݖ௧ = (ݓ௧− ݌௧,ݕ௧− ௧݈, ݑ௧, ݈ݑ௧, ݃ ݎݎ௧,ݐ௧௪ , ݉ ݈݅௧, ݇௧, ௧݅− ∆݌௧)ᇱ are ܫ(1) . Theseresults justify the use of cointegration techniques such as the CVAR which weproceed to model now.The starting point is the CVAR benchmark specification, equation 5.1. Thecomposition of its deterministic component ܥ is decided after visual inspectionof the data in Figure II.1. This inspection reveals that some of the variables of ݖ௧exhibit a time trend, which could cause the problem of quadratic trendsdiscussed in section 5.4. In order to avoid this phenomenon, we decompose thematrix of deterministic components ܥ into intercepts and time trends, andrestrict the time trends to the long run term, as per equation 5.5.The choice of lag order for this specification draws from the standard modelselection criteria, reported in Table 7.1, and along with the composition of x௧, isthe result of extensive experimentation with several specifications. After thisprocess we adopt the following VAR (2) expression with x௧ = (∆݌௧ି ଵ௩௠ ,
∆݌௧ି ଶ
௩௠ ,ܦ05ݍ4)ᇱas our preferred specification37:
37 We experimented with more parsimonious models (than our preferred specification), such asa VAR(2) specification with x௧ = (∆݌௧ି ଵ௩௠ ) and x௧ = (∆݌௧ି ଵ௩௠ , ∆݌௧ି ଶ௩௠ )ᇱ , Models of similardimensions to equation 7.1, such as VAR(2) with x௧ = (∆݌௧ି ଵ௩௠ , ∆݌௧ି ଶ௩௠ , ∆݌௧ି ଷ௩௠ )ᇱ, and x௧ =(∆݌௧ି ଵ௩௠ , ∆݌௧ି ଶ௩௠ ,ܦ05ݍ406ݍ12)ᇱwhere ܦ05ݍ406ݍ12 is a dummy for the last quarter of 2005 andthe first half of 2006, in which our estimates seemed less accurate. And less parsimoniousmodels, such as a VAR(3) specification following AIC’s suggestions, and a VAR(2) specificationwith x௧ = (∆݌௧ି ଵ௩௠ , ∆݌௧ି ଶ௩௠ , ܦ05ݍ4,ܧܯ ܵ)ᇱwhere ܦ05ݍ4 is the dummy considered in equation7.1, and ܧܯ ܵ is a dummy for the period in which the UK was part of the European MonetarySystem between 1990q1 to 1992q3, for which our estimates seemed less accurate. However,these specifications are unable to accommodate serial correlation problems, in some casesdespite consuming greater degrees of freedom than our preferred specification, andconsequently are discarded.
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7.1 ∆z௧ = c଴ + ߔଵ∆z௧ି ଵ + ߛߚᇱz୲∗ + λx௧+ ε୲ where, ݖ௧ =
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, x௧ =ቌ ∆݌௧ି ଵ௩௠∆݌௧ି ଶ௩௠
ܦ05ݍ4ቍ
Variables in ݖ௧, ݖ௧∗ and x௧have the same meaning as in Chapter 6. We adopt thisspecification, because it appears to deliver the best balance betweenparsimony, a rich and informative lag structure38 and satisfactory diagnostictest results for the UK’s data set.Lag order AIC SBC5 2449.4 1886.94 2405.3 1944.13 2391.8 2031.92 2360.1 2101.41 2229.0 2071.50 1239.7 1183.5
Table 7.1. Lag order selection criteria, UKNote: The test is carried out with 90 observations covering the period between 1985q3 to 2007q4.Statistics reported here are obtained from estimating an unrestricted VAR model for the variablescontained in the vector z௧, with a constant and a time trend39, two lags of ∆݌௩௠ , and the dummy variable
ܦ05ݍ4.
7.2.2 Cointegration testsFollowing, we test for cointegration among the variables of ݖ௧, Table 7.2presents the results of the Maximum Eigenvalue (ߣ௠ ௔௫) and Trace (ߣ௧௥௔௖௘)tests:
ߣ௠ ௔௫ ߣ௧௥௔௖௘
ܪ଴ ܪଵ
Statistic 95% Criticalvalues Statistic 95% Criticalvalues
r=0 r=1 91.84 61.27 355.41 222.62
r≤1 r=2 61.73 55.14 263.57 182.99
r≤2 r=3 57.42 49.32 201.84 147.27
r≤3 r=4 41.50 43.61 144.43 115.85
r≤4 r=5 33.46 37.86 102.93 87.17
r≤5 r=6 26.67 31.79 69.46 63.00
r≤6 r=7 20.41 25.42 42.79 42.34
r≤7 r=8 12.04 19.22 22.38 25.77
r≤8 r=9 10.34 12.39 10.34 12.39
Table 7.2. Results from cointegration tests, UKNote: Test statistics are obtained from applying the Maximum Eigenvalue and Trace test to z௧using aVAR(2) model with unrestricted intercepts and restricted trend coefficients, two lags of ∆݌௩௠ , and thedummy variable ܦ05ݍ4, with 93 observations covering the period between 1984q4 to 2007q4. Criticalvalues are chosen according to this specification.
38 It should be noted that a VAR(2) specification with nine variables is the equivalent to an
ܣܴܯ ܣ(18,16), (Hamilton, 1994, p.349)39 The inclusion of the time trend responds to the fact that most of our variables are trended,(Pesaran and Pesaran, 2003, p.310).
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The Maximum Eigenvalue test fails to reject the null hypothesis of having threelong run relationships, while the Trace test fails to reject the null hypothesis ofhaving seven cointegrated vectors. Hence, both tests suggest that there aremore long run relationships than as per our theoretical model, which onlypredicts two, although they disagree about the exact number. These results arerather inconclusive, although as discussed in section 5.5, this problem is wellreported in the literature.In these circumstances, it is generally advised to weight the tests results againsttheir potential biases and economic theory (Pesaran and Pesaran, 2003,p.293,Garrat et al.,2006,p.198). Cheung and Lai (1993) find that the MaximumEigenvalue and Trace tests tend to overstate the number of cointegratedvectors in the following situations: When the sample size is small, when thedimension of the model is large, and when the residuals of the regressions usedto calculate the test statistics do not follow a normal distribution, see section5.5 for further details.In our case, we have a reasonable large sample of 96 observations, but we areestimating a large VAR (2) with nine variables, and some of its residuals are notnormally distributed40. Hence, it seems reasonable to suspect that tests resultsreported in Table 7.2 might be inflated. In this scenario, Pesaran and Pesaran(2003,p.293) and Garrat et al. (2006,p.198) recommend to rely on thepredictions from economic theory rather than the tests’ results. We follow theiradvice and proceed under the assumption of r=2.
7.2.3 Identifying the long run relationshipsIn order to identify which variables take part in these two long runrelationships, we use the four sets of theoretically driven restrictions detailedin Table 5.1 (ߚ௅ே௃, ߚ஻ௌ, ߚ஺ௌோ and ߚோு) as identifying schedules. Table 7.3 reportsthe results of this process.We start by imposing the restrictions contained in ߚ௅ே௃. This set of restrictionsis insignificant at the standard 5%, its log-likelihood ratio (LR) test is a
ܺଶ(10)=62.016 with a p-value equal to [0.000]. Hence, evidence seems to leanagainst ߚ௅ே௃. Next, we test the validity of the restrictions contained in ߚ஻ௌ,which are also insignificant as a whole with a p-value for the LR test equal to[0.000]. Following, we introduce the set of restrictions of ߚ஺ௌோ41, for whichevidence is not very supportive either, since it is insignificant with a p-value forthe LR test equal to [0.002]. Finally, the set of restrictions contained in ߚோு isalso found insignificant, with a p-value for LR test equal to [0.000].
40 This refers to the residuals obtained from estimating the vector of equations contained inequation 7.1. We do not report them here due to space limitations, but are available uponrequest.41 Please note that the coefficient ߚଶଶ is left unrestricted because we fail to obtain convergingresults when introducing ߚଶଶ = −1 despite introducing ߚ஺ௌோ following different sequences.
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ݖ௧
∗ ߚመ௅ே௃ ߚመ஻ௌ ߚመ஺ௌோ ߚመோு ߚመୌ୷ୠ୰୧ୢ
ݓ௧− ݌௧ 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000
ݕ௧− ௧݈ 0.000 -1.000 0.000 -1.000 -0.267 -1.858NC 0.000 -1.000 0.000 -1.335§None None (0.134)
ݑ௧ 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
݈ݑ௧ 0.000 0.000 -1.200§ -0.207§ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000(0.408) (0.088)
݃ݎݎ௧ -0.272 -0.091 0.307 0.012 -0.081 -0.110 -0.738 -0.109 -0.991§ 0.000(0.579) (0.073) (0.469) (0.101) None None (1.128) (0.124) (0.450)
ݐ௧
௪ -3.162§ 0.118 -0.026 0.648§ -2.511 0.4501§ -4.096 0.069 0.000 0.373§(1.459) (0.185) (0.918) (0.198) None (0.074) (3.268) (0.358) (0.042)
݉ ݈݅௧ 0.104 -0.004 0.013 -0.019§ 0.099 -0.005 0.118 -0.003 -0.112§ -0.004§(0.063) (0.008) (0.029) (0.006) None None (0.104) (0.011) (0.052) (0.001)
௧݇ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.414 0.561 0.000 0.000 11.40§ 0.307§None None (3.452) (0.075)
௧݅− ∆݌௧ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.502 0.022 0.646§ 0.000(1.090) (0.122) (0.301)
ܶ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.123§ 0.000(0.038)
ݎଶ 4 4 4 4 4
݈݈௥మ 2532.7 2532.7 2532.7 2532.7 2532.7
ݍ 14 12 10 12 11
݈݈௤ 2501.7 2532.7 2522.4 2502.4 2526.0
ܺ௅ோ
ଶ (ݍ− ݎଶ) ܺଶ(10)=62.016[0.000] ܺଶ(8)=37.47[0.000] ܺଶ(6)=20.4376[0.002] ܺଶ(8)=60.561[0.000] ܺଶ(7)=13.387§[0.063]
Table 7.3. Identification process and estimation of long run elasticities, UKNote: These estimations were carried with 93 observations covering the period between 1984q4 to 2007q4. Asymptotic standard errors for each ߚ coefficient are provided in brackets. §indicates significant at 5% and * indicates significant at 10%. NC indicates that the coefficient is subject to a theoretical restriction for which we failed to obtain converging results, andhence had to be left unrestricted. ݎଶ=Number of just identified restrictions, and ݍ= Number of total restrictions imposed, i.e. over-identifying restrictions. ݈݈௥మ is the maximum value of thelog-likelihood function obtained under ݎଶ just identified restrictions. ݈݈௤ is the maximum value of the log-likelihood function obtained under ݍover-identifying restrictions. ܺ௅ோଶ (ݍ− ݎଶ) isthe chi-square statistics for the log-likelihood Ratio (LR) test. P-values for this test are provided in square brackets.
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Hence, evidence does not seem to yield support to any of the four sets ofrestrictions drawn from each of the nested NAIRU models. Far from concludingthat none of them is supported by the data, we interpret these results as a signthat the unemployment and real wages cointegrated vectors are more complexthan as portrayed by these stylised theoretical models.In fact, evidence from the trial and error process by which these sets ofrestrictions are introduced reveals some suggestive features of the data42:Introducing ߚଵ଼ = 0 , ߚଶଶ = −1 and ߚଵଵ଴ = 0 pushes ߚመ௅ே௃ , ߚመ஻ௌ and ߚመோு torejection. In the case of ߚመ஺ௌோ , it is imposing ߚଵଽ = 0 and ߚଵଵ଴ = 0 that pushes theset of restrictions into rejection. Further, ߚଵଶ = 0 seems supported by the datain several cases. This evidence suggests that some form of hybrid between ߚ஺ௌோ(where ߚଵ଼ ≠ 0) and ߚோு (where ߚଵଽ ≠ 0), along with ߚଵଶ = 0, ߚଶଶ ≠ −1 and
ߚଵଵ଴ ≠ 0 might be supported by the data.To test this hypothesis we build a sequence of restrictions denoted by ߚு௬௕௥௜ௗ,which contains these features, and experiment imposing further restrictions,generally exclusion restrictions to coefficients that appear to be individuallyinsignificant, until we find a ߚመு௬௕௥௜ௗ supported by the data. Results of thisprocess are reported in the last column of Table 7.3.The set of restrictions ߚመு௬௕௥௜ௗ is significant at the standard 5%, the LR test is a
ܺଶ(7)=13.387 with a p-value equal to [0.063]. Furthermore, according to theasymptotic standard errors (in brackets), all the unrestricted coefficients areindividually significant at the standard levels. ߚመு௬௕௥௜ௗ is clearly more significantthan the rest of ߚmatrices examined in Table 7.3 and consequently we adopt itas our preferred long run specification.To better discuss the economic implications of these results we rewrite ߚመு௬௕௥௜ௗin terms of the two cointegrated vectors that it describes (asymptotic standarderrors in brackets):7.2 ݑ௧ = 0.991݃ݎݎ௧+ 0.112݉ ݈݅௧− 11.40 ௧݇− 0.646( ௧݅− ∆݌௧) + 0.123ܶ+ ߦመଵ,௧(0.450) (0.052) (3.452) (0.301) (0.038)7.3 (ݓ௧− ݌௧) = 1.335(ݕ௧− ௧݈) − 0.373ݐ௧௪ + 0.004݉ ݈݅௧− 0.307 ௧݇+ ߦመଶ,௧(0.134) (0.042) (0.001) (0.075)
42 It must be noted that comments regarding the importance of individual restrictions reportedhere, are consistent with different ordering of the restrictions. This is worth mentioning,because given that restriction are introduced on one-by-one basis, and that the LR statistic,refers to the whole set of over-identifying restrictions. It is difficult to discern whether the (in-)significance of a set of restrictions is caused by the last restriction introduced or by thecombination of this one with the restrictions introduced previously. To ensure that ourinference regarding individual coefficients is well grounded we experiment with differentordering of the restrictions contained in each restricted ߚ. Thus, the comments made here arerobust to different ordering of the restrictions.
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Equation 7.2 describes the unemployment long run relationship, and hence canbe regarded as our NAIRU equation. Since all the variables are measured inlogarithms, the coefficients from this equation can be interpreted as theelasticities of the NAIRU with respect to each variable. Equation 7.3 describesthe real wages long run equilibrium and its coefficients can also be interpretedas long run elasticities.According to equation 7.2, the UK’s NAIRU is determined by some features ofthe labour market, such as unemployment benefits and workers’ militancy, asalso reported in Layard and Nickell (1986), Layard et al. (1991,p.441) or Nickelland Bell (1995). Although contrary to LNJ’s propositions, the NAIRU is notexclusively determined by these exogenous factors:First, the NAIRU is also influenced by the size of capital stock, our estimatessuggest that an increase in capital stock of 1% would reduce the NAIRU by11.40%. That means that for a NAIRU equal to 10%, a rise in capital stock of 1%would reduce it to 8.860%. According to our theoretical model, this evidencesuggests that capital stock limits firms’ ability to mark-up wages43. Our findingreinforce previous evidence that capital stock reduces the NAIRU in the UK,particularly that from Arestis and Biefang-Frisancho Mariscal (1998, 2000)who also find unemployment negatively cointegrated with capital stock, seealso Stockhammer (2004a). Further, this finding also reinforces doubts aboutthe robustness of Layard and Nickell’s (1986) early results, who find noevidence of a link between the NAIRU and capital stock.Second, the NAIRU is determined by real long term interest rates, our estimatesuggest that an increase in real long term interest rates of 1% would reduce theNAIRU by 0.646%. The sign of this coefficient is unexpected, because Rowthorn(1999, p.422) and Hein (2006) suggest that cost of long term borrowing risesfirms’ price mark-up and the NAIRU, and our findings suggest that it wouldreduce them44. This could be the result of a wealth effect, by which higher reallong term interest rates rises funding available to firms rather than making itmore expensive, as suggested by Bell-Kelton and Ballinger (2005).It could also reflect the impact of the cost of borrowing on the opportunity costof being unemployed, as pointed out by Honkapohja and Koskela (1999) 45.These authors argue that higher cost of borrowing rises the opportunity cost of
43 As per equation 4.4 ߚଵ଼ = − ఝమఠభାఝభ, hence finding ߚመଵ଼ < 0 requires ߮ଶ > 0, as long as thedenominator is positive, i.e. ߱ଵ + ߮ଵ > 0, which implies that unemployment reduces workersability to set real wages and firms ability to set their price mark-up, both very reasonable.44 As per equation 4.4, ߚ19 = ߮5߱1+߮1 , hence finding ߚመଵଽ < 0, requires ߮ହ < 0, which implies thathikes in long term interest rates would reduce firms mark-up. As long as ߱ଵ + ߮ଵ > 0.45 To account for this possibility in our model we would need to expand our real wage equation4.2 to consider the following term: −߱଻(݅− ∆݌), which would deliver a new ߚଵଽ = ఝఱିఠళఠభାఝభ .Hence, observing a ߚመଵଽ < 0, would require that ߮ହ < ߱଻.
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being unemployed, because unemployed workers will find harder to pay theirdebts, than those at work. As a result, they argue, workers will moderate theirreal wage demands to secure their jobs and the NAIRU will fall.In any case, this finding reinforces previous evidence that real interest ratesaffect the NAIRU in the UK, see Nickell (1998), Ball (1999) and Gianella et al.(2008) although in these studies the relationship found has the conventionalpositive sign. Considering the importance of capital stock highlighted by ourresults, and that these studies do not account for it, a possible explanation forthis sign discrepancy is that their positive real interest rate coefficient is in factcapturing the negative influence of capital stock over the NAIRU.Finally, we find significant evidence of the NAIRU having a time trend. It isworth noting that we do not find significant evidence of productivity having anyimpact on the NAIRU, as also reported in Layard and Nickell (1986), but incontrast to the findings from Hatton (2007). Further, there is no evidence oflabour market hysteresis affecting the NAIRU, contrary to Arestis and Biefang-Frisancho Mariscal (1998, 2000) and Stockhammer (2004a). Having controlledfor long term unemployment in our analysis, we suspect that hysteresis inthese studies might be capturing the effect of some omitted variables, whichhere have a significant influence on the NAIRU.Turning now to equation 7.3, the real wages equilibrium is positively affectedby productivity, with an elasticity slightly greater than unity, 1.335 to beprecise. This contradicts the findings from Arestis and Biefang-FrisanchoMariscal (1998) who find a long run one-to-one relationship between realwages and productivity. Workers’ militancy also increases the long run realwages equilibrium, suggesting that strike action increases real wages in thelong run, although the effect is modest. On the other hand, labour taxation andcapital stock reduce the real wages equilibrium. This suggests that in the longrun, workers are not able to compensate tax increases over their wages andthat greater capital does not result in greater real wages.
7.2.4 Short-run dynamics of unemployment and the anchor properties of
the NAIRUTo analyse the behaviour of unemployment around the NAIRU, we estimate theECM equation for ∆ݑ௧using the residuals from 7.2 and 7.3 as error correctionterms, see section 5.7 for further details. The resultant ∆ݑ௧, estimated with 93observations over the period 1984q4-2007q4, is the following:
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7.4 ∆ݑ௧= −14.52 + 0.028ߦመଵ,௧ି ଵ + 1.026ߦመଶ,௧ି ଵ− 0.746∆(ݓ௧ି ଵ− ݌௧ି ଵ) + 0.485∆(ݕ௧ି ଵ− ௧݈ି ଵ)[0.003] [0.103] [0.000] [0.055] [0.188]
+0.005∆ݑ௧ି ଵ− 0.430∆ ݈ݑ௧ି ଵ+ 1.164∆݃ݎݎ௧ି ଵ− 0.179∆ݐ௧ି ଵ
௪ + 0.004∆݉ ݈݅௧ି ଵ[0.962] [0.000] [0.000] [0.622] [0.067]
−0.666∆ ௧݇ି ଵ− 0.011∆( ௧݅ି ଵ− ∆݌௧ି ଵ) − 0.000∆݌௧ି ଵ௩௠ − 0.001∆݌௧ି ଶ௩௠ + 0.073ܦ05ݍ4 + εොଷ௧[0.627] [0.504] [0.882] [0.546] [0.000]Adj. ܴଶ=0.633,
ௌܺ஼
ଶ (4)= 8.722 [0.068], ܺிிଶ (1)= 1.135 [0.287],
ܺே௢௥௠
ଶ (2)= 0.681 [0.711], ܺு௘௧ଶ (1)= 0.440 [0.507]
ߦመଵ,௧ = ݑ− 0.991݃ݎݎ− 0.112݉ ݈݅+ 11.40݇+ 0.646(݅− ∆݌) − 0.123ܶ
ߦመଶ,௧ = (ݓ − ݌) − 1.335(ݕ− )݈ + 0.373ݐ௪ − 0.004݉ ݈݅+ 0.307݇
ߪகොయ = 0.0190Where Adj. ܴଶ denotes Adjusted R-square, ௌܺ஼ଶ , ܺிிଶ , ܺே௢௥௠ଶ , ܺு௘௧ଶ are chi-squarestatistics for Serial correlation (SC), Functional form (FF), Normality of theresiduals (NORM) and Heteroscedasticity (HET) tests respectively. ߪகොయis thestandard deviation of the error term in equation 7.4. p-values for t-tests anddiagnostic tests are reported in square brackets46.According to equation 7.4 the coefficient for ߦመଵ,௧ି ଵ is not significantly differentfrom zero, meaning that deviations from the NAIRU have no significantinfluence on unemployment dynamics. In other words, there is no evidence ofthe NAIRU acting as an anchor. Arestis and Biefang-Frisancho Mariscal (1998,2000) also find that deviations from the NAIRU have little influence onunemployment, as per their estimates, only a very modest 2.4% and 2.1% of thedeviation is corrected each quarter. Layard and Nickell (1986) report similarfindings in terms of employment.The coefficient for ߦመଶ,௧ି ଵ is significant and positive. This suggests that settingreal wages above their long run equilibrium increases unemployment.According to the dichotomy proposed by Bhaduri and Marglin (1990), thisestimate suggests that the UK operates under a “profit-led regime”, contrary tothe findings from Bowles and Boyer (1995) and Hein and Vogel (2007), whofind evidence of the UK operating under a “wage-led regime”.
7.2.5 Impulse response and the effects of an unemployment shockWe complete our analysis simulating an unemployment shock of one standarddeviation of the error term in equation 7.4, i.e. ߪகොయ = 0.0190. This amounts to arise in unemployment of 7.58% in annual terms47. Figure 7.1 shows the effect ofthis shock on the variables of ݖ௧using their GIR functions:
46 All diagnostic tests are passed at the standard 5% significance level ensuring that estimatedcoefficients are unbiased, and that inference can be done using the t-test.47 Because ݑ௧ is the logarithm of the unemployment rate, ∆ݑ௧approximates its growth rate,hence, assuming a shock to ∆ݑ௧of 0.0190 is equivalent to assume a 1.9% increase inunemployment in one quarter, or 7.58% in annual terms.
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Figure 7.1 GIR
05
1015
2025
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40 44 48Horizon (quarters) -10
-8-6
-4-2
02
4
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40 44 48Horizon (quarters)
-2.00
-1.50
-1.00
-0.50
0.00
0 4 8 12 1
-1.50
-1.00
-0.50
0.00
0 4 8 12 1
0.001.00
2.003.00
4.005.00
0 4 8 12 1
%chan
geper
annum
%chan
geper
annum
%chan
geper
annum
%chan
geper
annum(a) ݑ௧F of a standard deviat
6 20 24 28 32 36 40 44 48) -1.00
-0.80-0.60
-0.40-0.20
0.00
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40 44 48rs)
6 20 24 28 32 36 40 44 48uarters) -15.00
-10.00
-5.00
0.00
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40 44 48)
6 20 24 28 32 36 40 44 48ers) 0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40 44 48arters)
-40.00-30.00
-20.00-10.00
0.0010.00
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40 44 48ters)
%chan
geper
annumHorizon (quar(i) ݉ ݈݅௧
ion shock to unemploym(b) ݈ݑ௧Horizon (quarters(c) ݓ௧− ݌௧Horizon (quart(g) ݃ݎݎ௧Horizon (quarters(f) ௧݅− ∆݌௧Horizon (q(e) ௧݇Horizon (quarte(d) ݕ௧− ௧݈Horizon (qu(h) ݐ௧௪ent on all variables, UK
117
Unemployment in panel (a), shows no sign of returning to its baseline after theshock, as it would be expected if the NAIRU acted as an anchor, instead it driftsupwards until it stabilizes six years after the shock, at a level 19% greater thanits pre-shock value. This behaviour suggests that the NAIRU has no anchorproperties, and therefore reinforces the results from equation 7.4. Our estimateis more pessimistic than previous impulse response estimates. Henry et al.(2000) find that unemployment needs between 14 to 20 years to return to itsbaseline after a labour demand shock, Duval and Vogel (2008) find that the UKneeds between two and three years to close the output gap. However, theoverall conclusion is similar the NAIRU does not seem to be a strong anchor.The reaction of long term unemployment to the shock, shown in panel (b), isdescribed by a J-curve, which suggests that the effect of the shock changes overtime. On impact, ݈ݑ௧ falls as the number of recently fired workers increases, butas time goes by, some of these workers remain unemployed, and the long termunemployment rate rises until it stabilizes above its baseline.Real wages and productivity, panels (c) and (d), both fall as a consequence ofthe shock, although the fall in real wages is more pronounced than that ofproductivity. While ݓ௧− ݌௧stabilizes at a level 1.6% smaller than its pre-shockvalue, ݕ௧− ௧݈stabilizes 0.6% below its baseline. This suggests that the wageshare of GDP falls as a result of the shock.Capital stock and real long term interest rates, panel (e) and (f), fall as aconsequence of the shock until they stabilize at a level 1% and 8% smaller thantheir baselines, respectively. This reaction to the rise in unemployment is verysuggestive of the type of negative long run relationship that we find in oureconometric analysis.The last three panels refer to the wage-push factors considered in our model.Unemployment benefits and labour taxation, panels (g) and (h), increase afterthe shock until they stabilize above their baseline. This could either be theresult of a fall in wages, or a rise in social provisions and taxes, respectively.Recall that ݃ݎݎ௧and ݐ௧௪ are relative measures of benefits and labour taxationwith respect to wages, see Chapter 6 for further details on data description.Finally, workers’ militancy panel (i), fluctuates widely on impact, probablyreflecting greater volatility in industrial relations after the shock, but it ends upfalling sharply until it stabilizes at a level 30% below its pre-shock situation.
7.3 Netherlands
7.3.1 Data properties and model specificationWe turn now to the Dutch case, data of Netherland’s data set are very similar tothose of the UK, for evidence from unit root and stationary tests suggest that allvariables contained in the Netherlands’ ݖ௧ = (ݓ௧− ݌௧, ݕ௧− ௧݈,ݑ௧,݈ݑ௧, ݃ ݎݎ௧,
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ݐ௧
௪ , ݉ ݈݅௧, ݇௧, ௧݅− ∆݌௧)ᇱare ܫ(1), see Appendix II, which justifies the use of theCVAR approach.We follow the same modelling strategy as in the UK’s case. The starting point isthe CVAR’s benchmark equation 5.1. The composition of ܥ is decided aftervisual inspection of the data in Figure II.2, which reveals that some of thevariables of ݖ௧exhibit a time trend. To avoid the problem of quadratic trendsthis could cause we adopt equation’s 5.5 specification.The choice of lag order and the composition of x௧, are decided drawing from themodel selection criteria reported in Table 7.4, and after extensiveexperimentation with several specifications. After this process, the followingVAR (2) expression with x௧ = (∆݌௧ି ଵ௩௠ , ∆݌௧ି ଶ௩௠ )ᇱis adopted as our preferredspecification48:
7.5 ∆z௧ = c଴ + ߔଵ∆z௧ି ଵ + ߛߚᇱz୲∗ + λx௧+ ε୲ where,ݖ௧ =
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Variables in ݖ௧, ݖ௧∗ and x௧ have the same meaning as in Chapter 6. Thisspecification seems to provide the best balance between parsimony, a rich andinformative lag structure49 and satisfactory diagnostic test results for theNetherlands’ data set. Lag order AIC SBC5 2048.7 1529.04 1942.9 1518.73 1893.9 1565.12 1885.5 1652.21 1831.5 1693.70 1059.6 1017.2
Table 7.4. Lag order selection criteria, NetherlandsNote: The test is carried out with 78 observations covering the period between 1988q3 to 2007q4.Statistics reported here are obtained from estimating an unrestricted VAR model for the variablescontained in the vector z௧, with a constant and a time trend, and two lags of ∆݌௩௠ .
48 We experimented with more parsimonious models (than our preferred specification), such asa VAR(1) specification with x௧ = (∆݌௧ି ଵ௩௠ ), this lag order draw from SBC indications in Table 7.4.Or a VAR(1) with x௧ = (∆݌௧ି ଵ௩௠ , ∆݌௧ି ଶ௩௠ )ᇱ, and a VAR(2) with x௧ = (∆݌௧ି ଵ௩௠ ). And less parsimoniousmodels such as a VAR(2) specification with x௧ = (∆݌௧ି ଵ௩௠ , ∆݌௧ି ଶ௩௠ , ∆݌௧ି ଷ௩௠ )ᇱ. More parsimoniousspecifications fail to pass the corresponding diagnostic tests, in particular serial correlation,whereas, less parsimonious passed the serial correlation tests, but at the expenses ofconsuming greater degrees of freedom than our preferred specification, and consequently arediscarded.49 Equivalent to an ܣܴܯ ܣ(18,16), (Hamilton, 1994, p.349)
119
7.3.2 Cointegration testsTable 7.5 presents the results of testing for cointegration among the variablesof ݖ௧. The Maximum Eigenvalue test (ߣ௠ ௔௫) fails to reject the null hypothesis ofhaving three long run relationships, while the Trace test (ߣ௧௥௔௖௘) fails to rejectthe null hypothesis of having four cointegrated vectors. Hence, both testssuggest that there are more long run relationships than as per our theoreticalmodel, although they disagree about the exact number.
ߣ௠ ௔௫ ߣ௧௥௔௖௘
ܪ଴ ܪଵ
Statistic 95% Criticalvalues Statistic 95% Criticalvalues
r=0 r=1 73.36 61.27 310.02 222.62
r≤1 r=2 55.59 55.14 236.66 182.99
r≤2 r=3 52.81 49.32 181.06 147.27
r≤3 r=4 42.95 43.61 128.25 115.85
r≤4 r=5 31.31 37.86 85.30 87.17
r≤5 r=6 18.99 31.86 53.99 63.00
r≤6 r=7 14.37 25.42 34.99 42.34
r≤7 r=8 11.94 19.22 20.62 25.77
r≤8 r=9 8.69 12.39 8.69 12.39
Table 7.5. Results from cointegration tests, NetherlandsNote: Test statistics are obtained from applying the Maximum Eigenvalue and Trace test to z௧using aVAR(2) model with unrestricted intercepts and restricted trend coefficients, and two lags of ∆݌௩௠ , with 81observations covering the period between 1987q4 to 2007q4. Critical values are chosen according to thisspecification.As discussed in section 5.5, in these circumstances it is necessary to weight thetests results against their potential biases and economic theory. Consideringthat in the Netherland’s data set we only have 84 observations, that we areestimating a large VAR (2) with nine variables and that some of its residuals arenot normally distributed, it seems reasonable to suspect that the test resultsmight suffer of size biases. To overcome these problems, we follow theapproach adopted in the UK’s case, and proceed under the assumption of r=2 assuggested by economic theory.
7.3.3 Identifying the long run relationsIn order to identify which variables take part in these two long runrelationships, we use the four sets of restrictions from Table 5.1 (ߚ௅ே௃, ߚ஻ௌ, ߚ஺ௌோand ߚோு) as identifying schedules. Table 7.6 reports the results of this process.We start by imposing the restrictions contained in ߚ௅ே௃. This set of restrictionsis insignificant at the standard 5%, its log-likelihood ratio (LR) test is a
ܺଶ(10)=53.328 with a p-value equal to [0.000]. Hence, evidence seems to leanagainst ߚ௅ே௃. Next, we test the validity of the restrictions contained in ߚ஻ௌ,which are also insignificant as a whole with a p-value for LR test equal to[0.000]. Following, we introduce the set of restrictions of ߚ஺ௌோ , for whichevidence is not very supportive either, since it is insignificant with a p-value forthe LR test equal to [0.000]. Finally, the set of restrictions contained in ߚோு isalso found insignificant with a p-value for LR test equal to [0.000].
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ݖ௧
∗ ߚመ௅ே௃ ߚመ஻ௌ ߚመ஺ௌோ ߚመோு ߚመୌ୷ୠ୰୧ୢ
ݓ௧− ݌௧ 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000
ݕ௧− ௧݈ 0.000 -1.000 0.000 -1.000 -7.004 -1.000 0.000 -1.000 6.418§ -1.000None (0.726)
ݑ௧ 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
݈ݑ௧ 0.000 0.000 -0.421 0.037 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000(0.539) (0.055)
݃ݎݎ௧ -0.544 -0.026 -1.090 -0.014 3.376 -0.076 -0.668 -0.046 1.334§ 0.000None (0.025) (0.726) (0.031) None (0.058) None (0.030) (0.171)
ݐ௪ ௧ -2.616§ -0.259§ -1.994 -0.356§ 13.95 -0.424§ -2.633§ -0.307§ 2.483§ -0.276§(0.839) (0.037) (1.047) (0.153) None (0.185) (0.886) (0.059) (0.420) (0.038)
݉ ݈݅௧ -0.247 0.003 -0.039 0.004 -0.650 0.006 -0.150 0.003 0.000 0.000None (0.006) (0.157) (0.007) None (0.009) (0.092) (0.006)
௧݇ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 11.29 -0.092 0.000 0.000 1.586§ 0.000none (0.098) (0.333)
௧݅− ∆݌௧ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.091 0.022 0.408§ 0.000(0.333) (0.018) (0.079)
ܶ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
ݎଶ 4 4 4 4 4
݈݈௥మ 2076.2 2076.2 2076.2 2076.2 2076.2
ݍ 14 12 11 12 14
݈݈௤ 2049.5 2050.0 2059.7 2050.3 2070.2
ܺ௅ோ
ଶ (ݍ− ݎଶ) ܺଶ(10)=53.328[0.000] ܺଶ(8)=52.461[0.000] ܺଶ(7)= 32.979[0.000] ܺଶ(8)=51.717[0.000] ܺଶ(10)=12.073§[0.280]
Table 7.6. Identification process and estimation of long run elasticities, NetherlandsNote: These estimations were carried with 81 observations covering the period between 1987q4 to 2007q4. Asymptotic standard errors for each ߚ coefficient are provided in brackets. §indicates significant at 5% and * indicates significant at 10%. ݎଶ=Number of just identified restrictions, and ݍ= Number of total restrictions imposed, i.e. over-identifying restrictions.
݈݈௥మ is the maximum value of the log-likelihood function obtained under ݎଶ just identified restrictions. ݈݈௤ is the maximum value of the log-likelihood function obtained under ݍover-identifying restrictions. ܺ௅ோଶ (ݍ− ݎଶ) is the chi-square statistics for the log-likelihood Ratio (LR) test. P-values for this test are provided in square brackets.
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Hence, evidence does provide support to any of the four sets of restrictionsdrawn from each of the nested NAIRU models. As in the previous case, weinterpret these results as a sign that the unemployment and real wagescointegrated vectors are more complex than as portrayed by theoreticalmodels. In fact, evidence from the trial and error process by which these sets ofrestrictions are introduced reveals some suggestive features of the data50: In allcases, ߚଶଶ = −1 seems supported by the data, whereas ߚଵ଼ = 0 pushes ߚ௅ே௃, ߚ஻ௌand ߚோு into rejection. This evidence suggests that some variant of ߚ஺ௌோ (where
ߚଵ଼ ≠ 0 and ߚଶଶ = −1) might be supported by the data.Also as in the UK’s case, we test this hypothesis building a sequence ofrestrictions denoted by ߚு௬௕௥௜ௗ, which contains these features, and experimentuntil we find a ߚመு௬௕௥௜ௗ supported by the data, here reported in the last columnof Table 7.6. In this case, ߚመு௬௕௥௜ௗ is significant at the standard 5%, the LR test isa ܺଶ(10)=12.073, with a p-value equal to [0.280]. It must be noted that all theunrestricted coefficients are individually significant at the standard levels (seeasymptotic standard errors in brackets). ߚመு௬௕௥௜ௗ is clearly more significant thanthe rest of ߚmatrices examined in Table 7.6 and consequently we adopt it asour preferred long run specification.The following equations show the unemployment and real wages cointegratedvectors implied by ߚመு௬௕௥௜ௗ (asymptotic standard errors in brackets), recall thatthe coefficients of these equations can be interpreted as long run elasticitiesbecause all variables are measured in logarithms.7.6 ݑ௧= −6.418(ݕ௧− ௧݈) − 1.334݃ݎݎ௧− 2.483ݐ௧௪ − 1.586 ௧݇− 0.408( ௧݅− ∆݌௧) + ߦመଵ,௧(0.726) (0.171) (0.420) (0.333) (0.079)7.7 (ݓ௧− ݌௧) = (ݕ௧− ௧݈) + 0.276ݐ௧௪ + ߦመଶ,௧(0.038)As per equation 7.6, the Netherlands’ NAIRU is determined by some features ofthe labour market, such as unemployment benefits and labour taxation, as alsoreported in Arestis et al. (2007) or Gianella et al. (2008). Although contrary toLNJ’s propositions, the NAIRU is not exclusively determined by theseexogenous factors:First, the NAIRU is also affected by productivity, our estimates suggest that anincrease in productivity of 1% would reduce the NAIRU by 6.418%. Accordingto our theoretical model, this evidence suggests that the impact of productivityover firms mark-up is greater than its impact on real wages51. This seems aplausible possibility because the wage share in the Netherlands has fallen in the
50 As in the UK’s case, it must be noted that comments regarding the importance of individualrestrictions reported here, are consistent with different ordering of the restrictions.51 As per equation 4.4 ߚଵଶ = ఠమିఝయఠభାఝభ, hence finding ߚመଵଶ < 0 requires ߮ଷ > ߱ଶ. As long as thedenominator is positive, i.e. ߱ଵ + ߮ଵ > 0.
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period studied here, see Figure 6.13 (b). We do not have knowledge of previousevidence of this relationship.Second, the NAIRU is influenced by the size of capital stock, our estimatessuggest that 1% increase in capital stock would reduce the NAIRU by 1.586%.As discussed in the UK’s section, this evidence suggests that capital stock limitsfirms’ ability to mark-up wages. Our finding reinforces previous evidence thatcapital stock reduces the NAIRU in the Netherlands, particularly that fromArestis et al. (2007) who also find unemployment negatively cointegrated withcapital stock, see also (Driehuis, 1986).Third, the NAIRU is determined by real long term interest rates, our estimatesuggest that 1% increase in real long term interest rates would reduce theNAIRU by 0.408%. The sign of this coefficient is unexpected and we speculate itcould be the result of the wealth or/and the debt effect discussed in UK’ssection. In any case, this finding reinforces previous evidence that real interestrates affect the NAIRU in the Netherlands, see Ball (1999) and Gianella et al.(2008) although in these studies the relationship found has the conventionalpositive sign. Considering the importance of capital stock highlighted by ourresults, and that these studies do not account for it, a possible explanation forthis sign discrepancy is that their positive real interest rate coefficient is in factcapturing the negative influence of capital stock over the NAIRU. Finally, it isworth noting, that we do not find evidence of labour market hysteresisdetermining the NAIRU, as also reported in Arestis et al. (2007).Turning now to equation 7.7, the real wages equilibrium is positively affectedby productivity on one-to-one basis, suggesting that productivity gains are fullyreflected in the long run real wages equilibrium. Similar findings are reportedby Schreiber (2012), who also finds unit proportionality between real wagesand productivity in the Netherlands. Labour taxation also increases the longrun real wages equilibrium, this suggests that in the long run workers are ableto compensate tax increases over their wages.Finally, combining the evidence of long run unit proportionality, betweenproductivity and real wages, with the negative effect of productivity over theNAIRU suggests three possible scenarios52: First, one where unemploymentreduces firms ability to mark-up wages (߮ଵ > 0) but firms’ reaction toproductivity gains is above unity (߮ଷ > 1 ). Second, a scenario whereunemployment has no influence on firms’ ability to mark-up wages (߮ଵ = 0)
52 As per equation 4.5 ߚଶଶ = ቀ߮ ଵ ఠమିఝయఠభାఝభ + ߮ଷቁ, hence if ߚመଶଶ = 1 and ߚመଵଶ = ఠ ૛−࣐૜ఠ ૚+࣐૚ < 0 rewriting
ߚଶଶas follows; ߮ଵ ఠమିఝయఠభାఝభ = 1 − ߮ଷ, we can see that:If ߮ଵ > 0 then ߮ଷ > 1If ߮ଵ = 0 then ߮ଷ = 1If ߮ଵ < 0 then ߮ଷ < 1
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and firms’ reaction to productivity is equal to unity (߮ଷ = 1). Third, one whereunemployment increases firms’ ability to mark-up wages (߮ଵ < 0) but firmsreaction to productivity is below unity (߮ଷ < 1).
7.3.4 Short-run dynamics of unemployment and the anchor properties of
the NAIRUTo analyse the behaviour of unemployment around the NAIRU, we estimate theECM equation for ∆ݑ௧using the residuals from 7.6 and 7.7 as error correctionterms. The resultant ∆ݑ௧, estimated with 81 observations over the period1987q4- 2007q4, is the following:7.8 ∆ݑ௧= 6.717 − 0.042ߦመଵ,௧ି ଵ + 0.962ߦመଶ,௧ି ଵ− 1.528∆(ݓ௧ି ଵ− ݌௧ି ଵ) − 0.056∆(ݕ௧ି ଵ− ௧݈ି ଵ)[0.325] [0.490] [0.025] [0.096] [0.957]
−0.027∆ݑ௧ି ଵ− 0.201∆ ݈ݑ௧ି ଵ− 0.033∆݃ݎݎ௧ି ଵ+ 0.140∆ݐ௧ି ଵ
௪ − 0.012∆݉ ݈݅௧ି ଵ[0.824] [0.297] [0.947] [0.714] [0.498]
−7.290∆ ௧݇ି ଵ− 0.018∆( ௧݅ି ଵ− ∆݌௧ି ଵ) − 0.001∆݌௧ି ଵ௩௠ − 0.001∆݌௧ି ଶ௩௠ + εොଷ௧[0.116] [0.658] [0.472] [0.397]Adj. ܴଶ=0.447
ௌܺ஼
ଶ (4)= 7.552 [0.109], ܺிிଶ (1)= 0.381 [0.537]
ܺே௢௥௠
ଶ (2)= 5.669 [0.059], ܺு௘௧ଶ (1)= 0.116 [0.734]
ߦመଵ,௧ = ݑ+ 6.418(ݕ− )݈ + 1.334݃ݎݎ+ 2.483ݐ௪ + 1.586݇+ 0.408(݅− ∆݌)
ߦመଶ,௧ = (ݓ − ݌) − (ݕ− )݈ − 0.276ݐ௪
ߪகොయ = 0.0443Where Adj. ܴଶ, ௌܺ஼ଶ , ܺிிଶ , ܺே௢௥௠ଶ , ܺு௘௧ଶ have the same meaning as above. ߪகොయis thestandard deviation of the error term in equation 7.8. p-values for t-tests anddiagnostic tests are reported in square brackets53.As per equation 7.8 the coefficient for ߦመଵ,௧ି ଵ is not significantly different fromzero, meaning that deviations from the NAIRU have no significant influence onunemployment dynamics, i.e. there is no evidence of the NAIRU acting as ananchor. Arestis et al. (2007) also find that deviations from the NAIRU have littleinfluence on unemployment, as per their estimates, only a very modest 6.8% ofthe deviation is corrected each quarter. Our findings are also consistent withSchreiber’s (2012) results, who find that deviations from the NAIRU onlyexplain 4.6% of unemployment dynamics.The coefficient for ߦመଶ,௧ି ଵ is significant and positive. This suggests that settingreal wages above their long run equilibrium increases unemployment.According to Bhaduri and Marglin’s dichotomy, this estimate suggests that theNetherlands operates under a “profit-led regime”, as also reported by Hein andVogel (2007).
53 All diagnostic tests are passed at the standard 5% significance level.
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7.3.5 Impulse response and the effects of an unemployment shockWe complete our analysis simulating an unemployment shock of one standarddeviation in equation 7.8, i.e. ߪகොయ = 0.0443, which amounts to a rise inunemployment of 17.73% in annual terms. Figure 7.2 shows the effect of thisshock using GIR functions:Unemployment, panel (a), shows no sign of returning to its baseline after theshock, instead it drifts upwards until it stabilizes six years after the shock, at alevel 33% greater than its pre-shock value. This behaviour suggests that theNAIRU has no anchor properties and reinforces our findings from equation 7.8.Our estimate is more pessimistic than previous impulse response estimates.Duval and Vogel (2008) find that the Netherlands needs between three andfour years to close the output gap, but the overall conclusion is similar, theNAIRU does not seem to be a strong anchor.The reaction of long term unemployment, shown in panel (b), is described by aJ-curve. As discussed in the UK’s section, this illustrates that the effect of theshock changes over time. Real wages and productivity, panels (c) and (d), bothfall as a result of the shock, although the fall in real wages is more pronouncedthan that of productivity. While ݓ௧− ݌௧stabilizes at a level 1.6% smaller thanits pre-shock value, ݕ௧− ௧݈stabilizes 0.2% below its baseline. This suggests thatthe wage share falls as a result of the shock.Capital stock and real long term interest rates, panels (e) and (f), fall as aconsequence of the shock until they stabilize at a level 1.5% and 15% smallerthan their baselines, respectively. This reaction to the rise in unemployment isvery suggestive of the type of negative long run relationship that we find in oureconometric analysis. The same comment applies to the permanent reductionof productivity which follows to the shock.The last three panels refer to the wage-push factors of our model.Unemployment benefits and labour taxation, panels (g) and (h), fall after theshock until they stabilize below their baseline. As discussed in the UK’s case,this could either be the result of a rise in wages, or a fall in social provisions andtaxes, respectively. Workers’ militancy panel (i), falls sharply after the shock,until it stabilizes at a level 85% below its pre-shock situation.
125
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7.4 SummaryIn this chapter we have used the CVAR approach to study the determinants ofthe NAIRU and its anchor properties in the UK and the Netherlands. Thismethodology allows us to study the determinants of the NAIRU by testing thelong run restrictions required by each of the models nested in ourencompassing model (ߚ௅ே௃, ߚ஻ௌ, ߚ஺ௌோ and ߚோு ). Panel i) of Table 7.7 summarizesthe results of this process. According to our estimations, none of the set ofrestrictions is individually significant, although evidence is very supportive of a
ߚመୌ୷ୠ୰୧ୢ that combines different features of ߚ஺ௌோ and ߚோு in each country.UK Netherlands
i) Identification process
ߚመ௅ே௃ [0.000] [0.000]
ߚመ஻ௌ [0.000] [0.000]
ߚመ஺ௌோ [0.002] [0.000]
ߚመோு [0.000] [0.000]
ߚመୌ୷ୠ୰୧ୢ [0.063] [0.280]
ii) NAIRU determinants
݃ݎݎ 0.991 -1.334
ݐ௪ NS -2.483
݉ ݈݅ 0.112 NS
ݕ− ݈ NS -6.418
݈ݑ NS NS
݇ -11.40 -1.586
݅− ∆݌ -0.646 -0.408
T 0.123 NS
iii) NAIRU’s anchor properties
ߦመଵ,௧ି ଵ NS NSTime required to returnto baseline (GIR) No Return No Return
Table 7.7. Summary of findings for the UK and the NetherlandsNote: i) Results for the identification process are drawn from Table 7.3 in the UK’s case and from Table 7.6for the Netherlands. ii) Values for the NAIRU elasticities are drawn from each country’s unemploymentcointegrated vector, equations 7.2 and 7.6 respectively. iii) Coefficients of ߦመଵ,௧ି ଵ are drawn from equations7.4 and 7.8 respectively. “Time required to return to baseline” draws from Figure 7.1 and Figure 7.2respectively. NS not significant and “No return” indicates that unemployment does not return to itsbaseline.Panel ii) of Table 7.7 presents these ߚመୌ୷ୠ୰୧ୢ . In the UK, the NAIRU is determinedby some wage-push factors together with capital stock and long term interestrates. In the Netherlands, the NAIRU is determined by some labour marketinstitutions along with productivity, capital stock and long term interest rates.Hence, according to our results for the UK and the Netherlands the NAIRU is notexclusively determined by exogenous factors contrary to what LNJ’s modelsuggests.Further, these results add to the body of empirical literature that questions theclaim that time series evidence for the UK and the Netherlands support LNJ’spropositions, as for instance suggested by Nickell and Van Our (2000). In fact,our findings raise questions about the validity of the UK’s time series literature
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in which such claims are grounded for two reasons. First, our results castdoubts on the robustness of studies that find the NAIRU neutral to capital stock,such as Layard and Nickell (1986). Second, our finding that capital stock andreal long term interest rates influence the NAIRU, suggests that some of thetime series studies which are usually cited to vindicate LNJ’s claims, forinstance Layard et al. (1991,p.441) or Nickell and Bell (1995), are likely to bemisspecified because they omit these variables. Stockhammer (2004a,p.20) andArestis et al. (2007, p.144) have already warn of these potential biases.The CVAR approach also allows us to examine the anchor properties of theNAIRU by estimating a VECM model and GIR functions. Our results aresummarized in Panel iii) of Table 7.7.According to our VECM estimations deviations from the NAIRU in the UK andthe Netherlands have no significant influence on unemployment’s dynamics.These findings are reinforced by the results of simulating and unemploymentshock using GIR functions, which suggest that after this shock unemploymentdrifts away from its baseline in both countries, rather than returning to it as itwould be expected if the NAIRU acted as an anchor.Hence, our VECM and GIR results question LNJ’s claim about the anchorproperties of the NAIRU, although they are in tune with the existing literature,which suggest that the NAIRU in the UK and the Netherlands is at best a weakanchor for economic activity.In sum, our findings for the UK and the Netherlands presented in this chapterchallenge the validity of LNJ’s propositions, the time series literature thatprovides support to this model and consequently policy recommendationsinspired by this approach. See Chapter 11 for further discussion on policyimplications.
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Chapter 8 Determinants of the NAIRU and its anchor
properties, evidence from Germany and France.
8.1 IntroductionThis chapter presents the results of applying the CVAR approach to data forGermany and France. We start by summarizing the time series literaturereviewed in Chapter 3 that refers to these economies. A summary table of thisliterature can also be found in Table I.2 of Appendix I.It is commonly believed that the evolution of unemployment in Germanyprovides support to LNJ’s claims (Saint-Paul, 2004,p.52/3, OECD, 2010c, Rinneand Zimmermann, 2011,p.21). This seems to be backed by findings that suggestthat unemployment benefits and labour taxation determine the NAIRU(Gianella et al., 2008). However, these estimates for wage-push factors seem tobe far from robust, see for instance Carstensen and Hansen (2000).Furthermore, evidence of significant links between the NAIRU and demand alsochallenges these claims. Carstensen and Hansen (2000) and Schreiber (2012)find evidence of a negative long run link between unemployment andproductivity. Further, Arestis and Biefang-Frisancho Mariscal (2000) andArestis et al. (2007) find a significant negative link between capital stock andunemployment, these results are yet reinforced by evidence of the negativeimpact of accumulation over unemployment (Stockhammer, 2004a). Finally,there is evidence of a link between the NAIRU and real interest rates (Ball,1999, Gianella et al., 2008). Evidence with regard to hysteresis effects is lessclear, but Logeay and Tober (2006) find some supportive evidence thehysteresis hypothesis.The anchor properties of the NAIRU in Germany are less contentious, becauseall evidence suggests that the NAIRU is at best a weak anchor. Arestis andBiefang-Frisancho Mariscal (2000), Arestis et al., (2007) and Schreiber (2012)all find that deviations from the NAIRU have little influence on unemploymentdynamics. Furthermore, the adjustment after a shock seems to be veryprotracted (Carstensen and Hansen, 2000, Logeay and Tober, 2006, Duval andVogel, 2008).A similar picture arises when looking at the literature for France, there arenumerous claims that French unemployment performance provides support toLNJ’s claims (Saint-Paul, 2004,p.52/3, Jamet, 2006). This is based on findingsthat suggest that labour market institutions determine the NAIRU (L'Horty andRault, 2003, Gianella et al., 2008), but this evidence does not seem to be robust.Furthermore, evidence of significant links between the NAIRU and demandthrough different channels, challenge claims that France’s evidence providessupport to LNJ’s claims: L'Horty and Rault (2003) and Schreiber (2012) find
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evidence of a negative long run link between unemployment and productivity.Miaouli (2001) find a significant positive long run link between capital stockand employment. Similarly, Arestis et al. (2007) find evidence of a significantnegative long run link between capital stock and unemployment. These resultsare yet reinforced by evidence of the negative impact of accumulation overunemployment (Stockhammer, 2004a).Further, there is evidence of a link between the NAIRU and real interest rates(Ball, 1999, Gianella et al., 2008). The role of hysteresis is more ambiguous,although Stockhammer (2004a) finds evidence of unemployment andemployment persistence. Further as in the German case, deviations from theNAIRU seem to have little influence on unemployment dynamics (Miaouli,2001, Arestis et al., 2007, Schreiber, 2012), and the adjustment to shocksappear to be very sluggish (Duval and Vogel, 2008), which suggests that theNAIRU is at best a weak anchor.The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 8.2 presents our resultfor Germany, section 8.3 our results for France. Each of them contains fivesubsections devoted to the five CVAR stages. And section 8.4 closes the chapterwith a summary of key findings.
8.2 Germany
8.2.1 Data properties and model specificationIn order to confirm that the CVAR approach can be applied to Germany’s dataset, we examine the stationary properties of the data. According to the unit rootand stationarity tests results, reported in Appendix II, all the variables inGermany’s ݖ௧ = (ݓ௧− ݌௧,ݕ௧− ௧݈, ݑ௧, ݈ݑ௧,݃ݎݎ௧,ݐ௧௪ , ௧݇, ௧݅− ∆݌௧)ᇱ are ܫ(1). Theseresults justify the use of cointegration techniques such as the CVAR which weproceed to model now.The starting point is the CVAR benchmark specification, equation 5.1. Thecomposition of its deterministic component ܥ is decided after visual inspectionof the data in Figure II.3. This inspection reveals that some of the variables of ݖ௧exhibit a time trend, which could cause the problem of quadratic trendsdiscussed in section 5.4. In order to avoid this phenomenon, we decompose thematrix of deterministic components ܥ into intercepts and time trends, andrestrict the time trend to the long run term, as per equation 5.5.The choice of lag order for this specification draws from the standard modelselection criteria, reported in Table 8.1, and along with the composition of x௧, isthe result of extensive experimentation with several specifications. After this
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process we adopt the following VAR (2) expression with x௧ = (∆݌௧ି ଵ௩௠ ) as ourpreferred specification54:
8.1 ∆z௧ = c଴ + ߔଵ∆z௧ି ଵ + ߛߚᇱz୲∗ + λx௧+ ε୲ where ݖ௧ =
⎝
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݈ݑ௧
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௪
௧݇
௧݅− ∆݌௧⎠
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⎟
⎟
⎟
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ܶ ⎠
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⎟
⎟
⎞
, x௧ = (∆݌௧ି ଵ௩௠ )
Variables in ݖ௧, ݖ௧∗ and x௧have the same meaning as in Chapter 6. We adopt thisspecification because it appears to deliver the best balance between parsimony,a rich and informative lag structure55 and satisfactory diagnostic test results forGermany’s data set. Lag order AIC SBC5 1788.9 1443.64 1650.1 1369.13 1663.9 1447.12 1672.2 1519.61 1618.4 1530.10 1095.5 1071.4
Table 8.1. Lag order selection criteria, GermanyNote: The test is carried out with 55 observations covering the period between 1994q2 to 2007q4.Statistics reported here are obtained from estimating an unrestricted VAR model for the variablescontained in the vector z௧, with a constant and a time trend, and one lag of ∆݌௩௠ .
8.2.2 Cointegration testsFollowing, we test for cointegration among the variables of ݖ௧, Table 8.2presents the results of the Maximum Eigenvalue (ߣ௠ ௔௫) and the Trace (ߣ௧௥௔௖௘)tests. The Maximum Eigenvalue test fails to reject the null hypothesis of havingtwo long run relationships, while the Trace test fails to reject the nullhypothesis of having seven cointegrated vectors. That is, ߣ௠ ௔௫ supports thepredictions from our theoretical model of two long run relationships, but the
ߣ௧௥௔௖௘ suggests otherwise. Due to the problems of these tests in finite samples,see section 5.5, we resort to an overall judgment of their results along witheconomic theory (Pesaran and Pesaran, 2003,p.293, Garrat et al., 2006,p.198).The Maximum Eigenvalue and our theoretical model suggest that there are twolong run relationships among our variables, hence, it seems reasonable toproceed under the assumption of r=2.
54 We experimented with more parsimonious models (than our preferred specification), such asa VAR(1) with x௧ = (∆݌௧ି ଵ௩௠ ), this lag order draw from SBC indications in Table 8.1. Or a VAR(1)with x௧ = (∆݌௧ି ଵ௩௠ , ∆݌௧ି ଶ௩௠ )ᇱ. And less parsimonious models, such as a VAR(2) with x௧ =(∆݌௧ି ଵ௩௠ , ∆݌௧ି ଶ௩௠ )ᇱ. However, these specifications are unable to accommodate serial correlationproblems, in some cases despite consuming greater degrees of freedom than our preferredspecification, and consequently are discarded.55 Equivalent to an ܣܴܯ ܣ(16,14), (Hamilton, 1994, p.349)
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ߣ௠ ௔௫ ߣ௧௥௔௖௘
ܪ଴ ܪଵ
Statistic 95% Criticalvalues Statistic 95% Criticalvalues
r=0 r=1 77.59 55.14 295.57 182.99
r≤1 r=2 60.46 49.32 217.98 147.27
r≤2 r=3 41.21 43.61 157.51 115.85
r≤3 r=4 35.10 37.86 116.30 87.17
r≤4 r=5 34.30 31.79 81.21 63.00
r≤5 r=6 20.41 25.42 46.90 42.34
r≤6 r=7 14.09 19.22 26.49 25.77
r≤7 r=8 12.40 12.39 12.00 12.39
Table 8.2. Results from cointegration tests, GermanyNote: Test statistics are obtained from applying the Maximum Eigenvalue and Trace test to z௧using aVAR(2) model with unrestricted intercepts and restricted trend coefficients, and one lag of ∆݌௩௠ , with 58observations covering the period between 1993q3 to 2007q4. Critical values are chosen according to thisspecification.
8.2.3 Identifying the long run relationsIn order to identify which variables take part in these two long runrelationships, we use the four sets of theoretically driven restrictions detailedin Table 5.1 (ߚ௅ே௃, ߚ஻ௌ, ߚ஺ௌோ and ߚோு) as identifying schedules. Table 8.3 reportsthe results of this process.We start by imposing the restrictions contained in ߚ௅ே௃. This set of restrictionsis insignificant at the standard 5%, its log-likelihood ratio (LR) test is a
ܺଶ(10)=63.106 with a p-value equal to [0.000]. Hence, evidence seems to leanagainst ߚ௅ே௃. Next, we test the validity of the restrictions contained in ߚ஻ௌ56,which are also insignificant as a whole with a p-value for the LR test equal to[0.000]. Following, we introduce the set of restrictions of ߚ஺ௌோ , for whichevidence is not very supportive either, since it is insignificant with a p-value forthe LR test equal to [0.002]. Finally, the set of restrictions contained in ߚோு isalso found insignificant, with a p-value for LR test equal to [0.000].Hence, evidence does not seem to yield support to any of the four sets ofrestrictions drawn from each of the nested NAIRU models. As in previous cases,we interpret these results as a sign that the unemployment and real wagescointegrated vectors are more complex than as portrayed by theoreticalmodels.
56 It should be noted that the coefficient ߚଶଽ is left unrestricted because we fail to obtainconverging results when introducing ߚଶଽ = 0, despite introducing ߚ஻ௌ following differentsequences. This problem also appears when imposing ߚ஺ௌோ .
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ݖ௧
∗ ߚመ௅ே௃ ߚመ஻ௌ ߚመ஺ௌோ ߚመோு ߚመୌ୷ୠ୰୧ୢ
ݓ௧− ݌௧ 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000
ݕ௧− ௧݈ 0.000 -1.000 0.000 -1.000 13.34 -1.000 0.000 -1.000 8.933§ 1.000(9.172) (2.393)
ݑ௧ 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
݈ݑ௧ 0.000 0.000 0.937 0.195 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.247§(1.214) None (0.121)
݃ݎݎ௧ -0.338 0.218§ -0.535 -0.274§ 1.388 -1.737§ -0.378 -0.595 0.831§ -1.458§(0.577) (0.013) (0.498) (0.136) (1.187) (0.765) (0.398) (0.464) (0.322) (0.334)
ݐ௪ ௧ -2.989§ -0.161§ -4.456 -0.736 -5.453§ -1.001§ -1.928 -1.456§ -4.617§ -1.863§(1.330) (0.038) (2.759) none (1.906) (0.505) (1.091) (0.610) (0.711) (0.392)
௧݇ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -1.758 7.312 0.000 0.000 -1.312§ 6.903§(0.967) (3.876) (0.345) (1.698)
௧݅− ∆݌௧ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.155 -0.323 0.000 0.000(0.247) None
ܶ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002NC 0.000 -0.040NC 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.040§none (0.022) (0.010)
ݎଶ 4 4 4 4 4
݈݈௥మ 1821.3 1821.3 1821.3 1821.3 1821.3
ݍ 14 11 10 12 9
݈݈௤ 1789.8 1786.1 1810.8 1786.1 1818.7
ܺ௅ோ
ଶ (ݍ− ݎଶ) ܺଶ(10)=63.106[0.000] ܺଶ(7)=70.342[0.000] ܺଶ(6)=21.004[0.002] ܺଶ(8)=70.4874[0.000] ܺଶ(5)=5.219§[0.390]
Table 8.3. Identification process and estimation of long run elasticities, GermanyNote: These estimations were carried with 58 observations covering the period between 1993q3 to 2007q4. Asymptotic standard errors for each ߚ coefficient are provided in brackets. §indicates significant at 5% and * indicates significant at 10%. NC indicates that the coefficient is subject to a theoretical restriction for which we failed to obtain converging results, andhence had to be left unrestricted. ݎଶ=Number of just identified restrictions, and ݍ= Number of total restrictions imposed, i.e. over-identifying restrictions. ݈݈௥మ is the maximum value of thelog-likelihood function obtained under ݎଶ just identified restrictions. ݈݈௤ is the maximum value of the log-likelihood function obtained under ݍover-identifying restrictions. ܺ௅ோଶ (ݍ− ݎଶ) isthe chi-square statistics for the log-likelihood Ratio (LR) test. P-values for this test are provided in square brackets.
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In fact, evidence from the trial and error process by which these sets ofrestrictions is introduced reveals some suggestive features of the data57:Introducing ߚଵ଻ = 0 and ߚଶଶ = −1 pushes the set ߚመ௅ே௃ , ߚመ஻ௌ and ߚመோு intorejection (Similarly ߚଶଽ = 0 when we obtain converging results). In the case of
ߚመ஺ௌோ , it is imposing ߚଶସ = 0 and ߚଶଶ = −1 that pushes the set of restrictions intorejection. On the other hand, ߚଵସ = 0 and ߚଵ଼ = 0 seem to be supported by thedata in most cases. This evidence suggests that some form of hybrid between
ߚ஺ௌோ (where ߚଵ଻ ≠ 0) and ߚ஻ௌ (where ߚଶସ ≠ 0), along with ߚଵସ = 0 , ߚଵ଼ = 0 ,
ߚଶଶ ≠ −1 and ߚଶଽ ≠ 0 might be supported by the data.As in the UK’s case, we test this hypothesis building a sequence of restrictionsdenoted by ߚு௬௕௥௜ௗ, which contains these features, and experiment until we finda ߚመு௬௕௥௜ௗ supported by the data, here reported in the last column of Table 8.3.In this case, ߚመு௬௕௥௜ௗ is significant at the standard 5%, the LR test is a
ܺଶ(5)=5.219 with a p-value equal to [0.390]. Furthermore, according to theasymptotic standard errors (in brackets), all the unrestricted coefficients areindividually significant at the standard levels. ߚመு௬௕௥௜ௗ is clearly more significantthan the rest of ߚmatrices examined in Table 8.3 and consequently we adopt itas our preferred long run specification.The following equations show the unemployment and real wages cointegratedvectors implied by ߚመு௬௕௥௜ௗ (asymptotic standard errors in brackets), recall thatthe coefficients of these equations can be interpreted as long run elasticitiesbecause all variables are measured in logarithms.8.2 ݑ௧= −8.933(ݕ௧− ௧݈) − 0.831݃ݎݎ௧+ 4.617ݐ௧௪ + 1.312 ௧݇+ ߦመଵ,௧(2.393) (0.322) (0.711) (0.345)8.3 (ݓ௧− ݌௧) = −(ݕ௧− ௧݈) − 0.247 ݈ݑ௧+ 1.458݃ݎݎ௧+ 1.863ݐ௧௪ − 6.903 ௧݇+ 0.040ܶ+ ߦመଶ,௧(0.121) (0.334) (0.392) (1.698) (0.010)According to equation 8.2 Germany’s NAIRU is determined by some features ofthe labour market, such as unemployment benefits and labour taxation, as alsoreported in Gianella et al. (2008). Although contrary to LNJ’s propositions, theNAIRU is not exclusively determined by these exogenous factors:First, the NAIRU is also affected by productivity, our estimates suggest that anincrease in productivity of 1% would reduce the NAIRU by 8.933%. Asdiscussed in the Netherlands’ section, this evidence suggests that the impact ofproductivity over firms mark-up is greater than its impact on real wages. Thisseems a plausible possibility because the German wage share has fallen in theperiod studied here, see Figure 6.14 (a). This finding reinforces previousevidence that productivity reduces the NAIRU in Germany, particularly that
57 As in the UK’s case, it must be noted that comments regarding the importance of individualrestrictions reported here, are consistent with different ordering of the restrictions.
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from Schreiber (2012) who also find unemployment negatively cointegratedwith productivity, and Carstensen and Hansen (2000) who using IR functions,show how positive technological shocks increase employment permanently.Second, the NAIRU is influenced by the size of capital stock, although it has aperverse effect, for our estimates suggest that an increase in capital stock of 1%would increase the NAIRU by 1.312%. According to our theoretical model thisevidence suggests that capital stock increases firms’ ability to mark-up wagesrather than reduces it, making capital and labour substitutive factors ofproduction58. Alternatively, this could also reflect that capital stock increasesworkers real wage claims and that this effect dominates over that of capitalstock in the price mark-up59.In any case, this findings reinforces previous evidence that capital stock affectsthe NAIRU in Germany, see Arestis and Biefang-Frisancho Mariscal (2000),Arestis et al. (2007) and Stockhammer (2004a), although the sign of ourestimated coefficient is contrary to that obtained in these articles. This signdiscrepancy could be due to our sample size or differences in the definition ofcapital stock used. Our measure of capital stock accounts for the “wholeeconomy” while previous studies use a measure that only considers the“business sector”, see section 6.3.8 for further details. Although considering theimportance of productivity highlighted by our results, and that these studies donot account for it, we cannot discard that their capital stock coefficient is in factcapturing the influence of productivity over the NAIRU.It is worth noting, that we do not find evidence of labour market hysteresishaving any impact on the NAIRU, as also reported in Arestis and Biefang-Frisancho Mariscal (2000) and Arestis et al. (2007), but in contrast to thefindings from Logeay and Tober (2006). Further, there is no evidence of reallong term interest rates playing a significant role in determining the NAIRUcontrary to Ball (1999) and Gianella et al. (2008). Having controlled for longterm interest rates in our analysis, we suspect that the real cost of borrowing inthese studies, might also be capturing the effect of some omitted variables,which here have a significant influence on the NAIRU.Turning now to equation 8.3, the real wage equilibrium is negatively affectedby productivity on one-to-one basis suggesting that productivity gains reducerather than increase real wages in the long run. This is unsurprisingconsidering the fall of the German wage share in the period studied here, see
58 As per equation 4.1 ߚଵ଼ = − ఝమఠభାఝభ, hence finding ߚመଵ଼ > 0 requires ߮ଶ < 0, as long as thedenominator is positive.59 To account for this possibility we would need to expand our real wage equation 4.2 toconsider the following term: +߱଻ ,݇ which would deliver a new ߚଵ଼ = ఠళିఝమఠభାఝభ . Thus observing a
ߚଵ଼ > 0, could imply that ߱଻ > ߮ଶ, that is, growing capital stock increases workers real wagesclaims beyond what it reduces firms mark-ups.
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panel (a) in Figure 6.14. Similarly, Schreiber (2012) finds no evidence ofpositive unit proportionality between real wages and productivity, althoughthis author does not test if this relationship could take a negative sign.Long term unemployment and capital stock also reduce the long run real wagesequilibrium. This suggests that long term unemployed workers, are still able toexert downward pressure over real wage claims and that greater capital stockdoes not result in greater wages in the long run. On the other hand,unemployment benefits, labour taxation and a time trend increase the long runreal wages equilibrium, suggesting that benefits and taxation generates upwardpressure over real wages in the long run.
8.2.4 Short-run dynamics of unemployment and the anchor properties of
the NAIRUTo analyse the behaviour of unemployment around the NAIRU, we estimate theECM equation for ∆ݑ௧using the residuals from 8.2 and 8.3 as error correctionterms. The resultant ∆ݑ௧, estimated with 58 observations over the periodbetween 1993q3-2007q4, is the following:8.4 ∆ݑ௧ = 109.0 + 0.027ߦመଵ,௧ି ଵ− 0.541ߦመଶ,௧ି ଵ+ 0.797∆(ݓ௧ି ଵ− ݌௧ି ଵ) − 0.337∆(ݕ௧ି ଵ− ௧݈ି ଵ)[0.000] [0.454] [0.000] [0.040] [0.424]
+0.823∆ݑ௧ି ଵ− 1.083∆ ݈ݑ௧ି ଵ− 1.153∆݃ݎݎ௧ି ଵ+ 0.213∆ݐ௧ି ଵ
௪ + 14.64∆ ௧݇ି ଵ[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.568] [0.003]
−0.001∆( ௧݅ି ଵ− ∆݌௧ି ଵ) − 0.001∆݌௧ି ଵ௩௠ + εොଷ௧[0.914] [0.058]Adj. ܴଶ=0.775
ௌܺ஼
ଶ (4)= 1.160 [0.885], ܺிிଶ (1)= 0.006 [0.939]
ܺே௢௥௠
ଶ (2)= 0.861 [0.650], ܺு௘௧ଶ (1)= 7.205 [0.007]
ߦመଵ,௧ = ݑ+ 8.933(ݕ− )݈ + 0.831݃ݎݎ− 4.617ݐ௪ − 1.312݇
ߦመଶ,௧ = (ݓ − ݌) + (ݕ− )݈ + 0.247 ݈ݑ− 1.458݃ݎݎ− 1.863ݐ௪ + 6.903݇− 0.040ܶ
ߪகොయ = 0.0134Where Adj. ܴଶ, ௌܺ஼ଶ , ܺிிଶ , ܺே௢௥௠ଶ , ܺு௘௧ଶ have the same meaning as above. ߪகොయis thestandard deviation of the error term in equation 8.4. p-values for t-tests anddiagnostic tests are reported in square brackets60.According to equation 8.4 the coefficient for ߦመଵ,௧ି ଵ is positive but very small,meaning that deviations from the NAIRU have a negligible influence onunemployment dynamics, and consequently it is unlikely to act as an anchor.Arestis and Biefang-Frisancho Mariscal (2000) also find that deviations fromthe NAIRU have little influence on unemployment, as per their estimates, only a
60 All diagnostic tests are passed at the standard 5% significance level, except theheteroscedasticity tests. Hence, although our estimates are still unbiased, inference using the t-test needs to be taken with caution because heteroscedasticity reduces the power of the test.That is, the individual significance test is less likely to reject the null hypothesis of notsignificantly different from zero.
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very modest 1.5% of the deviation is corrected each quarter. Further, Arestis etal. (2007) find that deviations from the NAIRU have no significant influence onunemployment. Our findings are also consistent with Schreiber’s (2012)results, who find that deviations from the NAIRU only explain 18.8% ofunemployment dynamics.The coefficient for ߦመଶ,௧ି ଵ is significant and negative. This suggests that settingreal wages above their long run equilibrium reduces unemployment. Accordingto the dichotomy proposed by Bhaduri and Marglin (1990), this estimatesuggests that Germany operates under a “wage-led regime”, as also reported byHein and Vogel (2007) but in contrast to findings from Bowles and Boyer(1995).
8.2.5 Impulse response and the effects of an unemployment shockWe complete our analysis simulating an unemployment shock of one standarddeviation in equation 8.4, i.e. ߪகොయ = 0.0134, which amounts to a rise inunemployment of 5.36% in annual terms. Figure 8.1 shows the effect of thisshock using GIR functions:Unemployment, panel (a), shows no sign of returning to its baseline after theshock, instead it drifts upwards until it stabilizes four years after the shock, at alevel 16% greater than its pre-shock value. This behaviour suggests that theNAIRU has no anchor properties and reinforces the results from equation 8.4.Our estimate is more pessimistic than previous impulse response estimates.Carstensen and Hansen (2000) find that employment needs more than 13 yearsto return to its baseline after a labour demand shock. Similarly, Logeay andTober (2006) find that the unemployment-NAIRU gap has a cycle length of overeight years. Further, Duval and Vogel (2008) find that the Germany needsbetween three and four years to close the output gap. However, the overallconclusion is similar the NAIRU does not seem to be a strong anchor.As a consequence of the shock, long term unemployment increases, panel (b),until it stabilizes at a level 14% above its pre-shock situation. Real wages andproductivity, panels (c) and (d), follow opposite trajectories. As a consequenceof the shock, the real wage falls until it stabilizes at a level 2% smaller than itspre-shock value, while productivity increase until it stabilizes 0.8% above itsbaseline. This suggests that the wage share falls as a result of the shock.Capital stock and real long term interest rates, panels (e) and (f), fall as aconsequence of the shock, until they stabilize at levels 2.3% and 12% smallerthan their baseline, respectively.The last two panels refer to the wage-push factors considered in our model.Unemployment benefits panel (g), and labour taxation panel (h), followopposite patterns after the shock: Benefits fall permanently to a level 13%
138
below its pre-shock situation, this could either be the result of a reduction insocial provisions or a rise in wages. Whereas, labour taxation, increases to alevel 3.5% higher than prior to the shock, this could either be the result of a risein labour taxes or a fall in wages. Recall that both variables are relativemeasures with respect to wages.
Figure 8.1 GIRF of
024
6810
121416
1820
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40 44 48Horizon (quarters) 0
24
68
1012
1416
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40 44 48Horizon (quarters)
-2.50-2.00
-1.50-1.00
-0.500.00
0 4 8 12
-2.50-2.00
-1.50-1.00
-0.500.00
0 4 8 12
-14-12
-10-8
-6-4
-20
2
0 4 8 12 1
%chan
geper
annum
%chan
geper
annum
%chan
geper
annum
%chan
geper
annum(a) ݑ௧a standard deviation shock to unemploymen
16 20 24 28 32 36 40 44 48Horizon (quarters) -0.80
-0.60-0.40
-0.200.00
0.200.40
0.600.80
1.00
0 4 8 12
16 20 24 28 32 36 40 44 48quarters) -12
-10-8
-6-4
-20
2
0 4 8 12
6 20 24 28 32 36 40 44 48rters) 0.00
0.501.00
1.502.00
2.503.00
3.504.00
0 4 8 12(b) ݈ݑ௧16 20 24 28 32 36 40 44 48Horizon (quarters)(c) ݓ௧− ݌௧16 20 24 28 32 36 40 44 48rs)
16 20 24 28 32 36 40 44 48uarters)Horizon (qua(g) ݃ݎݎ௧Horizon (quarte(f) ௧݅− ∆݌௧Horizon ((e) ௧݇(d) ݕ௧− ௧݈Horizon (q(h) ݐ௧௪
t on all variables, Germany
139
8.3 France
8.3.1 Data properties and model specificationWe turn now to the French case, data properties of France’s data set are verysimilar to those of Germany, for evidence from unit root and stationary testssuggest that all variables contained in France’s ݖ௧ = (ݓ௧− ݌௧,ݕ௧− ௧݈, ݑ௧,
݈ݑ௧, ݃ ݎݎ௧,ݐ௧௪ , ݉ ݈݅௧, ݇௧, ௧݅− ∆݌௧)ᇱare ܫ(1), see Appendix II, which justifies theuse of the CVAR approach.We follow the same modelling strategy as in previous cases. The starting pointis the CVAR’s benchmark equation 5.1. The composition of ܥ is decided aftervisual inspection of the data in Figure II.3, which reveals that some of thevariables of ݖ௧exhibit a time trend. To avoid the problem of quadratic trendsthis could cause we adopt equation’s 5.5 specification.The choice of lag order and the composition of x௧, are decided drawing from themodel selection criteria reported in Table 8.4, and after extensiveexperimentation with several specifications. After this process, the followingVAR (3) expression with x௧ = (∆݌௧ି ଵ௩௠ ) is adopted as our preferredspecification61:8.5 ∆z௧ = c଴ + ߔଵ∆z௧ି ଵ + ߔଶ∆z௧ି ଶ + ߛߚᇱz୲∗ + λx௧+ ε୲
Where ݖ௧ =
⎝
⎜
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⎜
⎜
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ܶ ⎠
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, x௧ = (∆݌௧ି ଵ௩௠ )
Variables in ݖ௧, ݖ௧∗ and x௧ have the same meaning as in Chapter 6. Thisspecification seems to provide the best balance between parsimony, a rich andinformative lag structure62 and satisfactory diagnostic test results for France’sdata set.
61 We experimented with more parsimonious models (than our preferred specification), such asa VAR(2) with x௧ = (∆݌௧ି ଵ௩௠ ), this lag order draw from SBC indications in Table 8.4. Or a VAR(2)with x௧ = (∆݌௧ି ଵ௩௠ , ∆݌௧ି ଶ௩௠ )ᇱ, and a VAR(2) with x௧ = (∆݌௧ି ଵ௩௠ , ∆݌௧ି ଶ௩௠ ,ܯ ݅ݐݐ)ᇱ where ܯ ݅ݐݐ is adummy for the period in which President Mitterrand tried to implement the “110 Proposals for
France” between 1981q2-1983q1 (To be more precise May 1981 to March 1983) in which ourestimates seemed less accurate creating several outliners. And less parsimonious models, suchas a VAR(3) with x௧ = (∆݌௧ି ଵ௩௠ , ∆݌௧ି ଶ௩௠ )ᇱ. However, these specifications are unable toaccommodate serial correlation problems, in some cases despite consuming greater degrees offreedom than our preferred specification, and consequently are discarded.62 Equivalent to an ܣܴܯ ܣ(27,24), (Hamilton, 1994, p.349)
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Lag order AIC SBC5 2815.4 2266.14 2689.8 2243.43 2731.1 2387.82 2741.0 2500.61 2572.9 2435.60 1543 1508.9
Table 8.4. Lag order selection criteria, FranceNote: The test is carried out with 94 observations covering the period between 1981q3 to 2004q4.Statistics reported here are obtained from estimating an unrestricted VAR model for the variablescontained in the vector z௧, with a constant and a time trend, and one lag of ∆݌௩௠ .
8.3.2 Cointegration testsTable 8.5 presents the results of testing for cointegration among the variablesof ݖ௧. The Maximum Eigenvalue test (ߣ௠ ௔௫) fails to reject the null hypothesis ofhaving four long run relationships, while the Trace test (ߣ௧௥௔௖௘) fails to rejectthe null hypothesis of having eight cointegrated vectors. Hence, both testssuggest that there are more long run relationships than our theoretical model,although they disagree about the exact number.
ߣ௠ ௔௫ ߣ௧௥௔௖௘
ܪ଴ ܪଵ
Statistic 95% Criticalvalues Statistic 95% Criticalvalues
r=0 r=1 92.91 61.27 384.96 222.62
r≤1 r=2 75.15 55.14 292.05 182.99
r≤2 r=3 62.98 49.32 216.90 147.27
r≤3 r=4 52.06 43.61 153.93 115.85
r≤4 r=5 32.51 37.86 101.87 87.17
r≤5 r=6 22.42 31.79 69.36 63.00
r≤6 r=7 20.90 25.42 46.94 42.34
r≤7 r=8 16.47 19.22 26.04 25.77
r≤8 r=9 9.57 12.39 9.57 12.39
Table 8.5. Results from cointegration tests, FranceNote: Test statistics are obtained from applying the Maximum Eigenvalue and Trace test to z௧, using aVAR(3) model, with unrestricted intercepts and restricted trend coefficients, and one lag of ∆݌௩௠ , with 96observations covering the period between 1981q1 to 2004q4. Critical values are chosen according to thisspecification.As discussed in section 5.5, in these circumstances it is necessary to weight thetests results against their potential biases and economic theory. In this case, wehave a reasonable large sample of 100 observations, but we are estimating alarge VAR(3) with nine variables, and some of its residuals are not normallydistributed. Hence, it seems reasonable to suspect that the test results mightsuffer of size biases. To overcome these problems, we follow the approachadopted in the UK’s case, and proceed under the assumption of r=2 assuggested by economic theory.
8.3.3 Identifying the long run relationsIn order to identify which variables take part in these two long runrelationships, we use the four sets of restrictions from Table 5.1 (ߚ௅ே௃, ߚ஻ௌ, ߚ஺ௌோand ߚோு) as identifying schedules. Table 8.6 reports the results of this process:
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ݖ௧
∗ ߚመ௅ே௃ ߚመ஻ௌ ߚመ஺ௌோ ߚመோு ߚመୌ୷ୠ୰୧ୢ
ݓ௧− ݌௧ 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000
ݕ௧− ௧݈ 0.000 -1.000 0.000 -0.253§NC -0.066 -0.338§NC 0.000 -1.000 0.000 0.000(0.114) None (0.110)
ݑ௧ 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
݈ݑ௧ 0.000 0.000 -0.653§ 0.183§ 0.000 0.257§NC 0.000 0.000 -2.374§ 0.186§(0.319) (0.036) (0.068) (0.670) (0.027)
݃ݎݎ௧ 1.656§ 0.285 0.984 0.169§ 1.638§ 0.182§ 2.001§ 0.107 0.000 0.239§(0.416) None (0.529) (0.038) (0.685) (0.071) (0.533) (0.100) (0.047)
ݐ௪ ௧ -1.244§ -0.060 -1.254§ -0.066 -1.409§ -0.131§ -0.903§ -0.074 0.000 0.000(0.192) (0.052) (0.163) (0.050) (0.392) (0.076) (0.284) (0.065)
݉ ݈݅௧ -0.077 -0.063 0.060 -0.023 -0.111 -0.054 0.014 -0.033 0.761§ 0.000(0.081) none (0.117) (0.020) None (0.030) (0.116) None (0.184)
௧݇ 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.298§NC 0.088 -0.194 0.000 0.000 -1.278§ -0.488§(0.090) none (0.100) (0.311) (0.017)
௧݅− ∆݌௧ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.215 -0.011 0.000 0.000(0.137) (0.031)
ܶ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
ݎଶ 4 4 4 4 4
݈݈௥మ 2947.8 2947.8 2947.8 2947.8 2947.8
ݍ 14 10 9 12 14
݈݈௤ 2916.5 2937.6 2935.6 2918.2 2938.7
ܺ௅ோ
ଶ (ݍ− ݎଶ) ܺଶ(10)=62.611[0.000] ܺଶ(6)=20.249[0.003] ܺଶ(5)= 24.354[0.000] ܺଶ(8)=59.241[0.000] ܺଶ(10)=18.156§[0.052]
Table 8.6. Identification process and estimation of long run elasticities, FranceNote: These estimations were carried with 96 observations covering the period between 1981q1 to 2004q4. Asymptotic standard errors for each ߚ coefficient are provided in brackets. §indicates significant at 5% and * indicates significant at 10%. NC indicates that the coefficient is subject to a theoretical restriction for which we failed to obtain converging results, andhence had to be left unrestricted. ݎଶ=Number of just identified restrictions, and ݍ= Number of total restrictions imposed, i.e. over-identifying restrictions. ݈݈௥మ is the maximum value of thelog-likelihood function obtained under ݎଶ just identified restrictions. ݈݈௤ is the maximum value of the log-likelihood function obtained under ݍover-identifying restrictions. ܺ௅ோଶ (ݍ− ݎଶ) isthe chi-square statistics for the log-likelihood Ratio (LR) test. P-values for this test are provided in square brackets.
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We start by imposing the restrictions contained in ߚ௅ே௃. This set of restrictionsis insignificant at the standard 5%, its log-likelihood ratio (LR) test is a
ܺଶ(10)=62.611 with a p-value equal to [0.000]. Hence, evidence seems to leanagainst ߚ௅ே௃. Next, we test the validity of the restrictions contained in ߚ஻ௌ,which are also insignificant as a whole with a p-value for the LR test equal to[0.003]. Following, we introduce the set of restrictions of ߚ஺ௌோ , for whichevidence is not very supportive either, since it is insignificant with a p-value forthe LR test equal to [0.000]. Finally, the set of restrictions contained in ߚோு isalso found insignificant, with a p-value for LR test equal to [0.000].It should be noted that the coefficients ߚଶଶ and ߚଶ଼ are left unrestricted in ߚመ஻ௌbecause we fail to obtain converging results when introducing ߚଶଶ = −1 and
ߚଶ଼ = 0, despite introducing ߚ஻ௌ following different sequences. The sameoccurs with ߚଶଶ and ߚଶସ when we impose ߚ஺ௌோ .Hence, evidence does not provide support to any of the four sets of restrictionsdrawn from each of the nested NAIRU models. As in previous cases, weinterpret these results as a sign that the unemployment and real wagescointegrated vectors are more complex than as portrayed by theoreticalmodels. In fact, evidence from the trial and error process by which these sets ofrestrictions are introduced reveals some suggestive features of the data63:Introducing ߚଵ଼ = 0 pushes ߚመ௅ே௃, ߚመ஻ௌ and ߚመோு into rejection, so does ߚଵସ = 0 inthe cases of ߚ௅ே௃ and ߚோு (Similarly ߚଶଶ = −1 when we obtain convergingresults). This evidence suggests that some form of hybrid between ߚ஻ௌ (where
ߚଵସ ≠ 0) and ߚ஺ௌோ (where ߚଵ଼ ≠ 0) along with ߚଶଶ ≠ −1 might be supported bythe data.As in the UK’s case, we test this hypothesis building a sequence of restrictionsdenoted by ߚு௬௕௥௜ௗ, which contains these features, and experiment until wefind a ߚመு௬௕௥௜ௗ supported by the data, here reported in the last column of Table8.6. In this case, ߚመு௬௕௥௜ௗ is significant at the standard 5%, the LR test is a
ܺଶ(10)=18.156 with a p-value equal to [0.052]. It must be noted that all theunrestricted coefficients are individually significant at the standard levels (seeasymptotic standard errors in brackets). ߚመு௬௕௥௜ௗ is clearly more significant thanthe rest of ߚmatrices examined in Table 8.6 and consequently we adopt it asour preferred long run specification.The following equations show the unemployment and real wages cointegratedvectors implied by ߚመு௬௕௥௜ௗ (asymptotic standard errors in brackets), recall thatthe coefficients of these equations can be interpreted as long run elasticitiesbecause all variables are measured in logarithms.
63 As in the UK’s case, it must be noted that comments regarding the importance of individualrestrictions reported here, are consistent with different ordering of the restrictions.
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8.6 ݑ௧ = +2.374 ݈ݑ௧− 0.761݉ ݈݅௧+ 1.278 ௧݇+ ߦመଵ,௧(0.670) (0.184) (0.311)8.7 (ݓ௧− ݌௧) = −0.186 ݈ݑ௧− 0.239݃ݎݎ௧+ 0.488 ௧݇+ ߦመଶ,௧(0.027) (0.047) (0.017)As per equation 8.6, France’s NAIRU is determined by workers’ militancy asreported in Arestis et al. (2007), see also L'Horty and Rault (2003) or Gianellaet al. (2008). Although contrary to LNJ’s propositions, the NAIRU is notexclusively determined by exogenous factor:First, the NAIRU is also determined by long term unemployment, our estimatessuggest that an increase in the long term unemployment rate of 1% wouldincrease the NAIRU by 2.374%. According to our theoretical model, thissuggests that workers suffering jobless spells of a year or longer, cannot exertdownward pressure over real wages claims causing labour market hysteresis64.Similarly, Stockhammer (2004a) also find evidence of hysteresis in France.Second, the NAIRU is influenced by the size of capital stock, although it has aperverse effect, because our estimates suggest that an increase in capital stockof 1% would increase the NAIRU by 1.278%. As discussed in Germany’s section,this could be the result of capital stock increasing firms’ ability to mark-upwages rather than reduces it, or a sign that capital stock increases workers realwage claims more than it reduces firms’ mark-up. In any case, this findingreinforces previous evidence that capital stock affects the NAIRU in France, seeMiaouli (2001), Arestis et al. (2007) and Stockhammer (2004a), although thesign of our estimated coefficient is contrary to that obtained in these articles. Asin the German case, this sign discrepancy could be the result of using a differentmeasure of capital stock.It is worth noting, that we do not find significant evidence of productivityhaving an impact on the NAIRU, contrary to L'Horty and Rault (2003) andSchreiber (2012). Further, there is no evidence of real long term interest ratesdetermining the NAIRU, contrary to Ball (1999) and Gianella et al. (2008).Having controlled for productivity and long term interest rates in our analysis,we suspect that in previous studies, these variables, might be capturing theeffect of some omitted variables, which here have a significant influence on theNAIRU.Turning now to equation 8.7, the real wages equilibrium is not affected byproductivity suggesting that productivity gains do not results in greater realwages in the long run, as also reported by Schreiber (2012), who finds noevidence of cointegration between real wages and productivity in France. Wefind that the real wage equilibrium is positively affected by capital stock, which
64 As per equation 4.4 ߚଵସ = ఠభభఠభାఝభ, hence finding ߚመଵସ > 0 requires ߱ଵଵ > 0. As long as thedenominator is positive, i.e. ߱ଵ + ߮ଵ > 0.
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suggests that larger productive capacity results in greater real wages in thelong run. This is consistent with the positive link between capital stock and theNAIRU that we find in equation 8.6.On the other hand, unemployment benefits and long term unemploymentreduce the long run real wages equilibrium. This suggests that greater benefitsgenerosity eases pressure over real wages in the long run, and that workerswho suffer long unemployment spells are still able to exert downward pressureover real wage claims. The latter seems contradictory with evidence fromequation 8.6, although according to our theoretical model, this is possible aslong as firms’ mark-ups increase with unemployment65.
8.3.4 Short-run dynamics of unemployment and the anchor properties of
the NAIRUTo analyse the behaviour of unemployment around the NAIRU, we estimate theECM equation for ∆ݑ௧using the residuals from 8.6 and 8.7 as error correctionterms. The resultant ∆ݑ௧, estimated with 96 observations over the period1981q1-2004q4, is the following:8.8 ∆ݑ௧= −2.644 + 0.012ߦመଵ,௧ି ଵ− 1.010ߦመଶ,௧ି ଵ+ 1.102∆(ݓ௧ି ଵ− ݌௧ି ଵ) − 0.743∆(ݕ௧ି ଵ− ௧݈ି ଵ)[0.011] [0.346] [0.000] [0.039] [0.068]
+0.455∆ݑ௧ି ଵ− 0.415∆ ݈ݑ௧ି ଵ+ 0.581∆݃ݎݎ௧ି ଵ+ 0.452∆ݐ௧ି ଵ
௪ + 0.019∆݉ ݈݅௧ି ଵ[0.000] [0.011] [0.160] [0.260] [0.328]
−0.975∆ ௧݇ି ଵ+ 0.006∆( ௧݅ି ଵ− ∆݌௧ି ଵ) + 1.714∆(ݓ௧ି ଶ− ݌௧ି ଶ) − 1.019∆(ݕ௧ି ଶ− ௧݈ି ଶ)[0.817] [0.777] [0.001] [0.007]
−0.486∆ݑ௧ି ଶ+ 0.144∆ ݈ݑ௧ି ଶ− 0.148∆݃ݎݎ௧ି ଶ− 0.764∆ݐ௧ି ଶ
௪ − 0.004∆݉ ݈݅௧ି ଶ[0.000] [0.357] [0.704] [0.043] [0.859]
−2.917∆ ௧݇ି ଶ+ 0.017∆( ௧݅ି ଶ− ∆݌௧ି ଶ) − 0.001∆݌௧ି ଵ௩௠ + εොଷ௧[0.492] [0.418] [0.180]Adj. ܴଶ=0.564
ௌܺ஼
ଶ (4)= 2.638 [0.620], ܺிிଶ (1)= 2.035 [0.154]
ܺே௢௥௠
ଶ (2)= 6.151 [0.046], ܺு௘௧ଶ (1)= 13.86 [0.000]
ߦመଵ,௧ = ݑ− 2.374 ݈ݑ+ 0.761݉ ݈݅− 1.278݇
ߦመଶ,௧ = (ݓ − ݌) + 0.186 ݈ݑ+ 0.239݃ݎݎ− 0.488݇
ߪகොయ = 0.0178Where Adj. ܴଶ, ௌܺ஼ଶ , ܺிிଶ , ܺே௢௥௠ଶ , ܺு௘௧ଶ have the same meaning as above. ߪகොయis thestandard deviation of the error term in equation 8.8. p-values for t-tests anddiagnostic tests are reported in square brackets66.
65 As discussed above ߚመଵସ > 0 means that ߱ଵଵ > 0 . Further, as per equation 4.5 ߚ24 =
൬߮ 1 ఠ 11ఠ 1+߮1൰, hence finding ߚመଶସ = ቀ߮ ଵ ߱భభ߱భାఝభቁ< 1 requires ߮ଵ < 0.66 All diagnostic tests are passed at the standard 5% significance level, except theheteroscedasticity and normality tests. Hence, although our estimates are still unbiased,inference using the t-test is no longer valid because it is based on the assumption that residualsare normally distributed.
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As per equation 8.8 the coefficient for ߦመଵ,௧ି ଵ is positive but very small, meaningthat deviations from the NAIRU have a negligible influence on unemploymentdynamics, and consequently it is unlikely to act as an anchor. Miaouli (2001)and Arestis et al. (2007) also find that deviations from the NAIRU have littleinfluence on changes in employment and unemployment respectively. Ourfindings are also consistent with Schreiber’s (2012) results, who find thatdeviations from the NAIRU only explain 35.9% of unemployment dynamics.The coefficient for ߦመଶ,௧ି ଵ, is significant and negative. This suggests that settingreal wages above their long run equilibrium reduces unemployment. Accordingto Bhaduri and Marglin’s dichotomy, this estimate suggests that Franceoperates under a “wage-led regime”, as also reported by Hein and Vogel (2007)but in contrast to findings from Bowles and Boyer (1995).
8.3.5 Impulse response and the effects of an unemployment shockWe complete our analysis simulating an unemployment shock of one standarddeviation in equation 8.8, i.e. ߪகොయ = 0.0178, which amounts to a rise inunemployment of 7.13% in annual terms. Figure 8.2 shows the effect of thisshock using GIR functions:Unemployment in panel (a), shows no sign of returning to its baseline after theshock, instead it drifts upwards until it stabilizes six years after the shock, at alevel 12% greater than its pre-shock value. This behaviour suggests that theNAIRU has no anchor properties and reinforces our findings from equation 8.8.Our estimate is more pessimistic than previous impulse response estimates.Duval and Vogel (2008) find that France needs more than five years to close theoutput gap, but the overall conclusion is similar, the NAIRU does not seem toact as a strong anchor.The reaction of long term unemployment, shown in panel (b), is described by aJ-curve. As discussed in the UK’s section, this illustrates that the effect of theshock changes over time. Real wages and productivity, panels (c) and (d), bothincrease in an unsynchronized fashion for about eight years after the shockuntil they stabilize at a similar level. This suggests that the shock does not affectthe wage share.Capital stock, panel (e), falls as a consequence of the shock and stabilizes at alevel 0.8% smaller than its baseline. On the other hand, the shock has nopermanent effects on real long term interest rates, panel (f), although after theshock it fluctuates for about six years.
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1.1% greater than its pre-shock level, this could either be the result of a rise inlabour taxes or a fall in wages. Recall that both variables are relative measureswith respect to wages. Workers’ militancy panel (i), falls sharply on impact, andalthough it recovers modestly two years after the shock, it ends stabilizing at alevel 14.9% below its baseline.
8.4 SummaryIn this chapter we have used the CVAR approach to study the determinants ofthe NAIRU and its anchor properties in Germany and France. This methodologyallows us to study the determinants of the NAIRU by testing the long runrestrictions required by each of the models nested in our encompassing model(ߚ௅ே௃, ߚ஻ௌ, ߚ஺ௌோ and ߚோு). Panel i) of Table 8.7 summarizes the results of thisprocess. According to our estimations, none of the set of restrictions isindividually significant, although evidence is very supportive of a ߚመୌ୷ୠ୰୧ୢ thatcombines different features of ߚ஺ௌோ and ߚ஻ௌ in each country.Germany France
i) Identification process
ߚመ௅ே௃ [0.000] [0.000]
ߚመ஻ௌ [0.000] [0.003]
ߚመ஺ௌோ [0.002] [0.000]
ߚመோு [0.000] [0.000]
ߚመு௬௕௥௜ௗ [0.390] [0.052]
ii) NAIRU determinants
݃ݎݎ -0.831 NS
ݐ௪ 4.617 NS
݉ ݈݅ n/a -0.761
ݕ− ݈ -8.633 NS
݈ݑ NS 2.374
݇ 1.312 1.278
݅− ∆݌ NS NS
T NS NS
iii) NAIRU’s anchor properties
ߦመଵ,௧ି ଵ 0.027 0.012Time required to returnto baseline (GIR) No Return No Return
Table 8.7. Summary of findings for Germany and FranceNote: i) Results for the identification process are drawn from Table 8.3 in the Germany’s case and fromTable 8.6 for France. ii) Values for the NAIRU elasticities are drawn from each country’s unemploymentcointegrated vector, equations 8.2 and 8.6 respectively. iii) Coefficients of ߦመଵ,௧ି ଵ are drawn from equations8.4 and 8.8 respectively. “Time required to return to baseline” draws from Figure 8.1 and Figure 8.2respectively. NS means not significant and “No return” indicates that unemployment does not return to itsbaseline.Panel ii) of Table 8.7 presents these ߚመୌ୷ୠ୰୧ୢ . In Germany, the NAIRU isdetermined by some wage-push factors together with productivity and capitalstock. While, in France the NAIRU is determined by some labour marketinstitutions along with long term unemployment and capital stock. Hence,according to our results for these countries the NAIRU is not exclusivelydetermined by exogenous factors contrary to what LNJ’s model suggests.
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Further, these results add to the body of literature that questions the claim thattime series evidence for Germany and France support LNJ’s propositions, as forinstance suggested by Saint-Paul (2004).The CVAR approach also allows us to examine the anchor properties of theNAIRU by estimating a VECM and GIR functions. Our results are summarized inPanel iii) of Table 8.7.According to our VECM estimations deviations from the NAIRU in Germany andFrance have a negligible influence on unemployment’s dynamics. Thesefindings are reinforced by the results of simulating and unemployment shockusing GIR functions, which suggest that after this shock unemployment driftsaway from its baseline in both countries, rather than returning to it as it wouldbe expected if the NAIRU acted as an anchor.Hence, our VECM and GIR results question LNJ’s claim about the anchorproperties of the NAIRU, although they are in tune with the existing literature,which suggest that the NAIRU in Germany and France is at best a weak anchorfor economic activity.In sum, our findings for Germany and France presented in this chapterchallenge the validity of LNJ’s propositions and consequently policyrecommendations inspired by this approach. For instance, calls for labourmarket reforms that increase incentives to work in Germany (Brandt et al.,2005,p.66, Rinne and Zimmermann, 2011,p.21) and in France (Jamet, 2006,OECD, 2007a). Policy implications are discussed further in Chapter 11.
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Chapter 9 Determinants of the NAIRU and its anchor
properties, evidence from Italy and Spain.
9.1 IntroductionThis chapter presents the results of applying the CVAR approach to data forItaly and Spain. To contextualize our findings, we open the chapter with asummary of the time series literature reviewed in Chapter 3 that refers to theseeconomies. A summary table of this literature can also be found in Table I.3, inAppendix I.In the Italian case, it is usually argued that unemployment records providesupport to LNJ’s claims (OECD, 2003, 2005b,p.26, Saint-Paul, 2004,p.52/3).These claims are supported by findings of a significant link between the NAIRUand some wage-push factors such as unemployment benefits and labourtaxation, see for instance (Gianella et al., 2008).However, this evidence is challenged by a growing literature that findsevidence of links between the NAIRU and demand, through a number ofavenues. Miaouli (2001) find a significant positive long run link between capitalstock and employment. Similarly, Arestis et al. (2007) find evidence of asignificant negative long run link between capital stock and unemployment.These results are yet reinforced by evidence of the negative impact ofaccumulation over unemployment (Stockhammer, 2004a). Further, there isevidence of a link between the NAIRU and real interest rates (Ball, 1999,Gianella et al., 2008). The impact of productivity and hysteresis is ambiguous,Modigliani et al. (1986) even finds evidence a perverse effect of productivity onthe NAIRU.When it comes to the anchor properties in the Italian economy, the bulk ofevidence suggests that the NAIRU is at best a weak anchor, because deviationsfrom the NAIRU have little influence on unemployment dynamics (Arestis et al.,2007, Schreiber, 2012). Furthermore, adjustments to shocks seem to be veryprotracted (Duval and Vogel, 2008). Only Miaouli’s (2001) estimations suggestthat deviations from the labour demand have a strong correcting influence onemployment.The Spanish experience has generated an extensive literature, and it isgenerally believed that labour market institutions are to be blamed for thedismal performance of the Spanish labour market, dubbed as the “Spanishdisease”. This is based on the early work of Dolado et al. (1986), who find thatthe NAIRU is not determined by capital stock but labour market factors. Thisevidence is yet reinforced by later studies such as Estrada et al. (2000), whichalso find evidence of links between unemployment and exogenous factors ofthe labour market.
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More recently, the consensus view has shifted to explain Spanishunemployment, along the lines of the hysteresis hypothesis, as a combination ofadverse shocks and an over-protective labour market (Bentolila et al., 1990,Blanchard and Jimeno, 1995). Although labour markets institutions are stillseen as the ultimate culprit for unemployment’s evolution. This new consensusview, is supported by evidence from Dolado and Jimeno (1997), who find thatshocks such as demand, wages, prices and productivity, have permanent effectsover unemployment.However, this evidence is challenged by a growing body of literature that findsdemand factors per se, having an impact on the NAIRU. Miaouli (2001) andKaranassou and Sala (2008) find a significant long run positive link betweencapital stock and employment. Similarly, Arestis et al. (2007) find a significantnegative long run link between capital stock and unemployment, see alsoBallabriga et al. (1993). Furthermore, there is evidence of a link between theNAIRU and real interest rates (Ball, 1999, Gianella et al., 2008). The impact ofproductivity is ambiguous, and there is even evidence of a perverseproductivity effect (Dolado et al., 1986, Dolado and Jimeno, 1997).Further, as in the Italian case, the bulk of evidence suggests that the NAIRU is atbest a weak anchor. Arestis et al. (2007) find that deviations from the NAIRUseem to have little influence on unemployment dynamics. In the same vein,adjustments after a shock appear to be very sluggish (Duval and Vogel, 2008).Only Miaouli’s (2001) estimations suggest that deviations from the labourdemand have a correcting influence on employment.The rest of the chapter presents our findings and it is structured as follows:Section 9.2 presents result for Italy, section 9.3 the results for Spain. Each ofthem contains five subsections devoted to the five CVAR stages. Section 9.4closes the chapter with a summary of our key findings.
9.2 Italy
9.2.1 Data properties and model specificationIn order to confirm that the CVAR approach can be applied to Italy’s data set,we examine the stationary properties of the data. According to the unit root andstationarity tests results, reported in Appendix II, all the variables in Italy’s
ݖ௧ = (ݓ௧− ݌௧,ݕ௧− ௧݈, ݑ௧, ݈ݑ௧,݃ݎݎ௧,ݐ௧௪ ,݉ ݈݅௧, ௧݇, ௧݅− ∆݌௧)ᇱare ܫ(1). These resultsjustify the use of cointegration techniques such as the CVAR which we proceedto model now.The starting point is the CVAR benchmark specification equation 5.1. Thecomposition of its deterministic component ܥ is decided after visual inspectionof the data in Figure II.5. This inspection reveals that some of the variables of ݖ௧exhibit a time trend, which could cause the problem of quadratic trends
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discussed in section 5.4. In order to avoid this phenomenon, we decompose thematrix of deterministic components ܥ into intercepts and time trends, andrestrict the time trend to the long run term, as per equation 5.5.The choice of lag order for this specification draws from the standard modelselection criteria, reported in Table 9.1, and along with the composition of x௧, isthe result of extensive experimentation with several specifications. After thisprocess we adopt the following VAR (2) expression with x௧ = (∆݌௧ି ଵ௩௠ ) as ourpreferred specification67:
9.1 ∆z௧ = c଴ + ߔଵ∆z௧ି ଵ + ߛߚᇱz୲∗ + λx௧+ ε୲ where, ݖ௧ =
⎝
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, x௧ = (∆݌௧ି ଵ௩௠ )
Variables in ݖ௧, ݖ௧∗ and x௧have the same meaning as in Chapter 6. We adopt thisspecification because it appears to deliver the best balance between parsimony,a rich and informative lag structure68 and satisfactory diagnostic test results forItaly’s data set. Lag order AIC SBC5 2180.3 1638.04 2141.8 1701.23 2105.2 1766.32 2110.8 1873.61 2010.8 1875.20 1107.4 1073.5
Table 9.1. Lag order selection criteria, ItalyNote: The test is carried out with 91 observations covering the period between 1985q2 to 2007q4.Statistics reported here are obtained from estimating an unrestricted VAR model for the variablescontained in the vector z௧, with a constant and a time trend, and one lag of ∆݌௩௠ .
9.2.2 Cointegration testsFollowing, we test for cointegration among the variables of ݖ௧, Table 9.2presents the results of the Maximum Eigenvalue (ߣ௠ ௔௫) and the Trace (ߣ௧௥௔௖௘)tests:
67 We experimented with more parsimonious models (than our preferred specification), such asa VAR(1) with x௧ = (∆݌௧ି ଵ௩௠ ), this lag order draw from SBC indications in Table 9.1. Or a VAR(1)with x௧ = (∆݌௧ି ଵ௩௠ , ∆݌௧ି ଶ௩௠ )ᇱ. And less parsimonious models, such as a VAR(2) with x௧ =(∆݌௧ି ଵ௩௠ , ∆݌௧ି ଶ௩௠ )ᇱand a VAR(3) model. More parsimonious specifications fail to pass thecorresponding diagnostic tests, in particular serial correlation, whereas, less parsimoniouspassed the serial correlation tests, but at the expenses of consuming greater degrees of freedomthan our preferred specification, and consequently are discarded.68 Equivalent to an ܣܴܯ ܣ(18,16), (Hamilton, 1994, p.349)
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ߣ௠ ௔௫ ߣ௧௥௔௖௘
ܪ଴ ܪଵ
Statistic 95% Criticalvalues Statistic 95% Criticalvalues
r=0 r=1 84.55 61.27 310.48 222.62
r≤1 r=2 55.17 55.14 225.93 182.99
r≤2 r=3 43.65 49.32 170.76 147.27
r≤3 r=4 36.02 43.61 127.11 115.85
r≤4 r=5 28.59 37.86 91.09 87.17
r≤5 r=6 22.17 31.79 62.50 63.00
r≤6 r=7 18.37 25.42 40.33 42.34
r≤7 r=8 14.72 19.22 21.97 25.77
r≤8 r=9 7.25 12.39 7.25 12.39
Table 9.2. Results from cointegration tests, ItalyNote: Test statistics are obtained from applying the Maximum Eigenvalue and Trace test to z௧, using aVAR(2) model with unrestricted intercepts and restricted trend coefficients, and one lag of ∆݌௩௠ , with 94observations covering the period between 1984q3 to 2007q4. Critical values are chosen according to thisspecification.The Maximum Eigenvalue test fails to reject the null hypothesis of having twolong run relationships, while the Trace test fails to reject the null hypothesis ofhaving five cointegrated vectors. That is, ߣ௠ ௔௫ supports the predictions fromour theoretical model of two long run relationships, but the ߣ௧௥௔௖௘ suggestsotherwise. Due to the problems of these tests in finite samples, see section 5.5,we resort to an overall judgment of their results along with economic theory(Pesaran and Pesaran, 2003,p.293, Garrat et al., 2006,p.198). The MaximumEigenvalue and our theoretical model suggest that there are two long runrelationships among our variables, hence, it seems reasonable to proceed underthe assumption of r=2.
9.2.3 Identifying the long run relationsIn order to identify which variables take part in these two long runrelationships, we use the four sets of restrictions from Table 5.1 (ߚ௅ே௃, ߚ஻ௌ, ߚ஺ௌோand ߚோு) as identifying schedules. Table 9.3 reports the results of this process.We start by imposing the restrictions contained in ߚ௅ே௃. This set of restrictionsis significant at the standard 5%, its log-likelihood ratio (LR) test is a ܺଶ(10)=18.142 with a p-value equal to [0.053]. Hence, evidence seems to providesupport to ߚ௅ே௃. Next, we test the validity of the restrictions contained in ߚ஻ௌ,which are insignificant as a whole at the standard 5%, although they aremarginally significant at 1%, with a p-value for the LR test equal to [0.041].Following, we introduce the set of restrictions ߚ஺ௌோ69, for which evidence isquite supportive, since it is comfortably significant with a p-value for the LRtest equal to [0.469]. Finally, the set of restrictions contained in ߚோு is foundinsignificant at the standard 5%, although it is marginally significant at 1%,with a p-value for the LR test equal to [0.022].
69 It should be noted, that the coefficient ߚଶଽ, is left unrestricted because we fail to obtainconverging results when introducing ߚଶଽ = 0, despite introducing ߚ஺ௌோ following differentsequences.
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ݖ௧
∗ ߚመ௅ே௃ ߚመ஻ௌ ߚመ஺ௌோ ߚመோு ߚመୌ୷ୠ୰୧ୢ
ݓ௧− ݌௧ 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000
ݕ௧− ௧݈ 0.000 -1.000 0.000 -1.000 -1.941§ -1.000 0.000 -1.000 -2.044§ -1.000(0.352) (0.400)
ݑ௧ 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
݈ݑ௧ 0.000 0.000 -0.038 -0.073 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000(0.842) (0.167)
݃ݎݎ௧ -0.132§ 0.023§ -0.128 0.028 -0.045 0.016 -0.135§ 0.023§ -0.102§ 0.040§(0.051) (0.011) (0.077) (0.015) (0.067) (0.025) (0.043) (0.009) (0.034) (0.010)
ݐ௧
௪ -3.530§ 0.332 -3.444 0.428 -1.841 0.433 -3.888§ 0.400 -0.729§ 0.000(1.181) (0.246) (1.836) (0.370) (1.740) (0.664) (1.186) (0.242) (0.365)
݉ ݈݅௧ 0.279 -0.098§ 0.283 -0.092§ 0.321 -0.154§ 0.190 -0.080 0.000 -0.042§(0.171) (0.036) (0.175) (0.036) (0.185) (0.075) (0.181) (0.037) (0.009)
௧݇ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.209 0.223 0.000 0.000 1.814§ 0.000(0.924) (0.358) (0.244)
௧݅− ∆݌௧ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.063NC 0.121 -0.023 0.198§ 0.000(0.024) (0.192) (0.038) (0.047)
ܶ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
ݎଶ 4 4 4 4 4
݈݈௥మ 2278.1 2278.1 2278.1 2278.1 2278.1
ݍ 14 12 10 12 13
݈݈௤ 2269.0 2270.0 2275.3 2269.1 2270.8
ܺ௅ோ
ଶ (ݍ− ݎଶ) ܺଶ(10)= 18.142[0.053] ܺଶ(8)= 16.076[0.041] ܺଶ(6)= 5.606[0.469] ܺଶ(8)= 17.857[0.022] ܺଶ(9)= 14.441§[0.107]
Table 9.3. Identification process and estimation of long run elasticities, ItalyNote: These estimations were carried with 94 observations covering the period between 1984q3 to 2007q4. Asymptotic standard errors for each ߚ coefficient are provided in brackets. §indicates significant at 5% and * indicates significant at 10%. NC indicates that the coefficient is subject to a theoretical restriction for which we failed to obtain converging results, andhence had to be left unrestricted. ݎଶ=Number of just identified restrictions, and ݍ= Number of total restrictions imposed, i.e. over-identifying restrictions. ݈݈௥మ is the maximum value of thelog-likelihood function obtained under ݎଶ just identified restrictions. ݈݈௤ is the maximum value of the log-likelihood function obtained under ݍover-identifying restrictions. ܺ௅ோଶ (ݍ− ݎଶ) isthe chi-square statistics for the log-likelihood Ratio (LR) test. P-values for this test are provided in square brackets.
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Hence, evidence seems to support the four sets of restrictions albeit at differentlevels of significance. ߚ஺ௌோ appears to be the set of restrictions that is bettersupported by the data, but ߚ஺ௌோ is also significant at the standard 5%, and ߚ஻ௌand ߚோு are marginally significant. We interpret these results as a sign thatthere is some truth in all of them, in other words, that there is a ߚு௬௕௥௜ௗ, whichcombines some of their features that is supported by the data. In particular, avariant of ߚ஺ௌோ that incorporates some of the restrictions from the other nestedNAIRU models.To test this hypothesis, we build a sequence of restrictions taking ߚ஺ௌோ as ourbase and experiment adding restrictions from other nested models, andexclusion restrictions to coefficients that appear to be individually insignificant,until we find a ߚመு௬௕௥௜ௗ supported by the data. Results of this process arereported in the last column of Table 9.3.The set of restrictions described by ߚመு௬௕௥௜ௗ is significant at the standard 5%,the LR test is a ܺଶ(9)=14.441 with a p-value equal to [0.107]. Furthermore,according to the asymptotic standard errors (in brackets), all the unrestrictedcoefficients are individually significant at the standard levels. This combinationof significant restrictions and significant unrestricted coefficients, suggest that
ߚመு௬௕௥௜ௗ accommodates the statistical properties of the data better than the restof ߚmatrices examined in Table 9.3 and consequently we adopt it as ourpreferred long run specification.The following equations show the unemployment and real wages cointegratedvectors implied by ߚመு௬௕௥௜ௗ (asymptotic standard errors in brackets), recall thatthe coefficients of these equations can be interpreted as long run elasticitiesbecause all variables are measured in logarithms.9.2 ݑ௧ = +2.044(ݕ௧− ௧݈) + 0.102݃ݎݎ௧+ 0.729ݐ௧௪ − 1.814 ௧݇− 0.198( ௧݅− ∆݌௧) + ߦመଵ,௧(0.400) (0.034) (0.365) (0.244) (0.047)9.3 (ݓ௧− ݌௧) = (ݕ௧− ௧݈) − 0.040݃ݎݎ௧+ 0.042݉ ݈݅௧+ ߦመଶ,௧(0.010) (0.009)According to equation 9.2 Italy’s NAIRU is determined by some features of thelabour market, such as unemployment benefits and labour taxation, as alsoreported in Stockhammer (2004a), Arestis et al. (2007) or Gianella et al.(2008). Although contrary to LNJ’s propositions, the NAIRU is not exclusivelydetermined by these exogenous factors:First, the NAIRU is also affected by productivity, although it has a perverseeffect, our estimates suggest that an increase in productivity of 1% wouldincrease the NAIRU by 2.044%. According to our theoretical model, thisevidence suggests that either the impact of productivity over real wages is
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greater than its impact on firms mark-up 70, or that productivity increasesfirms’ mark-up rather than moderate them71. Given the tendency of the Italianwage share to fall during the sample period, see panel (c) of Figure 6.14, thesecond possibility seems more likely. Our finding is consistent with Modiglianiet al. (1986), who also find a positive relationship between productivity andunemployment equilibrium, but it is in contrast to Schreiber (2012), who didnot find evidence of cointegration between unemployment and productivity inthe Italian case.Second, the NAIRU is also influenced by the size of capital stock, our estimatessuggest that an increase in capital stock of 1% would reduce the NAIRU by1.814%. As discussed in the UK’s section, this evidence suggests that capitalstock limits firms’ ability to mark-up wages. Our finding reinforces previousevidence that capital stock reduces the NAIRU in Italy, particularly that fromArestis et al. (2007) who also find unemployment negatively cointegrated withcapital stock, but also Miaouli (2001) who report a positive long run elasticityof employment with respect to capital stock, see also Stockhammer (2004a).Third, the NAIRU is determined by real long term interest rates, our estimatessuggest that an increase in real long term interest rates of 1% would reduce theNAIRU by 0.198%. The sign of this coefficient is unexpected and we speculate itcould be the result of the wealth or/and the debt effect discussed in UK’ssection. In any case, this finding reinforces previous evidence that real interestrates affect the NAIRU in Italy, see Ball (1999) and Gianella et al. (2008)although in these studies the relationship found has the conventional positivesign. Considering the importance of capital stock highlighted by our results, andthat these studies do not account for it, a possible explanation for this signdiscrepancy is that their positive real interest rate coefficient is in factcapturing the negative influence of capital stock over the NAIRU.It is worth noting, that we do not find evidence of labour market hysteresisdetermining the NAIRU, as also reported in Arestis et al. (2007) but in contrastto the findings from Stockhammer (2004b) who find evidence of employmentand unemployment persistence.Turning now to equation 9.3, the real wages equilibrium is positively affectedby productivity on one-to-one basis, suggesting that productivity gains are fullyreflected in the long run real wages equilibrium. This is in contrast to Schreiber(2009), who finds no evidence of long run unit proportionality between realwages and productivity. Workers’ militancy also increases the long run realwages equilibrium, suggesting that strike action increases real wages in the
70 As per equation 4.4 ߚଵଶ = ఠమିఝయఠభାఝభ, hence finding ߚመଵଶ > 0 requires ߮ଷ < ߱ଶ. As long as, thedenominator is positive, i.e. ߱ଵ + ߮ଵ > 0.71 In terms of equation 4.1 ߮ଷ < 0.
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long run. On the other hand, unemployment benefits reduce the long run realwages equilibrium suggesting that greater benefits generosity eases pressureover real wages in the long run.Finally, combining the evidence of long run unit proportionality, betweenproductivity and real wages, with the positive effect of productivity over theNAIRU suggests three possible scenarios72: First, one where unemploymentreduces firms ability to mark-up wages (߮ଵ > 0) but firms reaction toproductivity gains is below unity (߮ଷ < 1 ). Second, a scenario whereunemployment has no influence on firms’ ability to mark-up wages (߮ଵ = 0)and firms’ reaction to productivity gains is equal to unity (߮ଷ = 1). Third, onewhere unemployment increases firms’ ability to mark-up wages (߮ଵ < 0) butfirms’ reaction to productivity gains is above unity (߮ଷ > 1).
9.2.4 Short-run dynamics of unemployment and the anchor properties of
the NAIRUTo analyse the behaviour of unemployment around the NAIRU, we estimate theECM equation for ∆ݑ௧using the residuals from 9.2 and 9.3 as error correctionterms. The resultant ∆ݑ௧, estimated with 94 observations over the periodbetween 1984q3-2007q4, is the following:9.4 ∆ݑ௧= −2.278 + 0.078ߦመଵ,௧ି ଵ + 0.047ߦመଶ,௧ି ଵ− 0.031∆(ݓ௧ି ଵ− ݌௧ି ଵ) + 0.656∆(ݕ௧ି ଵ− ௧݈ି ଵ)[0.093] [0.111] [0.696] [0.914] [0.113]
+0.054∆ݑ௧ି ଵ− 0.195∆ ݈ݑ௧ି ଵ+ 0.013∆݃ݎݎ௧ି ଵ+ 0.035∆ݐ௧ି ଵ
௪ + 0.002∆݉ ݈݅௧ି ଵ[0.685] [0.104] [0.589] [0.925] [0.484]-4.634∆ ௧݇ି ଵ− 0.021∆( ௧݅ି ଵ− ∆݌௧ି ଵ) − 0.001∆݌௧ି ଵ௩௠ + εොଷ௧[0.032] [0.501] [0.655]Adj. ܴଶ=0.171
ௌܺ஼
ଶ (4)= 5.934 [0.204], ܺிிଶ (1)= 0.257 [0.612]
ܺே௢௥௠
ଶ (2)= 2.921 [0.232], ܺு௘௧ଶ (1)= 3.563 [0.059]
ߦመଵ,௧ = ݑ− 2.044(ݕ− )݈ − 0.102݃ݎݎ− 0.729ݐ௪ + 1.814݇+ 0.198(݅− ∆݌)
ߦመଶ,௧ = (ݓ − ݌) − (ݕ− )݈ + 0.040݃ݎݎ− 0.042݉ ݈݅
ߪகොయ = 0.0238Where Adj. ܴଶ, ௌܺ஼ଶ , ܺிிଶ , ܺே௢௥௠ଶ , ܺு௘௧ଶ have the same meaning as above. ߪகොయis thestandard deviation of the error term in equation 9.4. p-values for t-tests anddiagnostic tests are reported in square brackets73.According to equation 9.4 the coefficient for ߦመଵ,௧ି ଵ is not significantly differentfrom zero, meaning that deviations from the NAIRU have no significant
72 As per equation 4.5 ߚଶଶ = ቀ߮ ଵ ఠమିఝయఠభାఝభ + ߮ଷቁ, hence if ߚመଶଶ = 1 and ߚመଵଶ = ఠమିఝయఠభାఝభ > 0 rewriting
ߚଶଶas follows; ߮ଵ ఠమିఝయఠభାఝభ = 1 − ߮ଷ, we can see that:If ߮ଵ > 0 then ߮ଷ < 1If ߮ଵ = 0 then ߮ଷ = 1If ߮ଵ < 0 then ߮ଷ > 173 All diagnostic tests are passed at the standard 5% significance level.
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influence on unemployment dynamics. In other words, there is no evidence ofthe NAIRU acting as an anchor. This estimate falls within the low end of existingestimates, which vary widely, Arestis et al. (2007) and Schreiber (2012) findthat deviations from the NAIRU have little or no explanatory power overunemployment dynamics, like us. Whereas, Miaouli (2001) find that deviationsfrom labour demand are corrected immediately, suggesting that the NAIRU is astrong anchor. The coefficient for ߦመଶ,௧ି ଵ is also insignificant, suggesting thatdeviations of real wages from their long run equilibrium have no impact onunemployment.
9.2.5 Impulse response and the effects of an unemployment shockWe complete our analysis simulating an unemployment shock of one standarddeviation in equation 9.4, i.e. ߪகොయ = 0.0238, which amounts to a rise inunemployment of 9.52% in annual terms. Figure 9.1 shows the effect of thisshock using GIR functions:Unemployment in panel (a), shows no sign of returning to its baseline after theshock, instead drifts upwards for about five years until it stabilizes at a level25% greater than its pre-shock value. This behaviour suggests that the NAIRUhas no anchor properties and reinforces the results from equation 9.4. Ourestimate is more pessimistic than previous impulse response estimates. Duvaland Vogel (2008) find that Italy needs more than five years to close the outputgap, but the overall conclusion is similar, the NAIRU does not seem to be astrong anchor.The reaction of long term unemployment to the shock, shown in panel (b), isdescribed by a J-curve. As discussed in the UK’s section, this illustrates that theeffect of the shock changes over time. Real wages and productivity, panels (c)and (d), both grow as a consequence of the shock, the rise in productivity ismore pronounced than that of real wages. This suggests that the wage sharefalls as a result of the shock.The unemployment shock causes a J-curve reaction in capital stock, panel (e),and after a fall on impact, it increases permanently. Real long term interestrates, panel (f), falls sharply on impact reaching its minimum after two yearsand thereafter it starts a very sluggish return towards its baseline.The last three panels refer to the wage-push factors considered in our model.Unemployment benefits and labour taxation, panels (g) and (h), increase afterthe shock until they stabilize above their baseline. As discussed in the UK’s case,this could either be the result of a fall in wages, or a rise in social provisions andtaxes, respectively. Finally, workers’ militancy panel (i), fluctuates widely onimpact, probably reflecting greater volatility in industrial relations after theshock, and it end ups stabilizing at a level 30% above its baseline. This suggeststhat the climate of industrial relations worsen permanently after the shock.
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Figure 9.1 GIRF
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9.3 Spain
9.3.1 Data properties and model specificationWe turn now to the Spanish case, data properties of Spain’s data set are verysimilar to those of Italy, for evidence from unit root and stationary tests suggestthat all variables contained in Spain’s ݖ௧ = (ݓ௧− ݌௧,ݕ௧− ௧݈, ݑ௧, ݈ݑ௧, ݃ ݎݎ௧,
ݐ௧
௪ , ݉ ݈݅௧, ݇௧, ௧݅− ∆݌௧)ᇱare ܫ(1), see Appendix II, which justifies the use of theCVAR approach.We follow the same modelling strategy as in Italy’s case. The starting point isthe CVAR’s benchmark equation 5.1. The composition of ܥ is decided aftervisual inspection of the data in Figure II.6, which reveals that some of thevariables of ݖ௧exhibit a time trend. To avoid the problem of quadratic trendsthis could cause we adopt equation’s 5.5 specification.The choice of lag order and the composition of x௧, are decided drawing from themodel selection criteria reported in Table 9.4, and after extensiveexperimentation with several specifications. After this process, the followingVAR (2) expression with x௧ = (∆݌௧ି ଵ௩௠ , ∆݌௧ି ଶ௩௠ ,ܦ87ݍ4)ᇱ is adopted as ourpreferred specification74:
9.5 ∆z௧ = c଴ + ߔଵ∆z௧ି ଵ + ߛߚᇱz୲∗ + λx௧+ ε୲ where ݖ௧ =
⎝
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
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ݓ௧− ݌௧
ݕ௧− ௧݈
ݑ௧
݈ݑ௧
݃ݎݎ௧
ݐ௧
௪
݉ ݈݅௧
௧݇
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݈ݑ௧
݃ݎݎ௧
ݐ௧
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݉ ݈݅௧
௧݇
௧݅− ∆݌௧
ܶ ⎠
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⎟
⎟
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⎟
⎞
, x௧ =ቌ ∆݌௧ି ଵ௩௠∆݌௧ି ଶ௩௠
ܦ87ݍ4ቍ
Variables in ݖ௧, ݖ௧∗ and x௧ have the same meaning as in Chapter 6. Thisspecification seems to provide the best balance between parsimony, a rich andinformative lag structure75 and satisfactory diagnostic test results for Spain’sdata set.
74 We experimented with more parsimonious models (than our preferred specification), such asa VAR(2) with x௧ = (∆݌௧ି ଵ௩௠ ) and a VAR(2) with x௧ = (∆݌௧ି ଵ௩௠ , ∆݌௧ି ଶ௩௠ )ᇱ. Models of similardimensions to equation 9.5, such as VAR(2) with x௧ = (∆݌௧ି ଵ௩௠ , ∆݌௧ି ଶ௩௠ , ∆݌௧ି ଷ௩௠ )ᇱ.And less parsimonious models such as a VAR(3) specification following AIC’s suggestions.However, these specifications are unable to accommodate serial correlation problems, in somecases despite consuming greater degrees of freedom than our preferred specification, andconsequently are discarded.75 Equivalent to an ܣܴܯ ܣ(18,16), (Hamilton, 1994, p.349)
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Lag order AIC SBC5 2620.1 2020.84 2546.3 2054.93 2570.5 2186.92 2597.6 2321.91 2418.0 2250.20 1327.4 1267.5
Table 9.4. Lag order selection criteria, SpainNote: The test is carried out with 106 observations covering the period between 1981q3 to 2007q4.Statistics reported here are obtained from estimating an unrestricted VAR model for the variablescontained in the vector z௧, with a constant and a time trend, two lags of ∆݌௩௠ and the dummy variable
ܦ87ݍ4.
9.3.2 Cointegration testsTable 9.5 presents the results of testing for cointegration among the variablesof ݖ௧. The Maximum Eigenvalue test (ߣ௠ ௔௫) fails to reject the null hypothesis ofhaving three long run relationships, while the Trace test (ߣ௧௥௔௖௘) fails to rejectthe null hypothesis of having eight cointegrated vectors. Hence, both testssuggest that there are more long run relationships than our theoretical model,although they disagree about the exact number.
ߣ௠ ௔௫ ߣ௧௥௔௖௘
ܪ଴ ܪଵ
Statistic 95% Criticalvalues Statistic 95% Criticalvalues
r=0 r=1 108.85 61.27 425.25 222.62
r≤1 r=2 90.73 55.14 316.40 182.99
r≤2 r=3 65.26 49.32 225.68 147.27
r≤3 r=4 41.18 43.61 160.42 115.85
r≤4 r=5 36.40 37.86 119.23 87.17
r≤5 r=6 32.40 31.79 82.83 63.00
r≤6 r=7 22.93 25.42 50.43 42.34
r≤7 r=8 20.45 19.22 27.49 25.77
r≤8 r=9 7.04 12.39 7.04 12.39
Table 9.5. Results from cointegration tests, SpainNote: Test statistics are obtained from applying the Maximum Eigenvalue and Trace test to z௧using aVAR(2) model with unrestricted intercepts and restricted trend coefficients, two lags of ∆݌௩௠ , and thedummy variable ܦ87ݍ4, with 109 observations covering the period between 1980q4 to 2007q4. Criticalvalues are chosen according to this specification.As discussed in section 5.5, in these circumstances it is necessary to weight thetests results against their potential biases and economic theory. In this case, wehave a reasonable large sample of 112 observations, but we are estimating alarge VAR(2) with nine variables, and some of its residuals are not normallydistributed. Hence, it seems reasonable to suspect that the test results mightsuffer of size biases. To overcome these problems, we follow the approachadopted in the UK’s case, and proceed under the assumption of r=2 assuggested by economic theory.
9.3.3 Identifying the long run relationsIn order to identify which variables take part in these two long runrelationships, we use the four sets of restrictions from Table 5.1 (ߚ௅ே௃, ߚ஻ௌ, ߚ஺ௌோand ߚோு) as identifying schedules. Table 9.6 reports the results of this process:
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ݖ௧
∗ ߚመ௅ே௃ ߚመ஻ௌ ߚመ஺ௌோ ߚመோு ߚመୌ୷ୠ୰୧ୢ
ݓ௧− ݌௧ 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000
ݕ௧− ௧݈ -3.146§NC -1.000 -2.734§NC -1.000 -2.822§ -1.000 -3.505§NC -1.000 -1.922§ -1.000(0.272) (0.510) (0.130) (0.312) (0.415)
ݑ௧ 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
݈ݑ௧ 0.000 0.000 -0.134 0.138 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.131§(0.172) (0.552) (0.033)
݃ݎݎ௧ -0.337 -0. 803§ 0.583 -0.595 -0.341 -0.634§ 0.194 -0.121 0.000 0.000(0.226) (0.367) (0.996) (2.094) (0.240) 0.299 (0.487) (0.375)
ݐ௪ ௧ -1.459§ 0.395 -2.817 2.644 -0.824§ -2.937§ -2.411 0.734 0.000 0.000(0.670) (1.065) (1.628) (5.385) (0.246) (1.004) (1.543) (1.295)
݉ ݈݅௧ 0.037 0.141§ -0.153 0.302 0.076§ -0.024 -0.137 0.114 0.112§ 0.077§none (0.059) (0.124) (0.531) (0.030) None (0.093) (0.076) (0.050) (0.024)
௧݇ 0.000 0.000 0.000 2.555 NC 1.211§ -2.395 0.000 0.000 4.140§ 0.000(5.556) (0.053) None (0.889)
௧݅− ∆݌௧ 0.000 0.123 NC 0.000 -0.079 NC 0.000 0.000 0.038 -0.113 0.000 0.110§None (0.170) (0.088) (0.064) (0.040)
ܶ 0.016§NC 0.005§NC 0.009 NC -0.027 NC 0.000 0.032NC 0.015§NC 0.000 -0.040§ 0.002§(0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.059) none (0.001) (0.012) (0.000)
ݎଶ 4 4 4 4 4
݈݈௥మ 2756.6 2756.6 2756.6 2756.6 2756.6
ݍ 10 7 10 10 12
݈݈௤ 2733.1 2746.8 2725.2 2740.6 2750.0
ܺ௅ோ
ଶ (ݍ− ݎଶ) ܺଶ(6)=46.889[0.000] ܺଶ(3)=19.590[0.000] ܺଶ(6)=62.769[0.000] ܺଶ(6)=32.023[0.000] ܺଶ(8)=13.171§[0.106]
Table 9.6. Identification process and estimation of long run elasticities, SpainNote: These estimations were carried with 109 observations covering the period between 1980q4 to 2007q4. Asymptotic standard errors for each ߚ coefficient are provided in brackets.§ indicates significant at 5% and * indicates significant at 10%. NC indicates that the coefficient is subject to a theoretical restriction for which we failed to obtain converging results, andhence had to be left unrestricted. ݎଶ=Number of just identified restrictions, and ݍ= Number of total restrictions imposed, i.e. over-identifying restrictions. ݈݈௥మ is the maximum value of thelog-likelihood function obtained under ݎଶ just identified restrictions. ݈݈௤ is the maximum value of the log-likelihood function obtained under ݍover-identifying restrictions. ܺ௅ோଶ (ݍ− ݎଶ) isthe chi-square statistics for the log-likelihood Ratio (LR) test. P-values for this test are provided in square brackets.
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We start by imposing the restrictions contained in ߚ௅ே௃. This set of restrictionsis insignificant at the standard 5%, its log-likelihood ratio (LR) test is a
ܺଶ(6)=46.889 with a p-value equal to [0.000]. Hence, evidence seems to leanagainst ߚ௅ே௃. Next, we test the validity of the restrictions contained in ߚ஻ௌ,which are also insignificant as a whole with a p-value for the LR test equal to[0.000]. Following, we introduce the set of restrictions of ߚ஺ௌோ , for whichevidence is not very supportive either, since it is insignificant with a p-value forthe LR test equal to [0.000]. Finally, the set of restrictions contained in ߚோு isalso found insignificant, with a p-value for the LR test equal to [0.000].It should be noted, that we encountered convergence problems whenintroducing all the sets of restrictions, which forces us to leave a number ofcoefficients unrestricted in each case. When introducing ߚመ௅ே௃, the coefficients
ߚଵଶ, ߚଵଵ଴, ߚଶଽ and ߚଶଵ଴ are left unrestricted, similarly with ߚଵଶ,ߚଵଵ଴, ߚଶ଼,ߚଶଽ and
ߚଶଵ଴ when imposing ߚመ஻ௌ. These problems improve when we introduce ߚመ஺ௌோ ,because only ߚଶଵ଴ = 0 produces non-converging results. Similarly, only ߚଵଶ and
ߚଵଵ଴ need to be left unrestricted in ߚመோு .Hence, evidence does not seem to yield support to any of the four sets ofrestrictions drawn from each of the nested NAIRU models. As in previous cases,we interpret these results as a sign that the unemployment and real wagescointegrated vectors are more complex than as portrayed by theoreticalmodels. In fact, evidence from the trial and error process by which these sets ofrestrictions are introduced reveals some suggestive features of the data76:Introducing ߚଵ଼ = 0 pushes ߚመ௅ே௃, ߚመ஻ௌ and ߚመோு into rejection. In the case of ߚመ஺ௌோ ,it is imposing ߚଶସ = 0 and ߚଶଽ = 0 that pushes the set of restrictions intorejection. On the other hand, ߚଶଶ = −1 seems supported by the data in all cases.This evidence suggests that some form of hybrid between ߚ஺ௌோ (where ߚଵ଼ ≠ 0),
ߚ஻ௌ (where ߚଶସ ≠ 0) and ߚோு (where ߚଶଽ ≠ 0), along with ߚଶଶ = −1 might besupported by the data.As in the UK’s case, we test this hypothesis building a sequence of restrictionsdenoted by ߚு௬௕௥௜ௗ, which contains these features, and experiment until we finda ߚመு௬௕௥௜ௗ supported by the data, here reported in the last column of Table 9.6.In this case, ߚመு௬௕௥௜ௗ is significant at the standard 5%, the LR test is a
ܺଶ(8)=13.171 with a p-value equal to [0.106]. It must be noted that all theunrestricted coefficients are individually significant at the standard levels (seeasymptotic standard errors in brackets). ߚመு௬௕௥௜ௗ is clearly more significant thanthe rest of ߚmatrices examined in Table 9.6 and consequently we adopt it asour preferred long run specification.
76 As in the UK’s case, it must be noted that comments regarding the importance of individualrestrictions reported here, are consistent with different ordering of the restrictions.
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The following equations show the unemployment and real wages cointegratedvectors implied by ߚመு௬௕௥௜ௗ (asymptotic standard errors in brackets), recall thatthe coefficients of these equations can be interpreted as long run elasticitiesbecause all variables are measured in logarithms.9.6 ݑ௧ = +1.922(ݕ௧− ௧݈) − 0.112݉ ݈݅௧− 4.140 ௧݇+ 0.040ܶ+ ߦመଵ,௧(0.415) (0.050) (0.889) (0.012)9.7 (ݓ௧− ݌௧) = (ݕ௧− ௧݈) + 0.131 ݈ݑ௧− 0.077݉ ݈݅௧− 0.110( ௧݅− ∆݌௧) − 0.002ܶ+ ߦመଶ,௧(0.033) (0.024) (0.040) (0.000)As per equation 9.6, Spain’s NAIRU is determined workers’ militancy as alsoreported in Dolado et al. (1986), Estrada et al. (2000) or Gianella et al. (2008).Although contrary to LNJ’s propositions, the NAIRU is not exclusivelydetermined by exogenous factors:First, the NAIRU is also affected by productivity, although it has a perverseeffect, our estimates suggest that an increase in productivity of 1% wouldincrease the NAIRU by 1.922%. As in the Italian case, this suggests that eitherthe impact of productivity over real wages is greater than its impact on firmsmark-up, or that productivity increases firms’ mark-up rather than moderatethem. This finding is consistent with Dolado et al. (1986) and Dolado andJimeno (1997), who also find a positive long run relationship betweenproductivity and unemployment, but it is in contrast to simulations fromBallabriga et al. (1993), which suggest that there is a negative relationship.Second, the NAIRU is also influenced by the size of capital stock, our estimatessuggest that an increase in capital stock of 1% would reduce the NAIRU by4.140%. As discussed in the UK’s section, this evidence suggests that capitalstock limits firms’ ability to mark-up wages. Our finding reinforce previousevidence that capital stock reduces the NAIRU in Spain, particularly that fromArestis et al. (2007) who also find unemployment negatively cointegrated withcapital stock, but also Miaouli (2001) and Karanassou and Sala (2008) whoreport a positive long run elasticity of employment with respect to capital, seealso Ballabriga et al. (1993). Further, this finding also reinforces doubts aboutthe robustness of Dorado’s et al (1986) early results, who find no evidence of alink between the NAIRU and capital stock.Finally, we find significant evidence of the NAIRU having a time trend. It isworth noting, that we do not find evidence of labour market hysteresis havingany impact on the NAIRU, as also reported in Arestis et al. (2007), but incontrast to the findings from Dolado and Jimeno (1997). This is an importantfinding, because it contradicts the widely accepted view that the “SpanishDisease” is the result of interactions between shocks and labour marketinstitutions, i.e. hysteresis (Bentolila et al., 1990, Blanchard and Jimeno, 1995).
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Further, there is no evidence of real long term interest rates playing asignificant role in determining the NAIRU, contrary to Ball (1999) and Gianellaet al. (2008). Having controlled for long term interest rates in our analysis, wesuspect that the real cost of borrowing in these studies, might be capturing theeffect of some omitted variables, which here have a significant influence on theNAIRU.Turning now to equation 9.7, real wages equilibrium is positively affected byproductivity on one-to-one basis, suggesting that productivity gains are fullyreflected in the long run real wage equilibrium. Sala (2009) also reports a longrun elasticity of real wages to productivity in the vicinity of unity 0.80, althoughthe estimates from Karanassou and Sala (2008) and Raurich et al. (2009) aremore modest, 0.52 and 0.65 respectively. Long term unemployment alsoincreases the long run real wages equilibrium, suggesting that workers who areout of work for a year or more are unable to exert downward pressure overreal wage claims.On the other hand, workers’ militancy, long term real interest rates and a timetrend reduce the long run real wages equilibrium. This suggests that strikeaction either has a perverse effect over real wages or that it has been unable toprevent real wages stagnation noted in panel (d) of Figure 6.14. Similarly, thesign of long term real interest rates suggests that workers are unable tocompensate rises in the cost of borrowing with greater real wages in the longrun.Further, as discussed in Italy’s case, combining the evidence of long run unitproportionality between productivity and real wages, with the positive effect ofproductivity over the NAIRU suggests three possible scenarios: First, one whereunemployment reduces firms ability to mark-up wages (߮ଵ > 0) but firmsreaction to productivity gains is below unity (߮ଷ < 1). Second, a scenario whereunemployment has no influence on firms’ ability to mark-up wages (߮ଵ = 0)and firms’ reaction to productivity is equal to unity (߮ଷ = 1). Third, one whereunemployment increases firms’ ability to mark-up wages (߮ଵ < 0) but firms’reaction to productivity is above unity (߮ଷ > 1).
9.3.4 Short-run dynamics of unemployment and the anchor properties of
the NAIRUTo analyse the behaviour of unemployment around the NAIRU, we estimate theECM equation for ∆ݑ௧using the residuals from 9.6 and 9.7 as error correctionterms. The resultant ∆ݑ௧, estimated with 109 observations over the period1980q4-2007q4, is the following:
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9.8 ∆ݑ௧= 24.11 − 0.250ߦመଵ,௧ି ଵ + 0.406ߦመଶ,௧ି ଵ− 1.176∆(ݓ௧ି ଵ− ݌௧ି ଵ) + 0.071∆(ݕ௧ି ଵ− ௧݈ି ଵ)[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.747]
+0.289∆ݑ௧ି ଵ− 0.077∆ ݈ݑ௧ି ଵ− 0.390∆݃ݎݎ௧ି ଵ+ 0.215∆ݐ௧ି ଵ
௪ − 0.001∆݉ ݈݅௧ି ଵ[0.000] [0.310] [0.029] [0.302] [0.408]
−11.38∆ ௧݇ି ଵ+ 0.000∆( ௧݅ି ଵ− ∆݌௧ି ଵ) − 0.000∆݌௧ି ଵ௩௠ + 0.000∆݌௧ି ଶ௩௠ − 0.047ܦ87ݍ4[0.000] [0.981] [0.731] [0.857] [0.011]Adj. ܴଶ=0.729
ௌܺ஼
ଶ (4)= 5.238 [0.264], ܺிிଶ (1)= 0.000 [0.996]
ܺே௢௥௠
ଶ (2)= 1.613 [0.446], ܺு௘௧ଶ (1)= 0.035 [0.852]
ߦመଵ,௧ = ݑ− 1.922(ݕ− )݈ + 0.112݉ ݈݅+ 4.140݇− 0.040ܶ
ߦመଶ,௧ = (ݓ − ݌) − (ݕ− )݈ − 0.131 ݈ݑ+ 0.077݉ ݈݅ + 0.110(݅− ∆݌) + 0.002ܶ
ߪகොయ = 0.0182Where Adj. ܴଶ, ௌܺ஼ଶ , ܺிிଶ , ܺே௢௥௠ଶ , ܺு௘௧ଶ have the same meaning as above. ߪகොయis thestandard deviation of the error term in equation’s 9.8. p-values for t-tests anddiagnostic tests are reported in square brackets77.As per equation 9.8 the coefficient for ߦመଵ,௧ି ଵ is negative and significantlydifferent from zero. It implies that 25% of the gap between unemployment andthe NAIRU is corrected each quarter, which amount to a half-life of about threequarters, and a 90% life of two years. Hence, the NAIRU seems to act as ananchor, although the speed of adjustment suggests that it is a rather weak one.Our estimate falls within the low end of existing estimates, which vary widely,Arestis et al. (2007) find that only 11.9% of the gap between the NAIRU andunemployment is corrected each quarter, half of what it is implied by ourestimate. Whereas, Miaouli (2001) find that deviations from labour demand arecorrected immediately.The coefficient for ߦመଶ,௧ି ଵ, is significant and positive. This suggests that settingreal wages above their long run equilibrium increase unemployment. Accordingto Bhaduri and Marglin’s dichotomy, this estimate suggests that Spain operatesunder a “profit-led regime”.
9.3.5 Impulse response and the effects of an unemployment shockWe complete our analysis simulating an unemployment shock of one standarddeviation in equation 9.8, i.e. ߪகොయ = 0.0182, which amounts to a rise inunemployment of 7.27% in annual terms. Figure 9.2 shows the effect of thisshock using GIR functions:
77 All diagnostic tests are passed at the standard 5% significance level.
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timing is slightly slower than that reported by Duval and Vogel (2008), whofind that Spain needs between four and five years to close the output gap.As a consequence of the shock, long term unemployment increases, panel (b),until it stabilizes at a level 9% above its pre-shock situation. Real wages andproductivity, panels (c) and (d), both fall as a result of the shock although thefall in real wages is more pronounced than that of productivity, the latter evengrows on impact. While ݓ௧− ݌௧stabilizes at a level 2.4% smaller than its pre-shock value, ݕ௧− ௧݈stabilizes 0.2% below its baseline. This suggests that thewage share falls as a result of the shock.Capital stock, panel (e), falls as a consequence of the shock until it stabilizes at alevel 1.1% smaller than its baseline. This reaction to the rise in unemploymentis very suggestive of the type of negative long run relationship that we find inour econometric analysis. Real long term interest rates, panel (f), fluctuateswidely on impact, although it ends stabilizing at a level 9% above its baseline.The last three panels refer to the wage-push factors of our model.Unemployment benefits, panel (g), increase after the shock until it stabilizesabove its baseline. Labour taxation, panel (h), follows an inverted J-curveevolution, and after an initial rise it stabilizes at a level below its baseline.Workers’ militancy panel (i), fluctuates widely on impact, probably reflectinggreater volatility in industrial relations after the shock, and it end upsstabilizing at a level 20% above its baseline. The latter suggests that the climateof industrial relations worsen permanently after the shock.
9.4 SummaryIn this chapter we have used the CVAR approach to study the determinants ofthe NAIRU and its anchor properties in Italy and Spain. This methodologyallows us to study the determinants of the NAIRU by testing the long runrestrictions required by each of the models nested in our encompassing model(ߚ௅ே௃, ߚ஻ௌ, ߚ஺ௌோ and ߚோு). Panel i) of Table 9.7 summarizes the results of thisprocess. In the Italian case, ߚመ஺ௌோ is strongly significant although a ߚመୌ୷ୠ୰୧ୢ thatcombines some of its features with ߚመோு is our preferred long run choice. In theSpanish case none of the set of restrictions is individually significant. However,evidence is very supportive of a ߚመୌ୷ୠ୰୧ୢ that combines different features of ߚ஻ௌ,
ߚ஺ௌோ and ߚோு .Panel ii) of Table 9.7 presents these ߚመୌ୷ୠ୰୧ୢ . In Italy, the NAIRU is determinedby some wage-push factors together with productivity, capital stock and reallong term interest rates. In the Spanish case, the NAIRU is determined by somelabour market institutions along with productivity and capital stock. Hence,according to our results for these countries the NAIRU is not exclusivelydetermined by exogenous factors contrary to what LNJ’s model suggests. It is
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also worth noting that our results for Spain do not provide support for thehysteresis hypothesis. Further, these results add to the body of literature thatquestions the claim that time series from Italy and Spain support LNJ’spropositions, as for instance suggested by Saint-Paul (2004). Neither do ourfindings support the claim that the evolution of unemployment in Spainprovides support to the hysteresis hypothesis, as proposed by Bentolila’s et al.(1990). Italy Spain
i) Identification process
ߚመ௅ே௃ [0.053] [0.000]
ߚመ஻ௌ [0.041] [0.000]
ߚመ஺ௌோ [0.469] [0.000]
ߚመோு [0.022] [0.000]
ߚመு௬௕௥௜ௗ [0.107] [0.106]
ii) NAIRU determinants
݃ݎݎ 0.102 NS
ݐ௪ 0.729 NS
݉ ݈݅ NS -0.112
ݕ− ݈ 2.044 1.922
݈ݑ NS NS
݇ -1.814 -4.140
݅− ∆݌ -0.198 NS
T NS 0.040
iii) NAIRU’s anchor properties
ߦመଵ,௧ି ଵ NS -0.250Time required to returnto baseline (GIR) No Return +6 years
Table 9.7. Summary of findings Italy and SpainNote: i) Results for the identification process are drawn from Table 9.3 in the Italian case and from Table9.6 for Spain. ii) Values for the NAIRU elasticities are drawn from each country’s unemploymentcointegrated vector, equations 9.2 and 9.6 respectively. iii) Coefficients of ߦመଵ,௧ି ଵ are drawn fromequations 9.4 and 9.8 respectively. “Time required to return to baseline” draws from Figure 9.1 and Figure9.2 respectively. NS not significant and “No return” indicates that unemployment does not return to itsbaseline.In fact, our findings raise questions about the validity of the Spanish time seriesliterature in which such claims are grounded for the following reasons. First,our results cast doubts on the robustness of studies that find the NAIRU neutralto capital stock, for instance Dolado et al. (1986), or previous studies whichfind evidence of hysteresis effects such as Dolado and Jimeno (1997). Second,our finding that productivity and capital stock influence the NAIRU, suggeststhat some of the time series studies which are usually cited to vindicate LNJ’sclaims, for instance Estrada et al. (2000) are misspecified because they omitproductivity and capital stock. The same applies to studies used to vindicate thehysteresis hypothesis that omit these variables in their analysis, such as Doladoand Jimeno (1997). Stockhammer (2004a,p.20) and Arestis et al. (2007, p.144)already warn of these potential biases.The CVAR approach also allows us to examine the anchor properties of theNAIRU by estimating a VECM model and GIR functions. Our results are
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summarized in Panel iii) of Table 9.7. According to our VECM estimations, inItaly deviations from the NAIRU have no significant influence onunemployment’s dynamics, which questions the ability of the NAIRU to act asan anchor. While in the Spanish case, our VECM results suggest that the NAIRUis a very weak anchor.These findings are reinforced by the results of simulating and unemploymentshock using GIR functions. In Italy, GIR estimates suggest that unemploymentdrifts away from its pre-shock value, rather than returning to it as it would beexpected if the NAIRU acted as an anchor. In Spain, GIR estimates suggest thatunemployment returns to its baseline but it needs more than six years to do so,which in line with our VECM estimations suggests that the NAIRU is a veryweak anchor.Hence, our VECM and GIR results question LNJ’s claim about the anchorproperties of the NAIRU, although they are in tune with the bulk of existingliterature, which suggest that the NAIRU in Italy and Spain is at best a weakanchor for economic activity.In sum, our findings for Italy and Spain presented in this chapter challenge thevalidity of LNJ’s propositions and the hysteresis hypothesis, the time seriesliterature that provides support to these models and consequently policyrecommendations inspired by these approaches. For instance, OECD’s(2003,p.22, 2005a) calls for labour market reforms in Italy that increaseincentives to work and make the wage setting framework more flexible. Or callsto reduce workers bargaining power in Spain (Brandt et al., 2005,p.60,66,Bentolila et al., 2011, Jaumotte, 2011). Policy implications are discussed furtherin Chapter 11.
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Chapter 10 Determinants of the NAIRU and its anchor
properties, evidence from Denmark and Finland.
10.1 IntroductionThis chapter presents the results of applying the CVAR approach to data forDenmark and Finland. We start by summarizing the time series literaturereviewed in Chapter 3 that refers to these economies. A summary table of thisliterature can also be found in Table I.4 in Appendix I.The Danish experience has received less attention in the empirical literaturethan other of the economies studied in this thesis, and evidence remainsscattered. It is sometimes argued that the evolution of unemployment in thiscountry provides support to LNJ’s approach (Siebert, 1997, OECD,2000b,p.223). Hansen and Warne (2001), Nymoen and Rødseth (2003) find noevidence of a link between productivity and the NAIRU, as suggested by LNJ,but there is no clear evidence of a link between unemployment and labourmarket institutions either (Arestis et al., 2007, Gianella et al., 2008), which runscontrary to LNJ’s propositions.On the other hand, Nymoen and Rødseth (2003) find that participation in thelabour market reduces unemployment, which suggests that the NAIRU issubject to hysteresis effects. Further, Karanassou et al. (2008a) find evidence oflong run positive link between capital stock and employment. Finally, there isalso evidence of a link between the NAIRU and real interest rates (Ball, 1999,Gianella et al., 2008).There is also a limited literature examining the anchor properties of the NAIRU,but it all suggests that at best, it is a weak anchor. Karanassou et al. (2008b)and Duval and Vogel (2008) find that after a shock, unemployment and outputfluctuate away from their respective long run equilibria for prolonged periodsof time.Finland has received a bit more of attention than Denmark due to the abruptrise in unemployment that it suffered in the 1990s. It is generally thought thatthe evolution of unemployment in this country provides support to LNJ’sclaims, particularly because evidence suggests that there is a significant linkbetween labour taxation and the NAIRU (Kiander and Pehkonen, 1999,Honkapohja and Koskela, 1999, Nickell, 1999). Further, it is also generallyaccepted that real interest rates affect the NAIRU, see Kiander and Pehkonen(1999), Honkapohja and Koskela (1999) and (Gianella et al., 2008).Evidence of the influence of other demand factors is more ambiguous. Fregertand Pehkonen (2008) attribute the influence of real interest rates to hysteresis,but when measured with long term unemployment, there is no evidence of such
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hysteresis effects (Arestis et al., 2007). The impact of productivity is alsoambiguous (Honkapohja and Koskela, 1999, Nymoen and Rødseth, 2003). Onlyevidence of a negative long run link between capital stock and unemployment(Arestis et al., 2007) and a positive one with employment seem to be robust(Karanassou et al., 2008a).Furthermore, as in the Danish case, there is a limited literature studying theanchor properties, but all suggests that the NAIRU is at best a weak anchorbecause deviations from the NAIRU have little influence on unemploymentdynamics (Arestis et al., 2007) and because adjustment after a shock appear tobe very sluggish (Duval and Vogel, 2008).The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 10.2 presents ourresults for Denmark, section 10.3 our results for Finland. Each of them containsfive subsections devoted to the five CVAR stages. And section 10.4 closes thechapter with a summary of key findings.
10.2 Denmark
10.2.1 Data properties and model specificationIn order to confirm that the CVAR approach can be applied to Denmark’s dataset, we examine the stationary properties of the data. According to the unit rootand stationarity tests results, reported in Appendix II, all the variables inDenmark’s ݖ௧ = (ݓ௧− ݌௧,ݕ௧− ௧݈, ݑ௧, ݈ݑ௧,݃ݎݎ௧,ݐ௧௪ ,݉ ݈݅௧, ௧݇, ௧݅− ∆݌௧)ᇱ are ܫ(1).These results justify the use of cointegration techniques such as the CVARwhich we proceed to model now.The starting point is the CVAR benchmark specification, equation 5.1. Thecomposition of its deterministic component ܥ is decided after visual inspectionof the data in Figure II.7. This inspection reveals that some of the variables of ݖ௧exhibit a time trend, which could cause the problem of quadratic trendsdiscussed in section 5.4. In order to avoid this phenomenon, we decompose thematrix of deterministic components ܥ into intercepts and time trends, andrestrict the time trend to the long run term, as per equation 5.5.The choice of lag order for this specification draws from the standard modelselection criteria, reported in Table 10.1, and along with the composition of x௧,is the result of extensive experimentation with several specifications. After thisprocess we adopt the following VAR (2) expression with x௧ = (∆݌௧ି ଵ௩௠ ,
∆݌௧ି ଶ
௩௠ , ∆݌௧ି ଷ
௩௠ , ∆݌௧ି ସ
௩௠ )ᇱas our preferred specification78:
78 We experimented with more parsimonious models (than our preferred specification), such asa VAR(1) specification with x௧ = (∆݌௧ି ଵ௩௠ ), this lag order draw from SBC indications in Table10.1. Or a VAR(1) with x௧ = (∆݌௧ି ଵ௩௠ , ∆݌௧ି ଶ௩௠ )ᇱ, a VAR(2) with x௧ = (∆݌௧ି ଵ௩௠ ), a VAR(2) withx௧ = (∆݌௧ି ଵ௩௠ , ∆݌௧ି ଶ௩௠ )ᇱ , and a VAR(2) with x௧ = (∆݌௧ି ଵ௩௠ , ∆݌௧ି ଶ௩௠ , ∆݌௧ି ଷ௩௠ )ᇱ . However, thesespecifications are unable to accommodate serial correlation problems, and consequently arediscarded. Experimenting with less parsimonious models, such as VAR models with higher lag
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10.1 ∆z௧ = c଴ + ߔଵ∆z௧ି ଵ + ߛߚᇱz୲∗ + λx௧+ ε୲ where ݖ௧ =
⎝
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
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ݓ௧− ݌௧
ݕ௧− ௧݈
ݑ௧
݈ݑ௧
݃ݎݎ௧
ݐ௧
௪
݉ ݈݅௧
௧݇
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⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎞
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ݐ௧
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ܶ ⎠
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⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
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⎝
⎛
∆݌௧ି ଵ
௩௠
∆݌௧ି ଶ
௩௠
∆݌௧ି ଷ
௩௠
∆݌௧ି ସ
௩௠ ⎠
⎞
Variables in ݖ௧, ݖ௧∗ and x௧have the same meaning as in Chapter 6. We adopt thisspecification, because it appears to deliver the best balance betweenparsimony, a rich and informative lag structure79 and satisfactory diagnostictest results for Denmark’s data set.Lag order AIC SBC5 1939.3 1436.84 1707.5 1293.63 1653.4 1328.22 1652.0 1415.51 1603.4 1455.60 1128.1 1069.0
Table 10.1. Lag order selection criteria, DenmarkNote: The test is carried out with 66 observations covering the period between 1991q3 to 2007q4.Statistics reported here are obtained from estimating an unrestricted VAR model for the variablescontained in the vector z௧, with a constant and a time trend, and four lags of ∆݌௩௠ .
10.2.2 Cointegration testsFollowing, we test for cointegration among the variables of ݖ௧, Table 10.2presents the results of the Maximum Eigenvalue (ߣ௠ ௔௫) and Trace (ߣ௧௥௔௖௘)tests:
ߣ௠ ௔௫ ߣ௧௥௔௖௘
ܪ଴ ܪଵ Statistic 95% Criticalvalues Statistic 95% Criticalvalues
r=0 r=1 85.55 61.27 333.71 222.62
r≤1 r=2 55.11 55.14 248.16 182.99
r≤2 r=3 52.30 49.32 193.04 147.27
r≤3 r=4 44.70 43.61 140.74 115.85
r≤4 r=5 37.28 37.86 96.05 87.17
r≤5 r=6 24.90 31.79 58.77 63.00
r≤6 r=7 19.87 25.42 33.87 42.34
r≤7 r=8 9.43 19.22 14.00 25.77
r≤8 r=9 4.57 12.39 4.57 12.39
Table 10.2. Results from cointegration tests, DenmarkNote: Test statistics are obtained from applying the Maximum Eigenvalue and Trace test to our vector z௧using a VAR(2) model with unrestricted intercepts and restricted trend coefficients and four lags of ∆݌௩௠ ,with 67 observations covering the period between 1991q2 to 2007q4. Critical values are chosenaccording to this specification.The Maximum Eigenvalue test fails to reject the null hypothesis of having onelong run relationships, while the Trace test fails to reject the null hypothesis of
order following AIC’s suggestions, is deemed unnecessary because diagnostic test issues arealready addressed by our preferred specification.79 Equivalent to an ܣܴܯ ܣ(18,16), (Hamilton, 1994, p.349)
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having five cointegrated vectors. That is, ߣ௠ ௔௫ suggests there is onecointegrated vector less than our theoretical model, while the ߣ௧௥௔௖௘ suggeststhat there are three cointegrated vectors more than we expected. As discussedin section 5.5, the finite sample properties of these tests are not well known yet,and interpreting their results should be done with caution. Given theuncertainty around the validity of the tests results, we follow the advice ofPesaran and Pesaran (2003,p.293) and Garrat et al. (2006,p.198), and relyingon the predictions from economic theory rather than the tests’ results, weproceed under the assumption of r=2.
10.2.3 Identifying the long run relationshipsIn order to identify which variables take part in these two long runrelationships, we use the four sets of theoretically driven restrictions detailedin Table 5.1 (ߚ௅ே௃, ߚ஻ௌ, ߚ஺ௌோ and ߚோு) as identifying schedules. Table 10.3reports the results of this process.We start by imposing the restrictions contained in ߚ௅ே௃. This set of restrictionsis insignificant at the standard 5%, its log-likelihood ratio (LR) test is a
ܺଶ(10)=60.970 with a p-value equal to [0.000]. Hence, evidence seems to leanagainst ߚ௅ே௃. Next, we test the validity of the restrictions contained in ߚ஻ௌ,which are also insignificant as a whole at the standard 5%, although they aremarginally significant at 1%, with a p-value equal to [0.014]. Following, weintroduce the set of restrictions of ߚ஺ௌோ80, for which evidence is not verysupportive either, since it is insignificant with a p-value for the LR test equal to[0.002]. Finally, the set of restrictions contained in ߚோு is also foundinsignificant with a p-value for the LR test equal to [0.004].Hence, evidence does not seem to yield support to any of the four sets ofrestrictions drawn from each of the nested NAIRU models at the standard 5%significance level. As in previous cases, we interpret these results as a sign thatthe unemployment and real wages cointegrated vectors are more complex thanas portrayed by theoretical models. In fact, evidence from the trial and errorprocess by which these sets of restrictions are introduced reveals somesuggestive features of the data81: Introducing ߚଵସ = 0 pushes ߚመ୐୒୎, ߚመ୅ୗୖ and ߚመୖୌinto rejection, whereas ߚଶଶ = −1 seems to be supported by the data in mostcases. Furthermore, ߚመ୆ୗ is marginally significant. This evidence suggests thatsome variant of ߚ஻ௌ (where ߚଵସ ≠ 0 and ߚଶଶ = −1) might be supported by thedata.
80 The coefficients ߚଵଽ and ߚଶଶ are left unrestricted because we fail to obtain converging resultswhen introducing ߚଵଽ = 0 and ߚଶଶ = −1 , despite introducing ߚ஺ௌோ following differentsequences.81 As in the UK’s case, it must be noted that comments regarding the importance of individualrestrictions reported here, are consistent with different ordering of the restrictions.
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ݖ௧
∗ ߚመ௅ே௃ ߚመ஻ௌ ߚመ஺ௌோ ߚመோு ߚመୌ୷ୠ୰୧ୢ
ݓ௧− ݌௧ 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000
ݕ௧− ௧݈ 0.000 -1.000 0.000 -1.000 -9.464 -1.130§NC 0.000 -1.000 0.000 -1.000None (0.036)
ݑ௧ 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
݈ݑ௧ 0.000 0.000 -1.332§ 0.012 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -1.000 0.000(0.405) (0.015)
݃ݎݎ௧ 1.767 0.218§ -0.093 0.224§ 1.341 0.233 -1.038 0.252§ 0.000 0.247§none (0.013) (0.500) (0.019) None None (0.983) (0.023) (0.018)
ݐ௪ ௧ -8.772 -0.161§ 2.221 -0.224§ 1.663 -0.155 -15.71§ −0.045 0.000 0.000None (0.038) (2.549) (0.097) None (0.277) (4.852) (0.115)
݉ ݈݅௧ -0.174 -0.155§ -0.198 -0.018§ -0.149 -0.025 0.549§ −0.022§ 0.000 -0.024§none (0.003) (0.114) (0.004) None None (0.273) (0.006) (0.003)
௧݇ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 6.832 0.054 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000none None
௧݅− ∆݌௧ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.848§NC 0.000 1.537§ -0.023 0.000 -0.027§(0.275) (0.688) (0.016) (0.005)
ܶ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
ݎଶ 4 4 4 4 4
݈݈௥మ 1796.8 1796.8 1796.8 1796.8 1796.8
ݍ 14 12 9 12 13
݈݈௤ 1766.3 1787.2 1787.1 1785.4 1785.7
ܺ௅ோ
ଶ (ݍ− ݎଶ) ܺଶ(10)=60.970[0.000] ܺଶ(8)=19.178[0.014] ܺଶ(5)=19.234[0.002] ܺଶ(8)=22.750[0.004] ܺଶ(9)=22.192§[0.052]
Table 10.3. Identification process and estimation of long run elasticities, DenmarkNote: These estimations were carried with 67 observations covering the period between 1991q2 to 2007q4. Asymptotic standard errors for each ߚ coefficient are provided in brackets. §indicates significant at 5% and * indicates significant at 10%. NC indicates that the coefficient is subject to a theoretical restriction for which we failed to obtain converging results, andhence had to be left unrestricted. ݎଶ=Number of just identified restrictions, and ݍ= Number of total restrictions imposed, i.e. over-identifying restrictions. ݈݈௥మ is the maximum value of thelog-likelihood function obtained under ݎଶ just identified restrictions. ݈݈௤ is the maximum value of the log-likelihood function obtained under ݍover-identifying restrictions. ܺ௅ோଶ (ݍ− ݎଶ)is the chi-square statistics for the log-likelihood Ratio (LR) test. P-values for this test are provided in square brackets.
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As in the UK’s case, we test this hypothesis building a sequence of restrictionsdenoted by ߚு௬௕௥௜ௗ, which contains these features, and experiment until we finda ߚመு௬௕௥௜ௗ supported by the data, here reported in the last column of Table 10.3.In this case, ߚመு௬௕௥௜ௗ is significant at the standard 5%, the LR test is a
ܺଶ(9)=22.192 with a p-value equal to [0.052]. Furthermore, according to theasymptotic standard errors (in brackets), all the unrestricted coefficients areindividually significant at the standard levels. ߚመு௬௕௥௜ௗ is clearly more significantthan the rest of ߚmatrices examined in Table 10.3 and consequently we adoptit as our preferred long run specification.The following equations show the unemployment and real wages cointegratedvectors implied by ߚመு௬௕௥௜ௗ (asymptotic standard errors in brackets), recall thatthe coefficients of these equations can be interpreted as long run elasticitiesbecause all variables are measured in logarithms.10.2 ݑ௧ = ݈ݑ௧+ ߦመଵ,௧10.3 (ݓ௧− ݌௧) = (ݕ௧− ௧݈) − 0.247݃ݎݎ௧+ 0.024݉ ݈݅௧+ 0.027( ௧݅− ∆݌௧) + ߦመଶ,௧(0.018) (0.003) (0.005)According to equation 10.2 Denmark’s NAIRU is exclusively determined by thelong term unemployment rate, with which unemployment has a long term one-to-one relationship. As discussed in France’s section, this suggests that workersthat have been out of work for a year or more cannot exert downward pressureover real wages claims, causing labour market hysteresis. Hansen and Warne(2001) find that greater labour participation in the labour market reduces theNAIRU, which is also suggestive of hysteresis effects.It is worth noting, that we do not find significant evidence of exogenous factorshaving any impact on the NAIRU. This is on line with previous studies, whichfound difficulties to establish a link between Denmark’s unemploymentevolution and its labour market institutions (Arestis et al., 2007, Gianella et al.,2008). Further, there is no significant evidence of productivity having anyimpact on the NAIRU, as also reported in Hansen and Warne (2001) andNymoen and Rødseth (2003).Further, there is no evidence of capital stock playing a significant role indetermining the NAIRU contrary to Karanassou et al. (2008a). Neither there isevidence of real long term interest rates playing a significant role indetermining the NAIRU contrary to Ball (1999) and Gianella et al. (2008).Having controlled for capital stock and long term interest rates in our analysis,we suspect that in previous studies, these variables might be capturing theeffect of hysteresis which they omit.Turning now to equation 10.3, the real wages equilibrium is positively affectedby productivity on one-to-one basis, suggesting that productivity gains are fully
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reflected in the long run real wages equilibrium. Hansen and Warne (2001) alsoreport a long run elasticity of real wages to productivity in the vicinity of unity,although Karanassou’s et al., (2008a) estimate are more modest 0.46. Workers’militancy and long term real interest rates also increase the long run real wagesequilibrium. This suggests that strike action increases real wages in the longrun and that workers are able to compensate rises in the cost of borrowingwith greater real wages in the long run.On the other hand, unemployment benefits reduce the long run real wagesequilibrium suggesting that greater benefits ease pressure over real wages inthe long run. Given the evidence in favour of labour market hysteresis from10.2, it is somehow surprising to find that long term unemployment has noeffect over real wages equilibrium. According to our theoretical model this ispossible as long as firms’ price mark-up are insensitive to unemployment82.
10.2.4 Short-run dynamics of unemployment and the anchor properties of
the NAIRUTo analyse the behaviour of unemployment around the NAIRU, we estimate theECM equation for ∆ݑ௧ using the residuals from 10.2 and 10.3 as errorcorrection terms. The resultant ∆ݑ௧, estimated with 67 observations over theperiod 1991q2-2007q4, is the following:10.4 ∆ݑ௧= 0.012 − 0.052ߦመଵ,௧ି ଵ− 1.480ߦመଶ,௧ି ଵ+ 0.891∆(ݓ௧ି ଵ− ݌௧ି ଵ) − 1.318∆(ݕ௧ି ଵ− ௧݈ି ଵ)[0.843] [0.345] [0.098] [0.440] [0.045]
+0.045∆ݑ௧ି ଵ− 0.120∆ ݈ݑ௧ି ଵ− 0.820∆݃ݎݎ௧ି ଵ+ 1.400∆ݐ
௪
୲ି ଵ− 0.007∆݉ ݈݅௧ି ଵ[0.800] [0.631] [0.130] [0.502] [0.837]
−2.659∆ ௧݇ି ଵ− 0.013∆( ௧݅ି ଵ− ∆݌௧ି ଵ) − 0.002∆݌௧ି ଵ௩௠ − 0.001∆݌௧ି ଶ௩௠[0.612] [0.798] [0.378] [0.493]
−0.004∆݌௧ି ଷ
௩௠ − 0.003∆݌௧ି ସ
௩௠ + εොଷ௧[0.053] [0.075]Adj. ܴଶ=0.102
ௌܺ஼
ଶ (4)= 6.180 [0.186], ܺிிଶ (1)= 1.968 [0.161]
ܺே௢௥௠
ଶ (2)= 0.380 [0.827], ܺு௘௧ଶ (1)= 0.085 [0.771]
ߦመଵ,௧ = ݑ− ݈ݑ
ߦመଶ,௧ = (ݓ − ݌) − (ݕ− )݈ + 0.247grr − 0.024݉ ݈݅− 0.027(݅− ∆݌)
ߪகොయ = 0.0514Where Adj. ܴଶ, ௌܺ஼ଶ , ܺிிଶ , ܺே௢௥௠ଶ , ܺு௘௧ଶ have the same meaning as above. ߪகොయis thestandard deviation of the error term in equation 10.4. p-values for t-tests anddiagnostic tests are reported in square brackets83.According to 10.4 the coefficient for ߦመଵ,௧ି ଵ is not significantly different fromzero, meaning that deviations from the NAIRU have no significant influence on
82 As per equations 4.4 and 4.5 ߚଵସ = ఠభభఠభାఝభ and ߚଶସ = ቀ߮ ଵ ఠభభఠభାఝభቁ respectively. Hence, if
ߚመଵସ = 1 and ߚመଶସ = 0, ߮ଵ must be equal to zero.83 All diagnostic tests are passed at the standard 5% significance level.
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unemployment dynamics. In other words, there is no evidence of the NAIRUacting as an anchor. Karanassou et al. (2008b) concludes similarly afterseparating the structural and the cyclical component of unemployment, andnoting that actual unemployment fluctuates away from its long run equilibriumfor most of their sample period.The coefficient for ߦመଶ,௧ି ଵ is significant -albeit only at 10% and by a very narrowmargin- and negative. This suggests that setting real wages above their long runequilibrium reduces unemployment. According to the dichotomy proposed byBhaduri and Marglin (1990), this estimate suggests that Denmark operatesunder a “wage-led regime”.
10.2.5 Impulse response and the effects of an unemployment shockWe complete our analysis simulating an unemployment shock of one standarddeviation in equation 10.4, i.e. ߪகොయ = 0.0514, which amounts to a rise inunemployment of 20.58% in annual terms. Figure 10.1 shows the effect of thisshock using GIR functions:Unemployment in panel (a), drifts upwards for the first year, and after peakingat 23% above the baseline, it falls moderately thereafter until it stabilizes at alevel 18.4% greater than its pre-shock value. The reaction of long termunemployment to the shock, shown in panel (b), approximates a J-curve: Onimpact, ݈ݑ௧ falls in the immediate quarters after the shock, although as timegoes by, some of these workers remain unemployed, and the long termunemployment rate rises until it stabilizes at a level 18.4% above its baseline.Hence, the shock has identical long run impact on ݑ௧and ݈ݑ௧. This reinforcesevidence of a one-to-one long run relationship between these variables foundin equation 10.2.Further, although unemployment does not return to its baseline, the fact that itstabilizes at the same level as ݈ݑ௧suggests that it stabilizes at a new NAIRUafter the shock. Five years are needed for both variables to align after theshock, the sluggishness of this process might explain why our coefficient for
ߦመଵ,௧ି ଵ in equation 10.4 is insignificant. This timing is slightly slower than thatreported by Duval and Vogel (2008), who find that Denmark needs betweenthree and four years to close the output gap.Real wages and productivity, panels (c) and (d), both grow as a consequence ofthe shock, although the rise in productivity is more pronounced than that ofreal wages. While ݕ௧− ௧݈stabilizes at a level 1.3% greater than its pre-shockvalue, ݓ௧− ݌௧stabilizes 0.4% above its baseline. This suggests that the wageshare falls as a result of the shock. Capital stock and real long term interestrates, panels (e) and (f), fall as a consequence of the shock until they stabilize ata level 1%, and 15% respectively, smaller than their baselines.
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stabilizes at a level below its baseline. Workers’ militancy panel (i), falls sharplyafter the shock, until it stabilizes at a level 26% below its pre-shock situation.
10.3 Finland
10.3.1 Data properties and model specificationWe turn now to the Finnish case, data properties of Finland’s data set are verysimilar to those of Denmark, for evidence from unit root and stationary testssuggest that all variables contained in Denmark’s’ ݖ௧ = (ݓ௧− ݌௧,ݕ௧− ௧݈, ݑ௧,
݈ݑ௧, ݃ ݎݎ௧,ݐ௧௪ , ݉ ݈݅௧, ݇௧, ௧݅− ∆݌௧)ᇱare ܫ(1), see Appendix II, which justifies theuse of the CVAR approach.We follow the same modelling strategy as in Denmark’s case. The starting pointis the CVAR’s benchmark equation 5.1. The composition of ܥ is decided aftervisual inspection of the data in Figure II.8, which reveals that some of thevariables of ݖ௧exhibit a time trend. To avoid the problem of quadratic trendsthis could cause, we adopt equation’s 5.5 specification.The choice of lag order and the composition of x௧, are decided drawing from themodel selection criteria reported in Table 10.4, and after extensiveexperimentation with several specifications. After this process, the followingVAR (2) expression with x௧ = (∆݌௧ି ଵ௩௠ , ∆݌௧ି ଶ௩௠ ,ܦ97ݍ123)ᇱis adopted as ourpreferred specification84:10.5 ∆z௧ = c଴ + ߔଵ∆z௧ି ଵ + ߛߚᇱz୲∗ + λx௧+ ε୲
whereݖ௧ =
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, x௧ = ቌ ∆݌௧ି ଵ௩௠∆݌௧ି ଶ௩௠
ܦ97ݍ123ቍ
Variables in ݖ௧, ݖ௧∗ and x௧ have the same meaning as in Chapter 6. Thisspecification seems to provide the best balance between parsimony, a rich and
84 We experimented with more parsimonious models (than our preferred specification), such asa VAR(1) specification with x௧ = (∆݌௧ି ଵ௩௠ ), this lag order draw from SBC indications in Table10.4. Or a VAR(1) with x௧ = (∆݌௧ି ଵ௩௠ , ∆݌௧ି ଶ௩௠ )ᇱ, a VAR(2) with x௧ = (∆݌௧ି ଵ௩௠ ), and a VAR(2) withx௧ = (∆݌௧ି ଵ௩௠ , ∆݌௧ି ଶ௩௠ )ᇱ. Models of similar dimensions to equation 10.5, such as a VAR(2) withx௧ = (∆݌௧ି ଵ௩௠ , ∆݌௧ି ଶ௩௠ ,ܦ97ݍ1)ᇱ , and a VAR(2) with x௧ = (∆݌௧ି ଵ௩௠ , ∆݌௧ି ଶ௩௠ ,ܦ97ݍ123)ᇱ where
ܦ97ݍ123 is the dummy considered in equation 10.5.And less parsimonious models, such asVAR(2) with x௧ = (∆݌௧ି ଵ௩௠ , ∆݌௧ି ଶ௩௠ , ∆݌௧ି ଷ௩௠ , ∆݌௧ି ସ௩௠ )ᇱ ,a VAR(2) with x௧ = (∆݌௧ି ଵ௩௠ , ∆݌௧ି ଶ௩௠ , ∆݌௧ି ଷ௩௠ ,
ܦ97ݍ123)ᇱ,a VAR(2) with x௧ = (∆݌௧ି ଵ௩௠ , ∆݌௧ି ଶ௩௠ , ∆݌௧ି ଷ௩௠ , ∆݌௧ି ସ௩௠ ,ܦ97ݍ1)ᇱand a VAR(2) withx௧ = (∆݌௧ି ଵ௩௠ , ∆݌௧ି ଶ௩௠ , ∆݌௧ି ଷ௩௠ , ∆݌௧ି ସ௩௠ ,ܦ97ݍ123)ᇱ. More parsimonious specifications and models ofsimilar dimensions to that of our preferred specification, fail to pass the correspondingdiagnostic tests, in particular serial correlation. Whereas, less parsimonious passed the serialcorrelation tests, but at the expenses of consuming greater degrees of freedom than ourpreferred specification, and consequently are discarded.
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informative lag structure85 and satisfactory diagnostic test results for Finland’s’data set. Lag order AIC SBC5 2022.4 1503.94 1813.6 1388.53 1776.1 1444.42 1793.1 1554.61 1709.7 1564.50 1053.5 1001.7
Table 10.4. Lag order selection criteria, FinlandNote: The test is carried out with 74 observations covering the period between 1989q3 to 2007q4.Statistics reported here are obtained from estimating an unrestricted VAR model for the variablescontained in the vector z௧, with a constant and a time trend, two lags of ∆݌௩௠ , and the dummy variable
ܦ97ݍ123.
10.3.2 Cointegration testsTable 10.5 presents the results of testing for cointegration among the variablesof ݖ௧. The Maximum Eigenvalue test (ߣ௠ ௔௫) fails to reject the null hypothesis ofhaving six long run relationships, while the Trace test (ߣ௧௥௔௖௘) fails to reject thenull hypothesis of having nine cointegrated vectors. Hence, both tests suggestthat there are more long run relationships than our theoretical model, althoughthey disagree about the exact number.
ߣ௠ ௔௫ ߣ௧௥௔௖௘
ܪ଴ ܪଵ
Statistic 95% Criticalvalues Statistic 95% Criticalvalues
r=0 r=1 104.29 61.27 435.11 222.62
r≤1 r=2 79.31 55.14 330.82 182.99
r≤2 r=3 66.60 49.32 251.51 147.27
r≤3 r=4 56.45 43.61 184.91 115.85
r≤4 r=5 40.90 37.86 128.46 87.17
r≤5 r=6 34.00 31.79 87.56 63.00
r≤6 r=7 23.10 25.42 53.56 42.34
r≤7 r=8 18.01 19.22 30.45 25.77
r≤8 r=9 12.44 12.39 12.45 12.39
Table 10.5. Results from cointegration tests, FinlandNote: Test statistics are obtained from applying the Maximum Eigenvalue and Trace test to z௧using aVAR(2) model with unrestricted intercepts and restricted trend coefficients, two lags of ∆݌௩௠ , and thedummy variable ܦ97ݍ123, with 77 observations covering the period between 1988q4 to 2007q4. Criticalvalues are chosen according to this specification.As discussed in section 5.5, in these circumstances it is necessary to weight thetests results against their potential biases and economic theory. Consideringthat in Finland’s data set we only have 80 observation, that we are estimating alarge VAR(2) with nine variables and that some of its residuals are not normallydistributed, it seems reasonable to suspect that the test results might suffer ofsize biases.In the case of Finland, there is another telling sign of these biases. ߣ௧௥௔௖௘suggests that there are nine cointegrated vectors among the nine variables
85 Equivalent to an ܣܴܯ ܣ(18,16), (Hamilton, 1994, p.349)
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contained in ݖ௧. That amounts to say that each variable describes a stationaryprocess, which is strongly contradicted by the results from the ADF-GLS andKPSS test reported in Appendix II. Thus, as in the UK’s case, it seems reasonableto rely on the predictions from economic theory rather than the tests’ resultsand proceed under the assumption of r=2.
10.3.3 Identifying the long run relationsIn order to identify which variables take part in these two long runrelationships, we use the four sets of restrictions from Table 5.1 (ߚ௅ே௃, ߚ஻ௌ, ߚ஺ௌோand ߚோு) as identifying schedules. Table 10.6 reports the results of this process.We start by imposing the restrictions contained in ߚ௅ே௃. This set of restrictionsis insignificant at the standard 5%, its log-likelihood ratio (LR) test is a
ܺଶ(10)=48.392 with a p-value equal to [0.000]. Hence, evidence seems to leanagainst ߚ௅ே௃. Next, we test the validity of the restrictions contained in ߚ஻ௌ,which are also insignificant as a whole at the standard 5%, although they aremarginally significant at 1%, with a p-value equal to [0.013]. Following, weintroduce the set of restrictions of ߚ஺ௌோ , for which evidence is not verysupportive either, since it is insignificant with a p-value for the LR test equal to[0.000]. Finally, the set of restrictions contained in ߚோு is also foundinsignificant, with a p-value for the LR test equal to [0.000].Hence, evidence does not seem to yield support to any of the four sets ofrestrictions drawn from each of the nested NAIRU models at the standard 5%significance level. As in previous cases, we interpret these results as a sign thatthe unemployment and real wages cointegrated vectors are more complex thanas portrayed by theoretical models. In fact, evidence from the trial and errorprocess by which these sets of restrictions are introduced reveals somesuggestive features of the data86: In all cases, ߚଶଶ = −1 seems supported by thedata, whereas ߚଵଽ = 0 pushes ߚ௅ே௃, ߚ஻ௌ, ߚ஺ௌோ into rejection, and ߚଶସ = 0 doesthe same with ߚ௅ே௃and ߚோு . Furthermore, ߚመ୆ୗ is marginally significant. Thisevidence suggests that some form of hybrid between ߚ஻ௌ (where ߚଶସ ≠ 0) and
ߚோு (where ߚଵଽ ≠ 0), along with ߚଶଶ = −1 might be supported by the data.
86 As in the UK’s case, it must be noted that comments regarding the importance of individualrestrictions reported here, are consistent with different ordering of the restrictions.
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ݖ௧
∗ ߚመ௅ே௃ ߚመ஻ௌ ߚመ஺ௌோ ߚመோு ߚመୌ୷ୠ୰୧ୢ
ݓ௧− ݌௧ 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000
ݕ௧− ௧݈ 0.000 -1.000 0.000 -1.000 -3.627 -1.000 0.000 -1.000 0.000 -1.000(4.017)
ݑ௧ 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
݈ݑ௧ 0.000 0.000 0.307 0.061§ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.039§(0.614) (0.031) (0.006)
݃ݎݎ௧ 8.946§ -1.758§ 17.06 -0.357 -4.581 -1.535§ -2.906 -1.572§ 0.000 -1.081§(4.004) (0.272) (18.02) (0.924) (4.259) (0.331) (2.452) (0.250) (0.163)
ݐ௪ ௧ -3.574§ -0.279§ -3.589§ -0.298§ -7.237§ -0.194 -7.474§ -0.217§ -5.663§ -0.294§(0.685) (0.048) (1.036) (0.058) (1.340) (0.112) (1.016) (0.103) (0.575) (0.036)
݉ ݈݅௧ -0.161 0.020§ -0.228 0.008 0.070 0.016 -0.097 0.018§ 0.000 0.019§(0.120) (0.008) (0.239) (0.013) (0.097) (0.008) (0.070) (0.007) (0.004)
௧݇ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.688 0.039 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000(3.647) (0.048)
௧݅− ∆݌௧ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.610§ -0.010 0.338§ 0.000(0.150) (0.015) (0.082)
ܶ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
ݎଶ 4 4 4 4 4
݈݈௥మ 1921.8 1921.8 1921.8 1921.8 1921.8
ݍ 14 12 11 12 14
݈݈௤ 1921.8 1912.2 1901.5 1905.0 1913.5
ܺ௅ோ
ଶ (ݍ− ݎଶ) ܺଶ(10)=48.392[0.000] ܺଶ(8)=19.287[0.013] ܺଶ(7)= 40.664[0.000] ܺଶ(8)=33.587[0.000] ܺଶ(10)=16.644§[0.083]
Table 10.6. Identification process and estimation of long run elasticities, FinlandNote: These estimations were carried with 77 observations covering the period between 1988q4 to 2007q4. Asymptotic standard errors for each ߚ coefficient are provided in brackets. §indicates significant at 5% and * indicates significant at 10%. ݎଶ=Number of just identified restrictions, and ݍ= Number of total restrictions imposed, i.e. over-identifying restrictions.
݈݈௥మ is the maximum value of the log-likelihood function obtained under ݎଶ just identified restrictions. ݈݈௤ is the maximum value of the log-likelihood function obtained under ݍover-identifying restrictions. ܺ௅ோଶ (ݍ− ݎଶ) is the chi-square statistics for the log-likelihood Ratio (LR) test. P-values for this test are provided in square brackets.
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As in the UK’s case, we test this hypothesis building a sequence of restrictionsdenoted by ߚு௬௕௥௜ௗ, which contains these features, and experiment until we finda ߚመு௬௕௥௜ௗ supported by the data, here reported in the last column of Table 10.6.In this case, ߚመு௬௕௥௜ௗ is significant at the standard 5%, the LR test is a
ܺଶ(10)=16.644 with a p-value equal to [0.083]. It must be noted that all theunrestricted coefficients are individually significant at the standard levels (seeasymptotic standard errors in brackets). ߚመு௬௕௥௜ௗ is clearly more significant thanthe rest of ߚmatrices examined in Table 10.6 and consequently we adopt it asour preferred long run specification.The following equations show the unemployment and real wages cointegratedvectors implied by ߚመு௬௕௥௜ௗ (asymptotic standard errors in brackets), recall thatthe coefficients of these equations can be interpreted as long run elasticitiesbecause all variables are measured in logarithms.10.6 ݑ௧ = 5.663ݐ௧௪ − 0.338( ௧݅− ∆݌௧) + ߦመଵ,௧(0.575) (0.082)10.7 (ݓ௧− ݌௧) = (ݕ௧− ௧݈) − 0.039 ݈ݑ௧+ 1.081݃ݎݎ௧+ 0.294ݐ௧௪ − 0.019݉ ݈݅௧+ ߦመଶ,௧(0.006) (0.163) (0.036) (0.004)As per equation 10.6 Finland’s NAIRU is determined by labour taxation, as alsoreported in Kiander and Pehkonen (1999), Honkapohja and Koskela (1999) orGianella et al. (2008). Although contrary to LNJ’s propositions, the NAIRU is notexclusively determined by exogenous factors, it is also influenced by long termreal interest rates. To be more precise, our estimates suggest that an increase inreal long term interest rates of 1% would reduce the NAIRU by 0.338%.The sign of this coefficient is unexpected and we speculate it could be the resultof the wealth or/and the debt effect discussed in UK’s section. Although thisfinding reinforces previous evidence that real interest rates affect the NAIRU inFinland, the sign of our estimate is at odds with that from previous studies, forHonkapohja and Koskela (1999), Kiander and Pehkonen (1999) and Gianella etal. (2008) all find the conventional positive relationship between real long terminterest rates and the NAIRU. Furthermore, Honkapohja and Koskela find noevidence of a relationship between the cost of borrowing and wages claims,which could arise as a result of the debt effect. Although, this does mean that inour study with a different sample it might be the case. In fact, the same authorsfind evidence of wealth effects over consumption between 1960 and 1996,although they do not investigate their potential influence on the NAIRU.It is worth noting, that we do not find evidence of productivity having anyimpact on the NAIRU, as also reported in Honkapohja and Koskela (1999), butin contrast to the findings from Nymoen and Rødseth (2003). Further, there isno evidence of labour market hysteresis playing a significant role indetermining the NAIRU as also reported in Honkapohja and Koskela (1999),
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but in contrast to the findings from Arestis et al. (2007). Finally, there is noevidence of capital stock playing a significant role in determining the NAIRU,contrary to Arestis et al. (2007) and Karanassou et al. (2008a). Havingcontrolled for capital stock in our analysis, we suspect that in previous studies,this variable might be capturing the effect of long term interest rates, whichthey omit.Turning now equation 10.7, the real wages equilibrium is positively affected byproductivity on one-to-one basis, suggesting that productivity gains are fullyreflected in the long run real wages equilibrium. Similar findings are reportedby Karanassou et al. (2008a), who find a long run elasticity of real wages toproductivity in the vicinity of unity. Unemployment benefits and labourtaxation also increase the long run real wages equilibrium, suggesting thatbenefits and taxation increases pressure over real wages in the long run.On the other hand, workers’ militancy and long term unemployment reduce thelong run real wages equilibrium. This suggests that strike action either has aperverse effect over real wages or that it has been unable to revert the phasesof real wages stagnation noted in panel (b) of Figure 6.15. Similarly, the sign oflong term unemployment suggests that workers, who are out of work for a yearor more, are still able to exert downward pressure over real wage claims.
10.3.4 Short-run dynamics: The NAIRU as an anchor?To analyse the behaviour of unemployment around the NAIRU, we estimate theECM equation for ∆ݑ௧ using the residuals from 10.6 and 10.7 as errorcorrection terms. The resultant ∆ݑ௧, estimated with 77 observations over theperiod between 1988q4-2007q4, is the following:10.8 ∆ݑ௧ = 8.078 + 0.049ߦመଵ,௧ି ଵ + 1.340ߦመଶ,௧ି ଵ− 0.354∆(ݓ௧ି ଵ− ݌௧ି ଵ) + 1.051∆(ݕ௧ି ଵ− ௧݈ି ଵ)[0.000] [0.083] [0.000] [0.517] [0.030]
−0.280∆ݑ௧ି ଵ− 0.030∆ ݈ݑ௧ି ଵ+ 3.930∆݃ݎݎ௧ି ଵ+ 0.077∆ݐ௧ି ଵ
௪ − 0.033∆݉ ݈݅௧ି ଵ[0.026] [0.222] [0.000] [0.933] [0.082]
−6.221∆ ௧݇ି ଵ− 0.105∆( ௧݅ି ଵ− ∆݌௧ି ଵ) + 0.001∆݌௧ି ଵ௩௠ − 0.002∆݌௧ି ଶ௩௠[0.077] [0.004] [0.665] [0.335]
−0.085ܦ97123 + εොଷ௧[0.001]Adj. ܴଶ=0.675
ௌܺ஼
ଶ (4)= 4.909 [0.297], ܺிிଶ (1)= 3.435 [0.064]
ܺே௢௥௠
ଶ (2)= 1.534 [0.464], ܺு௘௧ଶ (1)= 6.262 [0.012]
ߦመଵ,௧ = ݑ− 5.663ݐ௪ + 0.338(݅− ∆݌)
ߦመଶ,௧ = (ݓ − ݌) − (ݕ− )݈ + 0.039lu − 1.081grr − 0.294ݐ௪ + 0.019݉ ݈݅
ߪகොయ = 0.0384
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Where Adj. ܴଶ, ௌܺ஼ଶ , ܺிிଶ , ܺே௢௥௠ଶ , ܺு௘௧ଶ have the same meaning as above. ߪகොయis thestandard deviation of the error term in equation 10.8. p-values for t-tests anddiagnostic tests are reported in square brackets87.As per equation 10.8 the coefficient for ߦመଵ,௧ି ଵ is positive but very small,meaning that deviations from the NAIRU have a negligible influence onunemployment dynamics, and consequently it is unlikely to act as an anchor.Arestis et al. (2007) also find that deviations from the NAIRU have littleinfluence on unemployment, as per their estimates, only a modest 6.6% of thedeviation is corrected each quarter.The coefficient for ߦመଶ,௧ି ଵ is significant and positive. This suggests that settingreal wages above their long run equilibrium increases unemployment.According to Bhaduri and Marglin’s dichotomy, this estimate suggests thatFinland operates under a “profit-led regime”.
10.3.5 Impulse response and the effects of an unemployment shockWe complete our analysis simulating an unemployment shock of one standarddeviation in equation 10.8, i.e. ߪகොయ = 0.0384, which amounts to a rise inunemployment of 15.37% in annual terms. Figure 10.2 shows the effect of thisshock using GIR functions.Unemployment in panel (a), overshoots on impact, peaking two years after theshock at a level 21.7% above the baseline, an although it falls thereafter it doesnot return to its pre-shock value, instead it stabilizes eleven years after theshock, at a level 10% greater than its baseline. This behaviour suggests that theNAIRU has no anchor properties and reinforces our findings from equation10.8.Our estimate is more pessimistic than previous impulse response estimates.Duval and Vogel (2008) find that the Finland needs between four and five yearsto close the output gap, but the overall conclusion is similar, the NAIRU doesnot seem to be a strong anchor.The reaction of long term unemployment to the shock, shown in panel (b), isvery volatile on impact, but it ends stabilizing at a level 13% below its baseline.This might be indicative of long term unemployed workers leaving the labourmarket. The shock has not permanent effect on real wages, panel (c) despitesome fluctuations, whereas productivity, panel (d) increases until it stabilizesat a level 1% above its baseline. This suggests that the wage share falls as aresult of the shock.
87 All diagnostic tests are passed at the standard 5% significance level, except theheteroscedasticity tests. Hence, although our estimates are still unbiased, inference using the t-test needs to be taken with caution because heteroscedasticity reduces the power of the test.That is, the individual significance test is less likely to reject the null hypothesis of notsignificantly different from zero.
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The last three panels refer to the wage-push factors of our model.Unemployment benefits panel (g), and labour taxation panel (h), followopposite patterns after the shock in unemployment: Benefits follow an invertedJ-curve evolution, and after an initial rise it stabilizes at a level below itsbaseline. ݐ௧௪ follows a standard J-curve evolution, it falls on impact, butstabilizes above its baseline. Workers’ militancy panel (i), fluctuates widely onimpact, probably reflecting greater volatility in industrial relations after theshock, and it end ups stabilizing at a level 10% above its pre-shock situation.This suggests that the climate of industrial relations worsen permanently afterthe shock.
10.4 SummaryIn this chapter we have used the CVAR approach to study the determinants ofthe NAIRU and its anchor properties in Denmark and Finland. Thismethodology allows us to study the determinants of the NAIRU by testing thelong run restrictions required by each of the models nested in ourencompassing model (ߚ௅ே௃, ߚ஻ௌ , ߚ஺ௌோ and ߚோு ). Panel i) of Table 10.7summarizes the results of this process. According to our estimations, none ofthe set of restrictions is individually significant, although evidence is verysupportive of a ߚመୌ୷ୠ୰୧ୢ that combines different features of ߚ஻ௌ and ߚோு in eachcountry. Denmark Finland
i) Identification process
ߚመ௅ே௃ [0.000] [0.000]
ߚመ஻ௌ [0.014] [0.013]
ߚመ஺ௌோ [0.002] [0.000]
ߚመோு [0.004] [0.000]
ߚመୌ୷ୠ୰୧ୢ [0.052] [0.083]
ii) NAIRU determinants
݃ݎݎ NS NS
ݐ௪ NS 5.663
݉ ݈݅ NS NS
ݕ− ݈ NS NS
݈ݑ 1.000 NS
݇ NS NS
݅− ∆݌ NS -0.338
T NS NS
iii) NAIRU’s anchor properties
ߦመଵ,௧ି ଵ NS 0.049Time required to return tobaseline (GIR) 5 years No Return
Table 10.7. Summary of findings for Denmark and FinlandNote: i) Results for the identification process are drawn from Table 10.3 in Denmark’s case and from Table10.6 for Finland. ii) Values for the NAIRU elasticities are drawn from each country’s unemploymentcointegrated vector, equations 10.2 and 10.6 respectively. iii) Coefficients of ߦመଵ,௧ି ଵ are drawn fromequations 10.4 and 10.8 respectively. “Time required to return to baseline” draws from Figure 10.1 andFigure 10.2 respectively. NS not significant and “No return” indicates that unemployment does not returnto its baseline.
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Panel ii) of Table 10.7 presents these ߚመୌ୷ୠ୰୧ୢ . In Denmark, the NAIRU isexclusively determined by long term unemployment. While in Finland, theNAIRU is determined by some wage-push factors together with long terminterest rates. Hence, according to our results for these countries, the NAIRU is
not exclusively determined by exogenous factors contrary to what LNJ’s modelsuggests. Further, these results add to the body of literature that questions theclaim that time series evidence for Denmark and Finland support LNJ’spropositions, as for instance suggested by Nickell (1999).The CVAR approach also allows us to examine the anchor properties of theNAIRU by estimating a VECM model and GIR functions. Our results aresummarized in Panel iii) of Table 10.7.According to our VECM estimations, deviations from the NAIRU in Denmarkand Finland have no or negligible influence on unemployment’s dynamics.These findings are reinforced by the results of simulating and unemploymentshock using GIR functions. In Denmark, GIR estimates suggests thatunemployment reaches a new NAIRU after a very protracted adjustment of fiveyears, which might explain why our coefficient for ξመଵ,୲ି ଵ is insignificant. GIRestimates for Finland suggests that after this shock unemployment drifts awayfrom its baseline, rather than returning to it as it would be expected if theNAIRU acted as an anchor.Hence, our VECM and GIR results question LNJ’s claim about the anchorproperties of the NAIRU, although they are in tune with the existing literature,which suggest that the NAIRU in Denmark and Finland is at best a weak anchorfor economic activity.In sum, our findings for Denmark and Finland presented in this chapterchallenge the validity of LNJ’s propositions and consequently policyrecommendations inspired by this approach. For example, calls for labourmarket reforms that increase incentives to work in Finland (OECD, 2000a,2006b). Policy implications are discussed further in Chapter 11.
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Chapter 11 Concluding remarks
11.1 IntroductionIn this thesis we have presented the results of our novel empirical assessmentof the determinants of the NAIRU and its anchor properties. More precisely, wehave examined if the NAIRU is exclusively determined by exogenous factors, asproposed by the influential LNJ model, or otherwise, as suggested by critics ofthis approach. Further, we have assessed whether the NAIRU acts as an anchorfor economic activity as also suggested by LNJ.To answer these questions, we have analysed data from eight EU economies,
viz: the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Germany, France, Italy, Spain,Denmark and Finland. The data cover the period from 1980 to 2007. We haveemployed time series techniques to analyse these data sets, more specificallythe Cointegrated Vector Autoregressive (CVAR) approach. This was applied to atheoretical model that encompasses the conflicting views of the NAIRU that weaimed to assess.The main novelty of our research is the use of this encompassing model, asshown in section 4.4 this is the first time that such an approach has beenemployed in the literature. The second novelty of our work is that our sampleextends the analysis to the 2000s, a period which has rarely been studiedpreviously.The aim of this final chapter is to summarize the results of our research,highlight their contribution to the existing empirical literature, and discusstheir implications for economic theory and policy. The chapter is structured asfollows. Section 11.2 summarizes the results presented in previous chapters.Section 11.3 discusses the implications of these findings for economic theorydebates. Section 11.4 explains how our research contributes to extant empiricalliterature. Section 11.5 discusses the policy implications that can be extractedfrom our findings. Section 11.6 closes the chapter, and indeed the thesis,identifying avenues for potential future research.
11.2 Summary of findingsWe start the summary of our findings by recapitulating our results with regardto the determinants of the NAIRU. Table 11.1 reports the estimated elasticitiesof the NAIRU in the economies considered here, i.e. the coefficient that eachvariable takes in the unemployment cointegrated vector of each country.
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NAIRU determinantsExogenous factors Endogenous factors
݃ݎݎ ݐ௪ ݉ ݈݅ ݕ− ݈ ݈ݑ ݇ ݅− ∆݌UK 0.991 NS 0.112 NS NS -11.40 -0.646Netherlands -1.334 -2.483 NS -6.418 NS -1.586 -0.408Germany -0.831 4.617 n/a -8.633 NS 1.312 NSFrance NS NS -0.761 NS 2.374 1.278 NSItaly 0.102 0.729 NS 2.044 NS -1.814 -0.198Spain NS NS -0.112 1.922 NS -4.140 NSDenmark NS NS NS NS 1.000 NS NSFinland NS 5.663 NS NS NS NS -0.338
Table 11.1. Summary of the NAIRU determinantsNote: Values reported in this table correspond to the coefficients of each variable in the unemploymentcointegrated vector denoted by equations 7.2, 7.6, 8.2, 8.6, 9.2, 9.6, 10.2, 10.6. NS means not significant.Table 11.1 follows the structure of Tables 4.2 to Tables 4.5, and is divided intotwo blocks. First, “exogenous factors”, which refer to the variables of our modelthat are exogenous to demand, i.e. unemployment benefits ݃ݎݎ, labour taxation
ݐ௪ and unions’ power ݉ ݈݅. The second block, contains the variables that areendogenous to aggregate demand, i.e. productivity ݕ− ݈, long termunemployment ݈ݑ, capital stock ݇and real long term interest rates ݅− ∆݌.Dividing Table 11.1 into these two blocks illustrates our main finding. In all theeconomies in our sample, with the exception of Denmark, the NAIRU isdetermined by a mix of exogenous wage-push factors and endogenousvariables. In the case of the UK, the NAIRU is determined by exogenous factorstogether with capital stock and real long term interest rates. In the Netherlandsand Italy, the NAIRU is determined by exogenous factors along withproductivity, capital stock and real long term interest rates.In Germany, the NAIRU is determined by unemployment benefits and labourtaxation, together with productivity and capital stock. In France, workers’militancy along with long term unemployment and capital stock determine theNAIRU. In Spain, workers’ militancy along with productivity and capital stockdetermine the NAIRU. In Finland, the NAIRU is determined by labour taxationalong with the real long term interest rates. In the only exception country,Denmark, the NAIRU is exclusively determined by a variable that is endogenousto aggregate demand, long term unemployment.A second key finding that is clear from Table 11.1, is that determinants of theNAIRU differ across countries. If we look at the block of exogenous variables, itis only in the Netherlands, Germany and Italy that the NAIRU is affected by thesame factors, namely unemployment benefits and labour taxation. But even inthese cases, the size and the sign of these variables differ. If we look at the blockof endogenous variables we also find substantial differences across countries.Productivity affects the NAIRU in four economies, but the sign of thisrelationship depends on the economy. It is negative in the Netherlands andGermany, but positive in Italy and Spain.
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Long term unemployment only affects the NAIRU in France and Denmark.Capital stock is the most common factor, influencing the NAIRU in six out ofeight countries, although it has a perverse negative sign in Germany andFrance. Further, the size of the coefficient for capital stock also variessubstantially across countries. In most cases estimates are slightly above unity,but in the UK and Spain these elasticities are a lot larger, particularly in the UK.Finally, real long term interest rates only determine the NAIRU in the UK, theNetherlands, Italy and Finland. In fact, considering both exogenous andendogenous variables, only in the Netherlands and Italy do we find the NAIRUdetermined by the same variables. Nonetheless, as can be seen in Table 11.1,even in these cases, the size and the sign of most variables also differ betweenthe two countries.In general, these differences suggest that the parameters of the structuralequations of our model, i.e. equation 4.1 and 4.2, vary across countries. Let’sshow why. We start with productivity. As per equation 4.4, the elasticity of theNAIRU to productivity is ߚଵଶ = ఠమିఝయఠభାఝభ, where ߮ଷ denotes the impact ofproductivity on firms mark-up (equation 4.1) and ߱ଶ the influence ofproductivity on workers real wages claims (equation 4.2). Hence, in economieswhere ߚመଵଶ < 0, such as the Netherlands or Germany, our results suggest thatworkers cannot fully absorb productivity gains, i.e. ߮ଷ > ߱ଶ. This seems aplausible possibility in the Netherlands and Germany because the wage share inboth countries has fallen in the period studied here, see Figure 6.13 (b) andFigure 6.14 (a) respectively.On the other hand, in economies such as Italy or Spain where ߚመଵଶ > 0, ourresults suggests that the impact of productivity on real wages is greater than itsimpact on firms mark-up, i.e. ߱ଶ > ߮ଷ. As we discussed in Chapter 9, this seemsunlikely given the overall downward trend of the wage share in theseeconomies, particularly in Italy, see Figure 6.14. In section 9.2.3 we speculatedabout an alternative explanation, that is, productivity increases firms’ mark-uprather than moderate them. In terms of equation 4.1 this means that ߮ଷ < 0.Differences in the impact of long term unemployment suggest that there arehysteresis mechanisms in France and Denmark that do not exist in the rest ofthe countries. Because we are controlling for unemployment benefits or unions’power in our study, we can infer that hysteresis mechanisms in these countriesare not associated with these factors. Further research would be needed toidentify the specific hysteresis mechanisms operating in France and Denmark.With regards to capital stock, the elasticity of the NAIRU is ߚଵ଼ = − ఝమఠభାఝభ,where ߮ଶ denotes the influence of capital stock on firms’ mark-up, seeequations 4.1 and 4.4. In Denmark and Finland where ߚመଵ଼ = 0, our resultssuggest that capital stock does not influence firms’ mark-up, i.e. ߮ଶ = 0. In
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countries such as the UK, the Netherlands, Italy and Spain where ߚመଵ଼ < 0, ourresults suggest that capital stock limits the ability of firms to mark-up labourcosts, i.e. ߮ଶ > 0.The opposite seems to happen in Germany and France where ߚመଵ଼ > 0. In thesecountries our results suggest that capital stock increases firms’ capacity tomark-up labour costs, which in terms of equation 4.1 means that ߮ଶ < 0. Inchapter 8, we speculated with a second possibility, namely that capital stockmight also increase workers real wage claims, and that this effect dominatesthe impact of capital stock over the NAIRU, see section 8.2.3 for further details.This possibility seems plausible in the French case, because we find evidence ofa positive long run relationship between capital stock and real wages inequation 8.7.Finally real long term interest rates. As per equation 4.4 the elasticity of theNAIRU to the real cost of borrowing is ߚଵଽ = ఝఱఠభାఝభ, where ߮ହ denotes theinfluence of real long term interest rates over firms’ mark-up (equation 4.1). Incountries such as Germany, France, Spain and Denmark where ߚመଵଽ = 0, ourresults suggest that real long term interest rates do not influence firms’ mark-up, i.e. ߮ହ = 0. On the other hand, in countries where ߚመଵଽ < 0, such as the UK,the Netherlands, Italy and Finland, our results suggest that real long terminterest rates reduce firms’ mark-up, which in terms of equation 4.1 means that
߮ହ < 0.Turning now to the anchor properties of the NAIRU, Table 11.2 presents asummary of our VECM estimates and GIR simulations. The first column of thetable denotes the elasticity of changes of unemployment to deviations from theNAIRU (ߦመଵ,௧ି ଵ), as per each country’s VECM model. The second column reportsthe time required by unemployment to return to its baseline after a shockaccording to GIR functions.
ߦመଵ,௧ି ଵ Time required to returnto baselineUK NS No ReturnNetherlands NS No ReturnGermany 0.027 No ReturnFrance 0.012 No ReturnItaly NS No ReturnSpain -0.250 +6 yearsDenmark NS 5 yearsFinland 0.049 No Return
Table 11.2 Summary of the NAIRU anchor propertiesNote: Values reported in this table correspond to the coefficients of ߦመଵ,௧ି ଵ in the VECM models denoted byequations 7.4, 7.8, 8.4, 8.8, 9.4, 9.8, 10.4 and 10.8. NS means not significant. “Time required to return tobaseline” draws from the GIR functions shown in Figures 7.1, 7.2, 8.1, 8.2, 9.1, 9.2, 10.1, 10.2. “No return”indicates that unemployment does not return to its baseline.
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Estimates from the VECM suggest that deviations from the NAIRU have nosignificant (NS) influence on unemployment fluctuations in the UK, theNetherlands, Italy and Denmark. Deviations from the NAIRU have a significantbut negligible influence in Germany, France, and Finland. Spain is the countrywith the largest ߦመଵ,௧ି ଵ coefficient, but as discussed in section 8.3.4 our estimatestill implies a protracted adjustment, which suggests that the NAIRU has weakanchor properties this economy.Evidence from GIR functions provides similar results. In most countriesunemployment drifts away from its baseline rather than returning to it, as itwould be expected if the NAIRU acted as an anchor. Spain and Denmark are theonly two exceptions. In the Spanish case, our simulations show thatunemployment requires more than six years to return to its pre-shock levels,and hence is consistent with our VECM estimations, which also suggests thatthe NAIRU is only a weak anchor in Spain. In the Danish case, as per GIRsimulations unemployment needs five years to reach a new equilibrium, whichis likely to explain why the VECM finds no evidence of anchor properties in thiscountry.Thus, our main finding concerning the anchor properties of the NAIRU is that inthe countries in our sample, the NAIRU is either a weak anchor, in Spain andDenmark, or it has no anchor properties, in the rest of cases.
11.3 Implications for economic theoryFirst, our findings with regard to the determinants of the NAIRU are in starkcontrast to LNJ’s propositions, who argue that the NAIRU is exclusivelydetermined by factors that are exogenous to aggregate demand. Instead, ourfindings provide support to the critics of LNJ’s approach, who argue that theNAIRU might be determined by exogenous factors, but also by variables thatare sensitive to changes in demand policies, such as productivity, long termunemployment, capital stock and real long term interest rates.Second, as illustrated by differences across countries, although evidence clearlycontradicts LNJ’s propositions, there is not a clear winner among alternativetheories. The model proposed by Sawyer (1982) and Rowthorn (1995) seemsto be a front runner among LNJ’s critics. Recall that as per our results theNAIRU is determined by capital stock in six out of eight countries, and in four ofthose cases the NAIRU is also influenced by productivity, as suggested bySawyer and Rowthorn. But real long term interest rates and long termunemployment also play a significant role in at least half of the countries in oursample and their links with the NAIRU cannot be neglected.This suggests that when studying the determinants of the NAIRU, we need totake a broad view. On the one hand, we cannot constrain our analysis to LNJ’smodel, but on the other hand, we should not restrict our analysis to a particular
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alternative formulation. Instead, we need to consider the wider spectrum ofmodels available and use encompassing models of the type used employed thisthesis.Third, our findings with regard to the anchor properties of the NAIRU are alsoin contrast to LNJ’s propositions, who argue that the NAIRU acts as an anchorfor unemployment. Instead, our findings provide support to those who arguethat there are mechanisms that prevent the NAIRU from having suchproperties.In sum, our results challenge LNJ’s propositions about the determinants of theNAIRU and its anchor properties. Further, our findings suggest that differentalternative theories might be relevant in different countries and consequently itis advisable to use encompassing NAIRU models that consider a wide range oftheories.
11.4 Contribution to the existing empirical literatureWe start by discussing how our findings fit within the existing time seriesliterature devoted to the study of the determinants of the NAIRU. Our resultsreinforce previous studies that find evidence of a long run link betweenunemployment and variables such as productivity, long term unemployment,capital stock and real long term interest rates. In doing so, our results raisefurther questions about the robustness of time series studies, which find noevidence of such links, and that are usually cited to vindicate LNJ’s claims, forinstance Layard and Nickell (1986) or Dolado et al. (1986).Furthermore, our findings for the determinants of the NAIRU, suggests thatsome of the time series studies which are usually cited to vindicate LNJ’s claims,for instance Nickell and Bell (1995) or Estrada et al. (2000), are likely to bemisspecified because these studies omit variables that could make the NAIRUendogenous to aggregate demand, e.g. capital stock or productivity. Thispossibility has already been suggested by Stockhammer (2004a,p.20) andArestis et al. (2007, p.144). It should also be noted that according to our results,the danger of misspecification biases also affects the growing literature thatexamines the links between the NAIRU and demand. The reason being that inmost cases, as shown in section 4.4, these studies only consider one maybe twodemand-NAIRU links, as for instance in Dolado and Jimeno (1997) or Ball(1999).Further, it should be noted that with regard to the anchor properties of theNAIRU, our findings are consistent with extant time series literature, whichfinds that the NAIRU is at best a weak anchor.The evidence presented in this thesis is also of relevance for the widerempirical debates presented in Chapter 3. First, our results adds to the
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literature that challenges the claims that time series evidence complements thecase for a NAIRU a la LNJ made by panel data studies, as it is argued by Layardet al. (1991, p.443) and Nickell (1998, p.814). Second, by warning that timeseries studies ignoring the NAIRU-demand links might be misspecified, ourresults reinforce similar claims made in the panel data literature by Blanchardand Wolfers (2000,c1/2) and Storm and Naastepad (2009,P.313). Third,according to our findings the determinants of the NAIRU are markedly differentacross countries. These cross-country heterogeneity reinforces concerns thatpanel data methods, in assuming coefficient homogeneity across countries, areill suited to study the determinants of the NAIRU, as already noted byStockhammer (2004a), Arestis et al. (2007) or Gianella et al. (2008).Thus, we conclude that the empirical evidence presented in this thesisreinforces the case against a NAIRU a la LNJ. Further, our findings suggest thatstudies usually cited to vindicate LNJ’s claims in the time series and the paneldata literature might be misspecified because they omit relevant variables.Further, our results question the suitability of panel data techniques to studythe determinants of the NAIRU due to the existence of cross-countrydifferences.
11.5 Policy implications
11.5.1 Can structural reforms a la LNJ deliver lower unemployment?We start by assessing LNJ’s policy recommendations. According to LNJ’s model,the only policy that can achieve long lasting reductions of unemployment is onethat tackles the exogenous factors that determine the NAIRU. These policies arecommonly referred to as structural reforms. In our model we useunemployment benefits ݃ݎݎ, labour taxation ݐ௪ and unions’ power ݉ ݈݅ tocontrol for the exogenous factors that determine the NAIRU. Hence, we canproxy structural reforms a la LNJ by assuming reductions in unemploymentbenefits, labour taxation and unions’ power. The first question we want toanswer in this section is: Can reforms a la LNJ, i.e. reductions of unemploymentbenefits, labour taxation and unions’ power deliver lower unemployment?Our results suggest that in the countries in our sample, structural reforms a laLNJ cannot achieve long lasting reductions of unemployment because they areeither ineffective to reduce the NAIRU or because the NAIRU has no anchorproperties or because both things happen at the same time.In the UK, Italy and Finland structural reforms can reduce the NAIRU, as perTable 11.1 cuts in unemployment benefits, labour taxation and unions’ powerwould reduce their NAIRU. However, we find no evidence of the NAIRU actingas an anchor in these economies, see Table 11.2. Therefore a fall in the NAIRUcaused by structural reforms would not trigger a reduction in unemployment.In other words, in the UK, Italy and Finland, reforms a la LNJ would not
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generate the necessary demand to reduce unemployment, despite being able toreduce the NAIRU.In Germany, the effect of reforms on the NAIRU is ambiguous, cuts in labourtaxation can reduce the NAIRU but cuts in unemployment benefits wouldincrease it. In any case, the NAIRU does not seem to act as an anchor inGermany, and consequently even if we assume that reforms can reduce itsNAIRU, this fall would not be followed by a reduction in actual unemployment,as it was also the case in as in the UK, Italy and Finland.In the Netherlands, France and Denmark structural reforms would either havecounter-productive effect on the NAIRU, i.e. they would increase it or theywould have no effect whatsoever on the NAIRU, see Table 11.1. Furthermore, inthe Netherlands, France and Denmark the NAIRU does not seem to act as ananchor, and consequently structural reforms can reduce neither the NAIRU norunemployment in these economies.In Spain, the NAIRU seems to be weak anchor for economic activity, whichmeans that reforms that reduce the NAIRU would be followed by a sluggish fallin unemployment. Still, this does not mean that reforms a la LNJ can deliverlower unemployment in Spain, because our findings indicate that reformswould have counter-productive effects, that is, they would increase the NAIRUrather than reduce it.Thus, according to our results structural reforms a la LNJ cannot achieve longlasting reductions of unemployment in any of the countries in our sample.Furthermore, our results suggest that structural reforms a la LNJ are
unnecessary. The first reason being that in all the countries in our sample, theNAIRU is determined by at least one of the following variables: Capital stock,productivity, long term unemployment and real long term interest rates. Thesevariables are sensitive to demand policies and therefore provide avenues orchannels for aggregate demand to reduce the NAIRU, regardless of thestructure of the labour and the goods market.We discussed these mechanisms in section 2.3.2. The rationale is thatauthorities, using expansive macroeconomic policies can engineer high levels ofdemand that will increase firms’ capacity utilization and profitability, whichwill encourage investment in new capital stock, which in turn will reduce theNAIRU, for instance in countries like the UK, Netherlands, Italy and Spain.Similarly, rapid growth as the result of stimuli policies can foster productivity,through the so called “Kaldor-Verdoon effects” and/or workers participation inthe labour market, which will also reduce the NAIRU, for example in France andDenmark.
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Real long term interest rates deserve a special mention, because in the light ofdebates about the links between Central Bank rates and long run yieldsdiscussed in section 2.3.3, and current debates about “austerity” it is unclearwhat type of macroeconomic policy should be used to exploit the link betweenreal long term interest rates and the NAIRU. If the Central Bank can modify longrun yields, then according to the sign of our estimates, monetary authorities canreduce the NAIRU by raising interest rates. However, if the Central Bank cannotaffect real long term interest rates, it all depends on the effect of fiscal policyover long term cost of borrowing. This issue is well beyond the scope of thisthesis and hence we only notice that demand policies which affect real longterm interest rates can reduce the NAIRU, although it is unclear what formthese policies need to take.The second reason that makes structural reforms unnecessary is that usingexpansive macroeconomic policies to exploit the links between the NAIRU andvariables such as capital stock, productivity and long term unemployment, hasthe upshot that in stimulating economic activity, demand policies will alsoreduce actual unemployment. This is crucial in the countries in our samplebecause our findings suggest that the NAIRU has no (or very weak) anchorproperties.Finally, it is necessary to note that some might argue that our findings do notmake structural reforms unnecessary. Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) and OECD(2007b) argue that reforms foster innovation and productivity by generatingmore competitive and dynamic environments. Hence, they might argue thatreforms can successfully reduce unemployment by exploiting the link betweenproductivity and the NAIRU without resorting to demand policies. We are waryof this possibility because other studies, see for instance Vergeer andKleinknecht (2010) and Lucidi and Kleinknecht (2010), show that labourmarket institutions have the opposite effect on productivity, that is, theyenhance productivity.Bean (1989, p. 44, 1994, p.612) argues that structural reforms would reducethe NAIRU, even if this is determined by capital stock as long as reforms reducewage demands. The rationale behind Bean’s claim is that by reducing wages,reforms would increase firms’ profits and therefore funds available for newinvestment. Franz and König (1986, p. 236) and Malinvaud (1986, p.216) arguesimilarly. We are also sceptical of this possibility, because it relies on theimplicit assumption that the economy operates under a profit-led regime, i.e.that redistribution away from wages has an overall positive impact onaggregate demand. However, if the economy operates under a wage-led regime,as some of the countries in our sample seem to do, reducing wages would havean overall negative effect on demand, which arguably would reduce firms’incentive to invest in new capital stock.
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Further, Krugman (1994) and Blanchard and Katz (1997) argue that somestructural reforms, such as reducing benefits or unions’ power, can also preventhysteresis. The rationale being that the mechanism that cause hysteresis mightbe associated with those wage-push factors. However, since our econometricspecification controls for benefits and unions’ power, hysteresis in countriessuch as France and Denmark in our sample must be due to other mechanismsand therefore structural reforms of this type would still be ineffective toachieve long lasting reductions of unemployment.In any case, even if we were ready to accept that the effects of structuralreforms can be channelled to the NAIRU via productivity, capital stock or longterm unemployment, as Nicoletti, Scarpetta, Bean or Krugman argue, there isstill no solution to the lack of anchor properties of the NAIRU. Thus, althoughwe acknowledge their claims, we are sceptical of the effectiveness of theirpolicy recommendation, and maintain our assessment that structural reforms
cannot and are unnecessary to achieve long lasting reductions ofunemployment.
11.5.2 Can the “Fiscal Compact” reduce unemployment?The current crisis has generated not only a substantial rise in unemployment inEuropean economics, but also large budget deficits. The European Union hasreacted to these developments by agreeing upon the so-called “Fiscal Compact”.This coordinates the agenda of structural reforms known as “Europe 2020”,and the deficit (and debt) targets of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). Thequestion is can the “Fiscal Compact” reduce unemployment in Europe?The agenda “Europe 2020”, draws heavily from LNJ characterization of theNAIRU, these are some of the policy guidelines suggested by this agenda:Monitoring the efficiency of benefits and labour taxation to “make work pay”,favouring less constraining labour contracts, and ensuring the well-functioningof competition in the goods and services markets (European Commission,2010b). These guidelines are equivalent to the structural reforms analysed inthe previous section and consequently our assessment is the same, “Europe2020” cannot and is indeed unnecessary to achieve long lasting reductions ofunemployment in the countries in our sample.Let’s now turn to the fiscal policy targets of the “Fiscal Compact”, i.e. thecommitment of Members States to reduce their budget deficits. These fiscalpolicy targets prevent authorities from engineering the type of stimuli thatcould generate higher capital stock, productivity or participation in the labourmarket, which in turn could reduce the NAIRU as discussed above. Hence,according to our findings budget targets embedded in the “Fiscal Compact”,constitute a self-imposed constrain to reduce unemployment. Galbraith (1997),Arestis and Sawyer (1998) and Fontana and Palacio-Vera (2007) make similarassessments of the Maastricht’s Criteria and the SGP.
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In fact, considering that the “Fiscal Compact” is forcing most countries to cutdeficits despite rising unemployment, for instance in Spain or Italy, our resultssuggest that fiscal consolidation will have a perverse long lasting effect overunemployment in these economies. The UK is the only country in our samplethat has not signed the “Fiscal Compact”, however, considering the commitmentto fiscal consolidation of the current Coalition Government, the same could besaid about the UK. Thus, in the light of our results, we can only be scepticalabout the effectiveness of the “Fiscal Compact” to deliver lower levels ofunemployment in Europe.
11.5.3 Ideas for an alternative employment policyThis policy discussion would seem incomplete without a set of alternativepolicies that draw from our findings. First, our results suggest that reforms thataim at de-regulating the labour market, particularly increasing incentives towork and reducing unions’ power are unable to achieve long lasting reductionsof unemployment. Hence, these policies ought to be abandoned.Second, our findings suggest that stimuli policies that exploit the relationshipbetween the NAIRU and variables such as capital stock, productivity and longterm unemployment can reduce the NAIRU. Hence, it seems more appropriateto adopt macroeconomic policies that allow us to exploit these links.Third, these packages must be country specific, because according to ourresults, the determinants of the NAIRU differ across countries. This means thatEuropean policy makers need to abandon the “one size fits” type of approachthat underlines current fiscal and monetary policy rules.Fourth, stimuli policies might generate some inflation (or deflation) pressuresbecause unemployment and the NAIRU will not necessarily fall at the samepace (Sawyer, 2002, p.90). Hence, authorities need to acknowledge thissituation and tolerate these pressures.
11.6 New avenues for future researchIn closing this thesis, we identify some avenues for future research in this field.We envisage the following possibilities:Our study can easily be extended by considering new dimensions of the labourmarket. One that might be of interest is Employment Protection Legislation(EPL). Data might be a problem because OECD’s series for this variable onlystarts in 1985, in fact that is why we could not consider it in our analysis.Nonetheless, in coming years when the number of observations availableincrease, it is a path worth pursuing.A particularly interesting possibility for research using EPL measures, is toconsider how differences of EPL among workers, what is known as “dualizationof the labour market”, might affect the NAIRU (Bentolila et al., 2011). In recent
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years, “dualization” has become a popular culprit for unemploymentperformance in countries like Spain, Italy or France (OECD, 2005a, Jamet, 2006,Jaumotte, 2011).Our results suggest that the NAIRU in France and Denmark is affected by longterm unemployment. However, as discussed above, we cannot identify whathysteresis mechanisms create this link. Further research would be necessary toidentify the specific hysteresis mechanisms operating in France and Denmark.Another interesting extension of our study would be to incorporate exogenousprice push factors into the analysis. Again, data availability might be an issue,although OECD publishes a measure of Product Market Regulation (PMR) thatcan captures these factors, its time span and frequency are unsatisfactory toperform any reliable time series study. Hence, a possible path for furtherresearch is to create alternative measures of exogenous price push factors, andthen replicate our study with these new variables.The NAIRU is by definition the locus where distributional claims are madeconsistent, hence, it seems reasonable to extend the analysis to includedistributional variables. One possibility is to consider the role of adaptiveincome aspirations in determining the NAIRU (Skott, 2005, Setterfield andLovejoy, 2006). Another possibility is to consider whether income or wagedistribution affect the NAIRU, Karanassou and Sala (2011) provides a recentexample in this direction.Overall, our results reinforce previous evidence that capital stock affects theNAIRU. However, an issue that remains unclear is the role of public capitalstock in this relationship. This avenue might also be confronted with datadifficulties given that data series on public capital stock are rare. Nonetheless,considering public capital stock would be extremely useful for policy purposes,some examples can already be found for instance in Raurich et al. (2009).Finally, our results suggest that real long term interest rates might have anegative long run relationship with unemployment. We speculate that thisnegative relationship is the result of a wealth or a debt effect, but we have noexamined these possibilities. Further, we have no evidence of whether thisinfluence on the NAIRU arises from the wage or the price side of the model.These issues require further research. Further, if wealth effects do have aneffect on the NAIRU, it would be interesting to examine if the evolution of houseprices have had any influence on the NAIRU in the last two decades.
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Appendix I. Time series literature summary tables
In this appendix we present four tables summarizing the time series literaturethat examines our research questions for the eight countries in our sample.Information presented in the tables of this appendix is consistent with that ofTables 4.1, 4.2, 4.3. In fact, the information presented in the tables of Chapter 4has been extracted from the information compiled in the tables of thisappendix.We group the country literature in four tables: Table I.1 presents the summaryof the time series literature for the UK and the Netherlands. Table I.2 forGermany and France. Table I.3 for Italy and Spain. And Table I.4 for Finland andDenmark. Each table has ten columns denoted with roman numbers: Column i)to viii) summarize the evidence each paper reports regarding the NAIRUdeterminants. These columns are then divided in two groups, columns i) to iv)summarizes evidence from “exogenous factors”, in columns i) to iii) we reportthe evidence for the wage-push factors used in our study (unemploymentbenefits grr, labour taxationt୵ and worker militancy or union’s power mil)while in column iv) we report evidence for other exogenous factors, althoughwe only report those that are found significant in the cited papers. The secondgroup, columns v) to viii) summarizes evidence from four variables, whichaccording to our survey in section 2.3 can render the NAIRU endogenous toaggregate demand, hence the label “endogenous factors”. We report the sign ofthe unemployment long run elasticity to the variables in the heading of thecolumn. In some cases, it might be employment long run elasticity but weindicate it with the corresponding superindex. Further, column ix) summarizesthe evidence each paper reports regarding the anchor properties of the NAIRU.Unless the contrary is indicated, a measure of unemployment is the dependentvariable. This evidence comes in different forms and in each case thecorresponding superindex explains which in each case. Finally, column x)reports evidence with regard to real wages long run elasticity with respect toproductivity.Our own findings with regard to the NAIRU, its anchor properties and the longrun elasticity of real wages to productivity, presented in Chapter 7 to Chapter10, are also reported in these tables, we label them as “our estimates” andhighlight them with a shadowed row. This provides a visual comparative of ourresults with those of previous literature, which we use in our discussion offindings in the corresponding chapters.
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i) ii) iii) iv) v) vi) vii) viiii) ix) x)
UK NAIRU determinants Anchor w-p*88
Exogenous factors Endogenous factorsgrr t୵ mil Other
89
y-l lu k i-∆p y-lLayard and Nickell (1986) + + + mm+ipd NS NS୐ୀଵ HL = 5y୐ౚLayard et al. (1991,p.441) + + + mmNickell and Bell (1995)90 + NS NS mmNickell (1998) NS + mix91 mm +ୱ୲Arestis and Biefang-Frisancho Mariscal (1998) NS NS + + - ECM=-0.024 =1Ball (1999) +ୱ୲Arestis and Biefang-Frisancho Mariscal (2000) NS + - ECM=-0.021Henry et al. (2000)92 Stab=14-20y୍ୖ ୐ౚStockhammer (2004a)93 NS + - +୳-ଵ -∆୩Hatton (2007) -Gianella et al. (2008) + + NS PMR +Duval and Vogel (2008) Stab=2-3yygap-IROur estimates + NS + NS NS - - ECM=.028NS =1.335
Netherlands NAIRU determinants Anchor w-p*
Exogenous factors Endogenous factorsgrr t୵ mil Other y-l lu k i-∆p y-lDriehuis (1986) -∆୩Ball (1999) +ୱ୲Arestis et al. (2007) + + + NS - ECM=-0.068Duval and Vogel (2008) Stab=3-4yygap-IRGianella et al. (2008) + + NS PMR +Schreiber (2012) r= -0.216 =1Our estimates - - NS - NS - - ECM=-0.042 NS = 1
Table I.1Summary table of time series literature for the UK and the NetherlandsAbbreviations: grr, t୵ , mil, Other, y-l, lu, k, and i-∆p, and w-p* have the same meaning as above, see Table4.2. mm denotes a variable capturing skills miss-match, ipd denotes an income policy dummy for 1976and 1977, PMR stands for OECD’s measure of Product Market Regulation. r=stands for the coefficient ofcorrelation, squaring them we can obtain the coefficient of determination rଶ or Rଶ, which “measures theproportion or percentage of the total variation in Y explained by X” (Gujarati, 2003, p.84). HL=half life ofa shock. Stab=(un-)employment returns to its baseline or output gap is closed. ECM=denotes the value ofthe ECM term, coefficient must be multiplied by 100 to find out what % of the gap is closed in eachperiod. y=years.Signs and significance: +/- indicates a significant positive/negative impact on the NAIRU of the variable inthe heading of the column. NS indicates no significant at 5% level.Superindex: st, indicates that the measure of interest rate used in the article of reference is a measure ofshort term interest rates. ∆k, indicates that results are obtained using investment, accumulation ratherthan capital stock. IR indicates that evidence is obtained using impulse response diagrams. u-1 denotesresults are obtained using lagged value of unemployment. Lୢ denotes results are inferred from a labourdemand equation.
88 Results referring to the long run elasticity of real wages to productivity are not reported inthe literature review of Chapter 3, because they refer to long run distributional patterns but notto the NAIRU or its anchor.89 All variables reported in this column are found significant in the reported papers.90 Results refer to the “long run solution of a general dynamic model” reported in page 58, otherspecifications did not provide evidence of statistical significance.91 Authors consider two variables to capture the impact of workers’ militancy: IT=industrialturbulence, and UP=Union’s power. Only one of them is significant, and hence we treat it asmixed evidence.92 See footnote 105. Anchor reported results refer to Figure 2c/d in the reference article.93 Results reported here refer to Table 5 of the paper cited.
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i) ii) iii) iv) v) vi) vii) viiii) ix) x)
Germany NAIRU determinants Anchor w-p*
Exogenous factors Endogenous factorsgrr t୵ mil Other y-l lu k i-∆p y-lBall (1999) +ୱ୲Arestis and Biefang-Frisancho Mariscal (2000) + NS - ECM=-0.015Carstensen and Hansen(2000)94 NS wIR -୐ା Stab=+13y୍ୖ ୐ౚStockhammer (2004a)95 NS + - +୳-ଵ -∆୩Logeay and Tober (2006) + cl୳୥ୟ୮=8.5yArestis et al. (2007) - NS NS - - ECM=NSDuval and Vogel (2008) Stab=3-4yygap-IRGianella et al. (2008) + + NS PMR +Schreiber (2012) - - r=-0.434 NSOur estimates - + NS - NS + NS ECM= .027 het = -1
France NAIRU determinants Anchor w-p*
Exogenous factors Endogenous factorsgrr t୵ mil Other y-l lu k i-∆p y-lMalinvaud (1986)96 +Ball (1999) +ୱ୲Miaouli (2001)97 -୐ା ECM୐ౚ =0.118L'Horty and Rault (2003) + mm+ qr -Stockhammer (2004a)98 NS + NS +୳-ଵ -∆୩Arestis et al. (2007) + NS - NS - ECM=0.064Duval and Vogel (2008) Stab=+5yygap-IRGianella et al. (2008) + + NS PMR +Schreiber (2012) - - r= -0.599 NSOur estimates NS NS - NS + + NS ECM=.012
het/nn
NS
Table I.2 Summary table of time series literature for Germany and FranceAbbreviations: grr, t୵ , mil, Other, y-l, lu, k, and i-∆p, and w-p* have the same meaning as above, see Table4.3. mm denotes a variable capturing skills miss-match, PMR stands for OECD’s measure of ProductMarket Regulation. qr stands for the quit ratio. wIR denotes simulations of wage and prices using impulseresponse functions. r=stands for the coefficient of correlation, squaring them we can obtain thecoefficient of determination rଶ or Rଶ, which “measures the proportion or percentage of the totalvariation in Y explained by X” (Gujarati, 2003, p.84). Stab=(un-)employment returns to its baseline oroutput gap is closed. ECM=denotes the value of the ECM term, coefficient must be multiplied by 100 tofind out what % of the gap is closed in each period. cl୳୥ୟ୮= unemployment gap cycle length. y=years.Signs and significance: +/- indicates a significant positive/negative impact on the NAIRU of the variable inthe heading of the column. NS indicates no significant at 5% level.Superindex: st, indicates that the measure of interest rate used in the article of reference is a measure ofshort term interest rates. L +, indicates that in the original paper it is reported a positive long runrelationship between employment and capital stock/or productivity. ∆k, indicates that results areobtained using investment, accumulation rather than capital stock. IR indicates that evidence is obtainedusing impulse response diagrams. u-1 denotes results are obtained using lagged value of unemployment.Lୢ denotes results are inferred from a labour demand equation.
94 Evidence reported here refers to the IR for unemployment in page 487. Anchor reportedresults refer to page 492.95 See footnote 9396 Not used in discussion of findings due to methodological caveats discussed in chapter 3.97 An ECM term coefficient equal to 0.12 implies a half-life of the shock (calculated asln2/0.118) equal to 5.874 quarters, just below a year and a half.98 See footnote 93
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i) ii) iii) iv) v) vi) vii) viiii) ix) x)
Italy NAIRU determinants Anchor w-p*
Exogenous factors Endogenous factorsgrr t୵ mil Other y-l lu k i-∆p y-lModigliani et al. (1986) +Ball (1999) +ୱ୲Miaouli (2001) -୐ା ECM୐ౚ =-1.445Stockhammer (2004a)99 - + NS +୳-ଵ -∆୩Arestis et al. (2007) + + NS - - ECM=0.043Duval and Vogel (2008) Stab=+5yygap-IRGianella et al. (2008) + + NS PMR +Schreiber (2012) NS NS r= -0.463 NSOur estimates + + NS + NS - - ECM=NS = 1
Spain NAIRU determinants Anchor w-p*
Exogenous factors Endogenous factorsgrr t୵ mil Other y-l lu k i-∆p y-lDolado et al. (1986)100 + + + mm+ fc + NS୐ୀଵBallabriga et al. (1993)101 - -୐ାDolado and Jimeno (1997)102 + w&pIR +୍ୖ +୍ୖ ,ୈBall (1999) +ୱ୲Estrada et al. (2000) + + +Miaouli (2001) -୐ା ECM୐ౚ =-1.112Arestis et al. (2007) NS NS NS - - ECM=-0.119Duval and Vogel (2008) Stab=4-5yygap-IRKaranassou and Sala (2008)103 104 + + -୐ା =0.52Gianella et al. (2008) + + + PMR +Sala (2009) =0.8Raurich et al. (2009) =0.65Our estimates NS NS - + NS - NS ECM=-.250 = 1
Table I.3 Summary table of time series literature for Italy and SpainAbbreviations: grr, t୵ , mil, Other, y-l, lu, k, and i-∆p, and w-p* have the same meaning as above, see Table4.4. mm denotes a variable capturing skills miss-match, PMR stands for OECD’s measure of ProductMarket Regulation. qr stands for the quit ratio, fc stands for firing costs, w&pIR denotes simulations ofwage and prices using impulse response functions. r=stands for the coefficient of correlation, squaringthem we can obtain the coefficient of determination rଶ or Rଶ, which “measures the proportion orpercentage of the total variation in Y explained by X” (Gujarati, 2003, p.84). Stab=(un-)employmentreturns to its baseline or output gap is closed. ECM=denotes the value of the ECM term, coefficient mustbe multiplied by 100 to find out what % of the gap is closed in each period. y=years and q=quarters.Signs and significance: +/- indicates a significant positive/negative impact on the NAIRU of the variable inthe heading of the column. NS indicates no significant at 5% level.Superindex: st, indicates that the measure of interest rate used in the article of reference is a measure ofshort term interest rates. L +, indicates that in the original paper it is reported a positive long runrelationship between employment and capital stock/or productivity. ∆k, indicates that results areobtained using investment, accumulation rather than capital stock. IR indicates that evidence is obtainedusing impulse response diagrams. u-1 denotes results are obtained using lagged value of unemployment.
D denotes a demand shock. Lୢ denotes results are inferred from a labour demand equation.
99 See footnote 93100 Authors use technical change as measure of productivity.101 Counterfactual simulations are not reported, because they do not provide any inside ofanchor properties, but of variables that can affect unemployment permanently.102 See section 3.3.2.1 for a critical appraisal of these results. Anchor and IR: It reports ademand IR plot but not a labour demand or unemployment shock, hence we do not consider itprovides equivalent evidence to our IR.103 See footnote 105. Johansen estimates of long run relationship between employment andcapital stock reported in their Table 7, page 28.104 Results for NAIRU refer to Table 6, page 27. The impact of their variable capturing stockmarket return might resemble the wealth effect interest rates found in some of our countries,but since this measure is not directly comparable with our interest rate measure we ignore ithere. Counterfactual simulations are not reported, because they do not provide any inside ofanchor properties, but of variables that can affect unemployment permanently.
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i) ii) iii) iv) v) vi) vii) viiii) ix) x)
Denmark NAIRU determinants Anchor w-p*
Exogenous factors Endogenous factorsgrr t୵ mil Other y-l lu k i-∆p y-lBall (1999) +ୱ୲Hansen and Warne (2001) NS +୐୊ ≈ 1Nymoen and Rødseth (2003) + NSDuval and Vogel (2008) Stab=3-4yygap-IRGianella et al. (2008) NS NS + PMR +Karanassou et al. (2008a)105 -୐ା =0.46Karanassou et al. (2008b) NSOur estimates NS NS NS NS + NS NS ECM=-.052NS = 1
Finland NAIRU determinants Anchor w-p*
Exogenous factors Endogenous factorsgrr t୵ mil Other y-l lu k i-∆p y-lKiander and Pehkonen(1999) + + + +Honkapohja and Koskela(1999) + + NS NS +Nymoen and Rødseth (2003) mix106 -Arestis et al. (2007) NS NS + - - ECM=-0.066Duval and Vogel (2008) Stab=4-5yygap-IRGianella et al. (2008) + + + PMR +Karanassou et al. (2008a)107108 -୐ା ≈ 1Our estimates NS + NS NS NS NS - ECM=.049 het = 1
Table I.4. Summary table of time series literature for Denmark and FinlandAbbreviations: grr, t୵ , mil, Other, y-l, lu, k, and i-∆p, and w-p* have the same meaning as above, see Table4.5. PMR stands for OECD’s measure of Product Market Regulation. r=stands for the coefficient ofcorrelation, squaring them we can obtain the coefficient of determination rଶ or Rଶ, which “measures theproportion or percentage of the total variation in Y explained by X” (Gujarati, 2003, p.84). Stab=(un-)employment returns to its baseline or output gap is closed. ECM=denotes the value of the ECM term,coefficient must be multiplied by 100 to find out what % of the gap is closed in each period. y=years.Signs and significance: +/- indicates a significant positive/negative impact on the NAIRU of the variable inthe heading of the column. NS indicates no significant at 5% level.Superindex: st, indicates that the measure of interest rate used in the article of reference is a measure ofshort term interest rates. LF, indicates evidence is provided by estimating the long run elasticity ofunemployment to labour force shocks. L +, indicates that in the original paper it is reported a positivelong run relationship between employment and capital stock/or productivity. IR indicates that evidenceis obtained using impulse response diagrams.
105 Although authors regard frictional growth as a source of limitation of anchor properties,their results with regard to long run elasticity of employment with respect to capital stock (andreal wages with regard to productivity) are directly comparable with our estimations becausethese elasticities are found using cointegration, see page 992. Authors consider other variablesin their analysis (for instance lagged unemployment) but since they do not report their long runelasticity we ignore them here.106 Authors consider two specifications, in both cases it turns out to be positive, but only in oneis significant, hence, we treat it as mixed evidence.107 See footnote 105.108 A real long term interest rates variables is not considered in the Johansen’s estimation,despite been included in an earlier estimation of the labour demand in page 992.
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Appendix II. ADF-GLS and KPSS test resultsIn this appendix we present the results for the tests used to decide whether thevariables employed in our empirical work are I(0) or I(1) . Followingrecommendations in Kwiatkowski et al. (1992), we use two test for thispurpose. First, we use a test with null hypothesis of unit root, in our case ADF-GLS proposed by Elliott et al. (1996). Second, we employ a test with nullhypothesis of stationary, KPSS advanced by Kwiatkowski et al. (1992). Thisallows to cross-check the results from one test against the results of the other.The appendix is divided in eight sections, one for each country in our sample,and in each section we provide diagrams of the levels and first difference of allvariables. This is used to inspect the data visually, and decide whether a versionof test with a time trend, or without a time trend, should be used. Furthermore,each section contains a table with the results from ADF-GLS for several lags,and those of the KPSS for different window size.In most cases, both tests suggest that variables are I(1), and consequently wetreat them as such. There are some exceptions, where there is certainambiguity. This generally takes the form of the ADF-GLS test failing to reject thenull of a unit root in the first difference as lag order increases, for instance
∆൫w୲-p୲൯and ∆൫y୲-l୲൯in the UK. Or rejecting the null of stationarity with a smallwindow size in the KPSS test, for instance ∆grr୲in the Netherlands. But afterconsidering the results of both tests, inspecting the first difference diagrams,and considering the well-known power problems of the ADF-GLS and the sizeproblems of the KPSS test (Maddala and Kim, 1998Chapter 4), we conclude thatit is safe to treat all variables as I(1) and we proceed as such.
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Figure II.1 Level and first difference of all variables, UK
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Variable ADF-GLS(1) ADF-GLS(2) ADF-GLS(3) ADF-GLS(4) ADF-GLS(5)
(i) For the first differences
∆(w୲-p୲) -2.311 -2.019 -0.923 -0.976 -0.855
∆(y୲-l୲) -4.633 -3.701 -1.768 -1.446 -1.150
∆u୲ -2.484 -2.719 -2.910 -2.975 -3.472
∆lu୲ -3.109 -3.181 -3.320 -2.686 -2.713
∆grr୲ -2.313 -2.356 -2.422 -2.510 -2.524
∆t୲୵ -2.458 -2.535 -2.622 -2.535 -2.609
∆mil୲ -3.090 -2.646 -2.365 -1.704 -1.459
∆k୲ -1.000 -0.098 -1.122 -1.372 -1.372
∆(i୲-∆p୲) -4.257 -4.151 -1.760 -1.742 -1.536
∆p୲୴୫ -6.274 -4.334 -3.099 -3.341 -2.888
(ii) For the levelsw୲-p୲ -1.415 -1.613 -1.339 -2.138 -1.812y୲-l୲ -2.039 -1.942 -1.485 -2.173 -2.298u୲ -2.083 -3.600 -3.334 -3.102 -2.994lu୲ -2.800 -2.711 -2.553 -2.363 -2.842grr୲ -2.493 -2.457 -2.390 -2.295 -2.174t୲୵ -3.098 -3.042 -2.967 -2.869 -2.981mil୲ -4.947 -3.537 -3.077 -2.344 -1.712k୲ -2.191 -2.715 -2.770 -2.492 -2.034i୲-∆p୲ -2.884 -3.490 -2.017 -3.080 -2.426p୲୴୫ -0.312 -0.338 -0.531 -0.902 -0.526
Table II.1 Results from ADG-GLS unit root test, UKNote: ADF-GLS(p) represents Elliott et al. (1996) GLS augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root statistic for p lags. Test iscarried with data covering the period between 1984q1-2007q4. (i) For the 1st difference equations, ADF-GLS teststatistics are computed using p lagged first differences of the dependent variable and an intercept. (ii) For the levelequations, ADF-GLS test statistics are computed using p lagged first differences of the dependent variable, an interceptand a time trend. Critical value, at 5%, for regressions without trend is -1.950, and for regressions with trend is -3.043.
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Variable KPSS(0) KPSS(2) KPSS(4) KPSS(6) KPSS(8) KPSS(10) KPSS(12)
(i) For the first differences
∆(w୲-p୲) 0.105 0.127 0.121 0.115 0.104 0.096 0.090
∆(y୲-l୲) 0.032 0.059 0.066 0.066 0.066 0.069 0.073
∆u୲ 0.302 0.135 0.094 0.079 0.072 0.071 0.072
∆lu୲ 0.424 0.167 0.117 0.097 0.087 0.082 0.080
∆grr୲ 0.723 0.268 0.176 0.139 0.120 0.109 0.103
∆t୲୵ 0.629 0.236 0.158 0.126 0.110 0.102 0.098
∆mil୲ 0.050 0.084 0.140 0.173 0.193 0.210 0.255
∆k୲ 1.650 0.599 0.380 0.287 0.238 0.210 0.193
∆(i୲-∆p୲) 0.010 0.022 0.032 0.046 0.059 0.069 0.077
∆p୲୴୫ 0.500 0.637 0.557 0.563 0.566 0.563 0.557
(ii) For the levelsw୲-p୲ 1.180 0.414 0.257 0.191 0.155 0.133 0.119y୲-l୲ 1.020 3.990 0.255 0.193 0.161 0.142 0.131u୲ 0.579 0.199 0.126 0.096 0.081 0.073 0.069lu୲ 1.000 0.344 0.216 0.164 0.137 0.121 0.112grr୲ 1.600 0.540 0.331 0.243 0.195 0.167 0.148t୲୵ 0.561 0.193 0.121 0.092 0.077 0.068 0.064mil୲ 0.860 0.423 0.328 0.277 0.242 0.221 0.206k୲ 1.410 0.486 0.302 0.225 0.184 0.159 0.144i୲-∆p୲ 0.367 0.220 0.168 0.146 0.133 0.123 0.116p୲୴୫ 1.620 0.601 0.390 0.302 0.255 0.227 0.207
Table II.2 Results from KPSS stationary test, UKNote: KPSS(l) represents Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) stationarity test based on the Bartlett window for size l. Test iscarried with data covering the period between 1984q1-2007q4. (i) For 1st difference equations, KPSS test statistics arecomputed from a regression with and intercept and "l" lagged truncation parameter. (ii) For level equations, KPSS teststatistics are computed from a regression with and intercept, time trend and "l" lagged truncation parameter. Criticalvalues at 5% for regressions without trend is 0.463, for regressions with trend is 0.146.
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II.2 Netherlands
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Figure II.2 Level and first difference of all variables, Netherlands
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Variable ADF-GLS(1) ADF-GLS(2) ADF-GLS(3) ADF-GLS(4) ADF-GLS(5)
(i) For the first differences
∆(w୲-p୲) -4.481 -3.614 -2.271 -2.102 -1.781
∆(y୲-l୲) -1.981 -1.326 -0.920 -0.821 -0.634
∆u୲ -3.442 -2.562 -2.127 -1.683 -1.761
∆lu୲ -3.167 -3.287 -3.476 -2.928 -3.041
∆grr୲ -2.149 -2.199 -2.231 -2.298 -2.364
∆t୲୵ -3.602 -3.935 -4.425 -3.877 -4.138
∆mil୲ -4.734 -4.645 -5.385 -4.806 -4.560
∆k୲ -1.491 -1.513 -1.739 -1.769 -1.941
∆(i୲-∆p୲) -6.047 -5.515 -2.898 -3.300 -3.046
∆p୲୴୫ -4.318 -3.162 -2.260 -2.363 -1.942
(ii) For the levelsw୲-p୲ -0.878 -0.900 -0.088 -1.410 -1.381y୲-l୲ -1.366 -1.336 -1.401 -1.720 -1.625u୲ -1.682 -2.194 -2.771 -3.313 -4.312lu୲ -3.012 -2.901 -2.712 -2.432 -2.850grr୲ -2.144 -2.086 -1.975 -1.877 -1.722t୲୵ -4.343 -4.145 -3.771 -3.200 -3.484mil୲ -4.010 -4.364 -4.278 -3.398 -3.389k୲ -2.205 -3.852 -4.106 -3.870 -4.176i୲-∆p୲ -2.635 -2.508 -1.890 -2.704 -1.978p୲୴୫ -1.493 -1.605 -1.687 -1.989 -1.580
Table II.3 Results from ADG-GLS unit root test, NetherlandsNote: ADF-GLS(p) represents Elliott et al. (1996) GLS augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root statistic for p lags. Test iscarried with data covering the period between 1987q1-2007q4. (i) For the 1st difference equations, ADF-GLS teststatistics are computed using p lagged first differences of the dependent variable and an intercept. (ii) For the levelequations, ADF-GLS test statistics are computed using p lagged first differences of the dependent variable, an interceptand a time trend, except in the case of p୲୴୫ where no time trend is considered. Critical value, at 5%, for regressionswithout trend is -1.950, and for regressions with trend is -3.081.
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Variable KPSS(0) KPSS(2) KPSS(4) KPSS(6) KPSS(8) KPSS(10) KPSS(12)
(i) For the first differences
∆(w୲-p୲) 0.370 0.412 0.373 0.332 0.308 0.295 0.289
∆(y୲-l୲) 0.160 0.182 0.170 0.165 0.162 0.159 0.160
∆u୲ 0.235 0.125 0.088 0.070 0.061 0.057 0.056
∆lu୲ 0.436 0.181 0.134 0.118 0.114 0.116 0.123
∆grr୲ 1.750 0.663 0.446 0.360 0.320 0.301 0.290
∆t୲୵ 0.149 0.065 0.051 0.050 0.057 0.070 0.089
∆mil୲ 0.054 0.033 0.032 0.039 0.052 0.075 0.094
∆k୲ 1.290 0.466 0.295 0.223 0.185 0.163 0.151
∆(i୲-∆p୲) 0.033 0.052 0.063 0.086 0.107 0.106 0.115
∆p୲୴୫ 0.153 0.196 0.186 0.199 0.227 0.251 0.275
(ii) For the levelsw୲-p୲ 1.580 0.561 0.350 0.261 0.214 0.184 0.165y୲-l୲ 1.650 0.585 0.368 0.277 0.228 0.198 0.179u୲ 0.609 0.209 0.131 0.099 0.083 0.075 0.071lu୲ 0.605 0.213 0.138 0.110 0.097 0.092 0.091grr୲ 1.230 0.429 0.270 0.205 0.172 0.153 0.142t୲୵ 0.254 0.092 0.063 0.054 0.053 0.056 0.062mil୲ 0.266 0.103 0.078 0.073 0.076 0.082 0.088k୲ 0.770 0.264 0.165 0.124 0.103 0.091 0.085i୲-∆p୲ 0.309 0.148 0.111 0.099 0.094 0.092 0.093p୲୴୫ 1.250 0.472 0.312 0.246 0.213 0.194 0.183
Table II.4 Results from KPSS stationary test, NetherlandsNote: KPSS(l) represents Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) stationarity test based on the Bartlett window for size l. Test iscarried with data covering the period between 1987q1-2007q4. (i) For 1st difference equations, KPSS test statistics arecomputed from a regression with and intercept and "l" lagged truncation parameter. (ii) For level equations, KPSS teststatistics are computed from a regression with and intercept, time trend and "l" lagged truncation parameter, except inthe case of p୲୴୫ where no time trend is considered. Critical values at 5% for regressions without trend 0.463, forregressions with trend 0.146.
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Variable ADF-GLS(1) ADF-GLS(2) ADF-GLS(3) ADF-GLS(4) ADF-GLS(5)
(i) For the first differences
∆(w୲-p୲) -1.342 -0.974 -0.679 -0.663 -0.583
∆(y୲-l୲) -1.641 -1.212 -1.033 -1.016 -0.864
∆u୲ -1.443 -1.497 -1.809 -1.833 -1.516
∆lu୲ -0.730 -0.748 -0.768 -0.773 -0.798
∆grr୲ -1.775 -1.781 -1.803 -1.872 -1.920
∆t୲୵ -3.143 -3.394 -3.731 -2.507 -2.584
∆k୲ -0.918 -1.151 -1.254 -1.816 -1.979
∆(i୲-∆p୲) -2.314 -1.763 -0.900 -0.737 -0.556
∆p୲୴୫ -4.995 -3.990 -3.106 -3.277 -2.819
(ii) For the levelsw୲-p୲ -1.275 -1.159 -1.136 -1.410 -1.542y୲-l୲ -2.399 -2.092 -1.967 -2.209 -2.248u୲ -2.482 -2.839 -2.771 -2.387 -2.241lu୲ -1.928 -1.831 -1.733 -1.636 -1.571grr୲ -2.557 -2.531 -2.575 -2.599 -2.546t୲୵ -1.888 -1.640 -1.374 -1.101 -1.598k୲ -2.778 -3.656 -3.138 -3.046 -2.159i୲-∆p୲ -2.363 -2.318 -1.731 -1.992 -1.837p୲୴୫ -1.638 -1.885 -1.964 -2.308 -1.997
Table II.5 Results from ADG-GLS unit root test, GermanyNote: ADF-GLS(p) represents Elliott et al. (1996) GLS augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root statistic for p lags. Test iscarried with data covering the period between 1992q4-2007q4. (i) For the 1st difference equations, ADF-GLS teststatistics are computed using p lagged first differences of the dependent variable and an intercept. (ii) For the levelequations, ADF-GLS test statistics are computed using p lagged first differences of the dependent variable, an interceptand a time trend. Critical value, at 5%, for regressions without trend is -1.950 and for regressions with trend is -3.155.
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Variable KPSS(0) KPSS(2) KPSS(4) KPSS(6) KPSS(8) KPSS(10) KPSS(12)
(i) For the first differences
∆(w୲-p୲) 0.192 0.223 0.235 0.221 0.232 0.254 0.281
∆(y୲-l୲) 0.039 0.059 0.071 0.075 0.087 0.109 0.124
∆u୲ 0.762 0.308 0.220 0.190 0.181 0.180 0.185
∆lu୲ 1.580 0.610 0.418 0.342 0.309 0.294 0.288
∆grr୲ 1.000 0.368 0.241 0.189 0.162 0.147 0.140
∆t୲୵ 0.884 0.379 0.294 0.270 0.264 0.260 0.250
∆k୲ 2.130 0.757 0.478 0.363 0.305 0.272 0.255
∆(i୲-∆p୲) 0.046 0.081 0.111 0.129 0.142 0.143 0.150
∆p୲୴୫ 0.133 0.155 0.150 0.156 0.182 0.212 0.241
(ii) For the levelsw୲-p୲ 1.000 0.387 0.257 0.202 0.175 0.160 0.152y୲-l୲ 0.480 0.206 0.146 0.122 0.111 0.108 0.107u୲ 0.372 0.135 0.091 0.075 0.068 0.066 0.068lu୲ 0.709 0.264 0.177 0.142 0.125 0.116 0.112grr୲ 0.903 0.311 0.196 0.149 0.125 0.112 0.106t୲୵ 0.919 0.325 0.211 0.167 0.145 0.133 0.126k୲ 1.270 0.436 0.272 0.204 0.169 0.149 0.137i୲-∆p୲ 0.119 0.070 0.057 0.055 0.057 0.061 0.070p୲୴୫ 0.608 0.241 0.167 0.141 0.131 0.130 0.134
Table II.6 Results from KPSS stationary test, GermanyNote: KPSS(l) represents Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) stationarity test based on the Bartlett window for size l. Test iscarried with data covering the period between 1992q4-2007q4. (i) For 1st difference equations, KPSS test statistics arecomputed from a regression with and intercept and "l" lagged truncation parameter. (ii) For level equations, KPSS teststatistics are computed from a regression with and intercept, time trend and "l" lagged truncation parameter. Criticalvalues at 5% for regressions without trend 0.463, for regressions with trend 0.146.
230
II.4 France
8.600
8.700
8.800
8.900
9.000
9.100
9.200
1980Q
1
1982Q
1
1984Q
1
1986Q
1
1988Q
1
1990Q
1
1992Q
1
1994Q
1
1996Q
1
1998Q
1
2000Q
1
2002Q
1
2004Q
1
w-p
-0.015-0.010
-0.0050.000
0.0050.010
0.0150.020
0.0250.030
1980Q
1
1982Q
1
1984Q
1
1986Q
1
1988Q
1
1990Q
1
1992Q
1
1994Q
1
1996Q
1
1998Q
1
2000Q
1
2002Q
1
2004Q
1
1st difference w-p
9.1009.200
9.3009.400
9.5009.600
9.7009.800
1980Q
1
1982Q
1
1984Q
1
1986Q
1
1988Q
1
1990Q
1
1992Q
1
1994Q
1
1996Q
1
1998Q
1
2000Q
1
2002Q
1
2004Q
1
y-l
-0.030
-0.020
-0.010
0.000
0.010
0.020
0.030
0.040
1980Q
1
1982Q
1
1984Q
1
1986Q
1
1988Q
1
1990Q
1
1992Q
1
1994Q
1
1996Q
1
1998Q
1
2000Q
1
2002Q
1
2004Q
1
1st difference y-l
1.0001.200
1.4001.600
1.8002.000
2.2002.400
2.600
1980Q
1
1982Q
1
1984Q
1
1986Q
1
1988Q
1
1990Q
1
1992Q
1
1994Q
1
1996Q
1
1998Q
1
2000Q
1
2002Q
1
2004Q
1
u
-0.080-0.060
-0.040-0.020
0.0000.020
0.0400.060
0.0800.100
1980Q
1
1982Q
1
1984Q
1
1986Q
1
1988Q
1
1990Q
1
1992Q
1
1994Q
1
1996Q
1
1998Q
1
2000Q
1
2002Q
1
2004Q
1
1st difference u
3.3503.400
3.4503.500
3.5503.600
3.6503.700
3.7503.800
3.8503.900
1980Q
1
1982Q
1
1984Q
1
1986Q
1
1988Q
1
1990Q
1
1992Q
1
1994Q
1
1996Q
1
1998Q
1
2000Q
1
2002Q
1
2004Q
1
lu
-0.050-0.040
-0.030-0.020
-0.0100.000
0.0100.020
0.0300.040
0.0500.060
1980Q
1
1982Q
1
1984Q
1
1986Q
1
1988Q
1
1990Q
1
1992Q
1
1994Q
1
1996Q
1
1998Q
1
2000Q
1
2002Q
1
2004Q
1
1st difference lu
2.9003.000
3.1003.200
3.3003.400
3.5003.600
3.7003.800
3.900
1980Q
1
1982Q
1
1984Q
1
1986Q
1
1988Q
1
1990Q
1
1992Q
1
1994Q
1
1996Q
1
1998Q
1
2000Q
1
2002Q
1
2004Q
1
grr
-0.020
-0.010
0.000
0.010
0.020
0.030
0.040
1980Q
1
1982Q
1
1984Q
1
1986Q
1
1988Q
1
1990Q
1
1992Q
1
1994Q
1
1996Q
1
1998Q
1
2000Q
1
2002Q
1
2004Q
1
1st difference grr
231
Figure II.4 Level and first difference of all variables, France
2.3002.400
2.5002.600
2.7002.800
2.9003.000
3.1003.200
1980Q
1
1982Q
1
1984Q
1
1986Q
1
1988Q
1
1990Q
1
1992Q
1
1994Q
1
1996Q
1
1998Q
1
2000Q
1
2002Q
1
2004Q
1
tw
-0.025-0.020
-0.015-0.010
-0.0050.000
0.0050.010
0.0150.020
0.025
1980Q
1
1982Q
1
1984Q
1
1986Q
1
1988Q
1
1990Q
1
1992Q
1
1994Q
1
1996Q
1
1998Q
1
2000Q
1
2002Q
1
2004Q
1
1st difference tw
12.000
12.500
13.000
13.500
14.000
14.500
1980Q
1
1982Q
1
1984Q
1
1986Q
1
1988Q
1
1990Q
1
1992Q
1
1994Q
1
1996Q
1
1998Q
1
2000Q
1
2002Q
1
2004Q
1
mil
-1.000-0.800
-0.600-0.400
-0.2000.000
0.2000.400
0.6000.800
1980Q
1
1982Q
1
1984Q
1
1986Q
1
1988Q
1
1990Q
1
1992Q
1
1994Q
1
1996Q
1
1998Q
1
2000Q
1
2002Q
1
2004Q
1
1st difference mil
26.80027.000
27.20027.400
27.60027.800
28.00028.200
1980Q
1
1982Q
1
1984Q
1
1986Q
1
1988Q
1
1990Q
1
1992Q
1
1994Q
1
1996Q
1
1998Q
1
2000Q
1
2002Q
1
2004Q
1
k
0.0000.002
0.0040.006
0.0080.010
0.0120.014
0.016
1980Q
1
1982Q
1
1984Q
1
1986Q
1
1988Q
1
1990Q
1
1992Q
1
1994Q
1
1996Q
1
1998Q
1
2000Q
1
2002Q
1
2004Q
1
1st difference k
0.000
0.500
1.000
1.500
2.000
2.500
3.000
1980Q
1
1982Q
1
1984Q
1
1986Q
1
1988Q
1
1990Q
1
1992Q
1
1994Q
1
1996Q
1
1998Q
1
2000Q
1
2002Q
1
2004Q
1
i-dq
-0.300
-0.200
-0.100
0.000
0.100
0.200
0.300
0.400
1980Q
1
1982Q
1
1984Q
1
1986Q
1
1988Q
1
1990Q
1
1992Q
1
1994Q
1
1996Q
1
1998Q
1
2000Q
1
2002Q
1
2004Q
1
1st difference i-dp
-20.000-15.000
-10.000-5.000
0.0005.000
10.00015.000
1980Q
1
1982Q
1
1984Q
1
1986Q
1
1988Q
1
1990Q
1
1992Q
1
1994Q
1
1996Q
1
1998Q
1
2000Q
1
2002Q
1
2004Q
1
pvm
-8.000
-6.000
-4.000
-2.000
0.000
2.000
4.000
6.000
1980Q
1
1982Q
1
1984Q
1
1986Q
1
1988Q
1
1990Q
1
1992Q
1
1994Q
1
1996Q
1
1998Q
1
2000Q
1
2002Q
1
2004Q
1
1st difference pvm
232
Variable ADF-GLS(1) ADF-GLS(2) ADF-GLS(3) ADF-GLS(4) ADF-GLS(5)
(i) For the first differences
∆(w୲-p୲) -3.509 -2.656 -1.895 -1.575 -1.370
∆(y୲-l୲) -1.497 -1.208 -0.783 -0.657 -0.475
∆u୲ -5.173 -3.499 -3.079 -2.733 -3.198
∆lu୲ -3.646 -3.903 -4.253 -2.581 -2.638
∆grr୲ -0.996 -1.026 -1.053 -1.090 -1.118
∆t୲୵ -3.025 -3.026 -3.158 -1.568 -1.562
∆mil୲ -2.550 -2.780 -3.624 -2.737 -2.517
∆k୲ -0.136 -0.504 -0.437 -0.495 -0.354
∆(i୲-∆p୲) -7.941 -7.160 -5.040 -5.517 -6.178
∆p୲୴୫ -3.111 -2.134 -1.651 -1.765 -1.362
(ii) For the levelsw୲-p୲ -2.491 -2.402 -2.212 -2.319 -2.249y୲-l୲ -2.066 -2.125 -1.901 -2.033 -1.874u୲ -1.093 -0.907 -1.346 -1.542 -1.802lu୲ -2.443 -2.139 -1.807 -1.454 -2.095grr୲ -1.640 -1.488 -1.310 -1.135 -0.975t୲୵ -1.257 -1.064 -0.708 -0.297 -1.346mil୲ -4.167 -4.056 -3.462 -2.079 -2.057k୲ -3.031 -2.357 -1.748 -1.787 -1.676i୲-∆p୲ -2.920 -2.694 -2.336 -2.784 -2.259p୲୴୫ -1.809 -1.954 -2.174 -2.400 -1.918
Table II.7 Results from ADG-GLS unit root test, FranceNote: ADF-GLS(p) represents Elliott et al. (1996) GLS augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root statistic for p lags. Test iscarried with data covering the period between 1980q1-2004q4. (i) For the 1st difference equations, ADF-GLS teststatistics are computed using p lagged first differences of the dependent variable and an intercept. (ii) For the levelequations, ADF-GLS test statistics are computed using p lagged first differences of the dependent variable, an interceptand a time trend, except in the case of lu୲, where no time trend is considered. Critical value, at 5%, for regressionswithout trend is -1.950, and for regressions with trend is -3.030.
233
Variable KPSS(0) KPSS(2) KPSS(4) KPSS(6) KPSS(8) KPSS(10) KPSS(12)
(i) For the first differences
∆(w୲-p୲) 0.040 0.048 0.054 0.059 0.059 0.054 0.055
∆(y୲-l୲) 0.125 0.124 0.123 0.124 0.127 0.117 0.116
∆u୲ 1.190 0.616 0.471 0.386 0.351 0.327 0.309
∆lu୲ 0.260 0.114 0.092 0.087 0.086 0.087 0.088
∆grr୲ 1.980 0.768 0.532 0.447 0.420 0.418 0.425
∆t୲୵ 1.120 0.516 0.442 0.430 0.411 0.387 0.363
∆mil୲ 0.104 0.054 0.050 0.060 0.080 0.103 0.117
∆k୲ 2.610 0.927 0.591 0.450 0.374 0.329 0.300
∆(i୲-∆p୲) 0.064 0.080 0.091 0.120 0.144 0.152 0.160
∆p୲୴୫ 0.078 0.086 0.080 0.085 0.096 0.111 0.129
(ii) For the levelsw୲-p୲ 0.361 0.138 0.091 0.071 0.061 0.055 0.052y୲-l୲ 1.770 0.623 391.000 0.291 0.237 0.202 0.180u୲ 1.420 0.501 0.318 0.240 0.199 0.174 0.158lu୲ 0.837 0.291 0.186 0.143 0.121 0.108 0.101grr୲ 1.330 0.484 0.315 0.245 0.207 0.184 0.168t୲୵ 1.980 0.681 0.423 0.314 0.253 0.216 0.190mil୲ 1.000 3.890 0.282 0.246 0.228 0.212 0.195k୲ 1.160 0.407 0.257 0.193 0.159 0.139 0.125i୲-∆p୲ 0.302 0.139 0.107 0.099 0.096 0.095 0.096p୲୴୫ 1.560 0.565 0.363 0.279 0.234 0.206 0.186
Table II.8 Results from KPSS stationary test, FranceNote: KPSS(l) represents Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) stationarity test based on the Bartlett window for size l. Test iscarried with data covering the period between 1980q1-2004q4. (i) For 1st difference equations, KPSS test statistics arecomputed from a regression with and intercept and "l" lagged truncation parameter. (ii) For level equations, KPSS teststatistics are computed from a regression with and intercept, time trend and "l" lagged truncation parameter, except inthe case of lu୲, where no time trend is considered. Critical values at 5% for regressions without trend 0.463, forregressions with trend 0.146.
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Figure II.5 Level and first difference of all variables, Italy
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Variable ADF-GLS(1) ADF-GLS(2) ADF-GLS(3) ADF-GLS(4) ADF-GLS(5)
(i) For the first differences
∆(w୲-p୲) -6.600 -4.712 -3.896 -3.644 -2.884
∆(y୲-l୲) -2.842 -2.379 -1.838 -1.393 -1.018
∆u୲ -1.446 -1.115 -1.172 -1.006 -0.917
∆lu୲ -2.919 -3.094 -3.330 -2.043 -2.062
∆grr୲ -3.306 -2.929 -2.790 -2.635 -2.632
∆t୲୵ -2.895 -3.036 -3.208 -1.898 -1.928
∆mil୲ -7.193 -6.581 -3.142 -2.559 -2.083
∆k୲ -1.803 -1.676 -1.902 -1.725 -1.714
∆(i୲-∆p୲) -6.448 -5.367 -4.360 -4.543 -4.753
∆p୲୴୫ -6.169 -4.721 -3.742 -4.152 -3.691
(ii) For the levelsw୲-p୲ -0.805 -0.824 -0.929 -0.987 -0.941y୲-l୲ 0.050 -2.600 -0.258 -0.434 -0.782u୲ -0.424 -1.265 -1.754 -1.511 -1.587lu୲ -2.105 -1.777 -1.405 -0.993 -1.616grr୲ -1.410 -1.492 -1.558 -1.510 -1.482t୲୵ -2.350 -2.066 -1.755 -1.424 -2.150mil୲ -6.273 -6.069 -3.478 -4.092 -3.633k୲ -2.788 -2.469 -2.665 -2.362 -2.555i୲-∆p୲ -2.372 -2.117 -2.105 -2.291 -1.992p୲୴୫ -0.980 -1.193 -1.338 -1.559 -1.210
Table II.9 Results from ADG-GLS unit root test, ItalyNote: ADF-GLS(p) represents Elliott et al. (1996) GLS augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root statistic for p lags. Test iscarried with data covering the period between 1983q4-2007q4. (i) For the 1st difference equations, ADF-GLS teststatistics are computed using p lagged first differences of the dependent variable and an intercept. (ii) For the levelequations, ADF-GLS test statistics are computed using p lagged first differences of the dependent variable, an interceptand a time trend. Critical value, at 5%, for regressions without trend is -1.950, and for regressions with trend is -3.040.
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Variable KPSS(0) KPSS(2) KPSS(4) KPSS(6) KPSS(8) KPSS(10) KPSS(12)
(i) For the first differences
∆(w୲-p୲) 0.430 0.512 0.476 0.451 0.421 0.379 0.339
∆(y୲-l୲) 1.680 1.340 1.110 0.886 0.747 0.663 0.590
∆u୲ 1.520 0.896 0.647 0.531 0.464 0.426 0.403
∆lu୲ 0.804 0.354 0.285 0.275 0.282 0.297 0.313
∆grr୲ 0.846 0.391 0.292 0.253 0.241 0.242 0.246
∆t୲୵ 0.431 0.186 0.147 0.137 0.133 0.132 0.133
∆mil୲ 0.014 0.038 0.057 0.079 0.107 0.115 0.137
∆k୲ 1.830 0.648 0.412 0.312 0.258 0.226 0.206
∆(i୲-∆p୲) 0.081 0.065 0.066 0.073 0.078 0.078 0.082
∆p୲୴୫ 0.391 0.410 0.365 0.367 0.388 0.405 0.428
(ii) For the levelsw୲-p୲ 2.010 0.698 0.432 0.319 0.257 0.218 0.193y୲-l୲ 2.250 0.780 0.484 0.357 0.289 0.246 0.218u୲ 1.760 0.613 0.385 0.289 0.238 0.207 0.187lu୲ 1.070 0.383 0.251 0.198 0.170 0.154 0.145grr୲ 2.030 0.696 0.433 0.322 0.262 0.225 0.200t୲୵ 1.270 0.440 0.278 0.210 0.174 0.152 0.139mil୲ 0.066 0.078 0.086 0.098 0.104 0.097 0.094k୲ 1.220 0.416 0.257 0.190 0.154 0.133 0.119i୲-∆p୲ 0.972 0.352 0.230 0.178 0.150 0.133 0.122p୲୴୫ 1.340 0.497 0.327 0.259 0.225 0.206 0.195
Table II.10 Results from KPSS stationary test, ItalyNote: KPSS(l) represents Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) stationarity test based on the Bartlett window for size l. Test iscarried with data covering the period between 1983q4-2007q4. (i) For 1st difference equations, KPSS test statistics arecomputed from a regression with and intercept and "l" lagged truncation parameter. (ii) For level equations, KPSS teststatistics are computed from a regression with and intercept, time trend and "l" lagged truncation parameter. Criticalvalues at 5% for regressions without trend 0.463, for regressions with trend 0.146.
238
II.6 Spain
8.1008.200
8.3008.400
8.5008.600
8.7008.800
1980Q
1
1982Q
1
1984Q
1
1986Q
1
1988Q
1
1990Q
1
1992Q
1
1994Q
1
1996Q
1
1998Q
1
2000Q
1
2002Q
1
2004Q
1
2006Q
1
w-p
-0.030
-0.020
-0.010
0.000
0.010
0.020
0.030
0.040
1980Q
1
1982Q
1
1984Q
1
1986Q
1
1988Q
1
1990Q
1
1992Q
1
1994Q
1
1996Q
1
1998Q
1
2000Q
1
2002Q
1
2004Q
1
2006Q
1
1st difference w-p
8.8008.900
9.0009.100
9.2009.300
9.4009.500
1980Q
1
1982Q
1
1984Q
1
1986Q
1
1988Q
1
1990Q
1
1992Q
1
1994Q
1
1996Q
1
1998Q
1
2000Q
1
2002Q
1
2004Q
1
2006Q
1
y-l
-0.030
-0.020
-0.010
0.000
0.010
0.020
0.030
0.040
1980Q
1
1982Q
1
1984Q
1
1986Q
1
1988Q
1
1990Q
1
1992Q
1
1994Q
1
1996Q
1
1998Q
1
2000Q
1
2002Q
1
2004Q
1
2006Q
1
1st difference y-l
1.5001.700
1.9002.100
2.3002.500
2.7002.900
3.100
1980Q
1
1982Q
1
1984Q
1
1986Q
1
1988Q
1
1990Q
1
1992Q
1
1994Q
1
1996Q
1
1998Q
1
2000Q
1
2002Q
1
2004Q
1
2006Q
1
u
-0.100-0.080
-0.060-0.040
-0.0200.000
0.0200.040
0.0600.080
0.1000.120
1980Q
1
1982Q
1
1984Q
1
1986Q
1
1988Q
1
1990Q
1
1992Q
1
1994Q
1
1996Q
1
1998Q
1
2000Q
1
2002Q
1
2004Q
1
2006Q
1
1st difference u
2.500
3.000
3.500
4.000
4.500
5.000
1980Q
1
1982Q
1
1984Q
1
1986Q
1
1988Q
1
1990Q
1
1992Q
1
1994Q
1
1996Q
1
1998Q
1
2000Q
1
2002Q
1
2004Q
1
2006Q
1
lu
-0.010-0.005
0.0000.005
0.0100.015
0.0200.025
0.0300.035
0.040
1980Q
1
1982Q
1
1984Q
1
1986Q
1
1988Q
1
1990Q
1
1992Q
1
1994Q
1
1996Q
1
1998Q
1
2000Q
1
2002Q
1
2004Q
1
2006Q
1
1st difference grr
2.8002.900
3.0003.100
3.2003.300
3.4003.500
3.6003.700
3.800
1980Q
1
1982Q
1
1984Q
1
1986Q
1
1988Q
1
1990Q
1
1992Q
1
1994Q
1
1996Q
1
1998Q
1
2000Q
1
2002Q
1
2004Q
1
2006Q
1
grr
-0.020-0.015
-0.010-0.005
0.0000.005
0.0100.015
0.0200.025
0.030
1980Q
1
1982Q
1
1984Q
1
1986Q
1
1988Q
1
1990Q
1
1992Q
1
1994Q
1
1996Q
1
1998Q
1
2000Q
1
2002Q
1
2004Q
1
2006Q
1
1st difference tw
239
Figure II.6 Level and first difference of all variables, Spain
3.350
3.400
3.450
3.500
3.550
3.600
3.650
1980Q
1
1982Q
1
1984Q
1
1986Q
1
1988Q
1
1990Q
1
1992Q
1
1994Q
1
1996Q
1
1998Q
1
2000Q
1
2002Q
1
2004Q
1
2006Q
1
tw
-5.000-4.000
-3.000-2.000
-1.0000.000
1.0002.000
3.0004.000
1980Q
1
1982Q
1
1984Q
1
1986Q
1
1988Q
1
1990Q
1
1992Q
1
1994Q
1
1996Q
1
1998Q
1
2000Q
1
2002Q
1
2004Q
1
2006Q
1
1st difference mil
8.0009.000
10.00011.000
12.00013.000
14.00015.000
16.000
1980Q
1
1982Q
1
1984Q
1
1986Q
1
1988Q
1
1990Q
1
1992Q
1
1994Q
1
1996Q
1
1998Q
1
2000Q
1
2002Q
1
2004Q
1
2006Q
1
mil
-5.000-4.000
-3.000-2.000
-1.0000.000
1.0002.000
3.0004.000
1980Q
1
1982Q
1
1984Q
1
1986Q
1
1988Q
1
1990Q
1
1992Q
1
1994Q
1
1996Q
1
1998Q
1
2000Q
1
2002Q
1
2004Q
1
2006Q
1
1st difference mil
25.500
26.000
26.500
27.000
27.500
28.000
1980Q
1
1982Q
1
1984Q
1
1986Q
1
1988Q
1
1990Q
1
1992Q
1
1994Q
1
1996Q
1
1998Q
1
2000Q
1
2002Q
1
2004Q
1
2006Q
1
k
0.0000.002
0.0040.006
0.0080.010
0.0120.014
0.0160.018
0.020
1980Q
1
1982Q
1
1984Q
1
1986Q
1
1988Q
1
1990Q
1
1992Q
1
1994Q
1
1996Q
1
1998Q
1
2000Q
1
2002Q
1
2004Q
1
2006Q
1
1st difference k
0.000
0.500
1.000
1.500
2.000
2.500
3.000
1980Q
1
1982Q
1
1984Q
1
1986Q
1
1988Q
1
1990Q
1
1992Q
1
1994Q
1
1996Q
1
1998Q
1
2000Q
1
2002Q
1
2004Q
1
2006Q
1
i-dq
-1.500
-1.000
-0.500
0.000
0.500
1.000
1.500
1980Q
1
1982Q
1
1984Q
1
1986Q
1
1988Q
1
1990Q
1
1992Q
1
1994Q
1
1996Q
1
1998Q
1
2000Q
1
2002Q
1
2004Q
1
2006Q
1
1st difference i-dp
-20.000-15.000
-10.000-5.000
0.0005.000
10.00015.000
1980Q
1
1982Q
1
1984Q
1
1986Q
1
1988Q
1
1990Q
1
1992Q
1
1994Q
1
1996Q
1
1998Q
1
2000Q
1
2002Q
1
2004Q
1
2006Q
1
pvm
-8.000-6.000
-4.000-2.000
0.0002.000
4.0006.000
8.000
1980Q
1
1982Q
1
1984Q
1
1986Q
1
1988Q
1
1990Q
1
1992Q
1
1994Q
1
1996Q
1
1998Q
1
2000Q
1
2002Q
1
2004Q
1
2006Q
1
1st difference pvm
240
Variable ADF-GLS(1) ADF-GLS(2) ADF-GLS(3) ADF-GLS(4) ADF-GLS(5)
(i) For the first differences
∆(w୲-p୲) -1.965 -1.498 -0.880 -0.824 -0.772
∆(y୲-l୲) -6.968 -5.798 -4.057 -3.227 -2.291
∆u୲ -1.400 -1.197 -0.920 -0.738 -0.682
∆lu୲ -1.843 -1.859 -1.896 -1.386 -1.374
∆grr୲ -1.153 -1.163 -1.181 -1.200 -1.223
∆t୲୵ -3.195 -3.243 -3.382 -1.494 -1.496
∆mil୲ -11.266 -11.359 -6.481 -4.979 -3.743
∆k୲ -1.528 -1.823 -1.921 -1.786 -2.171
∆(i୲-∆p୲) -6.098 -6.466 -3.141 -3.056 -3.203
∆p୲୴୫ -5.381 -3.976 -3.080 -3.168 -2.700
(ii) For the levelsw୲-p୲ -0.141 -0.670 -0.778 -1.502 -1.589y୲-l୲ -0.069 -0.277 -0.209 -0.421 -0.587u୲ -1.025 -1.249 -1.320 -1.536 -1.720lu୲ -0.866 -0.813 -0.739 -0.649 -0.896grr୲ -1.415 -1.274 -1.130 -0.979 -0.832t୲୵ -3.356 -2.881 -2.134 -1.329 -2.544mil୲ -7.666 -6.389 -3.992 -4.008 -3.801k୲ -2.505 -2.432 -1.995 -1.876 -2.012i୲-∆p୲ -2.122 -2.681 -1.745 -2.510 -2.197p୲୴୫ -1.153 -1.404 -1.559 -1.798 -1.455
Table II.11 Results from ADG-GLS unit root test, SpainNote: ADF-GLS(p) represents Elliott et al. (1996) GLS augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root statistic for p lags. Test iscarried with data covering the period between 1980q1-2007q4. (i) For the 1st difference equations, ADF-GLS teststatistics are computed using p lagged first differences of the dependent variable and an intercept. (ii) For the levelequations, ADF-GLS test statistics are computed using p lagged first differences of the dependent variable, an interceptand a time trend, except in the case of u୲and lu୲, where no time trend is considered. Critical value, at 5%, forregressions without trend is -1.950, and for regressions with trend is -3.018.
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Variable KPSS(0) KPSS(2) KPSS(4) KPSS(6) KPSS(8) KPSS(10) KPSS(12)
(i) For the first differences
∆(w୲-p୲) 0.586 0.611 0.483 0.402 0.347 0.310 0.282
∆(y୲-l୲) 0.489 0.771 0.796 0.692 0.618 0.560 0.513
∆u୲ 1.930 0.852 0.585 0.457 0.389 0.349 0.327
∆lu୲ 5.480 2.040 1.350 1.050 0.895 0.796 0.730
∆grr୲ 2.400 0.930 0.640 0.533 0.494 0.480 0.472
∆t୲୵ 0.125 0.063 0.064 0.078 0.089 0.093 0.096
∆mil୲ 0.006 0.018 0.030 0.037 0.054 0.059 0.072
∆k୲ 4.300 1.490 0.926 0.689 0.561 0.485 0.436
∆(i୲-∆p୲) 0.016 0.039 0.054 0.075 0.093 0.114 0.131
∆p୲୴୫ 0.219 0.233 0.211 0.213 0.230 0.246 0.264
(ii) For the levelsw୲-p୲ 2.270 0.774 0.472 0.344 0.274 0.231 0.202y୲-l୲ 2.620 0.904 0.555 0.406 0.324 0.273 0.238u୲ 3.540 1.220 0.761 0.567 0.462 0.398 0.356lu୲ 4.890 1.690 1.040 0.771 0.621 0.527 0.463grr୲ 1.560 0.557 0.356 0.272 0.226 0.198 0.179t୲୵ 0.731 0.263 0.177 0.142 0.123 0.111 0.103mil୲ 0.032 0.038 0.042 0.044 0.051 0.057 0.066k୲ 1.950 0.674 0.418 0.310 0.252 0.217 0.193i୲-∆p୲ 0.977 0.498 0.340 0.271 0.231 0.205 0.187p୲୴୫ 1.840 0.662 0.422 0.322 0.268 0.235 0.213
Table II.12 Results from KPSS stationary test, SpainNote: KPSS(l) represents Kwiatkowski et al. (1992)stationarity test based on the Bartlett window of size l. Test iscarried with data covering the period between 1980q1-2007q4. (i) For 1st difference equations, KPSS test statistics arecomputed from a regression with and intercept and "l" lagged truncation parameter. (ii) For level equations, KPSS teststatistics are computed from a regression with and intercept, time trend and "l" lagged truncation parameter, except inthe case of u୲and lu୲, where no time trend is considered. Critical values at 5% for regressions without trend 0.463, forregressions with trend 0.146.
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Figure II.7 Level and first difference of all variables, Denmark
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Variable ADF-GLS(1) ADF-GLS(2) ADF-GLS(3) ADF-GLS(4) ADF-GLS(5)
(i) For the first differences
∆(w୲-p୲) -3.619 -2.301 -1.470 -1.166 -1.104
∆(y୲-l୲) -3.835 -2.253 -1.415 -0.971 -0.643
∆u୲ -3.558 -2.596 -3.427 -2.743 -1.978
∆lu୲ -1.628 -1.694 -1.781 -0.964 -1.016
∆grr୲ -2.130 -2.191 -2.263 -2.351 -2.460
∆t୲୵ -3.771 -4.255 -5.023 -2.590 -2.723
∆mil୲ -4.159 -4.486 -6.174 -4.269 -3.781
∆k୲ -2.760 -1.807 -1.725 -2.251 -2.022
∆(i୲-∆p୲) -6.721 -7.776 -3.292 -4.811 -5.161
∆p୲୴୫ -3.991 -2.963 -2.514 -3.247 -2.509
(ii) For the levelsw୲-p୲ -3.070 -2.381 -2.116 -2.348 -2.496y୲-l୲ -2.499 -1.969 -1.901 -2.102 -2.158u୲ -1.528 -1.965 -2.382 -1.562 -1.753lu୲ -3.213 -2.884 -2.491 -2.025 -2.544grr୲ -1.972 -1.872 -1.770 -1.658 -1.533t୲୵ -3.841 -3.384 -2.749 -1.979 -3.259mil୲ -2.910 -2.825 -2.354 -1.445 -1.617k୲ -1.104 -1.496 -2.210 -2.302 -1.760i୲-∆p୲ -3.517 -3.612 -2.334 -4.860 -3.262p୲୴୫ -1.138 -1.605 -1.974 -2.226 -1.418
Table II.13 Results from ADG-GLS unit root test, DenmarkNote: ADF-GLS(p) represents Elliott et al. (1996) GLS augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root statistic for p lags. Test iscarried with data covering the period between 1990q1-2007q4. (i) For the 1st difference equations, ADF-GLS teststatistics are computed using p lagged first differences of the dependent variable and an intercept. (ii) For the levelequations, ADF-GLS test statistics are computed using p lagged first differences of the dependent variable, an interceptand a time trend. Critical value, at 5%, for regressions without trend is -1.950, and for regressions with trend is -3.120.
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Variable KPSS(0) KPSS(2) KPSS(4) KPSS(6) KPSS(8) KPSS(10) KPSS(12)
(i) For the first differences
∆(w୲-p୲) 0.038 0.077 0.091 0.111 0.142 0.159 0.159
∆(y୲-l୲) 0.036 0.083 0.093 0.105 0.122 0.129 0.152
∆u୲ 0.278 0.183 0.149 0.139 0.132 0.128 0.129
∆lu୲ 0.313 0.138 0.111 0.109 0.119 0.135 0.152
∆grr୲ 1.450 0.546 0.366 0.294 0.262 0.246 0.236
∆t୲୵ 0.124 0.059 0.053 0.059 0.066 0.075 0.089
∆mil୲ 0.147 0.081 0.081 0.107 0.140 0.162 0.181
∆k୲ 1.110 0.533 0.357 0.287 0.247 0.224 0.210
∆(i୲-∆p୲) 0.017 0.028 0.035 0.050 0.067 0.078 0.089
∆p୲୴୫ 0.343 0.311 0.256 0.255 0.264 0.281 0.304
(ii) For the levelsw୲-p୲ 0.669 0.317 0.225 0.187 0.168 0.156 0.146y୲-l୲ 0.375 0.180 0.127 0.106 0.096 0.093 0.093u୲ 0.633 0.227 0.147 0.116 0.100 0.092 0.088lu୲ 0.524 0.191 0.130 0.107 0.097 0.091 0.089grr୲ 1.460 0.498 0.309 0.230 0.180 0.163 0.147t୲୵ 0.235 0.089 0.064 0.058 0.057 0.061 0.067mil୲ 0.946 0.349 0.241 0.199 0.175 0.159 0.148k୲ 0.904 0.314 0.198 0.151 0.126 0.112 0.105i୲-∆p୲ 0.200 0.108 0.088 0.086 0.090 0.096 0.103p୲୴୫ 0.833 0.311 0.209 0.170 0.154 0.148 0.148
Table II.14 Results from KPSS stationary test, DenmarkNote: KPSS(l) represents Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) stationarity test based on the Bartlett window for size l. Test iscarried with data covering the period between 1990q1-2007q4. (i) For 1st difference equations, KPSS test statistics arecomputed from a regression with and intercept and "l" lagged truncation parameter. (ii) For level equations, KPSS teststatistics are computed from a regression with and intercept, time trend and "l" lagged truncation parameter. Criticalvalues at 5% for regressions without trend 0.463, for regressions with trend 0.146.
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Figure II.8 Level and first difference of all variables, Finland
3.5503.600
3.6503.700
3.7503.800
3.8503.900
1988Q
1
1990Q
1
1992Q
1
1994Q
1
1996Q
1
1998Q
1
2000Q
1
2002Q
1
2004Q
1
2006Q
1
tw
-0.015
-0.010
-0.005
0.000
0.005
0.010
0.015
0.020
1988Q
1
1990Q
1
1992Q
1
1994Q
1
1996Q
1
1998Q
1
2000Q
1
2002Q
1
2004Q
1
2006Q
1
1st difference tw
8.0008.500
9.0009.500
10.00010.500
11.00011.500
12.00012.500
1988Q
1
1990Q
1
1992Q
1
1994Q
1
1996Q
1
1998Q
1
2000Q
1
2002Q
1
2004Q
1
2006Q
1
mil
-0.800-0.600
-0.400-0.200
0.0000.200
0.4000.600
0.8001.000
1988Q
1
1990Q
1
1992Q
1
1994Q
1
1996Q
1
1998Q
1
2000Q
1
2002Q
1
2004Q
1
2006Q
1
1st difference mil
25.00025.100
25.20025.300
25.40025.500
25.60025.700
25.80025.900
1988Q
1
1990Q
1
1992Q
1
1994Q
1
1996Q
1
1998Q
1
2000Q
1
2002Q
1
2004Q
1
2006Q
1
k
-0.0020.000
0.0020.004
0.0060.008
0.0100.012
0.0140.016
0.018
1988Q
1
1990Q
1
1992Q
1
1994Q
1
1996Q
1
1998Q
1
2000Q
1
2002Q
1
2004Q
1
2006Q
1
1st difference k
0.000
0.500
1.000
1.500
2.000
2.500
3.000
1988Q
1
1990Q
1
1992Q
1
1994Q
1
1996Q
1
1998Q
1
2000Q
1
2002Q
1
2004Q
1
2006Q
1
i-dq
-0.400-0.300
-0.200-0.100
0.0000.100
0.2000.300
0.4000.500
0.600
1988Q
1
1990Q
1
1992Q
1
1994Q
1
1996Q
1
1998Q
1
2000Q
1
2002Q
1
2004Q
1
2006Q
1
1st difference i-dp
-25.000
-20.000
-15.000
-10.000
-5.000
0.000
5.000
1988Q
1
1990Q
1
1992Q
1
1994Q
1
1996Q
1
1998Q
1
2000Q
1
2002Q
1
2004Q
1
2006Q
1
pvm
-8.000-6.000
-4.000-2.000
0.0002.000
4.0006.000
8.000
1988Q
1
1990Q
1
1992Q
1
1994Q
1
1996Q
1
1998Q
1
2000Q
1
2002Q
1
2004Q
1
2006Q
1
1st difference pvm
248
Variable ADF-GLS(1) ADF-GLS(2) ADF-GLS(3) ADF-GLS(4) ADF-GLS(5)
(i) For the first differences
∆(w୲-p୲) -6.067 -3.734 -3.778 -3.124 -2.558
∆(y୲-l୲) -4.551 -3.283 -2.383 -2.279 -2.022
∆u୲ -2.349 -2.167 -1.922 -2.049 -2.190
∆lu୲ -5.476 -4.654 -4.326 -3.672 -3.168
∆grr୲ -2.080 -2.118 -2.115 -2.209 -2.276
∆t୲୵ -2.353 -2.371 -2.444 -1.479 -1.482
∆mil୲ -4.462 -4.470 -5.166 -3.615 -3.138
∆k୲ -1.229 -1.181 -1.138 -1.464 -1.478
∆(i୲-∆p୲) -4.132 -3.326 -1.621 -1.817 -1.675
∆p୲୴୫ -3.584 -2.599 -2.052 -1.917 -1.616
(ii) For the levelsw୲-p୲ -1.597 -1.618 -2.122 -1.913 -2.151y୲-l୲ -1.945 -1.947 -2.085 -2.470 -2.322u୲ -1.129 -1.784 -1.865 -2.047 -1.889lu୲ -2.264 -2.254 -2.162 -1.960 -1.949grr୲ -2.699 -2.594 -2.485 -2.368 -2.206t୲୵ -1.892 -1.768 -1.606 -1.434 -2.178mil୲ -3.186 -3.068 -2.602 -1.770 -1.900k୲ -2.436 -3.130 -3.406 -3.752 -2.822i୲-∆p୲ -2.091 -2.019 -1.578 -2.326 -1.727p୲୴୫ -1.466 -1.687 -1.803 -1.996 -1.781
Table II.15 Results from ADG-GLS unit root test, FinlandNote: ADF-GLS(p) represents Elliott et al. (1996) GLS augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root statistic for p lags. Test iscarried with data covering the period between 1988q1-2007q4. (i) For the 1st difference equations, ADF-GLS teststatistics are computed using p lagged first differences of the dependent variable and an intercept. (ii) For the levelequations, ADF-GLS test statistics are computed using p lagged first differences of the dependent variable, an interceptand a time trend, except in the case of u୲, lu୲, grr୲and t୲୵ , where no time trend is considered. Critical value, at 5%, forregressions without trend is -1.950, and for regressions with trend is -3.094.
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Variable KPSS(0) KPSS(2) KPSS(4) KPSS(6) KPSS(8) KPSS(10) KPSS(12)
(i) For the first differences
∆(w୲-p୲) 0.086 0.105 0.096 0.087 0.087 0.091 0.095
∆(y୲-l୲) 0.074 0.079 0.074 0.072 0.071 0.076 0.076
∆u୲ 1.450 0.672 0.455 0.362 0.311 0.282 0.265
∆lu୲ 0.076 0.065 0.068 0.074 0.078 0.080 0.084
∆grr୲ 0.449 0.172 0.116 0.095 0.086 0.083 0.082
∆t୲୵ 0.908 0.370 0.269 0.225 0.197 0.180 0.173
∆mil୲ 0.105 0.065 0.071 0.098 0.128 0.144 0.147
∆k୲ 1.110 0.412 0.266 0.206 0.175 0.159 0.150
∆(i୲-∆p୲) 0.051 0.082 0.090 0.116 0.123 0.125 0.126
∆p୲୴୫ 0.160 0.206 0.202 0.210 0.241 0.272 0.304
(ii) For the levelsw୲-p୲ 1.130 0.414 0.266 0.204 0.173 0.156 0.146y୲-l୲ 0.574 0.210 0.136 0.107 0.092 0.084 0.081u୲ 1.460 0.502 0.312 0.233 0.192 0.167 0.152lu୲ 2.640 0.947 0.610 0.468 0.391 0.345 0.315grr୲ 2.160 0.737 0.459 0.345 0.286 0.251 0.229t୲୵ 1.640 0.559 0.345 0.256 0.208 0.179 0.160mil୲ 1.010 0.382 0.268 0.223 0.196 0.178 0.164k୲ 0.438 0.158 0.103 0.082 0.072 0.067 0.066i୲-∆p୲ 0.425 0.192 0.137 0.116 0.105 0.098 0.094p୲୴୫ 0.891 0.351 0.239 0.196 0.177 0.168 0.166
Table II.16 Results from KPSS stationary test, FinlandNote: KPSS(l) represents Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) stationarity test based on the Bartlett window for size l. Test iscarried with data covering the period between 1988q1-2007q4. (i) For 1st difference equations, KPSS test statistics arecomputed from a regression with and intercept and "l" lagged truncation parameter. (ii) For level equations, KPSS teststatistics are computed from a regression with and intercept, time trend and "l" lagged truncation parameter, except inthe case of u୲, lu୲, grr୲and t୲୵ , where no time trend is considered. Critical values at 5% for regressions without trend0.463, for regressions with trend 0.146.
